CHRISTINE M. BUBE and CONNIE HEDRINGTON v. Aspirus Hospital , Inc .

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-2892
C HRISTINE M. BUBE and C ONNIE HEDRINGTON,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
A SPIRUS H OSPITAL , INC .,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin.
No. 3:22-cv-00745-jdp — James D. Peterson, Chief Judge.
____________________
A RGUED A PRIL 18, 2024 — D ECIDED J ULY 29, 2024
____________________
Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and BRENNAN and SCUDDER , Cir-
cuit Judges.
SCUDDER , Circuit Judge. This appeal presents the question
of what suffices under Title VII at the pleading stage of federal
litigation to constitute a request for an accommodation based
on “religion” in the context of an employee’s request for an
exemption from their employer’s mandatory COVID vaccina-
tion requirement. Aligned with the explanation we supply in
a separate opinion issued this same day in Passarella &

-- 1 of 6 --

2 No. 23-2892
Dottenwhy v. Aspirus, Inc., Nos. 23-1660 & 23-1661, we hold
that an employee seeks accommodation because of their reli-
gion when their request, by its terms, is plausibly based at
least in part on some aspect of their religious belief or practice.
The application of that standard here leads us to reverse the
district court’s dismissal of the Title VII claim brought by
Christine Bube and Connie Hedrington.
I
While our opinion in Passarella & Dottenwhy fully explains
the reasoning underpinning the legal standard we adopt, a
summary is in order here.
The question presented is one of statutory construction,
requiring in the first instance consideration of Title VII’s lan-
guage. Congress made it unlawful for an employer to “fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, be-
cause of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). In 1972 Congress amended
the statute to clarify that “religion” includes “all aspects of re-
ligious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an
employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably ac-
commodate [] an employee’s or prospective employee’s reli-
gious observance or practice without undue hardship on the
conduct of the employer’s business.” Id. § 2000e(j).
A plaintiff claiming that her employer failed to accommo-
date her religion must as a threshold matter show that (1) the
observance, practice, or belief conflicting with an employ-
ment requirement is religious in nature; (2) the employee
called the religious observance, practice, or belief to the

-- 2 of 6 --

No. 23-2892 3
employer’s attention; and (3) the religious observance, prac-
tice, or belief was the basis for the employee’s discriminatory
treatment. See Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, 721 F.3d 444,
449 (7th Cir. 2013). Title VII’s broad definition of religion tells
us most everything we need to know about the scope of the
“religious in nature” inquiry. The employee must allege facts
plausibly permitting an inference that some “aspect[]” of the
accommodation request is based on the employee’s “religious
observance and practice” or “belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). Put
another way, the controlling inquiry at the pleading stage is
whether the employee plausibly based her vaccination ex-
emption request at least in part on an aspect of her religious
belief or practice.
II
This standard finds straightforward application on the
facts alleged in the complaint brought by Christine Bube and
Connie Hedrington. Both plaintiffs worked for many years as
registered nurses at Aspirus, Inc., a non-profit hospital system
based in Wausau, Wisconsin—Bube since 2002 and Hedring-
ton since 1990. In response to the COVID pandemic, Aspirus
announced in November 2021 that all employees would be
required to receive the COVID vaccine as a condition of em-
ployment—save those who sought and received a religious
exemption. Bube and Hedrington applied for exemptions
from the mandate, but Aspirus denied both requests and ter-
minated their employment in December 2021.
The content of Bube’s and Hedrington’s exemption re-
quests very much matter. For her part, Bube informed As-
pirus in her initial request that she is a “baptized and a prac-
ticing Catholic” and “following my conscience of refusing the
Covid vaccine at this time.” After Aspirus denied her initial

