United States of America v. Deven Lucas Deschepper

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 30, 2024
Decided October 31, 2024
Before
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1483
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DEVEN LUCAS DESCHEPPER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 21-CR-40028-001
James E. Shadid,
Judge.
O R D E R
Deven Deschepper pleaded guilty to possessing with intent to distribute
marijuana, possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and being a
felon in possession of a firearm. The district court sentenced him to 204 months of
imprisonment and 2 years of supervised release. Despite a broad appeal waiver in his
plea agreement, Deschepper filed a notice of appeal. His appointed counsel asserts that
the appeal is frivolous and seeks to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738,
744 (1967). Counsel’s brief details the nature of the case and discusses issues that an
appeal of this kind might be expected to involve. Because the analysis appears
thorough, we limit our review to the subjects that counsel discusses and that
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-1483 Page 2
Deschepper raises in his response under Circuit Rule 51(b). See United States v. Bey,
748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
After receiving a tip from a confidential informant, agents of the Quad City
Metropolitan Enforcement Group (a multijurisdictional task force) arranged three
controlled purchases of marijuana from Deschepper. In searches of Deschepper’s car
and residence, agents found substantial quantities of cannabis and psilocybin in various
forms, drug paraphernalia and packaging materials, cash, firearms, and ammunition.
A federal grand jury indicted Deschepper on four counts: (1) distribution of
marijuana, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D); (2) possession with intent to distribute
cocaine and marijuana, id. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C)–(D); (3) possession of a firearm in
furtherance of drug trafficking, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); and (4) felon in possession of a
firearm, id. §§ 922(g), 924(a)(2), 924(e).
Deschepper agreed with the government to plead guilty to the lesser-included
offense of count two (possession with intent to distribute marijuana) as well as counts
three and four. The written plea agreement included an appellate waiver under which
Deschepper expressly waived “all rights to appeal and/or collaterally attack his
conviction and sentence” on any ground other than ineffective assistance of counsel.
A magistrate judge conducted the change-of-plea hearing, placing Deschepper
under oath before conducting a colloquy. The court confirmed that Deschepper
understood the charges, forfeiture notice, and applicable penalties; his trial rights; the
consequences of pleading guilty; and the role of the Sentencing Guidelines. See F ED. R.
C RIM . P. 11(b)(1)(A)-(J), (L), (M). The court separately explained the appellate waiver,
and Deschepper affirmed that he understood and agreed to that provision. See F ED. R.
C RIM . P. 11(b)(1)(N). Deschepper’s trial counsel noted that Deschepper would seek to
postpone his federal sentencing because he was engaged in state post-conviction
proceedings that could affect his status as a career offender. Deschepper confirmed,
however, that he intended to plead guilty no matter what. (Ultimately, his
post-conviction petitions were denied before sentencing.) Deschepper then heard and
agreed to the factual basis and entered a plea of guilty. The magistrate judge
recommended acceptance of the plea.
After receiving no timely objections to the report and recommendation, the
district judge accepted the plea. The district judge later sentenced Deschepper to a
204-month prison term, which reflected concurrent 120-month prison sentences on

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No. 24-1483 Page 3
counts two and four and a consecutive 84-month prison sentence on count three. The
court also imposed concurrent two-, three-, and two-year terms of supervised release.1
Counsel informs us that Deschepper wishes to withdraw his guilty plea and
therefore first considers whether Deschepper could raise a non-frivolous argument that
his plea was not knowing and voluntary. See United States v. Larry, 104 F.4th 1020, 1022
(7th Cir. 2024). We agree with counsel that such a challenge would be frivolous.
Deschepper did not move in the district court to withdraw his plea, so we would
review only for plain error. United States v. Schaul, 962 F.3d 917, 921 (7th Cir. 2020). The
transcript of the plea colloquy shows that the court substantially complied with the
requirements of Rule 11(b) and so ensured that the plea was knowing and voluntary.
See United States v. Davenport, 719 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 2013). Under oath, Deschepper
confirmed that he understood the charges, penalties, and rights he was waiving. He also
affirmed that his plea was voluntary, not the product of coercion, and not given in
exchange for a promise. Although the magistrate judge did not advise Deschepper of its
authority to order restitution, see F ED. R. C RIM. P. 11(b)(1)(K), none was ordered, so
counsel correctly concludes that the omission was harmless. See Larry, 104 F.4th at 1023.
Therefore, Deschepper could not establish that it was plain error for the court to credit
his sworn statements. See United States v. Collins, 796 F.3d 829, 835 (7th Cir. 2015).
In his Rule 51(b) response, Deschepper argues that he did not knowingly enter
his guilty plea because his trial counsel had misinformed him that he could be
resentenced if the pending post-conviction proceedings in Illinois affected his
career-offender status in federal court. This argument, however, is not suited for direct
appeal. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel—which are exempt from
Deschepper’s waiver—should be reserved for collateral review, when Deschepper can
introduce the evidence that he refers to and create a record. See Massaro v. United States,
538 U.S. 500, 504–05 (2003); United States v. Cates, 950 F.3d 453, 457 (7th Cir. 2020).
Counsel next considers whether Deschepper could challenge his sentence and
correctly determines that the appeal waiver in his plea agreement forecloses any such
challenge. An appeal waiver “stands or falls” with the plea agreement of which it is
part. United States v. Nulf, 978 F.3d 504, 506 (7th Cir. 2020). Here, as we have stated,
Deschepper lacks any non-frivolous argument that his guilty plea was not knowing and
voluntary. Therefore, the appellate waiver is enforceable unless an exception applies.
1 In what appears to be a deviation from the oral pronouncement, the written
judgment reflects only a two-year term of supervised release.

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No. 24-1483 Page 4
See United States v. Brown, 973 F.3d 667, 718 (7th Cir. 2020). As counsel explains,
however, Deschepper’s prison sentence and terms of supervised release do not exceed
the applicable statutory maximums. And the record establishes that the court did not
consider any constitutionally impermissible factors. See Brown, 973 F.3d at 718. We
would thus enforce the appellate waiver with respect to any sentencing arguments.
The same is true for the additional issues that Deschepper says he would raise on
direct appeal to challenge both his conviction and sentence. The broad appellate waiver
forecloses them all.
We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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