Xihai Wang v. City of Indianapolis

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 28, 2025*
Decided April 3, 2025
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2664
XIHAI WANG,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:23-cv-01543-TAB-RLY
Tim A. Baker,
Magistrate Judge.
O R D E R
After state criminal charges against him were dropped, Xihai Wang sued the City
of Indianapolis and several officers for violations of his constitutional rights and various
state laws based on the officers’ conduct during his arrest and prosecution. The district
court dismissed some of his claims for lack of jurisdiction, others as time-barred, and
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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the rest for failure to state a claim. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, vacate
in part, and remand for further proceedings.
I.
We accept Wang’s well-pleaded facts as true and draw reasonable inferences in
his favor. Cielak v. Nicolet Union High Sch. Dist., 112 F.4th 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2024). To
provide context to his complaints, we also take judicial notice, as the district court did,
of the documents from Wang’s state court case. See Fosnight v. Jones, 41 F.4th 916, 922
(7th Cir. 2022) (“We’ve long held that district courts can take judicial notice of public
court documents and proceedings when considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”).
In December 2020, Wang was arrested after his two roommates reported him to
the police for allegedly attacking them in their shared Indianapolis house. When three
officers (Officers Cody Gaddis, Daniel Reed, and Steven Baumer) arrived at the house,
they separated Wang from his roommates. Officer Gaddis then spoke with the
roommates about what happened. In a probable-cause affidavit, the officers
characterized the roommates as stating that Wang had smashed a toilet seat and, during
an ensuing argument, attacked them. The officers arrested Wang for battery and
criminal mischief. Before leaving, the officers ordered the roommates to get rid of
Wang’s personal belongings. Wang contends that Officer Gaddis coerced false
statements from the roommates about what happened, and that the three officers then
embellished the probable-cause affidavit with further lies of their own. Wang was
detained for one week before he was released on bond.
The state court held a hearing to determine the conditions of his release on bond.
At the hearing, the officers submitted an affidavit containing the same allegedly false
statements that they used to arrest Wang. The state judge concluded that his arrest was
supported by probable cause and on December 26, 2020, issued a no-contact order—
based on a finding of dangerousness—that prevented Wang from going near his
roommates, possessing a firearm, or leaving the state. As a separate condition of Wang’s
release, the jail required that he wear an ankle monitor while out on bond.
On January 6, 2022, while the criminal proceedings were still ongoing, Wang
learned that the officers lied about what his roommates said on the night of his arrest.
On that day, he received the video from one officer’s body camera during the arrest.
Wang alleges that the video shows that the officer coordinated with the roommates to
create a false story about what happened, that the officer lied in the probable-cause

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affidavit about what the roommates told him, and that the officer ordered the
roommates to destroy the belongings Wang kept in the house.
Several months later, Wang entered into a pretrial diversion agreement. The
agreement required him to acknowledge that probable cause existed for his arrest and
charges. For reasons not reflected in the record, the prosecution dismissed the criminal
case against him on December 1, 2022. Attempting to comply with the Indiana Tort
Claims Act (which requires notice of a lawsuit against a municipality and its employees
within 180 days of the alleged injury), Wang filed notice of his tort claim with the City a
month later. See I ND. CODE § 34-13-3-8 (2023). The City denied his claim as untimely.
Wang filed this lawsuit against the City and the officers on August 28, 2023,
seeking damages and the expungement of his criminal record. All parties consented to
having a magistrate judge handle the case. See 28 U.S.C. 636(c). The case has been
protracted: Wang has filed three versions of his complaint and advanced over fifteen
theories of recovery. The first complaint contained the bulk of his theories:
• Detention-related theories: Wang alleged that the officers fabricated
probable cause to justify his arrest and pre-bond detention by coercing false
statements from his roommates. This, he contended, violated his Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights, see 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Indiana laws against false
arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution; and the Indiana
Constitution. He also alleged that the officers and the City caused him to be
subjected to unsanitary conditions and strip searched during his pre-bond
detention, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights and Indiana law.
• Pretrial-release theories: Wang alleged that the officers lied in the probable
cause affidavit about what his roommates said during his arrest and that the
officers used that affidavit to obtain the no-contact order. The no-contact
order, he alleged, abridged his rights guaranteed by the Second, Fourth, and
Fourteenth Amendments, and the Commerce Clause. He also contended that
wearing an ankle monitor violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights.
• Monell theories: Wang alleged that the City’s police department had a
practice or custom of arresting and charging people without probable cause,
as well as failing to supervise and discipline its officers. See Monell v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

