United States of America v. James Harris

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-2421
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JAMES HARRIS ,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:11-cr-00667-5 — John J. Tharp, Jr., Judge.
____________________
A RGUED M AY 20, 2024 — DECIDED O CTOBER 2, 2024
____________________
Before F LAUM , BRENNAN , and K OLAR , Circuit Judges.
BRENNAN , Circuit Judge. James Harris has a lengthy crimi-
nal history including a federal criminal case, a state drug case,
and a state gun case that resulted in an acquittal. He also has
multiple violations of federal and state supervised release
conditions, and a state supervised release revocation. Faced
with this history, and after a two-day evidentiary hearing, the
district court revoked Harris’s federal supervised release.

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2 No. 23-2421
Harris appeals, arguing that the district court did not have
jurisdiction to rule on the alleged supervised release
violations, as well as that the court made mistakes during the
revocation hearing. We conclude that the district court had ju-
risdiction and committed no procedural errors, so we affirm
its ruling.
I
A. Harris’s Criminal Background
The focus of this appeal is the revocation of Harris’s fed-
eral supervised release ordered in his 2013 federal drug con-
viction. Harris’s later 2016 state drug conviction, and acquittal
in a 2023 state gun case, impacted his supervised release in
this federal case.
In 2012, Harris was charged with and pleaded guilty in the
Northern District of Illinois to conspiring to distribute heroin
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and with possessing a fire-
arm as a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
He was sentenced to 66 months in prison followed by four
years of supervised release. His conditions of supervision
prohibited him from committing another state or federal
crime and possessing controlled substances. Harris was re-
leased from prison and began supervised release on July 25,
2016.
Two months later, Harris was arrested and charged in the
Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois with distribution of a
controlled substance. The federal district court was alerted to
this violation of Harris’s supervised release. The parties
agreed to continue the revocation proceedings while Harris’s
state case remained pending. In 2018, Harris pleaded guilty to
possession of heroin, and the state court sentenced him to

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No. 23-2421 3
five-years in prison and two years of mandatory supervised
release.
In light of that conviction, the district court revoked Har-
ris’s federal supervised release and sentenced him to one year
in prison to run consecutive to his state sentence, followed by
three years of supervised release. Harris began his new, three-
year term of supervised release on March 17, 2020, which was
expected to end on March 16, 2023.
Less than four months later, on July 21, 2020, Harris was
again arrested and charged in Cook County, this time with
state gun offenses, including possessing a firearm as a con-
victed felon in violation of 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a). A special re-
port was filed with the district court, alleging that Harris had
violated the terms of his federal supervised release by com-
mitting a state firearm offense. Five days later, the district
court issued a bench warrant for Harris’s arrest.
On August 13, 2020, Harris’s supervised release in the
state drug case was also revoked. The state imprisoned Harris
for five months. He completed that term on January 14, 2021.
Following that incarceration, Harris remained on a hold
stemming from his violation of federal supervised release. He
asked the district court to place him on home detention while
his state gun case was being resolved. The district court
granted his request, imposed a curfew, and required him to
wear an electronic-monitoring bracelet.
Over the next few months, Harris violated the conditions
of his federal supervised release. By September 2022, the pro-
bation office reported Harris had violated the court-imposed
curfew nine times and had become homeless.

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4 No. 23-2421
In response, the district court initially ordered Harris de-
tained. But at his request, the court released Harris, adding
the condition that he “reside at or participate in the program
of a community corrections facility (including a facility main-
tained or under contract to the Bureau of Prisons Salvation
Army) for all or part of the term of supervised release, for a
period up to 120 days.” In late October 2022, the probation
office again alerted the district court to violations of Harris’s
supervised release conditions. He had twice tested positive
for using controlled substances and he also admitted that he
had smoked marijuana and used a “vape p[e]n” he obtained
from another Salvation Army resident.
Harris failed to complete the Salvation Army program and
was discharged. Less than a week later, the district court or-
dered that Harris be detained at the Metropolitan Correc-
tional Center Chicago (MCC). Another special report was
filed, charging Harris with violating the recently added con-
dition of release that he “participate in the program of a com-
munity corrections facility (including … the Bureau of Prisons
Salvation Army).” Specifically, the report alleged that Harris
(1) possessed “[n]arcotic/[d]rug [p]araphernalia,” (2) failed
“to meet with [his] case manager,” (3) was found “in an
[u]nauthorized area without staff authorization,” and (4) pos-
sessed an “[u]nauthorized” item or one “not issued through
regular channels.” At Harris’s request, the district court post-
poned his federal revocation proceedings until after his state
gun case concluded.
Harris, still in detention, went to trial on the state gun case
in June 2023. At trial, the State relied on testimony from an
officer who arrested Harris. That officer said the Chicago po-
lice had received reports of a man with a firearm. When the

