Laquan Perkins v. Christine Brown

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 21, 2025*
Decided March 21, 2025
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1863
LAQUAN PERKINS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CHRISTINE BROWN,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Illinois.
No. 3:21-cv-00711-GCS
Gilbert C. Sison,
Magistrate Judge.
Laquan Perkins, an Illinois prisoner, sued the administrator of his prison’s
healthcare unit for denying him medical care in violation of his rights under the Eighth
Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court denied Perkins’s motions for
recruited counsel and later entered summary judgment for the administrator. On
appeal, Perkins challenges both decisions. We affirm.
* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the brief and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
O R D E R
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-1863 Page 2
We describe Perkins’s medical care based on the undisputed facts at summary
judgment, viewed in the light most favorable to him. Lockett v. Bonson, 937 F.3d 1016,
1022 (7th Cir. 2019). While incarcerated at Pinckneyville Correctional Center in
Pinckneyville, Illinois, Perkins had surgery to remove his lower-right wisdom tooth in
February 2020. Shortly after, Perkins told prison medical staff that he was experiencing
pain and that he had lost hearing in his right ear and feeling in the right side of his face,
including in his right eye. At a follow-up appointment two weeks after surgery, the oral
surgeon who extracted the tooth opined that Perkins’s symptoms were not caused by
the tooth extraction. The surgeon recommended that Perkins see a neurologist.
In March, Perkins submitted a sick call request, complaining of continued loss of
hearing and difficulties with his right eye. (He did not complain of pain at that time.) A
nurse practitioner who examined him a few days later noted that Perkins had no feeling
in his right ear or cheek. A little over a week later, Perkins was approved for a
neurology evaluation, but the appointment could be scheduled only after the prison
lifted its COVID-19 lockdown protocols.
Over the next several months, Perkins repeatedly complained about his facial
numbness and hearing loss and requested information on when he would be seen by
the neurologist. According to Perkins’s medical records, each time medical staff
responded that he would be scheduled for the appointment when the COVID-19
restrictions allowed. On occasions when Perkins specifically asked for “help,” medical
staff examined him and noted no new symptoms.
Perkins saw the neurologist in August 2020, about five months after the referral
was approved. But the neurologist could not identify the cause of Perkins’s symptoms
and recommended further testing: an MRI, labs, and an audiology test. Perkins received
those tests the next month, but again, the results were inconclusive. The radiologist who
performed Perkins’s MRI recommended a follow-up MRI in three months, but the
second MRI was delayed because of the COVID-19 pandemic. In the meantime, Perkins
complained to prison medical staff about his symptoms and that he had not “been
seen” about his concerns. Again, medical staff responded by examining him and
informed him that his specialist visits had been approved but were not yet scheduled.
In March 2021, Perkins had the second MRI and another appointment with the
neurologist, who reviewed the scans of Perkins’s brain and recommended that Perkins
see an audiologist and an ophthalmologist. While Perkins was waiting for those
appointments to be scheduled, he continually expressed concern about his symptoms.

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No. 24-1863 Page 3
In May, the ophthalmologist recommended that Perkins receive an ultrasound of
his neck arteries, which he received later that month. The cardiologist who conducted
that ultrasound recommended giving Perkins an echocardiogram, which was
conducted a few weeks later. Also in May, Perkins had a hearing test, which showed he
was having difficulty hearing. In June, he saw a new neurologist, who suspected that
his symptoms were the result of “malingering” or “conversion disorder.”
Later, medical staff at the prison did another hearing evaluation and referred
Perkins to an audiologist and an ear, nose, and throat specialist. The specialists
recommended, and Perkins received, another MRI—this time of his ear canal. As a
result of that imaging, he received a hearing aid in Spring 2022.
In June 2021, Perkins sued Christine Brown, the administrator of the healthcare
unit at Pinckneyville, and her employer, Wexford Healthcare Sources, alleging that they
had been deliberately indifferent to his facial numbness, hearing loss, and vision issues
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed
Perkins’s claims against Wexford at screening because Perkins had not alleged that
Wexford had a policy or practice that caused the violation of his rights. See Howell v.
Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 987 F.3d 647, 653–54 (7th Cir. 2021).
After Brown answered the complaint, Perkins moved for recruitment of counsel.
The district court denied the motion because Perkins was not proceeding in forma
pauperis and had not shown that he qualified as indigent. After the district court
denied Brown’s motion for summary judgment on exhaustion grounds, Perkins moved
three more times for counsel. The court denied his motions because, in its
determination, Perkins was competent to litigate the case on his own and noted that
Perkins had successfully defended against Brown’s first motion for summary judgment.
Brown then moved for summary judgment on the merits, arguing that she had
no personal involvement in Perkins’s care and, in any event, that Perkins had received
adequate medical treatment. Before responding to the motion, Perkins moved two more
times for recruitment of counsel pointing to his learning disability, mental-health issues,
and the difficulties he faced in accessing resources and communicating with his
jailhouse lawyers. The district court denied the first motion because Perkins had not yet
produced proof of his indigency and the second because, even though Perkins had
assistance preparing some of his prior filings, he was competent to litigate his case. But
the court gave Perkins extra time to file his response to Brown’s motion for summary
judgment to account for Perkins’s temporary transfer to a different facility.

