General Parker v. U.s. Department of Housing and Urban Development

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted February 24, 2025*
Decided February 28, 2025
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2567
GENERAL PARKER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING
AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:24-cv-05637
John Robert Blakey,
Judge.
O R D E R
General Parker appeals the dismissal of his federal complaint alleging
misconduct by multiple persons connected to his eviction from his apartment and state
* The appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this
appeal. We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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prosecution for battery. We affirm the judgment because each claim was directed at an
improper party, was untimely, or was insufficiently pleaded.
We accept the allegations in the complaint as true, viewing them in the light
most favorable to Parker. See Otis v. Demarasse, 886 F.3d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 2018). Parker
lived in a subsidized-housing unit in Peoria, Illinois. In October 2020, a fire broke out in
Parker’s apartment, damaging his kitchen and causing burns to his hand. To assess the
kitchen damage, a building manager for the county housing authority, Marsha Moses,
along with other employees, entered Parker’s apartment several times that week
without providing adequate notice under the terms of the lease. Parker called the police
after one incident during which Moses broke his door in after he shut it and re-injured
his burned hand, but police officers did not show up. As tensions escalated between the
two, Moses eventually called the police on Parker, accusing him of pushing her. Officers
arrived at Parker’s unit to investigate, and he was charged with misdemeanor battery.
(The charge was later dropped, and his state criminal case was dismissed, in June 2022.)
In January 2021, Moses served an eviction notice on Parker, just three days before
the scheduled eviction hearing. The notice stated that Moses initiated eviction
proceedings because Parker pushed her and failed to allow remediation of the fire
damage in his unit. At the hearing, Parker challenged these grounds and the untimely
notice, but the court entered judgment ordering Parker to vacate the unit.
In June 2024, Parker sued in federal court, invoking federal question jurisdiction,
28 U.S.C. § 1331, as well as diversity jurisdiction (he is now domiciled in California) and
supplemental jurisdiction, id. §§ 1332, 1367. His 11-count complaint alleged federal and
state-law claims against the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development (“HUD”); the Peoria County Tenth Judicial Circuit; Peoria County; the
Peoria Housing Authority (“PHA”); the City of Peoria; the Peoria Police Department;
Moses; Moses’s attorney; Parker’s public defender; the Assistant State’s Attorney
involved in Parker’s criminal prosecution; two police officers; and the state judge who
oversaw his eviction proceeding. Parker alleged that the defendants unlawfully entered
his apartment without his consent, used their influence to evict him from his apartment,
made false statements at his eviction proceeding, and prosecuted him for battery
without probable cause. He invoked multiple legal theories, such as malicious
prosecution, injurious falsehoods, retaliatory eviction, assault, and battery. Parker also
alleged that the defendants infringed upon his due-process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment and his right to be free from unreasonable searches under the Fourth
Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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No. 24-2567 Page 3
Because Parker applied to proceed in forma pauperis, the district court screened
the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and dismissed it as frivolous, stating without
elaboration that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precluded all of Parker’s claims because he
challenged the state-court eviction proceeding. The court gave Parker leave to amend
his complaint but ultimately dismissed the complaint with prejudice when he did not
amend by the deadline.1 Parker moved for reconsideration and filed an amended
complaint. But the court denied the motion, concluding that Parker still challenged the
outcome of his eviction proceeding, and the court could not award damages without
reversing the eviction order. Parker appeals, and we review the screening decision de
novo. See Otis, 886 F.3d at 644.
Parker argues that the district court incorrectly dismissed his complaint under
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because the claims relating to his eviction sought only
damages, not the reversal of the eviction judgment. We agree. A majority of this court
endorses the view that, perhaps with limited exceptions, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
does not apply in cases where a plaintiff seeks only monetary damages, as opposed to a
nullification of the state court’s judgment. See Gilbank v. Wood Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Srvs.,
111 F.4th 754, 792 (7th Cir. 2024) (en banc) (Kirsch, J., concurring in part) (“[A]warding
damages usually does not affect a state court judgment not sounding in monetary
terms.”). Parker sought damages for the defendants’ actions that led to his eviction and
his prosecution for battery, and thus the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is inapplicable. Id.
Moreover, not all of Parker’s claims stem from his eviction proceeding. He
sought to expunge the record of the battery charge based on a theory of malicious
prosecution. True, this court cannot order a state court to expunge the record of a
charge. But, again, Parker also sought damages, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does
not preclude a claim of malicious prosecution. Nor does the Heck doctrine, because the
criminal proceeding ended in a favorable termination for Parker. See Thompson v. Clark,
596 U.S. 36, 39 (2022). Further, Parker alleged independent state-law claims that Moses
assaulted and battered him when she broke in his door and re-injured his burned hand.
Those claims do not seek to overturn the eviction order and have only a tenuous
relationship to the eviction proceeding at all.
1 We note that, even though Parker was not granted leave to proceed in forma
pauperis, there is no evidence in the record that he paid the district court’s filing fee.
The district judge might consider asking the Clerk of Court to inquire.

