United States of America v. Joshua R. Campbell

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-3283
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JOSHUA R. C AMPBELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.
No. 3:21-cr-00089-DRL-MGG-1 — Damon R. Leichty, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED J ANUARY 9, 2024 — DECIDED A UGUST 5, 2024
____________________
Before R OVNER , HAMILTON , and J ACKSON -A KIWUMI , Circuit
Judges.
R OVNER , Circuit Judge. Joshua Campbell seeks to suppress
evidence of child pornography found by his parole officers
during an unannounced parole check. He argues that the in-
criminating statements that led to the evidence cannot be
used against him, as both his parole agreement, on the one
hand, and the officers’ failure to issue Miranda warnings on
the other, led to violations of his Fifth Amendment rights. The

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2 No. 22-3283
agreement did not threaten to penalize him for invoking his
Fifth Amendment rights, however. Nor was he in custody at
the time he revealed the incriminating information. Conse-
quently, Campbell was required to affirmatively assert his
rights pursuant to the Fifth Amendment to invoke the bene-
fits of its protection. Because he did not, we must affirm the
decision of the district court denying his motion to suppress
the evidence.
I.
In 2011, an Indiana court sentenced Campbell to a 10-year
prison term for child molestation. He was released on parole
in 2015, after signing a “Conditional Parole Release Agree-
ment.” Among other requirements in that agreement, Camp-
bell had to make every effort to remain employed. He was re-
quired to allow announced and unannounced home visits
which could include searches of his residence and property if
there was “reasonable cause to believe [he was] violating or
[was] in imminent danger of violating a condition,” of his pa-
role agreement, and periodic unannounced examination of
his computer equipment. R. 10-1 at 1, 10-2 at 2. The agreement
prohibited his possession of “sexual devices or aids,” or any
computer or electronic device without his parole officer’s per-
mission. R. 10-2 at 2. The record is unclear as to whether his
first parole officer permitted him to have a cellphone with in-
ternet access, but for purposes of this appeal, we adopt the
district court’s assumption that possession of his cellphone
was not, in and of itself, a parole violation.
On April 24, 2019, Campbell’s then-current parole officer,
Ryan Wheeler, and his former parole officer, Craig Smith, ac-
companied by two other officers, conducted an unannounced
home visit to check on Campbell’s employment status. While

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No. 22-3283 3
the other two officers remained downstairs with Campbell’s
roommate (also a parolee), Smith and Wheeler went upstairs
and found Campbell asleep and naked under a blanket. While
he was still in bed, Wheeler asked Campbell if he had any-
thing that would constitute a parole violation. Campbell con-
fessed that he had a collection of sex toys in his nightstand. In
response to the officers’ inquiry as to whether he had any-
thing else that violated the conditions of his parole, Campbell
lifted the covers to reveal a computer. At some point during
those early exchanges, the officers patted down Campbell’s
clothes, handed them to him, and asked him to get dressed.
When Campbell unlocked his cellphone at Wheeler’s request,
Wheeler saw sexually explicit images of people he suspected
were minors.
Campbell initially refused to allow the officers to access
his locked computer, but he admitted that the computer con-
tained pornography, qualifying that he was not sure of the
ages of the subjects of the pornography. Smith informed
Campbell that if Campbell did not reveal the password to the
computer, Smith would obtain access by way of a warrant,
and a few minutes later, Smith left the room to go to his patrol
car to do just that. At that point, about 15-20 minutes had
elapsed since the officers arrived.
With Smith gone, Wheeler placed Campbell in handcuffs
to conduct a search of the room. In response to Wheeler’s re-
peated requests for the computer password, Campbell even-
tually divulged it, and Wheeler found a folder containing ex-
plicit images of minors. Campbell was eventually arrested for
possession of child pornography. Indiana law enforcement
officers subsequently obtained search warrants for his elec-
tronic devices and accessed them without needing a

