United States of America v. Joseph R. Quinones

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued March 4, 2025
Decided April 1, 2025
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2539
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JOSEPH R. QUINONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.
No. 1:24-cr-00003-HAB-SLC-1
Holly A. Brady,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
Joseph Quinones pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1), and was sentenced to 150 months’ imprisonment, above the applicable
range of 110–137 months under the Sentencing Guidelines. Quinones appeals, arguing
that the district court made a procedural error by providing inadequate justification for
the upward variance and failing to explain why any deviation from the guidelines
range was necessary. He contends that the sentence is substantively unreasonable for
the same reasons. Because the court adequately explained the sentence and was not
required to specifically justify the variance, we affirm.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-2539 Page 2
One morning Quinones and his now wife went to a fast-food drive-through
window and attempted to order items off the lunch menu. When told that the
restaurant was serving only breakfast at the time, they got out of the car and went
inside. Quinones then walked behind the counter, pulled out a handgun, and began
threatening employees. An employee called the police, but by the time officers arrived,
Quinones and his wife were in their car. When officers stopped them and told them to
stay in the car, they both got out and began walking away. The police were forced to
chase Quinones down on foot.
Quinones was previously convicted of multiple felonies, and so he was charged
with being a felon in illegal possession of a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). He pleaded
guilty with no plea agreement.
Before the sentencing hearing, both parties submitted sentencing memoranda. In
mitigation, Quinones highlighted his difficult upbringing, noting that he had grown up
in poverty, enduring homelessness and a physically abusive father. Because of the
prevalence of drugs in his neighborhood, he began abusing alcohol and marijuana
when he was 11, soon moving on to other substances. He also presented studies on the
adverse effects of violence and early drug use on child development. With his
memorandum, he submitted videos from family members speaking on his behalf.
Quinones contended that a below-guidelines sentence of 96 months would be
appropriate. The government, in its memorandum, emphasized Quinones’s lengthy
criminal history and the fact that several previous sentences had not deterred him from
criminal conduct. It recommended a sentence of 126 months.
At the hearing, the court first confirmed that neither party objected to the facts
laid out in the presentence investigation report, then adopted them as its findings of
fact. The court then calculated the guidelines range: 110–137 months’ imprisonment
based on an offense level of 25 and a criminal history category of VI. U.S.S.G. § 5A. Both
parties agreed with this calculation.
Before hearing the parties’ arguments, the court acknowledged that it had
reviewed the sentencing memoranda and the family videos from Quinones. It also
explained what circumstances it viewed as aggravating and mitigating and how they
weighed in its assessment of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. In mitigation, the
court acknowledged Quinones’s difficult childhood, noting many of the details from his
memorandum. The court also favorably noted his wife’s support for him and his
prompt acceptance of responsibility. Then the court canvassed Quinones’s criminal
history and noted that it was “very concerned” that his past offenses included many

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No. 24-2539 Page 3
instances of violent conduct. Because of the violent nature of Quinones’s crimes and
their persistence despite previous sentences, the court stated, protecting the public and
deterrence would weigh most heavily in its consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. 18
U.S.C § 3553(a)(2)(B)–(C).
Given their turns to argue, the government and Quinones largely reiterated their
sentencing memoranda, with Quinones’s lawyer adding a few details about Quinones’s
participation in therapy and motivation to maintain sobriety. Quinones also spoke,
apologizing for his conduct and expressing his hope that he could stay on track after his
time in prison. The court briefly restated its consideration of the mitigating and
aggravating factors, acknowledging the additional remarks Quinones and his lawyer
had made in mitigation. The court then pronounced an above-guidelines sentence of
150 months in prison.
Quinones appeals, challenging the procedural validity and substantive
reasonableness of his sentence. He first argues that the court procedurally erred by
providing an insufficiently detailed explanation to permit appellate review and failing
to specifically justify why a sentence within the guidelines range was insufficient. We
review de novo procedural challenges to a sentence. United States v. Cook, 108 F.4th 574,
580 (7th Cir. 2024).
Quinones asserts that the sentencing court’s justification was too thin to allow us
to “meaningful[ly] … review” the sentence. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50
(2007). But this statement is unsupported by the record. The court, at the beginning of
the sentencing hearing, listed several specifics that it found mitigating, such as a strong
support system at home and his acceptance of responsibility. The court also noted that
Quinones’s long history of violent crime was highly aggravating and explicitly said that
deterrence and protection of the public were its most pressing concerns. A detailed
explanation of how the facts about the case and the defendant are aggravating or
mitigating and how they translate into § 3553(a) factors, as provided here, is a sufficient
explanation. See United States v. Hendrix, 74 F.4th 859, 867–68 (7th Cir. 2023); United
States v. Morgan, 987 F.3d 627, 632–33 (7th Cir. 2021).
Quinones justifies ignoring these sections of the transcript by contending that we
may not consider the explanatory statements the court made before hearing the parties
argue. The caselaw he relies on, however, stands only for the proposition that a
sentencing court must not finally decide a sentence before the parties have a chance to
argue. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 49–50 (directing the sentencing court to determine the
sentence only after hearing argument); United States v. Wilcher, 91 F.4th 864, 872 (7th Cir.