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• Remaining theories: Wang contended that the officers’ and City’s conduct
throughout his criminal proceedings constituted intentional infliction of
emotional distress in violation of Indiana law. He further contended that,
based on his other allegations, all the defendants conspired to violate his
constitutional rights or failed to prevent that conspiracy. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1985, 1986.
The defendants moved to dismiss, asserting that the district court lacked
jurisdiction over some claims because of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; that others were
time barred because they were not brought within two years of Wang’s alleged injuries,
as required by the Indiana statute of limitations; and that the allegations could not
support any remaining claims. Wang responded that he was not a state-court loser
seeking to overturn a judgment; that his claims did not accrue until January 6, 2022,
when he saw the body camera video; and that he properly stated claims for malicious
prosecution and Monell liability.
The district court dismissed Wang’s complaint for three reasons. First, the court
ruled that under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine it lacked jurisdiction over the pretrial-
release claims because his asserted injuries were inextricably intertwined with an order
issued by a state court. Second, the court concluded that even if it had jurisdiction, all
but two of Wang’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations: his claims against
the officers because he did not file his complaint until more than two years after his
arrest and release on bond, and his claims against the City because he failed to file
notice of his claims within 180 days of his arrest or release as required by the Indiana
Tort Claims Act.1 Third, the court concluded that Wang’s allegations could not support
any claims on the merits. Wang could not proceed on a claim of malicious prosecution
because he signed a diversion agreement in his state case acknowledging that his arrest
was supported by probable cause. (Alternatively, the court determined that Indiana law
granted immunity to the defendants.) As for Wang’s failure-to-supervise claim under
Monell, the court also concluded that the complaint’s conclusory statements such as
“employees regularly engage in the misdeeds set forth in this entire complaint” were
1 The district court dismissed Wang’s claims as time-barred under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). But the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, not a
pleadings defect, and so that issue should be adjudicated instead under Rule 12(c).
Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012). Because both rules apply the same
standard, there is no error in that respect, but courts should be careful to distinguish
between the two. Id. at 637–38.

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insufficient to plead a particular policy or practice. The court granted Wang leave to file
an amended complaint repleading his failure-to-supervise Monell claim but denied him
leave—on the basis of futility—to replead any other claims.
Wang filed an amended complaint. He repleaded both of his Monell claims, his
emotional distress claim, and added a new allegation that on the night of his arrest the
officers had violated state law and his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by
ordering his roommates to get rid of his belongings. At the same time, he also moved
for reconsideration. His motion and amended complaint resulted in a flurry of
responsive motions contesting, among other things, the time when his claims accrued.
Wang argued that he was unaware that his constitutional rights were violated until he
saw the video showing that the officers lied about what his roommates said. In his view,
either his claims accrued on January 6, 2022, when he saw the video, or the statute of
limitations should be equitably tolled or estopped until that point.
The district court denied his motion for reconsideration of the original complaint
and dismissed the amended complaint. The court ruled that he had failed to identify
any manifest errors of law or fact that would justify reconsideration, that he
impermissibly repleaded his dismissed claims, and that his property-related claims
were barred by Rooker-Feldman and the statute of limitations under the Indiana Tort
Claims Act. The court did not rule on the failure-to-supervise Monell claim, instead
requiring him to replead it without including other claims in the complaint.
Wang filed a second amended complaint repleading both of his Monell claims. In
relevant part, he added allegations that the chief of police had policymaking authority
over supervision and discipline and that complaints of police misconduct—for several
years—have been made against the police department on a weekly basis. He also
alleged as a basis for Monell liability that he had been subjected to excessive force when
handcuffed during his arrest, despite his being compliant and nonviolent. The district
court dismissed this complaint as well, concluding that it largely contained conclusory
and unsupported statements, and failed to allege facts suggesting a widespread custom
or practice. The court then entered judgment for the defendants.