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4 No. 22-3283
password. At no point did the parole officers inform Camp-
bell of his Miranda rights.
Campbell entered into a conditional guilty plea that pre-
served his ability to challenge the district court’s decision to
allow in the evidence obtained from the search of his room.
The district court later sentenced him to the mandatory mini-
mum—10 years’ imprisonment. In this appeal, Campbell as-
serts that the State violated his Fifth Amendment rights in two
ways: first, by way of a parole agreement that compelled his
responses under threat of penalty, and second, when the of-
ficers failed to warn him of his Fifth Amendment right to re-
main silent in the face of their custodial interrogation. We ex-
plore each of these arguments in turn, after first setting out
the parameters of Campbell’s Fifth Amendment rights as a
parolee.
II.
Despite significant restrictions on their liberty, those who
are incarcerated, on parole, or on probation do not relinquish
all constitutional liberties, and retain, in most instances, their
Fifth Amendment protection from being compelled to give in-
criminating statements. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426
(1984). See U.S. Const. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”).
The Fifth Amendment “not only protects the individual
against being involuntarily called as a witness against himself
in a criminal prosecution but also privileges him not to an-
swer official questions put to him in any other proceeding,
civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might
incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.” Lefkowitz v.
Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973). Our cases speak of the right as
being one that is not “self-executing.” That is, a person who

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No. 22-3283 5
wishes to be cloaked with the protections of the Fifth Amend-
ment ordinarily must assert the privilege. Murphy, 465 U.S. at
429. And if the questionee opts to answer without asserting
rights under the Fifth Amendment, a court will consider those
answers to have been freely and voluntarily given. Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966). Our cases recognize that this
assumption must give way, however, in situations in which
the subject of an interrogation will feel so compelled to an-
swer that we assume she has lost the “‘free choice to admit, to
deny, or to refuse to answer.’” Murphy, 465 U.S. at 429 (quoting
Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 657 (1976)). One of those
self-executing situations occurs when the government im-
poses penalties on the questionee for electing to exercise her
Fifth Amendment rights. The second occurs when a suspect
is subject to questioning while in police custody.
Campbell claims both circumstances existed at the time he
revealed incriminating information to the parole officers. If he
is correct, then any statements he made were inadmissible in
the subsequent criminal proceedings that the state initiated
against him for possession of the child pornography the offic-
ers found during the parole check. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 426.
And the discovered pornography would be excludable as de-
rivative of the unconstitutionally obtained incriminating
statements. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536–37
(1988). The district court concluded otherwise, however, and
denied Campbell’s motion to suppress the statements he
made to the officers. We review de novo the district court’s
legal conclusions—such as whether the parole agreement
threatened to penalize Campbell for asserting his rights and
whether Campbell was in custody—and its factual findings
for clear error. United States v. Cox, 54 F.4th 502, 511 (7th Cir.
2022).

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6 No. 22-3283
A. Threats of a penalty
Campbell never affirmatively asserted his Fifth Amend-
ment right to refuse to answer questions. The right against
self-incrimination becomes self-executing, however—that is,
it need not be affirmatively asserted—when the government
threatens to penalize a questionee for asserting the right. Mur-
phy, 465 U.S. at 434; see also Lefkowitz, 431 U.S. at 805 (“[A] State
may not impose substantial penalties because a witness elects
to exercise his Fifth Amendment right not to give incriminat-
ing testimony against himself.”).
Campbell points to two provisions in the parole
agreement that he says underlie the Fifth Amendment
violation. First, under the terms of the parole agreement,
Campbell “agreed to report to [his] supervising officer as
instructed and to respond to any and all communications
from any authorized employee of the Department of
Correction.” R. 10-1 (emphasis ours). Second, he
acknowledged “that any acts of omissions in violation of the
terms of parole [would] subject [him] to being taken into
immediate custody … and initiation of proceedings for
revocation of [his] parole.” R. 10-1.1 That language, he argues,
threatens a penalty—revocation of his parole—for refusing to
respond to questions. The Supreme Court, however, has
distinguished between threatening a penalty for refusing to
respond, and threatening a penalty for invoking Fifth
Amendment protections. Requiring a parolee to appear and
report to a parole officer and “answer truthfully the questions
1 We assume that the text of the sentence should have said “that any
acts or omissions” and not “any acts of omissions,” but the difference does
not affect the outcome in any way.

