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24-1148•United States of America v. Ledaniel Russell
24-1148Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit16.10.2024
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 15, 2024
Decided October 16, 2024
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1148
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
LEDANIEL RUSSELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Illinois.
No. 3:22-cr-30136-DWD
David W. Dugan,
Judge.
O R D E R
Ledaniel Russell pleaded guilty to one count of possession to distribute
controlled substances—heroin, fentanyl, methamphetamine, and cocaine, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B)—and was sentenced to 144 months in prison. Despite a
broad appeal waiver in his plea agreement, Russell filed a notice of appeal. His
appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and seeks to withdraw
under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Counsel's brief explains the nature of the
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1
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No. 24-1148 Page 2
case and addresses potential issues that an appeal of this kind would typically involve.
Because counsel's analysis appears thorough and Russell did not respond to the motion,
see C IR . R. 51(b), we limit our review to the subjects identified in the brief. See United
States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). We grant the motion and dismiss the
appeal.
Counsel informs us that Russell does not wish to challenge his guilty plea, so
counsel properly refrains from discussing the voluntariness of the plea. See United States
v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671
(7th Cir. 2002).
Counsel considers whether Russell could challenge his sentence and rightly
concludes that the appeal waiver would foreclose any challenge. In his plea agreement,
Russell waived his right to appeal “all appellate issues” including the right to modify or
contest “any aspect of the conviction or sentence in any type of proceeding.” An
appellate waiver stands or falls with the underlying plea agreement, see, e.g., United
States v. Nulf, 978 F.3d 504, 506 (7th Cir. 2020), and Russell does not want to challenge
his plea. Additionally, as counsel points out, no exception to the appeal waiver could
apply. Russell’s sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum of life imprisonment,
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), and, as the sentencing transcript shows, the court
did not consider any constitutionally impermissible factors at sentencing. See United
States v. Campbell, 813 F.3d 1016, 1018 (7th Cir. 2016). Moreover, Russell’s 144-month
sentence was within the applicable guidelines range. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A
(sentencing table). Russell’s 5-year term of supervised release was within the applicable
statutory limit. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B). Russell’s $300 fine was well
below the applicable guidelines range. See U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2. And Russell’s $100 special
assessment was within the applicable statutory limit. See 18 U.S.C. § 3013.
Therefore, we GRANT counsel's motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.
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