Terrence Buehler v. Boeing Company

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
Nos. 23-2358 & 23-2359
IN RE: LION AIR FLIGHT JT 610 CRASH
A PPEAL OF : LAURA SMITH , as duly appointed representative
and Independent Administrator of the ESTATE OF A NDREA
MANFREDI, deceased, et al.
______________________________________________________
A PPEAL OF : TERRENCE BUEHLER , Personal Representative and
Independent Administrator of the ESTATE OF LIU C HANDRA ,
deceased.
____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
Nos. 1:18-cv-07686, 1:19-cv-07091, 1:19-cv-01552 —
Thomas M. Durkin, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED FEBRUARY 16, 2024 — D ECIDED A UGUST 6, 2024
____________________
Before R IPPLE , BRENNAN, and J ACKSON-A KIWUMI, Circuit
Judges.
R IPPLE , Circuit Judge. These two consolidated cases arose
from the crash of a Boeing commercial jet aircraft into the Java

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2 Nos. 23-2358 & 23-2359
Sea off the coast of Indonesia. Everyone on board died. The
plaintiffs are family members and representatives of the es-
tates of two passengers on that flight. They brought these ac-
tions against Boeing and other defendants.
Boeing filed pretrial motions in each of these cases, raising
two issues, both of which are properly before us in this inter-
locutory appeal certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). First, is
the Death on the High Seas Act (“DOHSA”), 46 U.S.C.
§§ 30301–08, the sole source of potential recovery for the
plaintiffs, or can the plaintiffs assert other claims as well? Sec-
ond, are the plaintiffs entitled to a jury trial? The district court
concluded that the plaintiffs can only proceed under DOHSA
and that they are not entitled to a jury trial. We agree with the
district court and affirm its rulings.
I
BACKGROUND
On October 29, 2018, Lion Air Flight JT 610 took off from
Jakarta, Indonesia. Almost immediately after takeoff, the pas-
sengers began experiencing the aircraft’s erratic movements
and fluctuations in altitude due to mechanical issues with the
plane, a Boeing 737 MAX. After a few minutes, the plane flew
out over open water, and approximately five minutes after
that, it crashed into the Java Sea, about eighteen miles off of
the coast of Indonesia. There were no survivors. Boeing has
admitted that a manufacturing defect in its 737 MAX plane
caused the crash.
The two cases before us were brought by the families and
representatives of the estates of two passengers who died in
the crash: Liu Chandra, an Indonesian businessman, and An-
drea Manfredi, an Italian entrepreneur and professional

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Nos. 23-2358 & 23-2359 3
cyclist. The Chandra case was filed initially in Illinois state
court. Boeing subsequently removed it to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois without ob-
jection. The sole plaintiff in the Chandra matter is a repre-
sentative of both Mr. Chandra’s estate and Mr. Chandra’s
heirs. In the operative amended complaint, the representative
has named as defendants two United States government
agencies, three individuals, and four private entities, one of
which is Boeing. The representative asserted claims on behalf
of both Mr. Chandra’s estate and Mr. Chandra’s family mem-
bers under DOHSA; the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C.
§§ 30901–18; and Illinois state law. He demanded a jury trial
and asserted that the district court has jurisdiction based on
diversity; DOHSA; the Suits in Admiralty Act; and the Multi-
party, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act (“MMTJA”), 28
U.S.C. § 1369.
The Manfredi case was filed initially in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plain-
tiffs in that case are family members of Mr. Manfredi and a
representative of Mr. Manfredi’s estate (collectively, the
“Manfredi Plaintiffs”). The Manfredi Plaintiffs asserted
claims under state law and under the Consumer Fraud and
Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, on behalf of both Mr. Manfredi’s
estate and Mr. Manfredi’s family members. The Manfredi
Plaintiffs demanded a jury trial and alleged that the district
court has jurisdiction based on both diversity and the
MMTJA.
Boeing filed motions in both cases asking the district court
to rule that DOHSA applies, preempts all of the plaintiffs’
non-DOHSA claims, and mandates a bench trial. The district
court granted Boeing’s motions. The district court first