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No. 22-3283 7
of a probation officer” does not, in and of itself, give rise to a
self-executing privilege. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435, 437. The
threat of punishment, such as the revocation of probation, for
invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, however, does. Id. at 435–37. Mere fear of
revocation, however, “is not a ground for ruling that a
probationer’s confession deprived him of his Fifth
Amendment privilege.” United States v. Cranley, 350 F.3d 617,
622 (7th Cir. 2003).
At the end of the day, Murphy and Cranley control the out-
come here. In Murphy, the defendant’s probation officer asked
Murphy to meet to discuss his probation. She knew when she
made the request that she would be asking him about matters
that might incriminate him in a murder investigation. His
probation agreement required him to “report to his probation
officer as directed, and be truthful with the probation officer
in all matters.” Murphy, 465 U.S. at 422. The agreement also
informed Murphy that “[f]ailure to comply with these condi-
tions … could result in his return to the sentencing court for a
probation revocation hearing.” Id. Despite this language, the
Court held that there was “no reasonable basis for concluding
that Minnesota attempted to attach an impermissible penalty
to the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination.”
Murphy, 465 U.S. at 437. According to the Court’s reasoning,
“Murphy’s probation condition proscribed only false state-
ments; it said nothing about his freedom to decline to answer
particular questions and certainly contained no suggestion
that his probation was conditional on his waiving his Fifth
Amendment privilege with respect to further criminal prose-
cution.” Id. A probation officer, the Supreme Court reasoned,
can require a probationer to appear and give truthful testi-
mony about matters relevant to his probationary status,

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8 No. 22-3283
provided the officer does not make the probationer choose be-
tween “making incriminating statements and jeopardizing
his conditional liberty by remaining silent.” Id. at 436.
There is no material difference between Campbell’s com-
mand to “report to [the] supervising officer as instructed and
respond to any and all communications” and Murphy’s com-
mand to “report to his probation officer as directed, and be
truthful with the probation officer ‘in all matters.’” Id. at 422.2
In both cases, the “legal compulsion to attend the meeting and
to answer truthfully the questions of a probation officer” was
distinguishable from a threat to impose a penalty for a valid
exercise of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 437. And both Murphy
and Campbell retained the “freedom to decline to answer par-
ticular questions.” Id.3 Assertion of the Fifth Amendment is,
2 Murphy was on probation rather than parole. In the context of the
Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has noted that parolees have
fewer expectations of privacy than probationers, as parole is just a varia-
tion on imprisonment while probation is meted out in addition to impris-
onment, not in lieu of it. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006). It is
not clear whether this logic extends to the Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination, but in any event, Campbell certainly would have no
lesser claim to the right to assert the protections of the Fifth Amendment
than Murphy had.
3 Campbell points out that, in his testimony, Smith admitted to “vio-
lating” another parolee who refused to answer questions, several years
after the events in this case. R. 25 at 75–76. The record does not reveal
whether that parolee ultimately was subject to a parole revocation. More
importantly, because Campbell could not have known about Smith’s ac-
tions, and because, under our case law, Campbell was not, himself, threat-
ened with revocation for asserting his Fifth Amendment rights, Smith’s
report of “violating” another parolee for refusing to answer questions is
simply not relevant.

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No. 22-3283 9
after all, one way to “respond” to the inquiries of a parole of-
ficer.
This court, in Cranley, following Murphy, came to the same
conclusion—determining that a defendant had not been
threatened with parole revocation for invoking his Fifth
Amendment rights even where his probation agreement re-
quired both “that he report to his probation officer ‘as di-
rected for scheduled or unscheduled meetings,’ and that he
‘provide true and correct information verbally and in writing,
in response to inquiries by the [probation] agent.’” Cranley,
350 F.3d at 618. The agreements in Murphy, Cranley, and in
this case allow for the possibility that the defendants could
respond by invoking their Fifth Amendment right to refuse to
answer. See id. at 622.4
4 Campbell points to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v.
Saechao, 418 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2005), as an example of a case in which a
court found that the probation agreement imposed a penalty for assertion
of Fifth Amendment rights when it required a probationer to “promptly
and truthfully answer all reasonable inquiries” from the probation officer.
The Ninth Circuit determined
there is a significant difference between being
required to be “truthful with ... probation officer
in all matters,” Murphy, 465 U.S. at 422 (internal
quotation marks omitted), and being required
to “promptly and truthfully answer all reasona-
ble inquiries.” Whereas the former “sa[ys] noth-
ing about [a probationer’s] freedom to decline
to answer particular questions” and “pro-
scribe[s] only false statements,” the latter specif-
ically penalizes a refusal to “answer particular
(continued)