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No. 24-2567 Page 4
Although we agree with Parker that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not preclude
his claims, we see no use in remanding. We can affirm the dismissal on any ground that
the record supports. Sykes v. Cook Cnty. Cir. Ct. Prob. Div., 837 F.3d 736, 740 (7th Cir.
2016). Reviewing the complaint de novo, see Otis, 886 F.3d at 644, we conclude that
dismissal was appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and (iii), for a variety of
reasons we address in turn.
A. Claims Against an Improper Party
First, Parker cannot sue HUD because § 1983 applies only to state actors, and
HUD is a federal agency. See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424–25 (1973).
Federal officials can be liable in their individual capacities with respect to the limited set
of claims cognizable under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
Glaus v. Anderson, 408 F.3d 382, 389 (7th Cir. 2005). But such claims must be brought
against individuals, not their employing agency.
Second, Parker cannot sue the Peoria County Tenth Judicial Circuit because the
court is not a suable entity under § 1983. A state or an arm of the state is not a “person”
subject to suit under § 1983. I LL. C ONST. art. VI, § 7; see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Nor does § 1983 support “a claim based on a respondeat
superior theory of liability,” for example, if Parker intended to assert that the court was
responsible for the state judge’s actions. Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981);
Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 822 (7th Cir. 2009).
Claims against Peoria County, the PHA, the City of Peoria, and the Peoria Police
Department (to the extent that these are distinctly suable entities) similarly fail on the
basis that Parker cannot hold municipalities vicariously liable for employees’
misconduct. See Flores v. City of S. Bend, 997 F.3d 725, 731 (7th Cir. 2021). A municipality
or municipal entity can be liable under § 1983 only if it had an actual or de facto policy
or custom that caused a constitutional violation. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.,
436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). But Parker did not plead any facts plausibly suggesting that a
policy of the county or city caused a violation of his due process or equal protection
rights. Nor did he plausibly allege that a county or city policy deprived him of his right
to be free from an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.
Next, as to Moses’s attorney, any constitutional claim against him cannot survive
because nothing in the complaint permits an inference that he acted “under color of
state law.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The attorney is a private citizen, and the complaint does not
suggest a relationship with the city or county that effectively rendered him a public

