Robert Decker v. Katherine Sireveld

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-1725
R OBERT D ECKER ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
K ATHERINE S IREVELD, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Illinois.
No. 3:19-cv-00233-JPG — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED M AY 21, 2024 — DECIDED J ULY 30, 2024
____________________
Before S CUDDER , S T. EVE, and K IRSCH , Circuit Judges.
S CUDDER , Circuit Judge. Federal inmate Robert Decker
requested that his prison law library provide electronic access
to full, daily editions of the Federal Register. When the Bureau
of Prisons denied his request, Decker filed this lawsuit pro se
under the Administrative Procedure Act, alleging that the
denial violated his First Amendment rights to receive infor-
mation and petition the government in the form of public
comments on notices of proposed rulemaking. The district

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2 No. 23-1725
court entered summary judgment for the BOP. Applying the
framework established by the Supreme Court in Turner v.
Safley, the district court concluded that the Bureau’s policy
was “reasonably related to [its] legitimate penological
interest[]” in conserving limited resources and so did not
violate the First Amendment. 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). The
district court also denied Decker’s motions for the recruit-
ment of counsel, finding that he had proven himself compe-
tent to litigate his case despite the obstacles he faced while
incarcerated. We agree with both conclusions and affirm.
I
A
To enable inmates to research and litigate legal claims, the
Bureau of Prisons provides a law library at each of its facili-
ties. Most prison libraries contain computers that have been
disabled from accessing the internet. Instead, the computers
link to an “electronic bulletin board”—an internal database of
PDF documents uploaded manually by prison staff for
inmates to consult during legal research.
BOP policy directs each prison to maintain a list of
required texts at its library. That list currently includes the
Supreme Court Reporter, the Federal Reporter, the U.S. Code,
and the Code of Federal Regulations. It does not include the
full Federal Register, the federal government’s daily
publication of proposed rules, executive orders, and other
administrative documents. Rather than provide complete
editions of the Federal Register, the BOP directs law libraries
to maintain only those “documents … pertaining to the
Bureau and to the U.S. Parole Commission.” Bureau Program
Statement 1315.07 (Nov. 5, 1999).

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No. 23-1725 3
B
In 2019 Robert Decker filed suit against several BOP
officials under the Administrative Procedure Act. He alleged
that the BOP’s failure to upload the full Federal Register to its
electronic bulletin board violated his rights under the First,
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to receive information
and petition the government. Decker claimed that without
electronic access to the Federal Register, he could not submit
timely public comments on proposed rules that concerned
him, a right generally guaranteed by the APA. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 553.
The district court dismissed Decker’s complaint at the
screening stage pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. We vacated and remanded, observing
that open questions remained regarding which specific docu-
ments the BOP had provided Decker and whether its failure
to provide the full Federal Register violated his constitutional
rights.
On remand the case proceeded to discovery. Decker filed
several motions seeking recruitment of counsel, which the
district court denied. The district court explained that Decker
had not demonstrated a need for an attorney, given that he
had competently represented himself throughout the case
and could request deadline extensions as his circumstances
required.
In time the government moved for summary judgment. It
contended that the BOP’s decision to provide only Bureau-
related documents published in the Federal Register did not
violate Decker’s constitutional rights because, under Turner v.
Safley, the policy was “reasonably related to [the BOP’s]

