United States of America v. Christopher G. Hill

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted November 20, 2024
Decided November 21, 2024
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 23-1307
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER G. HILL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, New Albany Division.
No. 4:20CR00017-001
Tanya Walton Pratt,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
After a jury trial, Christopher Hill was convicted on one count of possessing over
50 grams of methamphetamine with the intent to distribute, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and
sentenced to 188 months in prison. He filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed counsel
asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Counsel explains the nature of the case and addresses the
potential issues that an appeal like this could involve. But because Hill identifies a
potential issue that warrants briefing on the merits—whether the district court abused its
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 23-1307 Page 2
discretion when it denied his motion to strike for cause a potential juror who arguably
equivocated on her impartiality—we deny the motion.
We summarize the procedural background. In October 2020, a confidential
informant told a police officer in Jeffersonville, Indiana, that Hill was selling drugs. The
officer alerted the FBI, which directed a cooperating buyer to call Hill on a recorded line.
The buyer agreed to pay Hill $1,500 for methamphetamine. The buyer and Hill agreed to
meet in Jeffersonville to complete the transaction. Shortly after the call ended, the police
watched Hill drive from a home toward Jeffersonville, and they stopped Hill and arrested
him. Hill, who the officers had been warned was likely armed, did not obey the arresting
officers’ instructions. To apprehend him, the officers used force and a police dog. As the
officers handcuffed him, two bags later confirmed to contain over 100 grams of pure
methamphetamine fell from Hill’s pants. Hill told officers that the drugs were his and that
he was a user. The next day, officers executed a search warrant of the home he had left and
found a loaded gun and 342 grams of a methamphetamine mixture, among other items
consistent with drug distribution. Officers also found on Hill’s phone several messages
about methamphetamine trafficking and photographs of Hill with cash, firearms, and
drugs. The government filed an indictment charging Hill with possessing over 50 grams of
methamphetamine with the intent to distribute.
During voir dire, the court noted that the prosecution intended to elicit testimony
from law-enforcement witnesses and asked prospective jurors whether they had close
relationships with members of law enforcement. Several said yes. Among them were
Jurors 53 and 55, whom the court questioned in tandem. Juror 53 disclosed that she had
once been married to one of the prosecution’s witnesses and worried that she would be
partial because she “would side with the police officers.” Juror 55 disclosed that she had
two sons in law enforcement and also worried that she could not be impartial:
THE COURT: Okay. And because you have two sons that are in law
enforcement, do you think that would affect your ability to be a fair and
impartial juror?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR [55]: Yes.
THE COURT: And tell me why.
PROSPECTIVE JUROR [55]: I worry about my son every single night he goes
to work. The majority of those arrests are drugs and alcohol.

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No. 23-1307 Page 3
THE COURT: Okay. If you—ladies, if you’re on the jury, you’re going to
listen to testimony and evidence that comes from the witness stand. The
witnesses will be under oath, and it will be the jurors’ responsibility to listen
to the testimony and determine whether its’s credible, credible or not. …
So we’re not—you’re not going to be asked to judge, you know, the charm or
personality of any of the witnesses. You’re going to be asked to listen to the
evidence, listen to the instructions on the law that I give you, and then base a
decision on the evidence and the law. None of the law enforcement officers
that you are familiar with, your children, are going to be testifying in this
case.
So do you think you can—you know, of course, we all worry about our
family in whatever their professions are, but especially in law enforcement,
but that doesn’t have anything to do with your ability to be a fair and
impartial juror. So do you think that you can listen to the testimony and the
evidence that comes from the witness stand and base a decision solely on
that—on what you see and hear in the courtroom? …
PROSPECTIVE JUROR [55]: I could try.
After receiving these responses, the court continued questioning the two prospective
jurors seeking unequivocal assurances that they could be fair and impartial:
THE COURT: If you are selected to sit in this case, despite the fact that
you’ve got law enforcement connections in your life, will you be able to
render a verdict solely on the evidence presented at the trial and in the
context of the law as I will give you in my instructions? Can you do that?
Can you set aside any personal beliefs or opinions that you’ve encountered
outside of this courtroom and make a decision based on the evidence and the
law that I’ll give you during the trial? Can you both do that?
Both are nodding their heads.
. . .
Do you feel you might give more or less weight to the testimony of law
enforcement witnesses as opposed to a civilian witness? Law enforcement
officers are human beings, you know that, both of you do. They’re just

