Frederick S. Koger v. Charles E. Kleidon

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 17, 2025 *
Decided March 20, 2025
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1324
FREDERICK S. KOGER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CHARLES E. KLEIDON, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:17-cv-09277
Martha M. Pacold,
Judge.
O R D E R
Frederick Koger appeals the denial of his post-judgment motion to reopen a case
that he dismissed with prejudice in 2018. The district court concluded that Koger’s
request was both untimely and unsupported by valid reasons to reopen. We affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record
adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the
court. FED . R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 24-1324 Page 2
In 2014, Chicago police arrested Koger after a physical altercation with his
daughter. Although Koger was released from custody and no charges were filed against
him, the record of his arrest, including his mugshot, remained publicly available. In
2017, he discovered his mugshot online and sued the officers involved in his arrest for
publishing the arrest report, violating his rights by arresting him without cause, failing
to read him his Miranda rights, and inflicting emotional distress that resulted in
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Koger soon moved to voluntarily dismiss the
case with prejudice, though he maintained that he wanted his mugshot removed from
the Internet. After confirming that Koger knew the defendants could not provide him
with that relief, the court granted his motion and dismissed the case.
Four years later, in 2022, Koger moved to reopen the case. He argued that he had
only agreed to dismiss his complaint because the defendants had promised to remove
his mugshot from the Internet, but had not done so, and reiterated that he had suffered
constitutional violations during his arrest. The district court construed the motion as
arising under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) and denied it. To the extent that
Koger sought relief from the judgment dismissing his case based on mistake, newly
discovered evidence, or misconduct by an opposing party, his request was too late. FED.
R. C IV. P. 60(b)(1)–(3); (c)(1) (imposing one-year deadline on motions under Rule
60(b)(1)–(3)). Even if the request could be construed as arising under the catchall
provision of Rule 60(b)(6), which generally permits a motion for relief from judgment
for any other reason provided the motion is filed in a reasonable time, it failed. Many of
the concerns Koger raised in the motion had been addressed at the time the case was
dismissed, and none of his other concerns justified reopening the case. He did not
appeal this decision.
In 2024, Koger filed a second post-judgment motion. Again, he sought to reopen
his case. He re-asserted the arguments from the first motion to reopen and added that
his PTSD caused him to mistakenly dismiss his case. He also requested that Judge
Pacold, who had denied the first post-judgment motion, recuse herself. The court
denied these motions, explaining that its reasoning from the first post-judgment motion
to reopen still applied, Koger had raised no additional valid reasons to reopen the case,
and he had provided no legitimate basis for Judge Pacold’s recusal.
Koger appeals the denials of his 2022 and 2024 motions, arguing that the district
court erred in denying them. We limited review to the 2024 denial because he had not
timely appealed the 2022 decision. He does not contest this decision or argue that the
court erred in denying his motion to recuse, so we do not address these topics. We

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No. 24-1324 Page 3
review a denial of a motion under Rule 60 for abuse of discretion. Motorola Sols., Inc. v.
Hytera Commc’ns. Corp., 108 F.4th 458, 504 (7th Cir. 2024).
In his brief, Koger generally restates that his arrest was illegal and that his PTSD
clouded his decision-making, causing him to erroneously seek dismissal of his case. But
the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that these arguments did not
justify reopening the case. The district court correctly concluded that to the extent that
Koger’s request for relief was predicated on mistake, newly discovered evidence, or
misconduct, it was filed nearly five years too late. See FED. R. C IV. P. 60(b)(1)–(3), (c)(1);
In re Cook Med., Inc., 27 F.4th 539, 543 (7th Cir. 2022) (explaining that Rule 60(c)(1)
imposes mandatory one-year deadline for motions invoking Rules 60(b)(1)–(3)).
Moreover, to justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6), Koger would need to identify
“extraordinary circumstances.” Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc. v. Grover, 792 F.3d 753, 754 (7th
Cir. 2015). Koger’s rehashing of the allegations he made in his original complaint, which
take up most of his motions and appellate brief, are not extraordinary circumstances.
Karraker v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 411 F.3d 831, 837 (7th Cir. 2005) (Rule 60(b)(6) motion is
not appropriate vehicle to raise arguments that should have been made earlier). And
Koger’s argument that he mistakenly dismissed his case because of his PTSD is the kind
of contention that would be addressed under 60(b)(1). See Bell v. McAdory, 820 F.3d 880,
883–84 (7th Cir. 2016). It cannot therefore be used to justify relief under 60(b)(6). Kemp v.
United States, 596 U.S. 528, 533 (2022) (a person may seek relief under Rule 60(b)(6) only
when Rules 60(b)(1)–(5) are inapplicable).
AFFIRMED

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