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4 No. 23-1725
legitimate penological interest[]” in conserving scarce
resources. See 482 U.S. at 89.
The government supported its position with an affidavit
from Sarah Qureshi, a BOP official who had been responsible
for drafting and distributing the agency’s regulations. The
affidavit stated that “it would be impractical and highly bur-
densome on limited BOP staffing resources to devote staff
time and expense to post the entire Federal Register to the
Electronic Bulletin Board each day.” The BOP saw Decker’s
rights, by contrast, as only minimally burdened because he
remained free to receive print copies of the Federal Register
through the mail. In the end, the district court agreed with the
government that no genuine dispute of material fact existed
regarding whether the BOP’s policy “reasonably related” to
its legitimate interest in saving resources. Based on that
conclusion, the district court entered summary judgment in
the government’s favor.
Decker filed a timely notice of appeal. We then appointed
counsel to represent Decker. His counsel, H. Hunter Bruton
and his colleagues, have our thanks for the diligence and skill
they have brought to their advocacy.
II
We review the district court’s order entering summary
judgment with a fresh set of eyes, asking whether any
genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the constitu-
tionality of the challenged BOP policy and, if not, whether the
government is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 255 (1986). In conducting this inquiry, we construe the
facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Decker as

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No. 23-1725 5
the party opposing summary judgment. See Anderson, 477
U.S. at 255.
It is well-established that prisoners do not surrender all of
their First Amendment rights upon their incarceration. See
Turner, 482 U.S. at 84 (“Prison walls do not form a barrier sep-
arating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitu-
tion.”). It is equally clear that “[l]awful incarceration brings
about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privi-
leges and rights” given the need to achieve “valid penological
objectives—including deterrence of crime, rehabilitation of
prisoners, and institutional security.” O'Lone v. Est. of Shabazz,
482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (quotation omitted). Courts “accord
substantial deference to the professional judgment of prison
administrators” in defining and pursuing such penological
objectives—a process which necessarily involves the curtail-
ment of certain constitutional rights. See Overton v. Bazzetta,
539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003).
Balancing respect for inmates’ constitutional rights with
the harsh realities of prison administration can be a difficult
endeavor. Recognizing the challenge, the Supreme Court has
supplied a framework for assessing the constitutionality of
prison regulations. The controlling standard comes from
Turner: “when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’
constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests.” 482 U.S. at 89.
Satisfying the standard requires the government in the first
instance to articulate a penological interest that is both legiti-
mate and neutral. See id. at 90; Van den Bosch v. Raemisch, 658
F.3d 778, 786 (7th Cir. 2011). From there the burden shifts to
the prisoner to demonstrate that a challenged prison

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6 No. 23-1725
regulation is not reasonably related to that interest. See
Overton, 539 U.S. at 132.
Turner established four factors that inform the constitu-
tional validity of a prison regulation: (1) the existence of a
“valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and
the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify
it;” (2) whether “alternative means of exercising the [inmate’s
constitutional] right [] remain open;” (3) “the impact accom-
modation of the asserted constitutional right will have on
guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison
resources generally;” and (4) the existence of “ready alterna-
tives” to the challenged regulation. 482 U.S. at 89–90.
The first of these factors imposes a threshold requirement
that every regulation must meet. See id.; see also Singer v.
Raemisch, 593 F.3d 529, 534 (7th Cir. 2010). A “regulation can-
not be sustained,” the Supreme Court has emphasized,
“where the logical connection between the regulation and the
asserted goal is so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or
irrational.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90.
We address each factor in turn.
A
Turner’s first factor concerns the closeness of the logical
connection between the challenged prison policy and the
asserted penological interest it advances. We have held that
reducing administrative costs—the interest asserted by the
BOP here—qualifies as a legitimate penological objective. See
Jackson v. Frank, 509 F.3d 389, 391 (7th Cir. 2007); Lindell v.
Frank, 377 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2004). The question, then, is
whether providing federal inmates like Robert Decker only