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No. 24-2567 Page 5
actor. See Spiegel v. McClintic, 916 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2019). The bare assertion that
the attorney conspired with officials to falsely accuse Parker or violate his constitutional
rights is insufficient to satisfy the requirement of state action. See id.
Finally, the state judge who presided over Parker’s eviction hearing and the
Assistant State’s Attorney who prosecuted Parker for battery are immune from § 1983
liability. Presiding judges have absolute immunity from any suit seeking “damages
stemming from many of [the judge’s] official acts, no matter how erroneous or
harmful.” Doermer v. Callen, 847 F.3d 522, 530 (7th Cir. 2017). If Parker believed that the
eviction judge acted unlawfully, his remedy was through the appellate process in state
court. See Dawson v. Newman, 419 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2005). Likewise, the prosecutor
is immune from suit for any actions taken within the scope of prosecutorial duties,
including the evaluation of a charge. See Bianchi v. McQueen, 818 F.3d 309, 316 (7th Cir.
2016) (immunity extends to all “conduct that is functionally prosecutorial” and broadly
covers “all conduct associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.”).
B. Timeliness
As to Parker’s remaining § 1983 claims against Moses and two police officers,
along with his state-law claims of malicious prosecution, injurious falsehoods,
retaliatory eviction, assault, and battery against an array of other defendants—which
we address because Parker plausibly invokes diversity jurisdiction, not just
supplemental jurisdiction—most are untimely. The statute of limitations is an
affirmative defense, but a court can invoke it sua sponte if the complaint itself
establishes beyond question that the claims are untimely. See Gleash v. Yuswak, 308 F.3d
758, 760 (7th Cir. 2002).
For § 1983 claims, we borrow the statute of limitations for personal-injury claims
in the forum state; in Illinois that period is two years. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387
(2007); see 735 ILCS 5/13-202. But federal law determines when the claim accrues.
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388. Parker’s unreasonable search claim against Moses and his due
process and equal protection claim against the officers accrued at the time of the
allegedly unlawful underlying action in October 2020. See Neita v. City of Chicago,
830 F.3d 494, 498 (7th Cir. 2016). That is when Moses entered his apartment without his
consent and when the officers responded to Moses’s 911 call to arrest him. Parker did
not sue until June 28, 2024, well beyond the two-year period. And the federal malicious
prosecution claim against Moses and the officers, which stemmed from his criminal
charge that was dropped on June 6, 2022, did not accrue until favorable termination of

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No. 24-2567 Page 6
the prosecution. See Thompson, 596 U.S. at 39. Still, Parker had only until June 6, 2024, to
sue, but he filed his complaint three weeks later.
Like the federal claims, most of the state-law claims are untimely, too. Under
Illinois law, the statute of limitations for any personal injury action is two years from
the date of injury. See 735 ILCS 5/13-202. But under the Illinois Tort Immunity Act, a
civil action against a local entity or any of its employees must commence within one
year of the date that the cause of action accrued. See 745 ILCS 10/8-101. Parker’s
state-law malicious prosecution and injurious falsehoods claims are based on an alleged
conspiracy to disseminate false information at his eviction hearing and prosecute him
without probable cause. Therefore, he had until June 6, 2024, at the latest, to file his
complaint. As to his assault and battery claims against Moses, Parker needed to file his
complaint by October 2022, two years from the date he alleged Moses injured him. So
these claims too are untimely.
C. Failure to State a Claim
This leaves Parker’s final claim of retaliatory eviction under the (now repealed)
Illinois Retaliatory Eviction Act, 765 ILCS 720/1 (2021), which made it unlawful for a
landlord to evict a tenant “on the ground that the tenant has complained to any
governmental authority of a bona fide violation of any applicable building code, health
ordinance, or similar regulation.” We assume in Parker’s favor that the Act, like other
remedial statutes addressing landlord-tenant relations in Illinois, has a five-year statute
of limitations from the date of eviction. See 735 ILCS 5/13-205; Mayle v. Urb. Realty
Works, LLC, 202 N.E.3d 1011, 1026 (Ill. App. Ct. 2022). That would mean Parker’s claim
is timely. But even reading his complaint broadly, he did not state a claim. Parker
alleges that Moses evicted him because of their dispute about her entry into his
apartment, not because he brought a complaint to a governmental authority about a
housing violation that was sustained. See Am. Mgmt. Consultant, LLC v. Carter,
915 N.E.2d 411, 425 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); 765 ILCS 720/1.
A note about the judgment: Dismissal under Rooker-Feldman is jurisdictional and
necessarily without prejudice, though the judgment here says “with prejudice.”
See Mains v. Citibank, N.A., 852 F.3d 669, 678 (7th Cir. 2017). Dismissal for failure to state
a claim, however, is a decision on the merits, which is normally with prejudice.
See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2015). Because that is
our alternate ground for affirming, there is no need to modify the judgment.
AFFIRMED

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