United States of America v. Ronald Morgan

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued September 14, 2023
Decided July 29, 2024
Before
ILANA D IAMOND R OVNER , Circuit Judge
D AVID F. H AMILTON, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
No. 22-1990
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA ,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
R ONALD M ORGAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
Division.
No. 1:21-cr-00041-1
Matthew F. Kennelly,
Judge.
O R D E R
Defendant-appellant Ronald Morgan appeals the sentence he received for
unlawfully possessing a firearm following a felony conviction in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). Three prior Illinois convictions triggered an increased sentencing range
under the Sentencing Guidelines. The district court ordered Morgan to serve a within-
Guidelines sentence of 96 months in prison. We affirm.
Based on Morgan’s prior Illinois convictions for attempted armed robbery and
armed robbery —which qualify as crimes of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines,
see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (Nov. 2021)—he was subject to an increased base offense level
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 22-1990 Page 2
of 24 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2). (He prevailed in the district court on an
objection to treating him as a career offender under the Guidelines, § 4B1.1, based on
the same prior convictions.) Morgan argued that it was error to characterize his Illinois
robbery convictions as crimes of violence, given the possibility that he might have been
convicted as an accomplice to armed robbery rather than as a principal, and given what
Morgan argues is the unique breadth of an Illinois rule of aiding and abetting liability
known as “common design.” See 720 ILCS 5/5-2; People v. Fernandez, 2014 IL 115527,
6 N.E.3d 145 (2014); Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193-94 (2007). He also
argued that his conviction for attempted armed robbery should not be treated as a
conviction for a crime of violence, notwithstanding this court’s contrary decision in
United States v. Ingram, 947 F.3d 1021, 1025-26 (7th Cir. 2020) (attempted Hobbs Act
robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under the elements clause of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(3)(A)). The district court rejected both arguments, R. 66 at 14, 33-34.
On appeal, Morgan renews his argument as to the breadth of Illinois
accountability liability under the common-design rule, but our recent decision in United
States v. Carr, No. 22-1245, —F.4th—, 2024 WL 3324727 (7th Cir. July 8, 2024), resolves
this issue against him.
Morgan also argues on appeal that attempted armed robbery should not be
treated as a crime of violence. Our Ingram decision was abrogated by Taylor v. United
States, 596 U.S. 845 (2022), decided one month after Morgan’s sentencing. But Taylor,
like Ingram, was a statutory case and it does not answer the question whether an
attempted robbery should be treated as a crime of violence for purposes of the
Sentencing Guidelines. Section 4B1.2(a)(2) of the Guidelines defines “crime of violence”
to include the offense of robbery, and there is no dispute that the elements of Illinois
robbery conform to the elements of generic robbery, such that Illinois armed robbery
constitutes a crime of violence under the Guidelines. See Carr, 2024 WL 3324727, at *4
(collecting cases). In turn, Application Note 1 to section 4B1.2 provides that the terms
“’[c]rime of violence’ and ‘controlled substance offense’ include the offenses of aiding
and abetting, conspiring, and attempting to commit such offenses.” Our decision in
United States v. Lomax, 51 F.4th 222, 229 (7th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 789 (2023),
distinguishing Taylor, recognized that this Circuit has treated Application Note 1 as
authoritative and thus held that a conviction for attempted murder qualifies as a crime
of violence under section 4B1.2(a) of the Guidelines. Lomax leaves no doubt that
Morgan’s prior conviction for attempted robbery should likewise be treated as a crime
of violence for Guidelines purposes.

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No. 22-1990 Page 3
Morgan argues nonetheless that it is error to treat the application note as
authoritative; he contends that the Lomax decision is out of step with prior cases on this
point. We disagree. Our decision in United States v. Raupp, 677 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2012),
overruled on other grounds by United States v. Rollins, 836 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2016) (en
banc), relied on the same application note to hold that a conspiracy to commit robbery
qualifies as a crime of violence for purposes of establishing the offense level for a felon
in possession of a firearm pursuant to section 2K2.1(a)(2) of the Guidelines. Our
subsequent decision in United States v. Adams, 934 F.3d 720 (7th Cir. 2019),
acknowledging that a circuit split had emerged on the question, declared that Raupp’s
textual analysis of sections 2K2.1 and 4B1.2 of the Guidelines (including Application
Note 1 to section 4B1.2) “remains sound” as to the question of whether inchoate
offenses constitute crimes of violence or controlled substance offenses for sentencing
purposes under the (now-advisory) Guidelines. Id. at 729. United States v. Smith, 989
F.3d 575, 583-86 (7th Cir. 2021), citing Adams, reached the same conclusion as to section
4B1.2. Lomax, in turn, relied on both Adams and Smith in treating Application Note 1 to
section 4B1.2 as authoritative regarding attempts to commit a crime of violence. 51 F.4th
at 229. (Adams and Smith involved prior convictions for controlled substance offenses
rather than crimes of violence, but our cases have not drawn a distinction between the
two insofar as the validity of the application note is concerned.) We see nothing about
Lomax that is contrary to prior circuit case law on the point. And, to wrap things up, in
our recent decision in United States v. White, 97 F.4th 532, 538-39 (7th Cir. 2024), this
court reaffirmed our treatment of the application note and declined to switch sides in
the circuit split. Lomax thus remains the law of this circuit.
AFFIRMED.

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