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No. 24-1863 Page 4
After Perkins responded to the motion, the district court entered summary
judgment for Brown, concluding that no reasonable jury could find that Brown was
personally involved in Perkins’s medical treatment. Perkins never interacted directly
with Brown and produced no evidence that Brown had any authority to override his
doctors’ decisions and prescribe or alter his treatment. Moreover, no evidence
suggested that any delay in Perkins’s treatment was attributable to Brown’s intentional
or reckless disregard of his serious medical conditions. Rather, medical staff exercised
their professional judgment in administering care, and any delays were attributable to
the COVID-19 pandemic.
On appeal, Perkins first challenges the district court’s denials of his motions to
recruit counsel, which we review for an abuse of discretion. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647,
658 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc). A district court must consider: (1) whether the indigent
plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel; and if so, (2) given the difficulty
of the case, whether the plaintiff appeared competent to litigate it himself. Id. at 654–55.
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that Perkins was
competent to litigate his case. The court applied the correct standard and considered
Perkins’s arguments about the difficulties he faced, including his arguments about his
literacy level, mental-health issues, and the significance of another inmate’s assistance
in preparing filings. See Dewitt v. Corizon, Inc., 760 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2014). It
concluded, however, that Perkins’s past filings and interactions with the court and
opposing counsel demonstrated that he understood court procedures and the relevant
law and was able to proceed without counsel. We see no abuse of discretion.
Next, Perkins challenges the district court’s entry of summary judgment for
Brown, a decision we review de novo. See Lockett, 937 F.3d at 1022. He asserts that the
district court overlooked disputed facts about Brown’s involvement in his care.
Specifically, Perkins argues that he produced evidence that Brown was responsible for
overseeing internal and external medical providers and coordinating patient care, and
therefore, was alerted to his situation because of his repeated requests for assistance.
Nevertheless, Perkins continues, Brown failed to act to ensure that he received
appropriate care.
But even if we assume, as Perkins suggests, that Brown was personally involved
in his care, Perkins also needed to show that she was deliberately indifferent to his
medical conditions. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Deliberate indifference
is more than negligence or even gross negligence. Stewart v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.,
14 F.4th 757, 763 (7th Cir. 2021). Instead, there must be some evidence that Brown knew

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of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 839 (1994). And because Perkins received at least some level of care for the
symptoms he experienced, we defer to the exercise of medical judgment unless “no
minimally competent professional would have so responded under those
circumstances.” Lockett, 937 F.3d at 1023 (citation omitted) (cleaned up).
No reasonable jury could find that Brown was deliberately indifferent to
Perkins’s loss of facial sensation and issues with his eyesight and hearing. Perkins
received continuous medical care in the form of examinations from both prison medical
staff and outside specialists in oral surgery, neurology, ophthalmology, cardiology,
audiology, and ear, nose, and throat and diagnostic testing, including MRIs, labs, an
ultrasound, an echocardiogram, and hearing tests. His medical records show that
Brown did not deny him any care recommended by either external specialists or
internal medical staff. And nothing in the record suggests that Brown allowed medical
staff to persist in a course of treatment that was so lacking that “no minimally
competent professional” would have responded similarly. See id. Perkins points only to
the fact that his symptoms persisted, but this alone is not sufficient to show deliberate
indifference. See Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 940 F.3d 954, 965–66 (7th Cir.
2019).
Moreover, the undisputed evidence does not support a finding that Brown
unreasonably delayed scheduling Perkins’s appointments with medical specialists.
Although delays in treatment can show deliberate indifference, see Rodgers v. Rankin,
99 F.4th 415, 423 (7th Cir. 2024), no evidence undermines statements in Perkins’s
medical records attributing the delay to the COVID-19 pandemic. Further, Perkins
produced no evidence that Brown herself caused the delays through deliberate
indifference to his medical conditions, nor did he produce sufficient evidence for a jury
to find that it was outside of the bounds of medical professionalism to determine that
COVID-19 concerns outweighed his need for medical care. See Walker, 940 F.3d at 965.
Therefore, summary judgment in Brown’s favor was proper, and the judgment of
the district court is AFFIRMED.

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