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4 Nos. 23-2358 & 23-2359
explained that DOHSA applies to all cases, like this one,
where the decedent died on the high seas. The court then held
that DOHSA preempted the plaintiffs’ non-DOHSA claims. It
explained that, where DOHSA applies, it is generally the ex-
clusive remedy. The court reasoned that, under this principle,
the plaintiffs’ claims for their decedents’ pre-death pain and
suffering and lost property could not proceed. Accordingly,
the court dismissed all state-law-based claims for pre-death
pain and suffering, emotional distress, and lost property. It
also dismissed all federal and state fraud claims.
The district court then considered whether the plaintiffs
were entitled to a jury trial. The court ruled that Congress has
“explicitly limited DOHSA to ‘a civil action in admiralty,’
which does not carry the right to a jury trial.” In re Lion Air
Flight JT 610 Crash, No. 18-cv-07686, 2023 WL 3653218, at *7
(N.D. Ill. May 25, 2023) (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 30302). It rejected
the plaintiffs’ argument that their DOHSA claims could be
brought as non-admiralty claims because there were non-ad-
miralty sources of jurisdiction. It accordingly concluded that
DOHSA precluded a jury trial on the plaintiffs’ claims and
granted Boeing’s request for a bench trial.
The plaintiffs asked the district court to certify an interloc-
utory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). They identified the
question of whether they are entitled to a jury trial as the ques-
tion warranting interlocutory review. The representative in
the Chandra case additionally submitted that the question of
whether DOHSA preempted their non-DOHSA claims was
another question warranting interlocutory review. The court
certified for immediate interlocutory appeal the question
whether a plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial under DOHSA.
The district court declined to certify the preemption issue.

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Nos. 23-2358 & 23-2359 5
II
DISCUSSION
A.
A court of appeals may, in its discretion, permit an appeal
to be taken from an order certified for interlocutory appeal by
a district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The order must present
a “controlling question of law,” difficult enough to leave
“substantial ground for difference of opinion,” and whose
resolution will “materially advance the ultimate termination
of the litigation.” Id. In such an appeal, although the district
court must identify a “controlling question of law,” our au-
thority extends past answering that question. Id.; see Martin v.
Goodrich Corp., 95 F.4th 475, 478 (7th Cir. 2024). The appeal
presents the order for appellate decision, and a court of appeals
“may address any issue fairly included within the certified
order.” Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199,
205 (1996).
Here, the district court certified the jury trial question for
interlocutory review. We agree with the district court that this
issue is suitable for interlocutory review. As we noted earlier,
the district court declined to certify the preemption question
for interlocutory review. But, because that issue was decided
in the same order, we can decide that question, and indeed
should resolve it because resolution of that issue will influ-
ence significantly our decision on the jury trial question.
There is authority that parties in admiralty cases can have a
jury trial on claims that would otherwise be tried by the court,
if their claims arise out of the same set of facts as a claim that
can be tried before a jury. See Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines Co., 374
U.S. 16, 21 (1963) (concluding that, when a Jones Act claim