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No. 23-2421 5
police arrived at the scene, they saw Harris set a brown purse
on a table then run away. The police caught Harris, arrested
him, and searched the bag, in which they found a firearm.
Harris claimed that neither the purse nor the gun were his and
that he did not know the gun was in the purse. Harris called
LaDonna Crawford, who owned the purse and firearm, to tes-
tify on his behalf. She said she legally possessed the gun pur-
suant to a state license. She also explained why Harris had her
purse. Another friend had accidentally taken her purse when
unloading groceries from her car. That friend gave Harris the
purse to return to Crawford. Closing arguments focused on
whether Harris knew that the gun was inside Crawford’s
purse. The defense argued that Harris ran from the police be-
cause he had an active arrest warrant at that time. The jury
acquitted Harris of all charges in the state gun case.
Harris then filed an emergency motion with the district
court seeking immediate release from detention. But the court
denied his motion, concluding that grounds for detention still
existed—the alleged federal supervised release violations. In
response, Harris filed a “Motion For the Court to Calculate
When Defendant’s Supervised Release Should Terminate.” In
it, Harris stated that he was unsure the “exact date” in 2020
when his three-year term of supervision began but posited
that his term “either has expired or [was] about to expire.” He
asked the court to determine whether his supervised release
term had lapsed and, if so, to terminate any further proceed-
ings.
The government responded by setting forth the district
court’s continuing jurisdiction. To the government, the term
of supervised release, which began on March 17, 2020, would
have expired on March 16, 2023. But the term was tolled for

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6 No. 23-2421
approximately five months—from August 13, 2020, through
January 14, 2021—when the supervised release in Harris’s
state drug case was revoked. The government emphasized
that Harris had requested and agreed to delay revocation pro-
ceedings on his federal supervised release until after the con-
clusion of his state gun case.
B. Revocation Hearing
The district court held a two-day evidentiary hearing in
July 2023 to consider the revocation of Harris’s federal super-
vised release. The court relayed his history of detainment,
including the five-months when Harris was imprisoned for
violating his state supervised release as a result of the state
gun charge. But the parties did not discuss this history in con-
nection with the court’s jurisdiction. Rather, they considered
whether the federal Bureau of Prisons would credit Harris for
time served in pretrial detention on the state gun charge. The
court believed that the time Harris served related to the state
gun case would apply to that case, not to the revocation sen-
tence in his federal case.
The government sought to prove that Harris violated three
supervised release conditions: (1) misconduct at the Salvation
Army in fall 2022; (2) possession of a firearm in July 2020 (as
charged in the state gun case); and (3) though not formally
charged as a violation, fighting at the MCC. On the first, Har-
ris’s counsel explained that Harris was “in a position to admit
to” several violations, those being “coming up positive for
marijuana and … some MDMA” and being “in a restricted or
an unauthorized area … at the Salvation Army.” But on the
second and third, concerning the firearm and MCC fight, Har-
ris’s counsel indicated that Harris would contest those allega-
tions. Specifically, as to the firearm-related allegation, counsel