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II.
Wang appeals each of the orders dismissing his claims.2 As a threshold matter,
however, the defendants argue that we lack appellate jurisdiction to review anything
but the final dismissal order because he filed his notice of appeal more than 30 days
after the entry of the first two orders. See F ED. R. A PP . P. 4(a). But the defendants are
mistaken. The first two orders dismissed only part of Wang’s complaint, rendering
them interlocutory orders that may be challenged on appeal as part of the final
judgment. See, e.g., Sargeant v. Barfield, 87 F.4th 358, 362 (7th Cir. 2023).
A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Wang first challenges the district court’s ruling that Rooker-Feldman barred his
claims stemming from the no-contact order. We agree with him that Rooker-Feldman
doctrine does not bar a federal suit that seeks damages relating to a state court order
that did not impose monetary penalties. Gilbank v. Wood County Dep’t of Human Servs.,
111 F.4th 754, 792 (7th Cir. 2024) (en banc) (holding on damage claims set forth in Part I
of opinion by Kirsch, J., joined in relevant part by Easterbrook, J.), cert. denied,
--- S.Ct. ---, 2025 WL 581600 (Feb. 24, 2025). Such a suit is not barred even if the
plaintiff’s claims deny “a legal conclusion that a state court has reached.” Id. at 797
(quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293 (2005)). Rather,
Rooker-Feldman applies only when “a plaintiff seeks relief from a federal court that
would reverse a state court judgment.” Id. at 794. We note that Gilbank had not yet been
decided at the time of the court’s jurisdictional ruling, but appellate courts generally
must “apply changes in the law,” and the defendants offer no reason for us not to apply
Gilbank on appeal. See Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956, 964 (7th Cir. 2019). Moreover,
contrary to the district court’s inquiry here, Gilbank disapproved of any assessment of
whether federal claims are “inextricably intertwined” with a state court judgment.
See Gilbank, 111 F.4th at 761, 767 n.5. Accordingly, Rooker-Feldman bars Wang’s claims
2 Wang contends that he pleaded an excessive force claim against the officers.
But the district court did not understand him to bring such a claim, and we see no
suggestion that he argued otherwise in any of his responses to the three separate
motions to dismiss. Relatedly, he does not dispute on appeal the district court’s
conclusion that his privacy and conditions-of-confinement claims under state law and
the Eighth Amendment were time barred. Those arguments are accordingly waived.
See, e.g., Bradley v. Vill. of Univ. Park, 59 F.4th 887, 897 (7th Cir. 2023).

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relating to the no-contact order to the extent that he asks the federal courts to expunge
his criminal record, but it does not bar his claims for damages.
B. Statute of Limitations
Wang next challenges the district court’s alternative holding that his pretrial-
release claims against Officers Gaddis, Baumer, and Reed are time-barred.3 If we
construe his arguments liberally, Wang asserts that each officer should have been
equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense because the officers’
alleged lies prevented him from knowing that his injuries were attributable to the
officers until he obtained the body camera video. Equitable estoppel tolls the statute of
limitations when a defendant “takes active steps to prevent the plaintiff from suing in
time,” Rosado v. Gonzalez, 832 F.3d 714, 716 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Shropshear v. Corp.
Couns. of Chi., 275 F.3d 593, 595 (7th Cir. 2001)), and the plaintiff actually and reasonably
relies upon the defendant’s conduct, Uebelacker v. Rock Energy Coop., 54 F.4th 1008, 1011
(7th Cir. 2022). “Hiding evidence” is a common justification for applying equitable
estoppel. Rosado, 832 F.3d at 717 n.2. And in this context, the officers’ alleged
concealment of evidence showing that the arrest resulted from their own wrongdoing—
rather than that of the roommates—would prevent Wang from discovering he had a
constitutional claim against the officers. See Askew v. City of Chicago, 440 F.3d 894, 895–96
(7th Cir. 2006) (no constitutional violation when police reasonably rely on false
information from witnesses).
Wang’s allegations justify equitable estoppel against Officers Gaddis, Baumer,
and Reed. We understand him to allege that, until he obtained the body camera video,
he believed that only his roommates had lied about what happened. At this stage, we
accept that belief as reasonable—he had no reason to think the officers would lie—and
so would not know he had a constitutional or tort claim against the officers. See Askew,
440 F.3d at 895–96. In essence, Wang argues that he did not know he had a claim against
Officer Gaddis until receiving the body camera footage because Officer Gaddis,
allegedly, lied in the probable cause affidavit about what was said during his
conversation with Wang’s roommates. See Rosado, 832 F.3d at 716–17 & 717 n.2
(suggesting without deciding that withholding video evidence showing that an officer
3 Even if we assume that Wang’s allegations against the City (that its official
policy, practice, or custom permitted and promoted the officers’ actions) justify
equitable estoppel for his pretrial-release claims, they nevertheless fail on the merits.
See Section C, infra.