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6 Nos. 23-2358 & 23-2359
and a maintenance and cure claim arise from the same acci-
dent, district courts must allow a jury trial, even if the mainte-
nance and cure claim is cognizable only in admiralty); Red
Star Towing & Transp. Co. v. The “Ming Giant”, 552 F. Supp.
367, 374–75 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (concluding that a jury should de-
cide both DOHSA and Jones Act claims, in case in which
plaintiffs asserted both types of claims); Gvirtsman v. W. King
Co., 263 F. Supp. 633, 634–35 (C.D. Cal. 1967) (same). There-
fore, if the plaintiffs have valid non-DOHSA claims, then the
district court presumably should have allowed the plaintiffs
to try those claims and their DOHSA claims before a jury. On
the other hand, if DOHSA preempts the other claims, then the
availability of a jury trial turns on whether DOHSA permits
the plaintiffs to demand a jury trial. Accordingly, we will ad-
dress both issues, starting with preemption.
B.
Before 1920, relatives of persons who died on the “high
seas”—waters far enough from any coast to be outside the ter-
ritorial waters of a state or country—generally had no rem-
edy. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 393
(1970). As a result, the family members of victims of high-seas
disasters like the sinking of the Titanic had no means of re-
covery. See Robert M. Hughes, Death Actions in Admiralty,
31 Yale L.J. 115, 117 (1921).
DOHSA, enacted in 1920, helped to fill this void. DOHSA
provides that, “[w]hen the death of an individual is caused by
wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas …,
the personal representative of the decedent may bring a civil
action in admiralty against the person or vessel responsible.”
46 U.S.C. § 30302. Claims under DOHSA can be brought in

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Nos. 23-2358 & 23-2359 7
federal court or in state court. Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallen-
tire, 477 U.S. 207, 232 (1986).
DOHSA functions as a wrongful-death statute in that it
gives “surviving relatives a cause of action for losses they suf-
fered as a result of the decedent’s death.” Dooley v. Korean Air
Lines Co., 524 U.S. 116, 123 (1998). Survivors whose losses can
be remedied in a DOHSA action include “the decedent’s
spouse, parent, child, or dependent relative.” § 30302.
DOHSA is not a survival statute. A survival statute “permits
a decedent’s estate to recover damages that the decedent
would have been able to recover but for his death.” Dooley,
524 U.S. at 123. Unlike survival statutes, “DOHSA does not
authorize recovery for the decedent’s own losses.” Id. at 122.
The Supreme Court has held that, where DOHSA applies,
it preempts all wrongful-death remedies otherwise available
under state law and general maritime law. See Offshore Logis-
tics, 477 U.S. at 232 (state law); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham,
436 U.S. 618, 624–25 (1978) (general maritime law). Although
the plaintiffs included in their complaints many state-law
wrongful-death claims, they now concede that DOHSA
preempts those claims.
They continue to contend, however, that some of their
state-law survival claims are not preempted by DOHSA. As
they acknowledge, this contention must grapple with Dooley
v. Korean Air Lines, supra. In Dooley, plaintiffs sought to re-
cover damages under state law for pain and suffering that
their relative, who died on the high seas, experienced shortly
before his death. The plaintiffs argued that DOHSA did not
preempt their claims because, in their view, DOHSA had no
“bearing on the availability of a survival action.” Id. at 123.
The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that “DOHSA

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8 Nos. 23-2358 & 23-2359
expresses Congress’ judgment that there should be no such
cause of action in cases of death on the high seas.” Id. The
Court explained that, in DOHSA, “Congress provided the ex-
clusive recovery for deaths that occur on the high seas.” Id.
Because “Congress ha[d] spoken on the availability of a sur-
vival action,” id. at 124, the Court held that the plaintiffs could
not pursue their state-law survival claims for their decedent’s
pre-death pain and suffering.
The plaintiffs contend that, despite Dooley, they can seek
two types of damages on behalf of their decedents’ estates.
First, the plaintiffs contend that they can seek damages for the
pain and suffering that their decedents experienced on the
over-land portion of the flight. It is difficult, however, to see
how this could be a separate claim than a claim for pain and
suffering the decedents experienced over water, minutes
later. This position is also inconsistent with decisions of other
courts that plaintiffs cannot avoid DOHSA preemption
merely by showing that a fatal accident on the high seas had
some connection to land. See, e.g., LaCourse v. PAE Worldwide
Inc., 980 F.3d 1350, 1357 (11th Cir. 2020) (accident was gov-
erned by DOHSA because the plane crashed into the high
seas, even though the alleged negligence occurred on land
and much of the flight was scheduled to be over land). Fur-
ther, much of the language in Dooley—especially the reference
to the congressional judgment that “there should be no [sur-
vival] cause of action in cases of death on the high seas,” 524
U.S. at 123—broadly indicates that DOHSA preempts all sur-
vivor actions grounded in state law or general maritime law
that are based on the same facts as the fatal accident. Second,
the plaintiffs contend that they can seek damages for property
their decedents lost in the crash. This claim, too, is foreclosed