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10 No. 22-3283
One might question whether it is a realistic assumption
that parolees will be aware of their right to claim a Fifth
Amendment privilege, having signed a parole or probation
agreement with language that, on its face, may appear to re-
quire a substantive “response.” This court, in Cranley, cer-
tainly questioned that assumption. Id. at 621–23. But despite
its skepticism, the Cranley panel gave due allegiance to Mur-
phy. Id. at 622. Likewise, the dissent in Murphy explored
whether the defendant could have known that he had a con-
stitutional right to refuse to answer his probation officer’s
questions. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 457 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
But despite the full airing of doubt in both courts, the assump-
tion prevails. There is no room, therefore, for this panel to find
otherwise.
The Murphy dissenters noted that “responsible criminal
defense attorneys whose clients are given probation will
questions.” Murphy, 465 U.S. at 437. In contrast
to Murphy, who the Supreme Court found was
free to remain silent as long as he was truthful
when he spoke, Saechao did not have the luxury
of remaining silent without violating the condi-
tions of his probation. Failure to answer a rele-
vant inquiry regarding the conditions of proba-
tion would have justified the revocation of his
probation.
Id. at 1078. We are not bound by the Ninth Circuit’s determination of the
distinction. But in any event, Campbell was required only to “respond,”
not to “answer all inquiries.” And as Murphy and Cranley both concluded,
invoking the Fifth Amendment is one possible response for a parolee or
probationer in these circumstances. See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 437; Cranley,
350 F. 3d at 622.

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No. 22-3283 11
inform those clients, in their final interviews, that they may
disregard probation conditions insofar as those conditions are
inconsistent with probationers’ Fifth-Amendment rights.” Id.
at 462 (Marshall, J. dissenting). The better practice would be
for the parole agreements themselves to advise parolees of
their Fifth Amendment rights explicitly. In contrast to the
original underlying parole agreement that is at issue in this
case, Campbell’s conditions of supervised release pursuant to
his judgment in the current matter does just that:
You must truthfully answer any inquiry by the
probation officer … . This condition does not
prevent you from invoking the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination.
R. 49 at 3. If his original parole agreement had provided the
same notice, we could have avoided the conflict before us. Of
course, he would still have his argument that he was in cus-
tody at the time of questioning, but this, as we will see in the
subsection below, was a weaker claim.
B. Custodial interrogation
The Fifth Amendment privilege also becomes self-
executing for those in police custody. Given the inherently
isolating and compelling nature of a custodial interrogation,
“the Miranda Court required the exclusion of incriminating
statements obtained during custodial interrogation unless the
suspect fails to claim the Fifth Amendment privilege after
being suitably warned of his right to remain silent and of the
consequences of his failure to assert it.” Murphy, 465 U.S. at
430.
It is true that for some purposes, a parolee is in custody.
“The essence of parole is release from prison, before the

