United States of America v. William Kieffer

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 22, 2024
Decided October 23, 2024
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2853
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM KIEFFER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 1:21-CR-00207(1)
Manish S. Shah,
Judge.
O R D E R
William Kieffer pleaded guilty to transporting and possessing child
pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1), (a)(5)(B), (b)(2), and was sentenced to 10 years’
imprisonment. Kieffer appeals, but his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is
frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the case and raises potential issues that an appeal
like this would be expected to involve. Because counsel’s analysis appears thorough,
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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and Kieffer has not responded to the motion, see C IR . R. 51(b), we limit our review to the
subjects that counsel discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
Kieffer administered an online network for distributing and exchanging child
pornography. After an undercover investigator infiltrated the ring, federal agents
executed a search warrant at Kieffer’s home and uncovered a cache of thousands of
images and videos depicting child exploitation. Kieffer cooperated with law
enforcement and, following an indictment on four counts, pleaded guilty to one count
of unlawful transportation of child pornography, 18 U.S.C § 2252A(a)(1), and one count
of unlawful possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2).
In his written plea agreement, Kieffer stipulated that: (1) he transferred multiple
images of child pornography to other users of his online network; (2) he owned several
devices that contained thousands of images and videos of child pornography; (3) he
occasionally disseminated these files in return for valuable consideration (other explicit
material); and (4) he possessed images of prepubescent minors and minors under 12
years of age, portrayals of sadistic and masochistic conduct, other depictions of
violence, and the sexual abuse or exploitation of an infant or toddler.
After holding a change-of-plea hearing and engaging in a colloquy with Kieffer,
see FED. R. C RIM. P. 11(b), the district court accepted Kieffer’s guilty plea and directed
the Probation Office to prepare a presentence investigation report (“PSR”). The PSR
grouped the two counts, U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d), and applied a base offense level of 22
under § 2G2.2(a)(2). The PSR added 18 levels for special offense characteristics: two
levels for material involving prepubescent minors or minors under the age of 12,
§ 2G2.2(b)(2); five levels for distributing the images for non-pecuniary valuable
consideration, § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B); four levels for material involving sadistic, masochistic,
or violent conduct, or portraying the sexual abuse of an infant or toddler, § 2G2.2(b)(4);
two levels for using a computer, § 2G2.2(b)(6); and five levels for conduct involving 600
or more images, § 2G2.2(b)(7)(D). Three offense levels were subtracted for timely
acceptance of responsibility, § 3E1.1(a)–(b). This resulted in a total offense level of 37,
which, when combined with a criminal history category of I, produced a sentencing
range of 210 to 262 months’ imprisonment.
By statute, the range of supervised release was five years to life, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(k), and so that became the guidelines range as well, U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(b)–(c). The
PSR identified, to date, 20 victims who claimed a total of $129,500 in mandatory
restitution. See 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b).

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Kieffer objected to the guidelines calculations in the PSR. He asserted he was
entitled to a two-level reduction under then-pending Amendment 821’s “Adjustment
for Certain Zero-Point Offenders.” U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1 (2023). Kieffer also objected to the
restitution, arguing that there was no evidence that he proximately caused the harm to
the victims. Finally, Kieffer objected to four of the recommended special conditions of
supervised release.
At the sentencing hearing, the court began by reviewing the PSR. Regarding
Kieffer’s guidelines objection, the district court observed that Amendment 821 was not
yet in effect and that, in any event, Kieffer would not satisfy § 4C1.1(a)(5)’s requirement
that his crime not be a sex offense. After overruling the objection, the district court
granted the government’s motion to subtract a third offense level for acceptance of
responsibility. Accordingly, the court adopted the guidelines range set forth in the PSR.
Regarding restitution, the district court rejected Kieffer’s proximate-causation
argument, concluding that victim impact statements showed that Kieffer harmed the
victims by possessing and trading images and that this harm could be approximately
measured for most victims under the “1/n” method.1 See Paroline v. United States, 57 U.S.
434, 458–460 (2014). The court reviewed each victim’s claim and assessed an amount
based on the total claimed damages, the amount of previous restitution payments, the
quantity of images of the victim, and whether the images had been distributed. The
court arrived at a total restitution of $67,400 to the 20 victims. Next, the court resolved
Kieffer’s objections to the conditions of supervised release, either sustaining them or
deferring a ruling until his release.
Finally, the court invited argument from both sides about the appropriate
sentence, heard Kieffer’s allocution, and then discussed the sentencing factors under 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court considered the gravity of Kieffer’s offense—emphasizing
that he not only collected but distributed the harmful material—and balanced that
against his stable personal life, his traumatic childhood, his health challenges, and the
heightened dangers he faces in prison. The court ultimately concluded that a below-
range sentence would serve the purposes of sentencing and imposed 120 months’
1 Under this method, a defendant’s restitution amount for each victim is that
victim’s total claimed expenses, divided by the number of offenders who have been
ordered to pay restitution, including the defendant being sentenced. United States v.
Sainz, 827 F.3d 602, 605 (7th Cir. 2016).