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No. 23-2421 7
stated that Harris has “said all along that he’s not guilty of
that. That’s his position.”
The government provided evidence in support of the three
violations. First, as to the alleged misconduct, it explained
that “[e]ven though Mr. Harris is admitting to the violation,”
it wanted to present a report issued by the Salvation Army
that chronicled numerous allegations of misconduct at the fa-
cility. After the government summarized months of violations
in the report, Harris’s counsel interjected, “Harris just wants
me to basically relate [why] he was in the Salvation Army. …
But we do not disagree with the report or the things that were
alleged regarding the violations at the Salvation Army.” Har-
ris then stated: “That’s a lie.” The district court did not ask
Harris to clarify his comment, and the government concluded
its summary by explaining that Harris was “discharged as a
program failure due to a cumulative amount of incident re-
ports.”
Second, the government presented evidence that Harris
possessed a firearm on July 21, 2020. A 911 caller said that a
person matching Harris’s description was carrying a bag with
a firearm inside, and a surveillance video depicted Harris car-
rying such a bag. Body-camera video from the responding of-
ficers showed Harris setting the bag down and fleeing. The
government also provided transcripts from the state trial, in-
cluding testimony from the officer who retrieved the firearm
from inside the bag. Harris gave various reasons for why he
ran. Initially, he said he had marijuana on him, and later he
said he ran because he had an ecstasy pill on him. In closing
argument, Harris’s state trial attorney told the jury that Harris
ran because he had an active arrest warrant. To the state, these
shifting explanations were evidence of Harris’s guilt. The

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8 No. 23-2421
government also presented a theory for why Harris must
have known the gun was in the bag. He had admitted he knew
the bag contained insulin, and he could have known this only
by looking inside.
Harris’s counsel conceded that Harris possessed the bag
but argued that the government failed to prove he knew a fire-
arm was inside it. Harris submitted the transcript of Craw-
ford’s state trial testimony. She said she owned the purse and
firearm, that on the date of Harris’s arrest she had accidentally
left her purse at a friend’s house, and that the friend had
asked Harris to return her purse. She also provided a receipt
and gun lockbox to show gun ownership and showed that her
insulin was in the purse. Harris argued that Crawford’s testi-
mony undercut the government’s position that he knew the
purse contained a firearm. He emphasized that a state jury
had acquitted him of knowingly possessing it. Harris also ar-
gued that the 911 caller’s identity was unknown and could
have been someone trying to set Harris up.
Third, the government presented evidence that on June 4,
2023, Harris attacked another inmate at the MCC and that an
unknown assailant stabbed the victim during the resulting
melee. Evidence included a video of the incident, reports of
witness interviews, and recorded jail calls made by Harris.
C. Revocation Findings and Sentence
The district court considered the evidence and made its
findings. Initially, the court addressed Harris’s alleged mis-
conduct at the Salvation Army. Because the reports detailing
the misconduct “w[ere] admitted … there’s no need for the
Court to delve into that in any great detail.” The court re-
marked that Harris’s conduct showed “significant drug

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No. 23-2421 9
problems,” “is consistent with his criminal history,” and re-
veals “significant disrespect for the rule of law and an inabil-
ity to abide by conditions of release.”
By a preponderance of the evidence, the court found that
Harris knowingly possessed a firearm on July 21, 2020, and
thus had unlawfully possessed a firearm while on supervised
release. Highlighting the accurate descriptions given by the
caller in reporting a firearm in the purse, the court found it
“inconceivable” that Harris could not have known the purse’s
contents. The court also found that the surveillance video
showed Harris setting down the bag and abandoning it when
he saw the responding police officers. Harris wore the bag in
a “crossbody fashion,” the court emphasized, seemingly to se-
cure the firearm and two magazines inside it. To the court,
there was “no reason that Mr. Harris would … leave [the bag]
as he did unless he knew that there was something in it that
he shouldn’t have in his possession.” Moreover, Harris’s ad-
mission to the arresting officers that he knew the bag con-
tained insulin meant he must have looked inside the bag and
seen the gun.
In addition, the district court found that Harris’s explana-
tions for fleeing were “inconsistent” and “undermine[d] his
credibility.” Harris first told the officers that he ran because
he was selling drugs, but he had no drugs on him when he
was arrested, nor were there drugs in the bag he set down be-
fore fleeing. Though Harris claimed he had thrown away his
marijuana before the officers detained him, surveillance video
undercut that claim. And his assertion that he ran because he
possessed an ecstasy pill was likewise undermined because
none was found. The court found “curious” Harris’s attempt
to make a deal with the officers—offering to “get the police

