David King v. UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES OF HARTGROVE, INC., doing business as Hartgrove Behavioral…

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued July 10, 2024
Decided August 5, 2024
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-3154
DAVID KING,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES OF
HARTGROVE, INC., doing business as
Hartgrove Behavioral Health System,
and UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 22-cv-5129
Charles P. Kocoras,
Judge.
O R D E R
In December 2018, David King sued his former employer, Hartgrove Behavioral
Health System, asserting several claims, including one for employment discrimination
based on his mental disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(a). King v. Universal Health Services, No. 1:18-cv-8418 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 21, 2018)
(“King I”). Hartgrove moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 23-3154 Page 2
that King had signed upon starting his employment. The district court granted the
motion and in May 2020 entered judgment, closing King I.
An arbitrator later issued an award in favor of Hartgrove. King then filed a new
lawsuit for purposes of moving to vacate the arbitration award under the Federal
Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 10(a). King v. Universal Health Services, No. 1:22-cv-
5129 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2022) (“King II”). Meanwhile, Hartgrove moved in King I to
confirm the award under 9 U.S.C. § 9. The court then entered an order in King II,
purporting to consolidate that case with King I. The court did not designate a lead case,
however, and continued to maintain both dockets. The court later entered an order in
King I confirming the award for Hartgrove. More than a month after that, the court
entered judgment in King II, explaining that “[n]o further action” was needed regarding
King’s motion to vacate the award in that case. King filed a timely notice of appeal in
King II. (The notice of appeal also referenced the case number for King I and the district
court’s decision confirming the award in that case—which the court had issued 45 days
earlier.)
On appeal, King contests the merits of the decision to confirm the award for
Hartgrove in King I, but that decision is not properly before us. The two cases were not
consolidated effectively here because the district court did not have jurisdiction over
King II and it therefore could not consolidate that case. See Capps v. Newmark S. Region,
LLC, 53 F.4th 299, 302 (4th Cir. 2022); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868)
(“Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause.”). The reason the
court did not have jurisdiction over King II is that it solely concerned King’s motion to
vacate the arbitration award under 9 U.S.C. § 10. The Supreme Court considered a case
with that posture and clarified that district courts cannot look through petitions to
confirm under 9 U.S.C. § 9 or petitions to vacate under 9 U.S.C. § 10 to the underlying
dispute to determine jurisdiction; they may do so only with petitions to compel
arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 4. Badgerow v. Walters, 596 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2022). It noted that:
The federal district courts may not exercise jurisdiction absent a statutory
basis. And the jurisdiction Congress confers may not be expanded by
judicial decree. Those bedrock principles prevent us from pulling look-
through jurisdiction out of thin air—from somehow finding, without
textual support, that federal courts may use the method to resolve various
state-law-based, non-diverse Section 9 and 10 applications.
Id. at 11–12. This holds true even if the underlying dispute being arbitrated involved a
claim “that (save for the parties’ agreement) could have been brought in federal court.”

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No. 23-3154 Page 3
Id. at 12. Thus, a federal court has jurisdiction over a petition to vacate an arbitration
award, if it would have jurisdiction over the underlying dispute. In other words, this
petition must have an “independent jurisdictional basis,” beyond the FAA itself. Id. at
8–9. King concedes that there is no diversity jurisdiction here, and we see no other
independent basis for subject-matter jurisdiction. 1
Even without an effective consolidation, we could still consider the notice of
appeal in King II as effective in both cases. Defects of form in a notice of appeal can be
disregarded, and this includes filing under the wrong case number. See Farzana K. v.
Indiana Dep't of Educ., 473 F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[W]riting the wrong docket
number on top of the papers [is] an error of form rather than substance” and has no
effect on filing deadline). Here, the notice of appeal gave sufficient notice of King’s
intent to appeal in King I, and it provided the information required by FED. R. A PP. P.
3(c)(1). See Owens v. Godinez, 860 F.3d 434, 437 (7th Cir. 2017).
But it still matters when King filed the notice of appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) (30
days to appeal in civil cases); FED. R. A PP. P. 4(a)(1)(A) (same). A timely notice of appeal
is required for appellate jurisdiction in a civil case because a statute prescribes the time
limit. Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 583 U.S. 17, 20–21 (2017); May v. Mahone,
913 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2019). Even leaving aside any defect of form, there is no timely
appeal of the decision confirming the arbitration award in King I. The only notice of
appeal came 45 days after the final decision to confirm the arbitration award, and so
that decision is not properly before us.
In regards to King II, the notice was timely as to the judgment, and, therefore, we
have appellate jurisdiction. All we can do, however, is vacate the judgment and remand
for the district court to dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
VACATED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
1 At the end of oral argument, counsel for appellant requested leave to file
additional briefing on the jurisdictional issue. We deny that request because jurisdiction
in this case is settled by Badgerow.

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