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12 No. 22-3283
completion of sentence, on the condition that the prisoner
abide by certain rules during the balance of the sentence.”
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972). Campbell’s Con-
ditional Parole Release Agreement stated, “I understand that
I am legally in the custody of the Department of Correction …
.” R. 10-1. But “[n]ot all restraints on freedom of movement
amount to custody for purposes of Miranda.” Howes v. Fields,
565 U.S. 499, 509 (2012). For example, the definition of “cus-
tody” for Miranda purposes is narrower than it is for habeas
corpus purposes. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 430. Even “imprison-
ment alone is not enough to create a custodial situation within
the meaning of Miranda.” Howes, 565 U.S. at 511. We have pre-
viously compiled a long list of cases holding that probationers
or parolees were not in police custody for Miranda purposes.
Cranley, 350 F.3d at 620 (collecting cases). To that earlier list
we can add many more. See State v. Brandon, 287 A.3d 71, 95–
96 (Conn. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 2669 (2023) (collecting
cases). In short, the fact of parole or probation alone does not
indicate whether a particular person is in custody for Miranda
purposes. Rather, a court must make an individualized deter-
mination about custody as it would in any other circum-
stance.
We employ an objective test to determine whether a
person is in custody, looking at the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation and asking whether “’a
reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at
liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.’” Howes, 565
U.S. 509 (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995)).
To make that assessment, a court must look at the totality of
the surrounding circumstances including factors such as “the
location of the questioning, its duration, statements made
during the interview, the presence or absence of physical

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No. 22-3283 13
restraints during the questioning, and the release of the
interviewee at the end of the questioning.” Id. (internal
citations omitted); see also Cox, 54 F.4th at 511. We have recited
lists of examples of other factors we might consider, but
always with the caveat that the driving determination is the
totality of the circumstances. For example, in United States v.
Patterson, 826 F.3d 450, 455 (7th Cir. 2016) we noted that “[w]e
have provided a non-exhaustive list of example factors, which
includes: ‘whether the encounter occurred in a public place;
whether the suspect consented to speak with the officers;
whether the officers informed the individual that he was not
under arrest and was free to leave; whether the individual
was moved to another area; whether there was a threatening
presence of several officers and a display of weapons or
physical force; and whether the officers’ tone of voice was
such that their requests were likely to be obeyed.’” Id. (quoting
United States v. Littledale, 652 F.3d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 2011)). In
the end, we look to see whether “the relevant environment
presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of
station house questioning at issue in Miranda.” Howes, 565
U.S. at 509.
Campbell’s claim that he was in custody emphasizes the
fact that the officers were very large men, and that their mere
presence in a small room (one stood inside the room, and the
other in the doorway) would have blocked Campbell’s egress.
Moreover, they wore “battle dress uniform”—tactical pants,
a t-shirt or polo, a utility belt with a firearm, taser, mace, am-
munition, and handcuffs, and entered unannounced, while
Campbell was in a vulnerable position—naked and sleeping.
According to Campbell, the armed, commanding officers
were firmly in control of the environment.

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14 No. 22-3283
But questioning by a parole officer presents a somewhat
unique set of circumstances. For the average citizen, “’[a]ny
interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will
have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the
police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may
ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime.’” Pat-
terson, 826 F.3d at 459 (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S.
492, 495 (1977)).
In the paradigmatic Miranda situation—a
person is arrested in his home or on the street
and whisked to a police station for
questioning—detention represents a sharp and
ominous change, and the shock may give rise to
coercive pressures. A person who is “cut off
from his normal life and companions,”
Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 106 (2010), and
abruptly transported from the street into a
“police-dominated atmosphere,” Miranda, 384
U.S. at 456, may feel coerced into answering
questions.
Howes, 565 U.S. at 511. But meetings with parole officers are
inherently different. Parolees sign agreements giving fair
warning that they will be subject to both scheduled and un-
scheduled visits. They likewise understand that their parole
officers will ask questions about parole compliance, including
whether the parolee has engaged in criminal conduct. See
Murphy, 465 U.S. at 432 (“[T]he nature of probation is such
that probationers should expect to be questioned on a wide
range of topics relating to their past criminality.”). “Many of
the psychological ploys discussed in Miranda capitalize on the
suspect’s unfamiliarity with the officers and the

