United States of America v. Antonio Maxey

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 21, 2025
Decided March 25, 2025
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1040
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ANTONIO MAXEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:20-CR-00332(5)
Elaine E. Bucklo,
Judge.
O R D E R
Antonio Maxey pleaded guilty to participating in a drug trafficking conspiracy.
The district court sentenced him to 62 months in prison and 3 years of supervised
release. Maxey appeals, but his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous
and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Counsel’s brief
explains the nature of the case and raises potential issues that an appeal like this would
be expected to involve. Because counsel’s brief appears thorough, and Maxey did not
respond to the motion, see C IR . R. 51(b), we limit our review to subjects that counsel
discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 24-1040 Page 2
From February to June 2019, Maxey worked with others to distribute crack
cocaine in Chicago. Authorities intercepted Maxey’s phone calls and heard him using
code words to coordinate the delivery of the drug to customers approximately 14 times.
Maxey was eventually charged in a superseding information with conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute, and to distribute, cocaine base. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846.
Maxey agreed to plead guilty. In his plea agreement, he admitted that he was
responsible for approximately 627 grams of cocaine base and that, under the Sentencing
Guidelines, he qualified as a career offender. For its part, the government agreed to
move for a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, id. § 3E1.1, and, if the
court determined that Maxey was a career offender, to recommend a downward
variance consistent with what Maxey’s guideline range would have been had he
distributed powder cocaine rather than crack.
At the change of plea hearing, the court accepted Maxey’s plea after conducting a
Rule 11 colloquy and determining that there was an adequate factual basis for his plea.
The presentence investigation report (PSR) prepared after the hearing set forth the same
guidelines calculations that were laid out in the plea agreement. The calculations
resulted in a guidelines range of 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment, based on a total
offense level of 29 and a criminal history category of VI.
In a sentencing memorandum, Maxey requested credit for time he had served in
state custody in a related case because the state offense was relevant conduct, but the
Bureau of Prisons would not deduct that time. He also noted that without the
powder-to-crack cocaine disparity and the career-offender guideline, he would have a
guidelines range of 57 to 71 months, and he argued that this range more accurately
reflected his offense. He believed that a 22-month sentence (including time served)
would be appropriate based on his personal history (a difficult childhood and severe
health challenges) and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities between
his sentence and those of his coconspirators. The government agreed that Maxey
correctly calculated his hypothetical guidelines range, but it requested a sentence of 87
months’ imprisonment.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court first explained its understanding of
the parties’ positions on the Guidelines. The parties agreed that Maxey qualified as a
career offender, and so the court ruled that the imprisonment range of 151 to 188
months applied. After discussing the implications of Maxey’s anticipated state sentence
and the § 3553(a) factors, the district court imposed 62 months’ imprisonment. The court

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No. 24-1040 Page 3
informed Maxey that it had given him credit for 883 days to account for time served in
state custody. It also imposed three years of supervised release.
In the Anders brief, counsel first reports that she consulted with Maxey and
advised him about the risks and benefits of withdrawing his guilty plea, and Maxey
affirmed that he wants to challenge only his sentence. Therefore, counsel properly
refrains from discussing the validity of the guilty plea. United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d
348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002).
As to the sentence, counsel correctly concludes that any challenge to the
calculation of Maxey’s guidelines range would be frivolous. His classification as a
career offender drove the base offense level and criminal history category. See U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.1. Because Maxey did not object to this determination, we would review it for
plain error. See United States v. Mikulski, 35 F.4th 1074, 1077 (7th Cir. 2022). Before the
offense of conviction, Maxey was twice convicted of controlled substance offenses that
were punishable by more than a year of imprisonment. Therefore, the court correctly
applied the career-offender guideline and identified the applicable range. See U.S.S.G.
§§ 4B1.1, 4B1.2. And based on the sentencing transcript, we also agree with counsel that
it would be frivolous to argue that the district court made any other procedural error,
such as “failing to consider the section 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on
clearly erroneous facts, or failing to explain adequately the chosen sentence.”
United States v. Griffith, 913 F.3d 683, 687 (7th Cir. 2019).
Next, counsel concludes that challenging the substantive reasonableness of
Maxey’s sentence would be frivolous. We would presume that Maxey’s
below-guidelines sentence is not unreasonably long. See United States v. Fitzpatrick, 32
F.4th 644, 651 (7th Cir. 2022). And counsel appropriately determines that Maxey cannot
rebut the presumption with his suggested argument—that his sentence is unreasonable
because it is longer than his co-defendants’. Only “unwarranted” disparities are
problematic. See 28 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6); United States v. Jarigese, 999 F.3d 464, 474 (7th Cir.
2021). And here, the district court adequately explained that Maxey’s sentence needed
to be higher to account for his more significant criminal history and his possession of a
firearm. It also explained the sentence with reference to other factors under § 3553(a),
including that Maxey’s prior incarceration had not deterred him, that his drug dealing
was “destructive,” and that despite his relatively young age, he was old enough to
conform his behavior to the law.
Last, counsel correctly determines that it would be frivolous to challenge either
the term or conditions of supervised release. The three-year term was statutorily

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required, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), and the court’s adequate justifications for Maxey’s
term of imprisonment apply to his term of supervised release as well, see United States v.
Bickart, 825 F.3d 832, 839 (7th Cir. 2016). Further, Maxey had prior notice of the
proposed conditions of supervised release, did not object to them in his sentencing
memo or at the sentencing hearing, and, in fact, agreed that the conditions would aid in
his adjustment to life after his term of imprisonment. Therefore, he waived any
challenge to them. See United States v. Flores, 929 F.3d 443, 449 (7th Cir. 2019).
We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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