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No. 23-1725 7
limited electronic access to the Federal Register “rational[ly]
connect[s]” to that interest. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
The parties stake out competing views. For its part, the
BOP contends its policy rationally advances its budgetary
interests by avoiding an undue financial burden. In support it
draws upon a line from the Qureshi affidavit stating that
electronically providing the full Federal Register would be
“impractical and highly burdensome on limited BOP staffing
resources.”
Decker disagrees and claims that the affidavit submitted
by Sarah Qureshi is too thin to dispel any reasonable factual
dispute over how burdensome his proposed accommodation
would be. He emphasizes that under our case law “a prison
may not restrict a prisoner’s rights without even looking to
see how the rights might be accommodated and estimating
the expense entailed by doing so.” Kikumura v. Turner, 28 F.3d
592, 599 (7th Cir. 1994). Nor may the government “avoid court
scrutiny by reflexive, rote assertions,” Shimer v. Washington,
100 F.3d 506, 510 (7th Cir. 1996), or “rely on the mere incanta-
tion of a penal interest,” Emad v. Dodge Cnty., 71 F.4th 649, 654
(7th Cir. 2023). Decker contends that the Qureshi affidavit is
just that—a “reflexive, rote assertion[]”summarily declaring
that the proposed accommodation would be too burdensome.
That statement alone, Decker insists, is not enough to
eliminate any factual question as to the severity of the
government’s burden. See Shimer, 100 F.3d at 509 (emphasiz-
ing that a “prison administration must proffer some evidence
to support its restriction of [inmates’] constitutional rights”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Emad, 71 F.4th at 654
(stating that, to prevail under Turner, the government must

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8 No. 23-1725
“come forward with record evidence that substantiates that
the interest is truly at risk”).
Decker emphasizes that, at the very least, the BOP’s
position that it would be too burdensome to electronically
provide the Federal Register is subject to reasonable factual
dispute. Anyone with internet access, Decker observes, can
download a full day’s edition in a matter of seconds by
clicking three times on www.federalregister.gov. He sees the
government’s proposed alternative—receiving print copies of
the Federal Register through the U.S. mail and prison’s
internal mail system—as far more costly, since it would
require administrators to manually screen, process, and
deliver documents running hundreds of pages on a regular
basis. This reality, Decker continues, is enough for reasonable
jurors to disagree on whether electronically supplying the
Federal Register would be unduly burdensome, particularly
if the government did so only on a periodic basis—say, every
week or two.
While much of Decker’s argument is well-taken, it too
discounts the highly deferential nature of the Turner analysis.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly described Turner as a
framework that affords significant weight to the professional
views of prison officials. See, e.g., Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Free-
holders of Cnty. of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 326 (2012) (describ-
ing Turner as a holding that “confirmed the importance of def-
erence to correctional officials”); Johnson v. California, 543 U.S.
499, 504 (2005) (emphasizing that Turner is a “deferential
standard”); Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 239 (2001) (same).
Given the “inordinately difficult undertaking that is modern
prison administration,” we owe “considerable deference to
the determinations of prison administrators.” See Thornburgh

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No. 23-1725 9
v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407–08 (1989) (quotation marks omit-
ted). Such deference is an essential component of both the
Turner framework and, more broadly, our role as a court of
general review. Right to it, we afford substantial deference to
the BOP’s assertion that providing electronic access to the full
Federal Register would require it to divert significant time
and resources that could otherwise be devoted to other tasks.
Recognize as well that, in response to the BOP’s affidavit,
Decker did not come forward in the district court with any
concrete evidence calling its conclusions into doubt. See
Overton, 539 U.S. at 132 (emphasizing that under Turner,
“[t]he burden [] is not on the State to prove the validity of
prison regulations but on the prisoner to disprove it”).
Regardless, Decker’s position also underappreciates a critical
feature of this case that makes it unique. Nearly every pub-
lished decision in which we have applied Turner involved an
affirmative restriction on an inmate’s conduct. See, e.g., Mon-
toya v. Jeffreys, 99 F.4th 394 (7th Cir. 2024) (reviewing a policy
presumptively restricting sex offenders’ contact with their mi-
nor children); Riker v. Lemmon, 798 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2015)
(reviewing a prohibition on a request for a prisoner to marry);
Nigl v. Litscher, 940 F.3d 329 (7th Cir. 2019) (same). In the First
Amendment context, these restrictions routinely take the
form of categorical prohibitions on the materials that an
inmate may receive through the mail. See, e.g., Lindell, 377
F.3d 655 (reviewing a prison’s ban on the receipt of printed
materials from non-official publications); Jackson, 509 F.3d 389
(reviewing a prison’s prohibition on a specific photograph);
Mays v. Springborn, 575 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2009) (reviewing a
prison’s decision to remove pages of a magazine containing
gang signs); Singer, 593 F.3d 529 (reviewing the confiscation

