Megan A. Rosenbaum v. State of Indiana

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted August 14, 2024*
Decided August 14, 2024
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1003
MEGAN A. ROSENBAUM,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
STATE OF INDIANA,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana,
Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:23-cv-01729-JPH-MJD
James Patrick Hanlon,
Judge.
O R D E R
Megan Rosenbaum appeals the dismissal of her complaint asserting that the
State of Indiana violated her constitutional rights when she was arrested for, and
ultimately convicted of, leaving the scene of an accident and driving under the
* The defendant-appellee was not served with process in the district court but
filed a response brief in this court after we notified it of the appeal. We have agreed to
decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present
the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court.
See F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-1003 Page 2
influence. We have already limited this appeal to the district court’s subsequent denial
of Rosenbaum’s “petition for rehearing,” which the district court properly construed as
a Rule 60(b) motion. Because the district court correctly denied that motion, which
proposed changing the defendant to a state court judge, we affirm.
Rosenbaum left the scene of a minor accident and was arrested; her ensuing
blood test was positive for cocaine. After a jury trial, which took place more than three
years after the accident in part because of the COVID-19 pandemic, Rosenbaum was
convicted of leaving the scene of an accident and driving under the influence. She was
sentenced to 120 days in jail and her driver’s license was suspended for one year.
After she completed her sentence and her license was restored, Rosenbaum filed
this lawsuit, asserting that police, the Indiana state courts, and her trial counsel violated
her constitutional rights. She said that the police unreasonably searched her and
unlawfully drew her blood without her consent. She also pressed various theories of
ineffective assistance of counsel and asserted that her right to a speedy trial had been
violated. Finally, she said the appellate court violated her constitutional rights when it
dismissed her direct criminal appeal after she failed to provide the correct trial
transcripts. Despite raising claims about the acts of several individuals, Rosenbaum
named only one defendant: the State of Indiana.
After construing the claims as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the district court
dismissed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, concluding that the State of Indiana
was not a person that could be sued under § 1983. The court gave Rosenbaum an
opportunity to amend her complaint, but it dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice after
she did not do so. The court issued the final judgment on October 31, 2023.
On December 4, Rosenbaum filed a “petition for rehearing.” In it, she proposed
substituting as the defendant one of the judges involved in her state criminal appeal.
Because the petition was submitted more than 28 days after the judgment was entered,
the district court construed it as a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).
The court denied the motion, reasoning that Rosenbaum had not identified a ground for
relief under Rule 60(b) and, in any event, the state court judge was immune from suit.
Rosenbaum then filed a notice of appeal, and we determined that her appeal was timely
only as to the denial of her post-judgment motion.
On appeal, Rosenbaum first challenges our order limiting the appeal to the
denial of her post-judgment motion. She argues that the motion was filed within
28 days of the entry of judgment and so it should have been construed as a motion to

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No. 24-1003 Page 3
alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), which would
have tolled the time to appeal, see Krivak v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 2 F.4th 601, 604
(7th Cir. 2021). She insists that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(d) extended the 28-day
period by three days because the final judgment was mailed to her. But Rule 6(d) does
not extend the deadline for Rule 59(e) motions. See Williams v. Illinois, 737 F.3d 473,
475–76 (7th Cir. 2013). In the alternative, Rosenbaum says the district court should have
considered the motion filed on the date she placed it in the mail (November 30), not the
date it arrived at the court (December 4). But motions submitted by non-incarcerated
litigants like Rosenbaum are considered filed when they are received by the clerk of the
court, not when they are mailed. See Raymond v. Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d 600, 604–05
(7th Cir. 2006). Because the motion was received by the district court more than 28 days
after judgment was entered, the court properly construed it as a motion under
Rule 60(b). We therefore will not disturb our previous order limiting this appeal.
Next, Rosenbaum argues that the district court wrongly denied her request to
substitute the appellate judge as the defendant. But the district court correctly
concluded that the judge was immune from suit. Judges are immune from any claim for
damages for judicial acts taken in their capacity as judges, unless they act “in the ‘clear
absence of all jurisdiction.’” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978) (quoting
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1872)). In Rosenbaum’s motion, she
complained about the delay in her criminal trial and the judge’s dismissal of her appeal.
She did not explain, and we do not see, how those acts were non-judicial or how the
judge would have acted without jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, Rosenbaum insists that Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), allows
her claims against the judge because she is also seeking injunctive relief: She is asking
the federal court to vacate the state appellate court’s dismissal of her appeal. But though
Ex parte Young allows some litigants to enjoin state officials from enforcing state laws
that contradict federal laws, it does not allow such suits against judges for acting in
cases before them. Id. at 163. Moreover, § 1983 bars injunctive relief against judicial
officers for actions taken in their judicial capacities. Finally, we note that the proper way
to seek federal collateral review of state-court rulings enforcing state custody is to
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 500 (1973), though such a petition was unavailable to Rosenbaum because she was
no longer in custody at the time she filed her complaint, see Stanbridge v. Scott, 791 F.3d
715, 718 (7th Cir. 2015).
AFFIRMED

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