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10 No. 23-2421
more guns if they [would] let him out the back door” of the
police car. Also considered and rejected was the argument, of-
fered by Harris’s counsel at the state trial, that Harris ran be-
cause of an outstanding arrest warrant. As the court put it,
there was no reason for Harris to suspect the police “would
have suddenly shown up at that spot to execute an arrest war-
rant.” To the district court, by abandoning the bag and flee-
ing, Harris had purposefully sought to distance himself from
the bag he knew contained a firearm. Separately, the court
called the argument “extraordinarily farfetched” that some-
one may have been trying to “set up” Harris by placing a 911
call to report his firearm possession.
As to the events at the MCC, the district court found that
Harris “was clearly involved in instigating” and engaging in
the fight. “[T]here’s no evidence that Mr. Harris was respon-
sible for the stabbing itself,” the court noted, but it neverthe-
less found his conduct “serious” and “disturbing.”
After pronouncing its findings, the district court turned to
Harris’s revocation sentence. His advisory Guidelines range
was calculated as 21 to 27 months’ imprisonment for the
supervised release violations. Before the court pronounced
sentence, Harris claimed innocence on the firearm charge—
insisting he “didn’t know the weapon was in that purse”—
but “accept[ing] responsibility for using drugs.” Harris ex-
plained why he used drugs at the Salvation Army:
I was kind of weak minded. You know, in situa-
tions in life I felt like I could have been a little
more stronger, smoke some marijuana, you
know, not knowing what they sprayed on it. So
yeah, I take full responsibility for that, being
weak minded.

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No. 23-2421 11
Harris denied his involvement in the incident at the MCC,
saying he “never got convicted” of the incident in any disci-
plinary proceeding, and contending the government was
“blam[ing] this big story [on him].”
The court sentenced Harris to concurrent terms of 24
months in prison for failing to participate in the Salvation
Army’s community corrections program by violating its rules
and 36 months in prison for unlawfully possessing a firearm.
Finding that Harris had engaged in the prison fight, the court
explained it was a factor in his revocation. But the court did
not specify a sentence for that conduct because the fight was
not formally charged as a violation of his supervised release.
No supervised release was ordered upon completion of the 36
months in prison.
In explaining the sentence, the district judge addressed
Harris stating, “[y]ou are responsible for what is, in my 11
years on the bench, the most abysmal performance on super-
vised release of any defendant that’s been assigned to my
docket.” The court emphasized that, “rather than actually ac-
cepting responsibility for your conduct, you’re still denying
your conduct.” Overall, the court found that Harris’s viola-
tions—in conjunction with his “MCC fight,” his “abysmal
compliance with location monitoring,” and “his prior history
of supervised release revocation”—compelled an above-
Guidelines sentence, with no additional supervision to fol-
low.
After the hearing, a docket entry reflected the revocation
of supervised release and the court’s sentence. It also noted
Harris’s motion for the court to calculate when his supervised
release should be terminated is “denied for the reasons set
forth in the Government’s response.”

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12 No. 23-2421
II
Harris brings two main claims on appeal. First, he con-
tends the district court did not have jurisdiction to rule on the
alleged supervised release violations connected to his federal
conviction. Second, he submits the district court committed
two procedural errors by finding that he “admitted” to the
Salvation Army violations and by relying on inaccurate infor-
mation.
A. District Court Jurisdiction
We review de novo whether the district court had jurisdic-
tion to revoke Harris’s supervised release. United States v.
Block, 927 F.3d 978, 981 (7th Cir. 2019). This question cannot
be waived. Id. A district court may “revoke a term of super-
vised release, and require the defendant to serve in prison all
or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute
for the offense that resulted in such term of supervised re-
lease … if the court … finds by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised
release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Harris argues that the district
court lacked jurisdiction to consider his alleged violations at
the Salvation Army because his supervised release had ex-
pired by the time of the court’s decision.1
Though a defendant’s supervised release ordinarily ends
at the conclusion of the term originally imposed by the district
court, that term is tolled “during any period in which the
person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a
1 Harris does not argue that the district court lacked jurisdiction to
consider whether he had committed another federal, state, or local crime
by possessing a firearm (as charged in the state gun case). Regardless, our
reasoning applies to all violations discussed at the revocation hearing.