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Nos. 23-2358 & 23-2359 9
by the reasoning in Dooley regarding survival-based claims.1
The plaintiffs’ non-DOHSA claims grounded in state law thus
cannot go forward.
C.
We now turn to the jury trial question (the question certi-
fied by the district court). We start with some background.
1.
This background can suitably begin in the years immedi-
ately before the Founding. In that era, individuals in the colo-
nies with maritime claims could bring those claims either in
vice admiralty courts created by Britain or in the local colonial
courts. Steven L. Snell, Courts of Admiralty and the Common
Law: Origins in the American Experiment in Concurrent Jurisdic-
tion 204–05 (2007). This arrangement “provided the litigants
with a choice,” and a “potential plaintiff was able to weigh
the alternatives between” the types of courts. Id. at 205. The
vice admiralty courts had the advantage of different remedial
mechanisms and often greater expertise, but, unlike in the lo-
cal colonial courts, claims there were tried without juries. Id.
at 182.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 preserved the substance, but not
the precise forms, of this arrangement. In that statute, Con-
gress gave the federal circuit courts jurisdiction over diversity
cases. 1 Stat. 73, § 11. It also gave federal district courts
1 Some courts have held that, under DOHSA, plaintiffs are able to recover
damages approximating the value of their decedents’ lost property if they
can establish that the property would have become part of their inher-
itance. See Snyder v. Whittaker Corp., 839 F.2d 1085, 1093 (5th Cir. 1988);
Nygaard v. Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc., 701 F.2d 77, 80 (9th Cir. 1983). We have
no occasion to address that issue today.

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10 Nos. 23-2358 & 23-2359
exclusive jurisdiction over “all civil causes of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction,” including those “upon the high seas,”
but from this grant of exclusive jurisdiction it “sav[ed] to suit-
ors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the
common law is competent to give it.” Id. § 9.2
This carve-out has been called the saving-to-suitors clause.
It “saves” all in personam claims. See The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S.
411, 431 (1867). Thus, the Judiciary Act of 1789 made federal
district courts the exclusive arbiter of all in rem maritime
claims, but not of all in personam maritime claims. Moreover,
because of the saving-to-suitors clause, unless another statute
provided to the contrary, maritime plaintiffs with in personam
claims were not required to sue in the federal district courts.
Instead, if they so chose, they could sue in state court, or, if
there was diversity, in federal circuit courts. See Norton v.
Switzer, 93 U.S. 355, 356 (1876) (“Parties in maritime cases are
not … compelled to proceed in the admiralty at all, as they
may resort to their common-law remedy in the State courts,
or in the Circuit Court, if the party seeking redress and the
other party are citizens of different states.”). In cases brought
“at law” in state courts or the circuit courts, either party could
demand a jury trial. The Sarah, 21 U.S. 391, 394 (1823). But in
cases brought “in admiralty” in the federal district courts, ab-
sent a statute to the contrary, the trial was by the court. Id.
2 Congress has since revised the language of the saving-to-suitors clause,
but “its substance has remained largely unchanged.” Lewis v. Lewis & Clark
Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 444 (2001). The statute now states that “the dis-
trict courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the
States, of: [a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to
suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.” 28
U.S.C. § 1333(1) (emphasis added).