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10 No. 23-1725
of particular published material); Van den Bosch, 658 F.3d 778
(same).
Here, by contrast, the BOP has placed no restriction on the
type, source, or volume of materials that Decker seeks to
receive. To the contrary, the Bureau has repeatedly pledged
to allow Decker to arrange for the delivery of physical copies
of the Federal Register through the prison mail system. The
Qureshi affidavit confirms that the BOP has also committed
to electronically provide Federal Register documents that
“pertain[]” or “relate[]” to the Bureau. That, of course, is in
addition to the full suite of criminal-law research materials
available at BOP law libraries—the adequacy and availability
of which Decker does not challenge.
Decker insists that this is not enough. He emphasizes that
the BOP has deemed some regulatory subjects that directly
affect him—inmate calling services, for instance—as not “per-
taining to the Bureau” and thus not included in the electronic
bulletin board. To ensure access to all such regulations,
Decker asks us to impose an affirmative obligation on the
BOP to electronically provide every daily edition of the
Federal Register in full.
This request—not to discontinue a ban on certain publica-
tions but to proactively supply them—sets Decker’s claim
apart. When, as here, a prisoner seeks a court mandate
compelling the BOP to furnish particular materials at regular
and frequent intervals across all facilities at its own cost, the
danger of overstepping our judicial role is at its apex.
Recognizing that “the judiciary is ‘ill equipped’ to deal with
the difficult and delicate problems of prison management,”
we hesitate to embrace any course of action that would lead

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No. 23-1725 11
to the micromanagement of prison administration from the
bench. See Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 407–08.
Consider the alternative. If we find in favor of Decker
today, there is a unique likelihood that this case would lead
to a cascade of similar requests that would, in the aggregate,
place an inordinate burden on the prison system. Such a
burden would be particularly difficult to justify given that
law libraries must already provide documents “pertaining to
the Bureau.” As such, we conclude that the BOP’s denial of
that request is reasonably related to its legitimate interest in
saving resources.
B
Proceeding to the next Turner factor, we assess whether
Decker possessed “alternative means of exercising [his]
right”—in this case the First Amendment right to petition the
government—despite his lack of electronic access to the
Federal Register. See 482 U.S. at 90; see also Hudson v. Palmer,
468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984) (recognizing that “prisoners have the
constitutional right to petition the Government for redress of
their grievances”).
Decker contends that the BOP’s policy left him with no al-
ternative means of exercising his right to petition through the
submission of public comments on proposed regulations. He
emphasizes that the APA allows agencies to promulgate rules
after receiving and considering comments for only 30 days.
See 5 U.S.C. § 553(d). Without regular and timely electronic
access to the Register, Decker claims that it is impossible for
him to meet such a 30-day deadline, given the routine and
significant delays that accompany the delivery of prison mail.

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12 No. 23-1725
After carefully reviewing the record and drawing all
factual inferences in favor of Decker as the nonmovant at
summary judgment, we accept his assertion that electronic ac-
cess to the Federal Register is necessary for him to reliably
submit timely public comments. As Decker observes, in this
litigation alone his legal mail was delayed for more than
30 days on multiple occasions, despite the BOP prioritizing it
above other categories of mail. The government has not de-
nied such delays, nor has it provided any reason to conclude
that Decker could still meet the statutory deadline for
comments. Nor has the government contradicted Decker’s
two additional reasons for the lack of alternative means of
exercising his right to petition—the prohibitive cost of a print
subscription to the Federal Register and prison policies that
would bar him from storing and consulting physical editions
at the facility. Given these unrebutted and plausible
objections, we conclude that a genuine factual dispute exists
regarding whether Decker can timely comment on
proposed regulations under existing BOP policy. For that
reason, Turner’s second factor weighs in Decker’s favor.
That conclusion does not end our inquiry, however.
Although “[t]he absence of any alternative [] provides some
evidence that the regulations [a]re unreasonable,” it “is not
conclusive of the reasonableness of the [p]olicy.” Beard v.
Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 532 (2006) (quoting Overton, 539 U.S. at
135) (internal quotation marks omitted). So we proceed to
consider the remaining factors of the Turner framework.
C
Any weight given to Decker’s position under the second
Turner factor is counterbalanced by the third: “the impact
accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have