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No. 23-2421 13
Federal, State, or local crime … .” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e). Such
imprisonment “pause[s] and postpone[s] an ongoing term” of
supervision. United States v. Maranda, 761 F.3d 689, 695 (7th
Cir. 2014).2 Harris’s three-year term of federal supervised re-
lease began on March 17, 2020. But he was imprisoned in the
Illinois Department of Corrections for five months of that pe-
riod when his supervised release was revoked in his state
drug case.
Considering the plain language of § 3624(e), numerous
federal circuits have held that that statute’s tolling provision
triggers when a defendant on federal supervised release is im-
prisoned in a state case. See, e.g., United States v. Ahmadzai, 723
F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[W]henever a person is
imprisoned for one crime, a term of supervised release for an-
other crime does not run, regardless of any other circum-
stances.”) (citation omitted); United States v. Hernandez-Ferrer,
599 F.3d 63, 67 (1st Cir. 2010) (“The government is correct that
imprisonment lasting for at least thirty days, in connection
with a different offense, tolls the running of a supervised re-
lease term.”); United States v. House, 501 F.3d 928, 930 (8th Cir.
2007) (“[U]nder the express terms of 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e), the
one-year term of supervised release was tolled … when
House began serving an eight-year prison sentence imposed
by the State of Missouri.”). That remains true even when the
2 Harris also argues Maranda supports the argument that his super-
vised release period was not tolled. But Maranda discussed whether the
term of a defendant’s supervised “release began on the day his prison sen-
tence expired, rather than on the day he was physically released from cus-
tody.” 761 F.3d at 694. “Rather than analyzing the circumstances that will
toll an ongoing term of supervised release,” the court determined “the cir-
cumstance that causes a term of supervised release to commence.” Id. at 698.
So, Maranda does not support Harris’s argument.

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14 No. 23-2421
state detention results from revocation of a term of state su-
pervision. See United States v. Bussey, 745 F.3d 631, 633 (2d Cir.
2014) (finding that defendant’s federal supervised release was
tolled for the entirety of his 22-month incarceration for violat-
ing parole in a New York state case because “the incarceration
that results from revocation is a consequence of the underly-
ing crime of conviction”); United States v. Jackson, 426 F.3d 301,
303–04 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that defendant’s “[federal] su-
pervised release period was tolled while he was incarcerated
for [a state] parole violation,” even though the parole
violation was later held unconstitutional, because § 3624(e)
“indicates that the period of supervised release does not run
during imprisonment; the statute states no exceptions”).
We agree the plain language of § 3624(e) requires that Har-
ris’s term of federal supervised release was tolled during the
five months he was incarcerated for violating his state super-
vised release. So, his supervised release term would expire af-
ter the district court made its revocation findings. The district
court thus had jurisdiction to rule on Harris’s supervised re-
lease violations.
Nevertheless, Harris asserts his five-month imprisonment
should not count for purposes of § 3624(e)’s tolling provision
because it was triggered by the revocation of supervised re-
lease and is not a “new ‘conviction’”. Because incarceration
for violations of supervised release is a continuation of an old
conviction, Harris says his supervised release term was not
tolled. But this analysis is incorrect.
The tolling provision of § 3624(e) is not limited to new con-
victions or to terms of imprisonment imposed in the immedi-
ate wake of sentencing. Rather, by its plain language, a term
of federal supervised release “does not run during any period

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No. 23-2421 15
in which the person is imprisoned in connection with a con-
viction for a … State … crime.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e). Here, Har-
ris’s five-month imprisonment was in connection with his
state drug conviction. His state supervised release was im-
posed at sentencing for that conviction. And he served the five
months of imprisonment at issue as part of that sentence.
Harris relies on Mont v. United States, 587 U.S. 514 (2019),
to support his argument, but he misreads that case. Mont con-
fronted a separate question—whether pretrial detention later
credited as time served for the same pending conviction is
“imprison[ment] in connection with a conviction” and thus
tolls the supervised-release term under § 3624(e). Mont, 587
U.S. at 516. The Supreme Court held that the pretrial deten-
tion was in connection with the pending conviction and tolled
supervised release. Id.
To reach its holding in Mont, the Court analyzed key defi-
nitions in the statute, finding, for example, “that ‘in connec-
tion with’ can bear a ‘broad interpretation.’” Id. at 521. The
Court deemed the text of the statute to be retrospective—that
is, to compel courts to calculate the time spent “in connection”
with a conviction “upon the defendant’s release from cus-
tody.” Id. at 523. Additionally, the Court found “it would be
an exceedingly odd construction of the statute to give a de-
fendant the windfall of satisfying a new sentence of imprison-
ment and an old sentence of supervised release with the same
period of pretrial detention.” Id. at 524. This was because
“[s]upervised release is a form of punishment that Congress
prescribed along with a term of imprisonment as part of the
same sentence” and “Congress denies defendants credit for
time served if the detention time has already ‘been credited
against another sentence.’” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b)).