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No. 22-3283 15
environment.” Murphy, id. at 433. Of course, a parole inter-
view might become custodial for Miranda purposes (e.g.
United States v. Byram, 145 F.3d 405, 409 (1st Cir. 1998)), but
the factors that cause a court to presume compulsion in a cus-
todial arrest do not necessarily exist during regular parole vis-
its. Once again, the determination depends on the totality of
the circumstances.
In this case, Campbell encountered a regular, unan-
nounced parole check with officers with whom Campbell was
very familiar. Smith supervised Campbell from his 2015 re-
lease until early 2019 (excluding some period during which
Campbell was in prison for an earlier parole violation).
Campbell saw Smith every Friday at group meetings, and
Smith had visited his home ten times before. Wheeler had
only supervised Campbell for about four months, but they too
met at weekly group meetings and Wheeler had visited
Campbell at home three to five times previously. A parolee’s
“regular meetings with his probation officer should have
served to familiarize him with her and her office and to insu-
late him from psychological intimidation that might overbear
his desire to claim the privilege.” Murphy, 465 U.S. at 433.
Those officers were wearing what Campbell was accustomed
to seeing them wearing. Campbell was not handcuffed or
physically restrained. See id. at 432. He was in the familiar en-
vironment of his home. See Howes, 565 U.S. at 511. The officers
did not display firearms or threaten to use force, and no one
told Campbell that he was under arrest or that he was not free
to leave. See United States v. Leal, 1 F.4th 545, 552 (7th Cir.
2021). The officers were courteous. See United States v. Am-
brose, 668 F.3d 943, 958 (7th Cir. 2012). And although there
were actually four officers at the house, two remained down-
stairs and there is no evidence that Campbell was aware of

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16 No. 22-3283
their presence. Campbell had consented to these visits by
signing his parole agreement, which significantly reduced
any expectation of privacy. See United States v. Beechler, 68
F.4th 358, 365 (7th Cir. 2023) (“When assessing the privacy ex-
pectations of a person subject to a correctional system, salient
factors include … whether the individual has agreed to waive
some or all Fourth Amendment rights in exchange for more
freedom within the correctional system.”). It was also com-
mon and expected that officers would question him about pa-
role violations. See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 432 . Nothing about the
initial part of this visit was any different than any of the dozen
or more parole visits which Campbell had experienced be-
fore. Campbell made the incriminating statements about the
sex toys, computer, and pornography after only 15-20
minutes of questioning, and before Wheeler handcuffed him.
Murphy and Cranley also control our analysis of the custo-
dial nature of the interrogation. The Supreme Court held that
Murphy was not in custody requiring Miranda warnings de-
spite the fact that the probation officer compelled Murphy’s
attendance and truthful answers, she sought incriminating
evidence, Murphy was not expecting the types of questions
the officer asked, and there were no observers to guard
against abuse or trickery. Id. at 431–32. The court concluded
that Murphy was in a familiar environment—the probation
office—with familiar officers, he was not physically re-
strained, and could have left at any time. Id. at 432.
Similarly, this court in Cranley, relying on Murphy, came to
the same conclusion, although “[w]ith reluctance, given the
coercive atmosphere and the pressure on Cranley to talk in
order to avoid jeopardizing his probation.” Cranley, 350 F.3d
at 619. This court concluded that Cranley met with the

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No. 22-3283 17
probation officer in a building otherwise unrelated to law en-
forcement, there were no usual indicia of police custody, and
Cranley could have asked officers if he was free to leave. Id.
at 620.
In any event, almost immediately after the officers’ arrival,
Campbell confessed to having sex toys in his nightstand—a
violation of parole which would have given the officers rea-
sonable cause to look further for other violations, which, in
turn, would have led to the discovery of the child pornogra-
phy. After discovering the illegal photos on his phone, and
the computer under the blanket, the officers eventually hand-
cuffed Campbell. But even if Campbell was in custody when
he gave officers further information, he was not in custody
when he made his first admissions which would have inevi-
tably and lawfully led to the rest.
Murphy and Cranley dictate that Campbell’s parole agree-
ment did not threaten a penalty for exercise of his Fifth
Amendment protections, and he was not in custody when he
made the relevant incriminating statements. Because Camp-
bell did not invoke his Fifth Amendment right, and it was not
otherwise self-executing, the district court properly denied
his motion to suppress the evidence, and its opinion is there-
fore AFFIRMED.

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