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No. 23-1725 13
on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison
resources generally.” 482 U.S. at 90. It is worth emphasizing
anew the uniqueness and breadth of the accommodation that
Decker seeks. He asks not for the removal of a prohibition on
receipt of the Federal Register but for a judicial decree obli-
gating the BOP to upload every day’s edition to its electronic
bulletin board for all federal prisoners nationwide.
We also see no limiting principle to the type of relief that
Decker seeks. If he were correct that Turner requires prison
officials to affirmatively offer electronic access to the Federal
Register, the same could be said of any number of other
government publications. Prisons would potentially have to
provide administrative records from each of the 50 states—at
least those that can be downloaded online with equivalent
ease as the Federal Register. With each new request for a
different publication, administrative costs would mount and
managerial responsibilities compound. We decline the invita-
tion to embark on a course so inevitably destined to
overburden and tamper with the “allocation of prison
resources”—an outcome starkly at odds with our deferential
role under Turner. See 482 U.S. at 90.
To be sure, we recognize that “[t]he proper path [i]s to
answer the narrow and specific claim advanced by [the plain-
tiff]” on “the narrowest possible grounds” when evaluating a
prisoner’s claim for relief under Turner. See Miller v. Downey,
915 F.3d 460, 464 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Hegwood v. City of Eau
Claire, 676 F.3d 600, 603 (7th Cir. 2012)). In keeping with that
principle, we express no definitive opinion on what the
consequences of granting Decker’s specific claim for
accommodation would be in future similar cases where a
prisoner seeks publications other than the Federal Register.

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14 No. 23-1725
Our only point here is that it is appropriate to consider the
presence or absence of a limiting principle when assessing the
likely administrative burden on the prison of granting
Decker’s request for accommodation. Because Decker’s claim
creates a substantial risk of opening the door to an endless
procession of future similar requests for accommodation
—requests that, if granted, would significantly tax the BOP’s
limited resources—we conclude that Turner’s third factor
strongly favors the government.
D
That brings us to the fourth and final factor of the Turner
analysis. “[T]he absence of ready alternatives” to the chal-
lenged prison regulation “is evidence of [its] reasonableness.”
Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. “By the same token, the existence of
obvious, easy alternatives may be evidence that the regulation
is not reasonable, but is an ‘exaggerated response’ to prison
concerns.” Id. “[I]f an inmate claimant can point to an alterna-
tive that fully accommodates the prisoner’s rights at de
minimis cost to valid penological interests, a court may
consider that as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy
the reasonable relationship standard.” Id.
We conclude that no ready alternative regulation can fully
accommodate Decker’s rights without meaningfully compro-
mising the prison’s interest in conserving resources. Decker’s
only proposed alternative—providing the full Federal Regis-
ter at irregular weekly or biweekly intervals—would still re-
quire an expenditure of time and resources to implement.
And, even if there were a more ideally calibrated policy, the
existence of that hypothetical would not render the BOP’s
chosen policy invalid. Indeed, we have emphasized that even
when “the DOC’s asserted penological objectives … might