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16 No. 23-2421
The Court stressed that defendant’s contrary “reading of
§ 3624(e) would deprive the Government of its lawfully im-
posed sentence of supervised release while the defendant is
serving a separate sentence of incarceration—one often im-
posed by a different sovereign.” Id.
Mont underscores the plain reading of the tolling statute:
when a federal supervisee spends time imprisoned following
a state conviction, his term of federal supervised release is
tolled for that period. See id. at 523–24.
Separately, Harris argues that United States v. Block, 927
F.3d 978 (7th Cir. 2019), stands for the proposition that a
supervised release period is not tolled during “any time a su-
pervisee spends in detention as part of a revocation of super-
vised release or when otherwise reincarcerated as a result of
an earlier conviction.” Again, Harris overreads this prece-
dent. Block involved different circumstances than here. If an-
ything, its holding undermines Harris’s position.
In Block, the probation office reported that the defendant
had violated conditions of a three-year term of federal
supervised release. The district court detained the defendant
pending a hearing on those allegations without issuing any
summons or warrant. 927 F.3d at 981. More than a year later,
after the defendant’s term of supervision had expired, the dis-
trict court held the hearing and formally revoked his super-
vised release. Id. On appeal, this court held that the district
court lacked jurisdiction over the matter because the defend-
ant’s period of incarceration pending the revocation hearing
did not toll his term of supervision. Id. We explained that 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) grants district courts the power to “‘require
the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of su-
pervised release authorized by statute for the offense that

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No. 23-2421 17
resulted in such term of supervised release.’” Id. at 982 (quot-
ing § 3583(e)(3)). In other words, a defendant’s pre-hearing
detention amounted to an in-custody portion of the three-year
term of supervision he was serving—a term that continued to
run while he was detained in the same federal case. See id. As
we explained, “§ 3624(e)’s tolling provision is inapposite
where a releasee is reincarcerated as a result of his original con-
viction.” Id. (emphasis added).
This case presents a different situation. Unlike in Block,
Harris’s five months in custody were served on a different
case, in a different jurisdiction. To the extent Block has any ap-
plication here, it underscores that Harris’s time in custody fol-
lowing the revocation of his state supervised release occurred
“as a result” of that state conviction, and thus was in connec-
tion with it—precisely as § 3624(e) contemplates. Block, 927
F.3d at 982. Indeed, in reaching its holding that a federal su-
pervisee’s detention in the same case does not toll his term of
supervision, Block cited United States v. Cole, 567 F.3d 110, 114-
15 (3d Cir. 2009): “Congress has provided for tolling in only
one situation: where the defendant is imprisoned for more
than 30 days for another conviction.” Block, 927 F.3d at 982
(cleaned up). That is the case here.
The rule Harris advocates also would frustrate the pur-
pose of supervised release in the federal system. As the Su-
preme Court has explained, “‘[t]he objectives of supervised
release would be unfulfilled if excess prison time were to off-
set and reduce terms of supervised release’ because ‘[s]uper-
vised release has no statutory function until confinement
ends.’” Mont, 587 U.S. at 523–24 (citing United States v. Johnson,
529 U.S. 53, 59–60 (2000)). The Court also explained that the
text of § 3624(e) “reinforces the fact that prison time is ‘not