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imprisonment and 10 years’ supervised release. The court also imposed $10,200 in
special assessments: $200 under 18 U.S.C. § 3013(a)(2)(B) and $10,000 under § 3014(a)(3).
In his Anders brief, counsel first states that he advised Kieffer about the risks and
benefits of challenging the guilty plea and determined that Kieffer does not seek to
withdraw his plea. See United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002). Counsel
therefore properly omits discussion of whether the plea was knowing and voluntary.
See United States v. Larry, 104 F.4th 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 2024).
Next, counsel considers whether Kieffer could raise a nonfrivolous argument
that there was a procedural error at sentencing, but counsel properly concludes that
there is not. The base offense level was 22 under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d) and § 2G2.2(a)(2),
Kieffer stipulated to the facts supporting the 18 levels of special offense characteristics,
and he received the full three-level reduction for accepting responsibility. Kieffer had
zero criminal history points, corresponding to the criminal history category of I, and so
the court adopted the correct range of 210–262 months’ imprisonment. Counsel also
considers Kieffer’s request that the district court apply a two-level reduction for being a
zero-point offender under Guidelines Amendment 821. A district court must normally
apply the Guidelines that are in effect on the sentencing date, § 1B1.11(a), and here that
did not include the zero-point offender adjustment, see § 4C1.1 (adjustment effective
November 1, 2023). Moreover, the provision does not apply to sex offenses. U.S.S.G.
§ 4C1.1(a)(5).
Counsel next considers but rightly rejects a challenge to the substantive
reasonableness of the 120-month prison term. On appeal, we presume that a sentence
below a properly calculated guidelines range is not unreasonably long. United States v.
Campbell, 37 F.4th 1345, 1352 (7th Cir. 2022). As counsel explains, nothing in the record
undermines that presumption. The court applied the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and
weighed the seriousness of the offense against Kieffer’s mitigating personal
characteristics. We would not conclude that the district court abused its discretion with
respect to how it weighed these factors. See Campbell, 37 F.4th at 1349.
Counsel further considers the restitution. The district court found that the victim
impact statements show Kieffer caused harm to the victims by viewing and trading the
images, and that the victims incurred measurable losses because they require
continuing counseling. Those findings are a proper basis for a court to order restitution
under 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b). See Paroline, 572 U.S. at 458–60. Kieffer expressly agreed at
sentencing he did not dispute the “claimed total losses” and therefore waived any
objection to the amounts. See United States v. Harris, 102 F.4th 847, 850–52 (7th Cir. 2024).

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The court’s method of calculation was within its discretion. United States v. Sainz,
827 F.3d 602, 605–07 (7th Cir. 2016). The court treated each victim’s claim individually,
calculated an estimated amount using the approved “1/n” method, and erred toward
awarding a conservative amount compared to what was claimed. See Paroline, 572 U.S.
at 458–60; Sainz, 827 F.3d at 605–07. It would therefore be frivolous to challenge the
mandatory restitution amounts.
Finally, counsel considers whether the district court properly ordered the special
assessment under the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3014(a)(3).
Through his pension income, Kieffer can pay the assessment over a 20-year period, so
he is not indigent under § 3014 and is subject to its mandatory payment.
See United States v. Otradovec, 72 F.4th 794, 797 (7th Cir. 2023). It would therefore be
frivolous for Kieffer to challenge this aspect of the special assessment.
Therefore, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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