NIKITA BIDDLE and CHIQUITA BIDDLE v. City of Chicago

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 17, 2025*
Decided March 18, 2025
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2049
NIKITA BIDDLE and CHIQUITA
BIDDLE,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 21 C 1793
Jorge L. Alonso,
Judge.
O R D E R
Nikita and Chiquita Biddle appeal the dismissal of their civil rights suit alleging
sexual harassment, false arrest, and excessive force. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Nikita has not
prosecuted her appeal, so we dismiss it. And the district court correctly dismissed
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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Chiquita’s case because her latest proposed amended complaint was untimely and she
had abandoned any earlier claims; we thus affirm that dismissal.
We recount the facts as alleged in the complaint and accept the well-pleaded
allegations as true. See Esco v. City of Chicago, 107 F.4th 673, 678 (7th Cir. 2024). This suit
stems from an incident that occurred at a McDonald’s restaurant in Chicago on
St. Patrick’s Day of 2019. According to the complaint, Nikita attempted to redeem a
coupon, but a McDonald’s employee refused to accept it, asked Nikita to leave, and
sexually harassed her. A security officer then physically clashed with Nikita. Police
officers arrived shortly later and arrested Nikita and her sister Chiquita.
Two years later, the Biddles sued McDonald’s Corporation, “Unknown
McDonald’s Employees,” the City of Chicago, and “Unknown Police Officers,” alleging
that they violated the Biddles’ civil rights during the encounter. The City defendants
and McDonald’s sought dismissal for failure to state a claim. The Biddles, represented
by counsel, did not oppose the defendants’ arguments. Instead, in January 2024—nearly
5 years after the events—they sought leave to amend their complaint under Rule 15 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by adding new parties. (The Biddles had
previously amended their complaint in August 2023.) The Biddles did not identify the
parties, request discovery to identify the parties, or explain why the court should grant
the motion. The defendants replied that the court should reject any proposed
amendment as untimely and not subject to tolling.
The district court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. It ruled that the
Biddles’ proposed amendment did not meet the requirements of Rule 15(c) for the
amendment to relate back to the initial complaint. The court explained that because the
Biddles sought to file their latest amended complaint in January 2024—well after the
applicable two-year statute of limitations period had expired—the amendment would
be futile. The court also ruled that, by not otherwise contesting the motions to dismiss,
the Biddles had forfeited their claims against the City defendants and McDonald’s.
Chiquita, who is now pro se, filed an appeal on behalf of herself and Nikita.
Because Chiquita—a non-attorney—cannot represent anyone other than herself, we
ordered Nikita to file a motion to adopt the opening brief. She has not done so. We thus
dismiss her from this appeal. See Georgakis v. Ill. State Univ., 722 F.3d 1075, 1077 (7th Cir.
2013) (“A nonlawyer can’t handle a case on behalf of anyone except himself.”).

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No. 24-2049 Page 3
Chiquita raises two unpersuasive arguments on appeal. She first argues that the
district court erred by blaming her for her attorney’s error of failing to name a proposed
party in the amended complaint. In Chiquita’s view, the district court should not have
faulted her for her attorney’s failure to comply with Rule 15(c). But it is a basic principle
of “our system of representative litigation” that “each party is deemed bound by the
acts of [her] lawyer-agent.” Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 634 (1962). Thus,
Chiquita cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts of her attorney. Id. at 633–34.
Whatever remedy Chiquita might have based on her attorney’s alleged negligence, she
is not entitled to revive her claims in this litigation. See Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc. v. Grover,
792 F.3d 753, 754 (7th Cir. 2015).
Next, Chiquita argues that the district court erred by ruling that her proposed
amended complaint—seeking to sue new, unnamed parties—was untimely. She insists
that we may consider the amendment timely by relying on her asserted disability and
tolling the limitations period until August 2023 (the date of her first amended
complaint). This argument, too, is unavailing. In a § 1983 suit filed in federal court in
Illinois, the court borrows Illinois’ two-year limitations period for personal-injury
actions. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); 735 ILCS 5/13-202. The court also
borrows the tolling rules from the law of the state of injury. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 394.
Under Illinois law, a disability permits tolling only if it prevents a person from being
“fully able to manage his or her person or estate.” Parks v. Kownacki, 737 N.E.2d 287, 295
(Ill. 2000) (quoting 5 ILCS 70/1.06). Chiquita contends that her mental illnesses and
homelessness made it difficult for her to sue. But “[t]he inability to pursue a legal
remedy does not, standing alone, fall into any recognized category of legal disability.”
Id.
In any event, Chiquita did not develop in the district court an argument that her
mental illness rendered her unable to manage herself or her estate, as she must if she
seeks to toll the limitations period. Of course, a plaintiff need not anticipate an
affirmative defense like the statute of limitations or attempt to rebut it in her complaint.
Sabo v. Erickson, ––– F.4th ––––, ––––, 2025 WL 354484, at *2 (7th Cir. Jan. 31, 2025)
(en banc). But “[w]e have repeatedly held that a party opposing a motion in the district
court must inform the court of the factual and legal reasons why the motion should not
be entered, and if it fails to do so it cannot then raise those arguments on appeal.”
O'Gorman v. City of Chicago, 777 F.3d 885, 890 (7th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). The
defendants argued in their motions to dismiss that the statute of limitations had expired
on Chiquita’s proposed amended complaint and that she could not invoke tolling to
prolong the two-year period to sue any new defendants. At that point, Chiquita had to

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No. 24-2049 Page 4
assert facts and legal reasons to counter the defendants’ position. Id. Because she did
not do so then, she may not do so for the first time now. See id.
AFFIRMED

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