Defreese Smith v. Bryan Cipolla

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted December 10, 2024 *
Decided December 13, 2024
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-2085
DEFREESE SMITH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BRYAN CIPOLLA, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 21-CV-1387
Manish S. Shah,
Judge.
O R D E R
Defreese Smith, a former employee of Sony Digital Audio Disc Corporation,
appeals the summary judgment rejecting her claims that the company and her
managers discriminated against her based on race and sex. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
2000e-2. We affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record
adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the
court. FED . R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 23-2085 Page 2
In May 2018, Smith was investigated by Sony DADC’s human resources office
for violating workplace policy. She was overheard commenting that a recently deceased
supervisor had “got what she deserved.” Smith learned of the investigation and left an
angry voicemail message on an HR manager’s phone, threatening the coworker who
reported her and disparaging the coworker’s character and appearance. Several days
later, after meeting with HR managers about the investigation, Smith walked into the
HR office crying, banging on the walls, and yelling that she wanted to go home. She
then left more voicemail messages and texts for the managers, complaining about the
investigation, denying that she had made any offensive statements, and speculating
about the behavior of other coworkers.
After the HR office closed its investigation (its findings proved inconclusive),
Sony DADC fired Smith. Sony DADC concluded that Smith’s conduct during the
investigation violated workplace policies against disruptive and inappropriate
behavior.
Smith filed suit, asserting under federal and state law that Sony DADC and
numerous managers conspired, discriminated, and retaliated against her based on her
race and sex. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985(3), 2000e-2.
The district judge granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and denied
it in part. The judge dismissed Smith’s state law claims, the § 1983 conspiracy claim, and
the § 1985 retaliation claim for failing to state a claim. But the judge granted Smith leave
to file an amended complaint clarifying her § 1981 and Title VII discrimination claims.
She did not follow up on the court’s invitation.
The defendants then moved for summary judgment, and the judge granted the
motion. The judge accepted as undisputed the defendants’ proposed statement of facts
because Smith did not respond to it. See N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1. As for the merits, the judge
concluded that some of Smith’s claims were time-barred, and the others failed as a
matter of proof.
On appeal, Smith does not engage with the district judge’s reasons for granting
summary judgment. She simply recites the facts that she says took place. To the extent
she thinks the judge wrongly admitted the defendants’ statement of facts, the judge was
entitled to insist on strict compliance with local rules. See Stevo v. Frasor, 662 F.3d 880,
886–87 (7th Cir. 2011). Local Rule 56.1(e) requires that a party opposing summary
judgment respond to each disputed fact with “citations to the supporting evidentiary
material,” and a movant’s proposed facts “may be deemed admitted if not controverted

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No. 23-2085 Page 3
with specific citations to evidentiary material.” Even pro se litigants like Smith are not
exempt from procedural rules or the consequences of failing to comply with them.
See McCurry v. Kenco Logistics Servs., LLC, 942 F.3d 783, 787 n.2 (7th Cir. 2019). Because
Smith failed to respond to the defendants’ statement of facts, the judge appropriately
exercised his discretion to treat the defendants’ facts as admitted.
AFFIRMED

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