Tyrone Stallings v. Daisy Chase

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 17, 2025*
Decided March 24, 2025
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1726
TYRONE STALLINGS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
DAISY CHASE,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 22-CV-161-JPS
J. P. Stadtmueller,
Judge.
O R D E R
Tyrone Stallings, a Wisconsin prisoner, appeals the denial of his petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He argues that his right to confront adverse
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C). We have substituted Daisy Chase,
the current warden of Redgranite Correctional Institution, for Michael Gierach. F ED. R.
A PP . P. 43(c)(2).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

-- 1 of 3 --

No. 24-1726 Page 2
witnesses at trial was violated when a non-testifying confidential informant’s
statements were admitted into evidence. See U.S. C ONST. amend. VI. But because any
violation of Stallings’s right to confront an adverse witness would have been harmless,
we affirm the district court’s decision.
Stallings was arrested after police officers searched his residence under a no-
knock warrant. In his application for the warrant, an officer had submitted an affidavit
relaying statements from a confidential informant. The informant testified to being
inside Stallings’s house and seeing a firearm that belonged to Stallings; the informant
also testified to seeing Stallings distribute cocaine. After obtaining the warrant, police
officers searched Stallings’s home and found nearly 200 grams of marijuana and a
sawed-off shotgun.
Stallings was charged in state court with two firearm-related offenses and a drug
offense. At trial, the warrant affidavit was admitted into evidence. The jury convicted
Stallings of all three offenses, and he was sentenced to 13 years in prison.
When Stallings tried to appeal the convictions, his appellate counsel filed a no-
merit report, and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. State v.
Stallings, No. 2018AP982-CRNM, 2021 WL 8534196 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2021).
Relevant here, the court concluded that Stallings’s right under the Confrontation Clause
of the Sixth Amendment was not violated by the confidential informant’s statements
because they were not offered to prove that Stallings was a felon, or that he had
possessed an illegal firearm or drugs. Id. at *9. Instead, the court explained that “[t]he
warrant materials were introduced only as proof police had entered the residence
pursuant to a warrant.” Id. The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied Stallings’s petition to
review the appellate court’s decision.
Stallings then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
He made three arguments: (1) the search warrant that yielded evidence against him was
not supported by probable cause as required by the Fourth Amendment; (2) the
prosecution failed to retain and turn over potentially exculpatory evidence in violation
of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); and (3) the confidential informant’s statements
in the warrant affidavit violated his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.
The district court denied Stallings’s petition. The court explained that the state
appellate court’s determination—that the confidential informant’s statements were
introduced to show only that the search was authorized by a warrant—was not an
unreasonable application of federal law. Regardless, the court added, any error would

-- 2 of 3 --

No. 24-1726 Page 3
have been harmless because there was plenty of other evidence linking Stallings to the
crimes. The court denied a certificate of appealability.
Stallings then filed a notice of appeal, which we construed as a request for a
certificate of appealability. We granted the request, framing the substantial
constitutional question as “whether the admission into evidence of the search warrant
application and affidavit violated Stallings’s rights under the Confrontation Clause.”
For Stallings to receive relief, he must show that the state court unreasonably applied
Supreme Court precedent or based its decision on an unreasonable determination of the
facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24–25 (2002).
Stallings argues that the state appellate court unreasonably applied Supreme
Court precedent in deciding that the informant’s statements did not violate the
Confrontation Clause. He contends that the state court unreasonably applied Crawford
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004), which held that an out-of-court statement to police
officers during interrogations violated the Confrontation Clause. And here, the
confidential informant made statements to a police officer who formalized those
statements in a warrant application.
But we need not reach the constitutional question in this case. “If there is one
doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional
adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality … unless
such adjudication is unavoidable.” Spector Motor Serv. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105
(1944); see Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99 (1981). And here a nonconstitutional
ground for decision is harmless error. “It is well settled that confrontation clause
violations are subject to a harmless error analysis, … and that the harmless error
standard applies in habeas review … .” U.S. ex rel. Lee v. Flannigan, 884 F.2d 945, 951
(7th Cir. 1989). And Stallings cannot show “actual prejudice.” Brecht v. Abrahamson,
507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). That is, he has not shown that the admission of the confidential
informant’s statements into evidence “had substantial and injurious effect or influence
in determining the jury’s verdict.” Id. at 623. Plenty of other evidence linked him to the
charged offenses. The marijuana and shotgun were found in his home, various pieces of
mail established that he resided there, and he confessed to selling marijuana and to
various details about the shotgun that could lead a jury to believe that he owned it.
AFFIRMED

-- 3 of 3 --