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Nos. 23-2358 & 23-2359 11
The organizational landscape of the federal courts
changed over time, but the basic choices available to admi-
ralty plaintiffs generally did not. One significant change came
in the Judicial Code of 1911, when Congress eliminated the
federal circuit courts and transferred those courts’ original ju-
risdiction to the federal district courts. Pub. L. No. 61-475,
§§ 1, 24, 36 Stat. 1087, 1087, 1091. Consequently, common law,
equity, and admiralty cases were now all brought in the same
federal court. Because of the differences in the procedures for-
merly employed in litigating various types of cases, each fed-
eral district court now was seen as having a law side, an eq-
uity side, and an admiralty side. See Pugent Sound Nav. Co. v.
Nelson, 41 F.2d 356, 357–58 (9th Cir. 1930). As before, absent a
statute to the contrary, plaintiffs with in personam actions
could sue in admiralty, in state court, or on the law side (if
diversity existed). See Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co.,
358 U.S. 354, 363 (1959). Cases brought on the law side carried
the right to a jury trial, whereas cases brought on the admi-
ralty side generally did not. Compare Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc.
v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 360 (1962) (“This suit being
in the federal courts by reason of diversity of citizenship car-
ried with it, of course, the right to trial by jury.”), with Fitzger-
ald, 374 U.S. at 20 (noting that “the Seventh Amendment does
not require jury trials in admiralty cases”).
In the ensuing years, a unification process took place in
federal district court practice. By 1966, this unification was
complete, and since then the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
have governed all civil actions, including admiralty actions.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 1, cmt. (1966). The United States district courts
no longer have separate “sides.” Id. Critically, this merger of
the law, equity, and admiralty spheres of federal district court
practice did not change materially the choices available to

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12 Nos. 23-2358 & 23-2359
plaintiffs with maritime claims. See David W. Robertson, Ad-
miralty Procedure and Jurisdiction After the 1966 Unification, 74
Mich. L. Rev. 1627, 1630–31 (1976). Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 9(h), which became effective at the same time as the
unification, has helped to ensure as much. Under Rule 9(h), a
party whose claim is “within the admiralty or maritime juris-
diction and also within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction
on some other ground” can designate his claim as a non-ad-
miralty, common law claim or as an admiralty claim. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 9(h)(1). “One of the important procedural conse-
quences [of that designation] is that in the civil action either
party may demand a jury trial, while in the suit in admiralty
there is no right to jury trial except as provided by statute.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9, cmt. (1966).
To summarize: For a long time, maritime plaintiffs gener-
ally have been able to choose the forum in which they bring
in personam claims. Such plaintiffs generally could sue in fed-
eral admiralty courts, in state court, or if diversity existed, in
the federal circuit courts (1789–1911), on the “law side” of the
federal district courts (1911–1966), or by refraining from des-
ignating their claims as admiralty claims under Rule 9(h)
(since 1966). In these various eras, unless a statute provided
otherwise, if the plaintiff sued at law, either party could de-
mand a jury trial, but if they sued in admiralty, the case would
be tried by the court.
2.
With this background, we now address whether the plain-
tiffs are entitled to a jury trial. The plaintiffs contend that they
need not assert their DOHSA claims “in admiralty,” as admi-
ralty claims. They analogize their DOHSA claims to the
causes of action described in the previous section, which, as

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Nos. 23-2358 & 23-2359 13
we explained, can be brought as common-law claims if there
is a non-admiralty source of jurisdiction. They contend that
non-admiralty sources of jurisdiction such as diversity and
the MMTJA allow them to assert their DOHSA claims “at
law” and to demand a jury trial.3 The defendants, for their
part, maintain that plaintiffs with DOHSA claims in federal
court can only proceed “in admiralty,” without a jury trial.
Several considerations lead us to the conclusion that the
defendants have the better reading of the statute. First,
DOHSA states in its first section that a plaintiff “may bring a
civil action in admiralty.” § 30302 (emphasis added). In its
original form, it similarly stated that a plaintiff “may maintain
a suit for damages in the district courts of the United States,
in admiralty.” Pub. L. No. 66-165, § 1, 41 Stat. 537, 537 (1920)
(emphasis added). DOHSA has never expressly stated that
plaintiffs with DOHSA claims can maintain a suit at law or
with the right to a jury trial. The most natural inference to
draw from the combination of the express reference to a suit
in admiralty and the absence of a reference to a suit at law or
with a jury trial is that the cause of action created by DOHSA
3 Some scholars have, over the years, agreed with various versions of the
plaintiffs’ position. See Steven F. Friedell, Death at Sea and the Right to Jury
Trial, 48 Tul. Mar. L.J. 156 (2024) (criticizing the district court’s decision in
this case on the jury trial issue); Louis F. Nawrot, Jr., Note, Admiralty: Death
on the High Seas by Wrongful Act, 47 Cornell L.Q. 632, 637 (1962) (stating
that a “[p]reliminary analysis” of DOHSA “unquestionably favors concur-
rent jurisdiction with state and federal civil courts”); Calvert Magruder &
Marshall Grout, Wrongful Death Within the Admiralty Jurisdiction, 35 Yale
L.J. 395, 420 (1926) (stating that “a common law action [under DOHSA] …
probably” could “be brought in the federal courts”).