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No. 23-1725 15
very well be achieved with a narrower policy, the absence of
an ideal policy does not render the policy that officials have
adopted unconstitutional.” Van den Bosch, 658 F.3d at 790.
Here, the BOP has made the reasonable managerial decision
to save resources by electronically providing only limited ad-
ministrative documents that directly impact many prisoners.
Turner’s fourth factor requires no more.
* * *
In the final analysis, we conclude that the balance of the
Turner factors supports the BOP’s policy of providing only
limited electronic access to the Federal Register as “reasona-
bly related” to its “legitimate penological interest” in conserv-
ing resources. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. Although the BOP policy
places some burden on Decker’s constitutional rights, such a
burden is consistent with the recognition that “the constitu-
tional rights that prisoners possess are more
limited in scope than the constitutional rights held by individ-
uals in society at large,” and that “[i]n the First Amendment
context, … some rights are simply inconsistent with the status
of a prisoner or ‘with the legitimate penological objectives of
the corrections system.’” Shaw, 532 U.S. at 229 (citing Pell, 417
U.S. at 822).
Be careful, however, not to overread our decision as
approving a wholesale denial of electronic access to all ad-
ministrative documents from the Federal Register. Recall that,
under the BOP policy we affirm today, prison libraries must
provide access to all “documents … pertaining to the Bureau
and to the U.S. Parole Commission.” See Bureau Program
Statement 1315.07 (Nov. 5, 1999). Decker’s fourth amended
complaint alleged that the BOP had violated this provision by
failing to upload even Bureau-issued documents to its

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16 No. 23-1725
electronic bulletin board. Because the BOP subsequently
remedied this omission and Decker seeks only injunctive
relief, this claim is no longer before us. In short, in no way
does today’s decision foreclose a claim alleging that the
Bureau has failed to electronically provide documents from
other agencies that “pertain[] to” the Bureau, such as
proposed amendments from the U.S. Sentencing
Commission. We express no opinion on the merits of such a
claim.
III
In addition to challenging the BOP’s policy concerning the
Federal Register, Decker separately appeals the district
court’s denial of his motions for the recruitment of counsel.
He claims that the district court abused its discretion in
declining to recruit an attorney to aid him in his lawsuit,
stressing that he was unable to adequately litigate on his own.
A district court may, at its discretion, “request an attorney
to represent any person unable to afford counsel” under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). In evaluating a § 1915 request, the court
ought to consider whether “the indigent plaintiff [has] made
a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively
precluded from doing so” and, if so, whether “given the
difficulty of the case, … the plaintiff appear[s] competent to
litigate it himself.” Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir.
2007) (en banc). The district court found—and the BOP does
not dispute—that Decker made reasonable and unsuccessful
efforts to obtain counsel on his own. So the sole remaining
question is whether the district court abused its discretion in
concluding that Decker was competent to litigate his case
pro se.

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No. 23-1725 17
A district court does not abuse its discretion in declining
to recruit counsel under § 1915 unless “(1) the record contains
no evidence upon which the court could have rationally based
its decision; (2) the decision is based on an erroneous conclu-
sion of law; (3) the decision is based on clearly erroneous
factual findings; or (4) the decision clearly appears arbitrary.”
Id. at 658. None of these grounds applies in this case.
Decker contends that the district court either ignored or
dismissed several factors that compromised his ability to rep-
resent himself, including his limited access to the law library
while confined to the Special Housing Unit, his restrictive
conditions of confinement pending a facility transfer, his nine
other pending cases, and substantial delays in receiving his
mail. While these considerations undoubtedly presented
challenges, the district court’s determination that they did not
necessitate counsel was not arbitrary, irrational, or based on
erroneous legal or clearly erroneous factual conclusions. See
id. In its § 1915 order, the district court directly addressed
Decker’s limited access to the law library, explained why
Decker had proven himself competent to litigate despite this
hurdle, and explained that the court could extend discovery
deadlines as his situation required. Informed as it was by a
careful consideration of the circumstances that Decker faced
in his self-representation, the district court’s order did not
constitute an abuse of discretion.
For these reasons, we AFFIRM.

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