Jeanette S.r. Lipinski v. Yesenia Chavez

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted August 14, 2024*
Decided August 14, 2024
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2471
JEANETTE S.R. LIPINSKI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
YESENIA CHAVEZ, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 19-cv-06154
Martha M. Pacold,
Judge.
O R D E R
Jeanette S.R. Lipinski appeals the district court’s decision to grant the motion of
defendants (two police officers from the Village of Burnham, Illinois, and the Village) in
this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce the settlement of this case and dismiss it. The
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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district court properly found that the parties agreed to settle and enforced that
agreement by dismissing this case; thus we affirm.
The district court recruited Attorney Antonio Jeffrey to represent Lipinski. In
December 2021, Jeffrey recommended to Lipinski over a text message that he demand
$15,000 to settle the case. Lipinski replied “Ok! Still in rehabilitation. Thank you,” but
later asked him to demand more. The next month, Jeffrey and an opposing lawyer
began to discuss settlement via email. On January 20, 2022, defense counsel offered
$4,500 for a “full and complete settlement.” Jeffrey replied with a demand of $13,500;
defense counsel countered with $9,500; and Jeffrey returned with a $11,500 demand. On
February 25, defense counsel replied, “We have a deal.” The next day, Jeffrey confirmed
to counsel that Lipinski had previously approved the deal, but he added that she was
now giving “a little push back.” The next week, after Jeffrey sent Lipinski paperwork
reflecting the settlement, she told him over text message, “NO DEAL.”
The Village and the officers sought to enforce the settlement. Shortly before they
moved to enforce, Lipinski fired Jeffrey, the district court allowed him to withdraw, and
it recruited new counsel for Lipinski. She then responded to the motion to enforce with
a sworn statement that she never authorized Jeffrey to demand $11,500 and that the text
exchange of December 2021 was the last time she discussed settlement with Jeffrey
before he sent her the paperwork. The defendants replied with an affidavit from Jeffrey
and attached his phone records. He asserted that during calls on January 11 and
January 24, 2022, Lipinski authorized him to settle the case for any amount over $10,000.
He also stated that during a phone call the day after defense counsel accepted the
$11,500 demand, Lipinski “expressed hesitation regarding settlement” because she
wanted the officers to lose their jobs and be arrested as part of a settlement. Lipinski’s
second attorney later moved to withdraw, the court granted the motion, and it declined
to recruit another lawyer, so Lipinski proceeded pro se.
To resolve the competing narratives about the settlement, the court held an
evidentiary hearing after which it granted the motion to enforce and dismissed the suit.
Jeffrey testified consistently with his affidavit that Lipinski authorized him to settle the
case for over $10,000. Lipinski at first denied giving him that authority, but then
admitted that she did: “Just to get him off my—the subject, I agreed to the 10,000 just to
shut him up.” In granting the motion, the court applied Illinois law, reasoning that state
law governs the enforcement of settlement agreements in federal court. Next, the court
found that, as Illinois law requires, Jeffrey had express authority to settle the case for
over $10,000. It found credible Jeffrey’s testimony, corroborated with his phone records

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and Lipinski’s concession, that Lipinski authorized the settlement and voiced no regret
until after the case settled. Ruling that under Illinois law the settlement was enforceable,
the court dismissed with prejudice the claims against the Village and the officers. This
left only claims (under state law) against another defendant, a neighbor, who never
appeared and thus defaulted. The court vacated the default, relinquished supplemental
jurisdiction over those claims, and dismissed them without prejudice.
On appeal, Lipinski’s opening brief does not engage with the district court’s
reasoning. Although Lipinski is pro se, she must comply with Rule 28(a) of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure by including in her opening brief an argument explaining
why the court’s decision was incorrect. Atkins v. Gilbert, 52 F.4th 359, 361 (7th Cir. 2022).
Lipinski’s reply brief includes such an argument, but arguments raised for the first time
in a reply are waived. See White v. United States, 8 F.4th 547, 552 (7th Cir. 2021). Still, we
prefer to decide cases on their merits when we can, Atkins, 52 F.4th at 361, and
overlooking her waiver, we are able to do so here.
We begin with the governing legal principles. First, we review for clear error a
district court’s findings about historical facts, Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 126
(2009), and de novo its conclusion that a settlement agreement existed and is
enforceable, Beverly v. Abbott Lab’ys, 817 F.3d 328, 332 (7th Cir. 2016). Also, as the district
court explained, state law governs the enforcement of a settlement deal reached in
federal court, id. at 333, and the relevant state law is from Illinois because negotiations
all occurred there, see Sims-Madison v. Inland Paperboard and Packaging, Inc., 379 F.3d 445,
448 (7th Cir. 2004). In Illinois, an attorney must have the client’s express authority to
settle a lawsuit. Magallanes v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 535 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing
Webster v. Hartman, 749 N.E.2d 958, 963 n.1 (Ill. 2001)). And a settlement is enforceable if
supported by an offer, acceptance, and meeting of the minds on its material terms.
Dillard v. Starcon Intern., Inc., 483 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir. 2007) (applying Illinois law).
The district court did not clearly err by finding that Jeffrey had Lipinski’s express
authority to settle the case for any amount over $10,000. The record contains ample
evidence of the finding: Jeffrey testified—and Lipinski confirmed—that Lipinski gave
him that authority and that she voiced regret only after the deal for $11,500 was made.
Likewise, the district court properly enforced the settlement, and Lipinski’s
arguments for vacating the enforcement are unavailing. First, she argues that she
rejected the settlement when Jeffrey sent her the paperwork and when she fired him.
But those events happened after February 25, 2022, and by then the defense had already
accepted Lipinski’s authorized offer to settle the suit for $11,500 by replying on

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February 25 “We have a deal.” This exchange reflects a meeting of the minds regarding
an offer and acceptance of the essential terms of the suit’s settlement, and thus it is an
enforceable agreement under Illinois law. Second, Lipinski contends that she and
Jeffrey never exchanged emails about settlement. But the absence of an email exchange
is irrelevant because, as Jeffrey testified and the district court permissibly found,
Lipinski authorized the settlement over the phone. Third, Lipinski insists that Jeffrey
lied. But we must defer to the district court’s credibility determinations, see Anderson v.
City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985), where, as here, Lipinski gives no
compelling reason to overturn the court’s amply supported determination.
Finally, the district court properly handled the state-law claims against the
neighbor who defaulted by failing to appear. District courts may relinquish
supplemental jurisdiction when they dismiss all the claims over which they have
original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). And we presume that they will do so when
they dismiss all federal claims before trial. RWJ Mgmt. Co. v. BP Prod. N. Am., Inc., 672
F.3d 476, 479 (7th Cir. 2012). Because the district court never entered a judgment against
the neighbor, and it dismissed all federal claims before trial, the district court properly
followed that practice here.
We have considered Lipinski’s remaining arguments; none merits discussion.
AFFIRMED

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