United States of America v. Jaron Jay Jackson

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-3205
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JARON JAY JACKSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 22-CR-55 — William C. Griesbach, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED SEPTEMBER 13, 2024 — DECIDED MARCH 28, 2025
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK, JACKSON-AKIWUMI, and KOLAR, Cir-
cuit Judges.
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Jaron Jackson pleaded guilty
to sex trafficking of a minor and transportation of child por-
nography. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1), (b)(2), 2252A(a)(1). The sen-
tence is 240 months’ imprisonment. Jackson’s appeal under
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2) presents a single argument: that the
district court should have suppressed evidence (photographs,
text messages, and a video) found in his cell phone. The

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2 No. 23-3205
search was authorized by a warrant, and Jackson concedes
that the warrant was supported by probable cause. But he
contends that the police took too long—40 days after his ar-
rest—before seeking that warrant. The district court, how-
ever, denied the motion after concluding that the delay did
not permit the police to obtain any evidence they would not
have received had they sought a warrant immediately. 2023
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100549 (E.D. Wis. June 9, 2023).
The district judge found that the motion was untimely,
which is beyond dispute. The court set July 1, 2022, as the
deadline for pretrial motions. Jackson did not file any. In Jan-
uary 2023 the court appointed a different lawyer for Jackson,
and in May 2023 counsel filed a motion to suppress evidence
recovered from the phone. That motion was ten months late.
Only “good cause” permits a district court to resolve an un-
timely motion to suppress. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(C), (c)(3).
The district court held a hearing to consider whether “good
cause” justified the delay and concluded that it does not. 2023
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100549 at *6–9. That conclusion does not re-
flect any clearly erroneous finding or abuse of discretion.
We could stop there, but Jackson then could seek relief un-
der 28 U.S.C. §2255 on the ground that the lawyers’ unjusti-
fied delay violated his right under the Sixth Amendment to
the assistance of counsel. One question in such a proceeding
would be whether deficient legal assistance caused preju-
dice—in other words, whether a timely motion to suppress
would have been granted. The district judge addressed that
question to fend off any collateral ajack. 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
100549 at *9–20. We think it prudent to do the same.
Jackson was arrested on June 30, 2019, and has been in cus-
tody since then. He was carrying a phone when arrested; that

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No. 23-3205 3
phone was seized and has been retained. On August 9, 2019,
a detective with the Oshkosh, Wisconsin, police asked for a
warrant to search the phone’s contents. A state judge
promptly issued a warrant. It took until May 17, 2021, to by-
pass the phone’s password protection; Jackson does not con-
tend that this delay is problematic. (He could have avoided it
by providing his passcode.) His argument is limited to the 40
days that elapsed between the phone’s seizure and the appli-
cation for a search warrant.
The Fourth Amendment provides that every search,
whether or not authorized by a warrant, must be “reasona-
ble”. Courts often say that delay can make a search unreason-
able. See, e.g., United States v. Prideaux-Wen<, 543 F.3d 954,
957–59 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Mi>en, 592 F.3d 767, 775
(7th Cir. 2010); Owens v. United States, 387 F.3d 607, 608 (7th
Cir. 2004). Suppose an informant reports seeing heroin in a
house on Day 1, and the police do not mount a search until
Day 40. By then the drugs may be gone—indeed, by Day 40
the house may have been sold and occupied by an innocent
family. Delay reduces the chance of finding evidence and in-
creases the risk of disrupting innocent persons’ lives, so the
passage of time may make the search unreasonable.
But that is not a risk in this case. The cell phone has been
in official hands since June 30, 2019. It contains exactly the
same evidence today as it did the moment it was seized. (Jack-
son has not contended that he possessed the ability to erase
the phone remotely, and at all events he cannot receive a legal
benefit from a potential ajempt at spoliation of evidence.) A
search in August 2019 created no greater risk of intruding on
innocent persons’ privacy than a search 40 days earlier would
have done.

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4 No. 23-3205
Suppose the police had arrested Jackson in his home and
seized a strongbox that they believed contained evidence.
Forty days later, they obtain a warrant that authorizes the box
to be opened. That search would not pose any greater risk to
any person than a search on the day the box had been seized,
so the delay would not make the search unreasonable. Just so
with a locked phone that the police seize when making an ar-
rest.
This observation supposes that the police have a right to
retain the phone or strongbox. Suppose an arrested person’s
phone is seized, after which the suspect posts bail and is re-
leased. The release presumptively entitles him to regain his
possessions, for a phone like a car may be essential to lawful
activities. Cf. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) (discussing
the importance of cell phones and the data they contain). The
value of this possessory interest is why we suggested in
United States v. Burgard, 675 F.3d 1029 (7th Cir. 2012), that six
days’ delay in obtaining a warrant to search a cell phone is
near the outer limit. Burgard had been stopped and ques-
tioned but not arrested, though the police held onto his
phone. We affirmed his conviction but cautioned officers not
to assume that they could take longer than a week. Our opin-
ion focused directly on the time during which the police de-
prived Burgard of his possessory interest. Id. at 1031, 1033. See
also United States v. Mitchell, 565 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2009) (21-
day delay unreasonable when suspect was not in custody);
United States v. Pra>, 915 F.3d 266 (4th Cir. 2019) (31-day delay
unreasonable when suspect was not in custody).
Unlike the situation in Burgard, Mitchell, and Pra>, how-
ever, Jackson did not have a right to keep the cell phone in his
possession during custody. No jail or prison allows inmates

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No. 23-3205 5
to keep and use cell phones. Jackson told the district court that
he could have exercised his possessory interest by giving the
phone to a friend, to which the judge replied: “[E]ven though
the rules governing the Milwaukee County Jail where Jackson
was initially held allow inmates to release their property to
other individuals, Jackson made no ajempt to do so. He filed
no motion for the return of his property, as Wisconsin law ex-
plicitly authorized him to do.” 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100549 at
*17 (citation omijed).
Had Jackson sought to regain or transfer the phone’s pos-
session—or indicated any concern about delay in searching
its contents—that could have spurred the police to seek a war-
rant quickly. But he did not, so they did not. The time they
took was not unreasonably long. This conclusion finds sup-
port in other circuits. See, e.g., United States v. Sullivan, 797
F.3d 623, 633–34 (9th Cir. 2015) (21-day delay in search of lap-
top computer reasonable when suspect was in custody);
United States v. Bragg, 44 F.4th 1067, 1072–73 (8th Cir. 2022)
(24-day delay reasonable when suspect was in custody and
there was no evidence that he or anyone acting on his behalf
made a request for phone’s return); United States v. Johnson,
875 F.3d 1265, 1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 2017) (one-year delay rea-
sonable when suspect was in custody and he did not seek the
phone’s return). The district court properly denied the motion
to suppress the evidence recovered from the phone.
AFFIRMED

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