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14 Nos. 23-2358 & 23-2359
is to be brought in admiralty.4 This natural, ordinary reading
of DOHSA’s first section supports the defendants’ interpreta-
tion. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004) (“When inter-
preting a statute, we must give words their ‘ordinary or nat-
ural’ meaning.”) (quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223,
228 (1993)).
Second, courts have construed language similar to
DOHSA’s “may bring a civil action in admiralty” language to
require cases to be brought in admiralty. Under the Ship
Mortgage Act, which was enacted in 1920, mortgagees can in
certain cases bring “a civil action in personam in admiralty.”
46 U.S.C. § 31325(b)(2)(A). Under the Public Vessels Act,
which was enacted in 1925, “[a] civil action in personam in
admiralty may be brought … against the United States for
damages caused by a public vessel of the United States.” 46
U.S.C. § 31102(a). Both of these statutes, like DOHSA, do not
specifically address the jury trial issue. Nevertheless, claims
brought under those provisions do not carry the right to a jury
trial. See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law
§ 4:4 (5th ed. 2011). Courts “normally presume that the same
language in related statutes carries a consistent meaning.”
United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445, 458 (2019); see Azar v. Allina
Health Servs., 587 U.S. 566, 574 (2019) (“This Court does not
lightly assume that Congress silently attaches different mean-
ings to the same term in the same or related statutes.”). That
4 A different provision in DOHSA (46 U.S.C. § 30308(a)) allows plaintiffs
to bring DOHSA claims in state court, see Offshore Logistics, 477 U.S. at 232,
but that section does not address whether DOHSA claims that are in fed-
eral court must be brought in admiralty.

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Nos. 23-2358 & 23-2359 15
presumption applies here and supports the defendants’ posi-
tion.
Third, many other courts have for a long time agreed with
the defendants that, if a case involving only DOHSA claims is
in federal court, it must proceed in admiralty, without a jury
trial. See Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677, 680
(2d Cir. 1957); Higa v. Transocean Airlines, 230 F.2d 780, 782–85
(9th Cir. 1955); Lasky v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 850 F.
Supp. 2d 1309, 1314–15 (S.D. Fla. 2012); In re Air Disaster Near
Honolulu, Hawaii on Feb. 24, 1989, 792 F. Supp. 1541, 1547 (N.D.
Cal. 1990); Friedman v. Mitsubishi Aircraft Int’l, Inc., 678 F.
Supp. 1064, 1065–66 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Favaloro v. S/S Golden
Gate, 687 F. Supp. 475, 481 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Heath v. American
Sail Training Ass’n, 644 F. Supp. 1459, 1471 (D.R.I. 1987);
Rairigh v. Erlbeck, 488 F. Supp. 865, 867 (D. Md. 1980).5 The
plaintiffs and the amici supporting them have not identified
any decisions to the contrary.
These cases matter, in part because of the maxim that, if
Congress leaves in place a unanimous or near-unanimous ju-
dicial interpretation for a sufficiently long period of time, it
can be deemed to have acquiesced in or ratified that judicial
interpretation. See Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive
Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 536 (2015) (“If a word or
phrase has been … given a uniform interpretation by inferior
courts …, a later version of that act perpetuating the wording
5 See also LaCourse v. Def. Support Servs. LLC, No. 16-cv-170, 2018 WL
7342153, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2018); Modica v. Hill, No. 96-cv-1121, 1999
WL 52153, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 29, 1999). Cf. Choy v. Pan American Airways
Co., 1941 AMC 483, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (concluding that DOHSA claims
could be brought on the law side of the federal courts), expressly abrogated
by Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677, 680 (2d Cir. 1957).