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18 No. 23-2421
interchangeable’ with supervised release.” Id. at 524 (citing
Johnson, 529 U.S. at 59). This rationale supports the district
court’s reading of § 3624(e)’s tolling provision in Harris’s case.
While Harris was in prison for violating the terms of his state
supervised release—purposely excluded from the commu-
nity—his federal probation officer could not supervise him.
“[I]t was impossible for his probation officer to assist him in
returning to the community.” Jackson, 426 F.3d at 305.
Altogether, Harris’s five-month period of incarceration in
Illinois for allegedly violating conditions of his state super-
vised release tolled the period of his federal supervised re-
lease. His federal supervised release term ended more than a
month after the revocation hearing. So, the district court had
jurisdiction to consider the alleged violations of Harris’s su-
pervised release conditions.
B. Claimed Procedural Errors
Harris also argues that the district court erred at the revo-
cation hearing. If properly preserved, procedural and other
constitutional challenges to supervised release revocation
proceedings are reviewed de novo. See United States v. Karst,
948 F.3d 856, 864 (7th Cir. 2020) (procedural error); United
States v. Lee, 795 F.3d 682, 685 (7th Cir. 2015) (constitutional
arguments). But if a defendant did not raise the issue with the
district court—forfeited his claims—his challenge is reviewed
for plain error. Lee, 795 F.3d at 685. Even more, where a de-
fendant’s failure to object was intentional, the challenge is
waived. United States v. Armour, 804 F.3d 859, 865 (7th Cir.
2015).

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No. 23-2421 19
Harris claims the district court committed two procedural
errors—finding that Harris “admitted” to the Salvation Army
violations and relying on inaccurate information.
1. Admission to Salvation Army Misconduct
Although “a revocation hearing need not contain all of the
procedural protections of” Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 11 (the rule applicable to guilty pleas), the Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 32.1 (the rule applicable to revoking or
modifying supervised release) does apply. United States v. Le-
Blanc, 175 F.3d 511, 516 (7th Cir. 1999). So, admissions to vio-
lations of supervised release must be knowing and voluntary.
See id. at 516–17. To determine whether a defendant’s waiver
of the right to challenge a violation was knowing and volun-
tary, courts look at the totality of the circumstances. See id. at
517. District courts may skip a formal colloquy before accept-
ing an admission—but only if the record confirms that the
defendant “‘had a sufficient grasp of a particular right or con-
sequence of the waiver.’” United States v. Nelson, 931 F.3d 588,
591 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Boultinghouse, 784
F.3d 1163, 1172 (7th Cir. 2015)).
The district court found that Harris “admitted” to the Sal-
vation Army violations. So, it saw no need “to delve into that
[violation] in any great detail.” Harris argues the record does
not show any such admission. Though his trial counsel com-
mented about his potential desire to admit the violation, Har-
ris contends he did not admit anything.
At the beginning of the evidentiary hearing, Harris’s trial
counsel said that Harris was “in a position to admit to” sev-
eral violations, but counsel did not expressly say that Harris
wanted to do so. Later, when the government presented its

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20 No. 23-2421
evidence, Harris’s counsel repeated that he would not chal-
lenge any facts alleged in the Salvation Army’s reports. But
again, counsel did not expressly say that Harris wanted to ad-
mit those facts, nor did he say that Harris wanted to admit to
a violation. Last, when Harris’s lawyer said, “we do not disa-
gree with the report or the things that were alleged regarding
the violations at the Salvation Army,” Harris interrupted to
say, “[t]hat’s a lie.” The district court did not ask Harris what
he meant by this outburst, nor did it ask him directly whether
he wanted to challenge the violation.
To Harris, the totality of these circumstances shows that
he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to con-
test this violation. But he does not consider the full record.
Harris’s counsel relayed—in front of his client—Harris’s de-
cision not to contest the allegation that he failed to comply
with Salvation Army requirements. His counsel said Harris
was “in a position to admit to” several violations, those being
“coming up positive for marijuana and … some MDMA” and
being “in a restricted or an unauthorized area … at the Salva-
tion Army.” Harris did not express disagreement or object.
Nor did he speak up later in the hearing when government
counsel repeated that Harris was “admitting to the [Salvation
Army] violation, which is unlawful use of a controlled sub-
stance.” Nor did Harris do so when the district court stated
the “Salvation Army conduct … was admitted.” Even more,
near the end of the hearing and before the district court im-
posed any punishment, Harris addressed the court: “I ac-
cepted responsibility for using drugs.” Harris explained he
“smoke[d] some marijuana … not knowing what they
sprayed on it” because he was “weak minded” at the time. He
reiterated, “I take full responsibility for that.”