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No. 24-2539 Page 4
2024) (requiring a sentencing court to provide an explanation, but not prescribing when
the explanation must come). Quinones cites no decisions that prevent an appellate court
from reviewing any portion of the transcript when deciding if a district court
adequately justified a sentence. Instead, we review the entire transcript to determine if
the explanation of the sentence was sufficient. United States v. Swank, 37 F.4th 1331, 1334
(7th Cir. 2022); see also United States v. Brooks, 100 F.4th 825, 841 (7th Cir. 2024).
Quinones also argues that the court procedurally erred by failing to consider his
arguments in mitigation or his suggestions for an appropriate lower sentence. First,
Quinones waived any argument that the court did not sufficiently consider his
arguments in mitigation. At the end of the sentencing hearing, the court asked
Quinones if it had satisfactorily addressed his arguments in mitigation, and Quinones
responded in the affirmative; he cannot argue otherwise on appeal. See United States v.
Creek, 95 F.4th 484, 492 (7th Cir. 2024). And even if this argument were not waived, we
have never prescribed how a court must demonstrate consideration of arguments in
mitigation, only that it may not “pass over in silence” the defendant’s main arguments.
See United States v. Castaneda, 77 F.4th 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2023); United States v.
Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2005). Here, just before announcing the
sentence, the court specifically mentioned all the main factors in mitigation that
Quinones had raised: his acceptance of responsibility, his difficult background, his
mental health struggles, and his post-arrest efforts at rehabilitation.
Nor did the court procedurally err by not specifically explaining why the lower
sentences suggested by Quinones and the government were insufficient. Quinones
relies upon United States v. Ferguson, 831 F.3d 850, 855 (7th Cir. 2016), and United States
v. Lyons, 733 F.3d 777, 785 (7th Cir. 2013), for the proposition that courts must
specifically state why they did not impose the shorter sentences suggested by the
parties. This misreads Ferguson and Lyons. In each case, the crucial error was that the
district court inadequately explained the sentence that it pronounced, not that it failed
to explain why other, lower, sentences were not appropriate. Ferguson, 831 F.3d at 855;
Lyons, 733 F.3d at 785.
Finally, Quinones argues that the court procedurally erred by not directly
explaining why a within-guidelines sentence would be insufficient. He points to the
Court’s mandate in Gall that sentencing courts, when considering an out-of-guidelines
sentence, “consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is
sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance,” along with its

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observation that “a major departure should be supported by a more significant
justification than a minor one.” 552 U.S. at 50.
But Gall does not require a sentencing court to explain specifically why it chose a
sentence above the range. The instructions that Quinones points to require a more
thorough explanation of an above-guidelines sentence, but they do not mandate that
courts use specific language to explain why the guidelines range was insufficient. Id.
Here, the sentencing court highlighted the specific aggravating and mitigating factors
that concerned it to help guide the parties’ arguments, listened to those arguments, and
then explicitly rested its variance from the Guidelines on “justifiable reasons” – the
seriousness of the offense, specific deterrence, and public safety. This articulation as a
whole is entirely sufficient. Our case law supports this approach: we have routinely
upheld above-guidelines sentences that are justified with reference to the § 3553(a)
factors. See, e.g., Hendrix, 74 F.4th at 867–68; United States v. Kuczora, 910 F.3d 904, 908
(7th Cir. 2018).
Quinones’s procedural argument therefore fails. Not using specific language to
explain why the court deviated from the Guidelines is not procedural error when the
court’s rationale adequately supports the chosen sentence. And, as explained above,
here the court “thoroughly document[ed]” its reasons for imposing the sentence and
demonstrated that it considered the sentencing factors; that is procedurally sufficient.
Cook, 108 F.4th at 583; Hendrix, 74 F.4th at 867.
For the same reason, Quinones cannot establish that his sentence is substantively
unreasonable. In contending that the sentence is too long, he essentially restates his
arguments that the court imposed an above-guidelines sentence without adequately
justifying it—as he puts it, that the procedural errors led the court to impose a
substantively unreasonable sentence. But if there is no procedural error under de novo
review, it follows by Quinones’s own logic that the same purported defects do not
render the sentence substantively unreasonable under review for abuse of direction.
See Cook, 108 F.4th at 580 (identifying the standard of review and noting that a
substantively reasonable sentence is one that is imposed in conformity with the
§ 3553(a) factors).
AFFIRMED

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