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16 Nos. 23-2358 & 23-2359
is presumed to carry forward that interpretation.”); United
States v. Sanapaw, 366 F.3d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 2004) (relying on
Congress’s thirty-year acquiescence in decisions from circuit
courts).6 Here, Congress has not made any material changes
to DOHSA’s first section in the nearly eighty years since the
Second and Ninth Circuits decided this issue in accord with
the defendants’ position. Much has changed in admiralty law
in the years since, but, with the exception of two minor alter-
ations not relevant here,7 Congress has left DOHSA’s first sec-
tion unchanged. This history provides additional support for
our conclusion that the defendants have the better reading of
DOHSA.
The plaintiffs rely on what the Supreme Court has called
“the historic option of a maritime suitor pursuing a common-
law remedy to select his forum.” Romero, 358 U.S. at 371. They
contend that, in admiralty law, plaintiffs bringing tort claims
are presumed to be able to proceed at law, with a jury trial,
and that our reading of DOHSA would violate that presump-
tion. Our task in interpreting DOHSA, however, is not neces-
sarily to neatly harmonize that statute with other areas of ad-
miralty law. Instead, our task is to interpret the statute, start-
ing with its text and the rules of construction aimed at effec-
tuating Congress’s intent. For the reasons we have provided,
6 See also Manhattan Props., Inc. v. Irving Tr. Co., 291 U.S. 320, 336 (1934)
(concluding that congressional amendments that did not change relevant
provision, in the face of consensus interpretation given by courts of ap-
peals, ratified that judicial interpretation).
7 See Pub. L. 106-181, § 404(a)(1), 114 Stat. 61, 131 (2000); Pub. L. 109-304,
§ 6(c), 120 Stat. 1485, 1511 (2006).

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Nos. 23-2358 & 23-2359 17
we think that the defendants’ reading is most consistent with
DOHSA’s text and Congress’s intent.
We recognize the potential anomaly in allowing defend-
ants to effectively extinguish a plaintiff’s jury trial right by re-
moving a case to federal court. DOHSA claims, like other
wrongful-death tort claims, are typically tried by juries when
they are in state court. See, e.g., Curcuru v. Rose’s Oil Serv., Inc.,
802 N.E.2d 1032, 1039 (Mass. 2004); Khung Thi Lam v. Global
Med. Sys., 111 P.3d 1258, 1260, 1262 n.20 (Wash. Ct. App.
2005). But our analysis indicates that Congress has spoken on
the issue of the availability of a jury trial on DOHSA claims in
federal court.8
Conclusion
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the dis-
trict court’s rulings.
AFFIRMED
8 We note the possibility that the Chandra plaintiffs, whose claims were
filed initially in state court, could have tried to object to removal, relying
on certain authorities that interpret the saving-to-suitors clause to block
removal of otherwise removable admiralty claims. See Lu Junhong v. Boeing
Co., 792 F.3d 805, 818 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Perhaps it would be possible to ar-
gue that the saving-to-suitors clause itself forbids removal, without regard
to any language in § 1441.”); Riyanto v. Boeing Co., 638 F. Supp. 3d 902, 911
(N.D. Ill. 2022) (in a case arising out of a different plane crash in the Java
Sea, relying on saving-to-suitors clause for conclusion that Boeing could
not remove the case from state court to federal court). We have no occasion
to address that possibility here.

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