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lied about what he observed during an arrest would equitably estop a statute of
limitations defense); Est. of Amaro v. City of Oakland, 653 F.3d 808, 813–14 (9th Cir. 2011).
Those alleged lies made Wang believe that his roommates were responsible for his
injuries. The argument is similar for Officers Reed and Baumer: Wang contends that
both officers knew that Officer Gaddis had lied but nonetheless conspired to prevent
Wang from learning about the lies—thereby preventing Wang from discovering that he
had a claim against either Officer Reed or Officer Baumer. See Rosado, 832 F.3d at 716–17
& 717 n.2 (suggesting that participating in withholding evidence justifies equitable
estoppel); Est. of Amaro, 653 F.3d at 813–14.
Because Officers Gaddis, Reed, and Baumer should have been equitably
estopped from invoking a statute of limitations defense, the statute of limitations
started to run when Wang discovered the officers’ alleged lies: January 6, 2022. He thus
had two years from that date to bring his § 1983 and § 1985 claims. I ND. C ODE § 34-11-2-
4 (2024); Wilson v. Giesen, 956 F.2d 738, 741 & n.4 (7th Cir. 1994). He had one year to
bring his § 1986 claims. 42 U.S.C. § 1986. Because Wang sued on August 28, 2023, he
was not timely with regard to his § 1986 claims. He was, however, timely with regard to
his § 1983 and § 1985 claims, and the district court erred by dismissing them for being
untimely.
Wang’s state claims (apart from malicious prosecution) against each defendant—
the City and Officers Gaddis, Reed, and Baumer—were correctly dismissed as untimely.
The Indiana Tort Claims Act requires a plaintiff to give notice of all claims against a
municipality and its employees within 180 days of an injury, see I ND. C ODE § 34-13-3-8
(2023), but Wang waited nearly two years after receiving the video to do so. He
responds that Indiana’s continuing wrong doctrine should further toll the statute of
limitations for those claims because he is still suffering the negative effects of being
criminally charged, but that doctrine does not apply “if a plaintiff knows of facts that
should lead to the discovery of a cause of action, even if his or her relationship with the
tortfeasor continues beyond that point.” Waldrip v. Waldrip, 976 N.E.2d 102, 110–11 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2012).
C. Merits
Wang next challenges the district court’s dismissal of his malicious prosecution
claims under federal and state law. He contends that they should not have been
dismissed because the defendants are not entitled to immunity. But he has waived any
challenge to the dismissal of those claims because he fails to contest the court’s
alternative rationale for dismissing them. The court concluded that those claims fail

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because Wang conceded in his pretrial diversion agreement that probable cause existed
for his arrest and the charges brought against him. Wang does not contest on appeal the
court’s consideration or characterization of the agreement and so has waived any
dispute. See Bradley, 59 F.4th at 897. As a result, we affirm the district court’s dismissal
of those claims. See Hart v. Mannina, 798 F.3d 578, 587 (7th Cir. 2015) (probable cause is
an absolute defense to a malicious prosecution claim); Ingram v. Diamond Equipment,
Inc., 118 N.E.3d 1, 7 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (probable cause is an essential element of a
malicious prosecution claim).
Several of Wang’s other claims also turn on whether probable cause existed for
his detention, and so, although they were timely, we uphold their dismissal on the
merits. Any claim under the Fourth Amendment4—whether styled as false arrest, false
imprisonment, or malicious prosecution—requires that a plaintiff’s arrest or detention
not be supported by probable cause. Hart, 798 F.3d at 587. Because Wang has waived
any argument that the officers lacked or fabricated probable cause to arrest and detain
him, he may not proceed on his related Fourth Amendment claims under §§ 1983 and
1985. See Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 342 (7th Cir. 2017).
Wang next argues that the district court erred in determining that he had not
adequately pleaded the existence of a practice or custom for both of his Monell claims.
But there is no municipal liability under Monell without an underlying constitutional
violation. City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986). So because Wang failed to
state a Fourth Amendment claim against the officers, as we have established, he also
failed to state a claim against the City under Monell relating to his arrest and detention.
As for his other Monell claim alleging a failure to supervise and discipline, that claim
fails as well because he did not adequately allege a policy, practice, or custom of
violating constitutional rights. To the extent he sought to rely on excessive force or
fabricating probable-cause affidavits as a basis for that claim, he identifies no express
policy. As for custom or practice, he identifies only a single instance of an alleged
falsification in probable-cause affidavits, and this is insufficient to show a widespread
custom or practice. Gill, 850 F.3d at 344. Nor may he rely on excessive force as a basis
for a Monell claim because he has not alleged that the force used in his arrest was
4 The only theory under the federal constitution that Wang could proceed upon
for these claims was that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated. Although Wang
invoked the Fourteenth Amendment, that amendment is not implicated unless the
criminal proceedings end with a conviction. Manuel v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S. 357, 367,
369 n.8 (2017).

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excessive. See Stainback v. Dixon, 569 F.3d 767, 773 (7th Cir. 2009). Rather than allege that
the cuffs were too tight, he simply alleges that the cuffs were not necessary because he
was unarmed and cooperative. See id. Unable to plausibly allege excessive force against
the officers, he cannot sustain a Monell claim against the City on that basis. See City of
Los Angeles, 475 U.S. at 799.
In conclusion, we affirm the dismissal of Wang’s detention-related claims
brought under federal and state law, his state law claims relating to his pretrial release,
and both Monell claims. We vacate and remand for further proceedings on Wang’s
federal claims relating to his pretrial release. Nothing in our discussion of the claims
that we remand should be taken as expressing a view on their substantive merits. We
chart our course today based on the principle that “[w]e are ‘a court of review, not first
view.’” United States v. Dingwall, 6 F.4th 744, 762 (7th Cir. 2021) (Kirsch, J., concurring)
(quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 781 n.7 (2005)).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part and VACATED in part,
and we REMAND for proceedings consistent with this order.

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