-- 3 of 6 --

4 No. 23-2892
request, she appealed and further explained that she tries to
“eat healthy” and “remain active” to “keep my God-given
mind, body, and soul healthy.” Citing her safety concerns
about the vaccine, she then stated that receiving it “would be
going against what God has intended for me.”
Hedrington’s request invoked similar themes. In her ap-
peal to the hospital, for example, she cited her belief that God
is her “creator” and that God “made me in his image and has
given me life. He created me perfectly!” As a result, “I trust in
God completely and cannot accept this vaccine in my body.”
We have no trouble concluding that both of these requests
are based at least in part on an aspect of the plaintiffs’ reli-
gious beliefs. God “gave” Bube a “mind, body and soul” so
that she feels obligated to avoid what she considers unsafe
substances in order to remain healthy. And Hedrington was
“created … perfectly” by God so that accepting a “risk[y]”
vaccine would be a “sin.”
The district court took a different, more parsing approach
and dismissed Bube and Hedrington’s Title VII claim because
their accommodation requests did not “tie [their] general
statements to any [] particular religious belief or practice that
[is] inconsistent with taking the vaccine.” In the same vein,
the district court concluded that the plaintiffs’ objections are
“about personal autonomy, as well as the safety and efficacy
of the vaccine.” But as we explain in Passarella, the fact that an
accommodation request invokes or even rests in the main on
secular considerations does not negate its religious nature.
Bube’s and Hedrington’s requests contain health and safety
concerns, but the critical point is that their requests by their
terms are also based in part on religious belief.

-- 4 of 6 --

No. 23-2892 5
Scrutinizing the composition of these requests—especially
at the pleading stage—runs counter to not only the broad lan-
guage of Title VII but also the Supreme Court’s repeated
warnings that the law requires a hands-off approach when it
comes to defining and discerning the core limits of religious
exercise. See, e.g., Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Indiana Emp. Sec. Div.,
450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) (explaining that “it is not within the
judicial function and judicial competence to inquire whether
the petitioner or his fellow worker more correctly perceived
the commands of their common faith” for purposes of First
Amendment protection); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
573 U.S. 682, 724 (2014) (emphasizing that “federal courts
have no business addressing [] whether the religious belief as-
serted in a [Religious Freedom Restoration Act] case is rea-
sonable”); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (em-
phasizing that “[r]eligious experiences which are as real as life
to some may be incomprehensible to others”).
We too have recognized—in the Title VII context no less—
that courts should avoid putting themselves in the impossible
position of trying to define religious legitimacy and view-
point sufficiency. See Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 900–
01 (7th Cir. 1978) (explaining that Title VII protects “conduct
which is ‘religiously motivated,’ i.e., all forms and aspects of
religion, however eccentric”); Adeyeye, 721 at 452 (emphasiz-
ing Title VII’s “broad and intentionally hands-off definition
of religion”). Our treatment of Bube’s and Hedrington’s ex-
emption requests is consistent with the caution demanded
when it comes to religious belief and exercise.
The standard we announce today also aligns with the one
adopted by both the Sixth and Eighth Circuits—the only two
other circuits to have decided the question presented here. See

-- 5 of 6 --

6 No. 23-2892
Lucky v. Landmark Med. of Michigan, 103 F.4th 1241 (6th Cir.
2024); Ringhofer v. Mayo Clinic, Ambulance, 102 F.4th 894 (8th
Cir. 2024).
III
A final point warrants mention in closing. Aspirus’s vac-
cination mandate warned any employee requesting a reli-
gious-based exemption that “including misinformation (not
supported by widely accepted medical or scientific infor-
mation) or including non-religious rationale anywhere in the
[employee’s] submission will likely result in denial.” Indeed,
the company’s guidance then went even further, including as
one example of “misinformation” “the presences of fetal cells
or tissue in the vaccine.”
In their complaint, Bube and Hedrington expressed reser-
vations about whether Title VII allows an employer to impose
such limitations on the content and viewpoint an employee
wishes to convey in requesting religious accommodation.
These concerns are serious. An employer cannot at one and
the same time adhere to Title VII’s obligation to accommodate
religious beliefs yet prevent an employee from articulating
the basis of her beliefs. Apart from sounding this reservation,
though, we decline to say more on this point as Bube and
Hedrington did not develop this aspect of their Title VII claim
in the district court. Nor have they done much on appeal.
Bube and Hedrington do not tell us, most importantly, that
Aspirus’s guidance actually prevented them from including
fetal cell-based objections in their exemption requests.
Having already determined that the plaintiffs’ requests
are based in part on religion, our analysis need go no further.
We REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings.

-- 6 of 6 --