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No. 23-2421 21
This record shows that Harris did not want to contest that
he used drugs at the Salvation Army. He thus waived the ar-
gument that he did not violate his supervised release condi-
tions with misconduct at the Salvation Army.
2. Reliance on Accurate Information
Criminal defendants have “‘a due process right to be sen-
tenced on the basis of accurate and reliable information.’”
United States v. Oliver, 873 F.3d 601, 608–09 (7th Cir. 2017)
(quoting United States v. Corona-Gonzalez, 628 F.3d 336, 343
(7th Cir. 2010)). This right applies equally to revocation pro-
ceedings. See United States v. White, 868 F.3d 598, 603–04 (7th
Cir. 2017). And a court commits “a significant procedural er-
ror if it selects a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts.”
Oliver, 873 F.3d at 609 (cleaned up).
To successfully challenge a sentence on this ground, a
defendant “‘must show both that information before the sen-
tencing court was inaccurate and that the sentencing court re-
lied on the inaccurate information in the sentencing.’” Id. at
609 (citing Lechner v. Frank, 341 F.3d 635, 639 (7th Cir. 2003)).
The defendant’s burden to make this showing is “low.” United
States v. Miller, 900 F.3d 509, 513 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting
United States v. Barnes, 907 F.2d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 1990)). And
requires “only that ‘false information was part of the basis for
the sentence.’” Miller, 900 F.3d at 513 (quoting U.S. ex rel.
Welch v. Lane, 738 F.2d 863, 865 (7th Cir. 1984)). The defendant
does not have to demonstrate prejudice or “that the judge
would have chosen a different sentence if properly in-
formed.” Id.
Harris claims the district court relied on inaccurate infor-
mation during the revocation hearing by concluding that he

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22 No. 23-2421
knowingly possessed a gun. Key to the court’s consideration
was whether Harris knew the purse he was holding contained
a firearm. A jury had found that Harris did not know about
the gun when it acquitted him of state gun charges. At the rev-
ocation hearing, the government argued the jury got it wrong,
in part because of Harris’s “changing explanations” for why
he ran from the police. The court accepted the government’s
argument, citing Harris’s “inconsistent statements about why
he ran” as one of the main reasons for finding that Harris
knowingly possessed the gun. In making this finding, the dis-
trict court discussed three explanations the government cited:
that Harris possessed marijuana, that he possessed an ecstasy
pill, and that he had a parole violation and knew there was a
warrant out for his arrest.
Harris asserts the third statement, about the parole viola-
tion and warrant, was made by his counsel, not him. He
claims the district court did not pick up on this distinction,
which skewed the court’s view of his credibility and sentence.
But the district court understood that Harris’s counsel
made the third statement. After discussing that evidence the
court found persuasive, it noted how the three explanations
impacted Harris’s credibility. The court commented how each
was unpersuasive—those Harris offered to the police when he
was arrested, and the one his state trial counsel offered. The
court identified the explanation that Harris ran because “there
was a warrant out for his arrest” as “the defense that was of-
fered at the trial.” After rejecting the contention, the court
moved to the accounts Harris offered to police—that he pos-
sessed marijuana and an ecstasy pill, both of which the sur-
veillance video refuted. Although the court then addressed
for a second time “the argument that [Harris] ran because

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No. 23-2421 23
there was an arrest warrant,” the transcript does not support
the assertion that the court was unclear about the source of
that statement. So, the district court did not rely on inaccurate
information.
III
We compliment the district court for its excellent work in
this case. Harris’s five-month period of incarceration in Illi-
nois for allegedly violating the supervised release in the state
drug case tolled his federal supervised release period. So, the
district court had jurisdiction to consider Harris’s alleged vi-
olations of his federal supervised release conditions. The
court did not err in finding that Harris admitted to the Salva-
tion Army violations, and it did not rely on inaccurate infor-
mation. For these reasons, we A FFIRM the district court.

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