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No. 23-1307 Page 4
normal people, just like everyone else. If you’re on this jury, will you be able
to give their testimony the same weight as you would any other witness?
Can you do that, number 53?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR [53]: I would try.
THE COURT: Can you do that, number 55?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR [55]: I think so, yes.
Hill’s trial counsel followed the court in questioning both prospective jurors.
MR. SIMON: Do you have … hesitancy about whether or not you can give
Mr. Hill a fair shake?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR [53]: Yes, I do. I’ve been honest.
MR. SIMON: Okay. I get it. I hear what you’re saying.
And, juror 55, do you share that concern, as well as juror 53?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR [55]: I somewhat do, yes.
. . .
MR. SIMON: Would you discount the questioning of a police officer by
someone that was aligned with the defendant, Mr. Hill, just based on the fact
that you have—your two sons are police officers? One is going to be.
PROSPECTIVE JUROR [55]: Not necessarily, no.
Hill’s counsel then asked the court to strike both prospective jurors for cause,
noting that Juror 53 had a close connection to one of the government’s witnesses and that
Juror 55’s responses about whether she could be fair and impartial had been equivocal.
The court agreed to strike Juror 53 but disagreed with Hill’s counsel regarding Juror 55:
THE COURT: Okay. Lawyers, I’m going to grant the motion to strike
number 53 for cause, and I’m going to deny the motion to strike number 55.
Number 55 did tell me that, when I asked her, “Do you feel you could give—
might give more or less weight to the testimony of a law enforcement

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No. 23-1307 Page 5
witness as opposed to a civilian witness,” and I asked her specifically would
she be able to judge the credibility of a law enforcement officer the same as
any other witness, and she said, “I think so yes.”
She also said that she would have to hear the testimony—again, which is the
correct answer—before she could determine the credibility of a witness. So
I’m going to deny your motion for cause on 55.
Because Hill had used all of his peremptory challenges, Juror 55 was seated on the jury.
The trial followed. Hill contended that the methamphetamine he possessed was for
personal use and he did not intend to sell it. As planned, law-enforcement witnesses
testified for the government. An FBI agent testified about the phone call in which a buyer
agreed to purchase $1,500 worth of methamphetamine from Hill. Other officers testified
about surveilling the home, Hill’s failure to comply with officer instructions during his
arrest, and the force used against him. Another officer recounted the evidence gathered at
Hill’s arrest: over $5,000 in cash, a ballistic vest, cell phones (including the one used to
communicate with the buyer), and a pipe for smoking methamphetamine. A second FBI
agent testified that the price and quantity that Hill negotiated for sale was consistent with
the local drug-dealing practices. The agent also testified that carrying large amounts of
cash, firearms, ballistic vests, and more than one cell phone was consistent with drug
dealing. Hill was found guilty and sentenced to 188 months in prison.
In responding to the Anders brief, Hill proposes a potential challenge to the district
court’s denial of Hill’s motion to excuse Juror 55 for cause. Because Hill preserved that
challenge, if he renewed it on appeal, we would review the court’s decision for abuse of
discretion. See United States v. Taylor, 777 F.3d 434, 440 (7th Cir. 2015). We would not
disturb the ruling if the juror had given “unequivocal assurances” that she could set aside
material biases, follow instructions on the law, and suspend judgment until hearing all
evidence. Thompson v. Altheimer & Gray, 248 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2001).
Hill could plausibly argue on appeal that Juror 55 did not give an unequivocal
assurance of impartiality. To the contrary, Juror 55 first said that, “yes,” her concern for the
safety of her two sons in law enforcement “would affect [her] ability to be a fair and
impartial juror.” Her second statement that she “could try” to be fair and impartial was
also arguably equivocal. Juror 55’s next statement was again arguably not reassuring:
When the court asked if she could give a police officer’s testimony the same weight as she
would any other witness, Juror 55 said only, “I think so, yes.” And she arguably expressed
lingering partiality when Hill’s counsel questioned her. She told Hill’s counsel that she

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remained “somewhat” concerned that she could not give Hill a “fair shake” and only that
she would “not necessarily” discount efforts to impeach the credibility of police officers.
We recognize that the court stated that it observed Juror 55 “nodding” her head
when the court asked whether she could set aside personal biases, follow the judge’s
instructions, and decide the case based on the evidence presented. A district judge can
rely—at least partially—on nonverbal cues when assessing a juror’s responses. See United
States v. Granger, 70 F.4th 408, 411 (7th Cir. 2023). But when the court denied Hill’s motion
to recuse, it did not suggest that it relied on the nodding; rather it relied solely on some of
the audible statements described above, all of which we have said are arguably equivocal.
We take no view on whether, after full adversarial briefing on this issue, we would
conclude that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to excuse this juror. All we
decide is that counsel for Hill could plausibly argue the point by contending that the
district court did not receive an unequivocal assurance of impartiality. Because the
argument is not frivolous, and because a potential remedy for an abuse of discretion of this
kind is retrial, see Smith v. United States, 599 U.S. 236, 245 (2023) (citing Sheppard v. Maxwell,
384 U.S. 333, 362–63 (1966)), dismissing Hill’s appeal would not be appropriate. See United
States v. Maday, 799 F.3d 776, 780 (7th Cir. 2015).
Thus, counsel’s motion to withdraw is DENIED, and counsel is ORDERED to
submit a merits brief addressing the issue we have identified and any others counsel
deems appropriate. To the extent that Hill has moved for substitute appellate counsel (he
has asked us to “hold [counsel] accountable”), the motion is DENIED because he is not
entitled to the lawyer of his choosing. Briefing will be set by a separate order.

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