United States of America v. Edward C. Brown

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
Nos. 24-1581 & 24-1582
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
EDWARD C. BROWN ,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois.
Nos. 2:15-cr-20008 & 2:23-cr-20033 — Colin S. Bruce, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED J ANUARY 14, 2025 — DECIDED M AY 5, 2025
____________________
Before R IPPLE, BRENNAN , and K OLAR , Circuit Judges.
K OLAR , Circuit Judge. Edward C. Brown was convicted of
distribution and possession of child pornography. After his
prison sentence elapsed, Brown entered supervised release.
During an unannounced visit to Brown’s apartment, a proba-
tion officer discovered and seized an unreported cell phone.
A forensic search revealed that the phone contained 75
thumbnail images of child pornography in an inaccessible

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2 Nos. 24-1581 & 24-1582
cache folder. Brown was charged with possession of child
pornography, and a jury convicted him.
On appeal, Brown challenges the sufficiency of the evi-
dence. He highlights deficiencies in the forensic digital evi-
dence, including that the 75 thumbnail images lacked
metadata, and argues that there is insufficient basis for a jury
to find that he knowingly possessed child pornography. We
affirm Brown’s conviction.
I. Background
In 2015, Brown pleaded guilty to distribution and posses-
sion of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§2252A(a)(2)(A), (b)(1) and 18 U.S.C. §2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2).
In June 2022, Brown transferred out of prison to a halfway
house, and in December 2022, he began supervised release. As
part of his terms of supervised release, Brown agreed to let
probation make unannounced visits to his apartment. Proba-
tion also only allowed Brown to have one cell phone and re-
quired him to report that single device.
Probation officers visited Brown’s apartment unan-
nounced on April 13, 2023. They observed a Consumer Cellu-
lar Link II cell phone that Brown had not reported. They
seized the cell phone and sent it off for a forensic search.
The forensic data extraction revealed that the cell phone’s
cache contained 75 thumbnail images of child pornography.
The images were not accessible through the cell phone’s nor-
mal user interface. And the images contained no metadata in-
dicating when they were created, accessed, or modified.
Brown was arrested, and a federal grand jury returned an
indictment charging him with one count of possessing child

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Nos. 24-1581 & 24-1582 3
pornography on or about April 13, 2023, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2). Brown pleaded not guilty.
In the run-up to trial, the district court granted the govern-
ment’s motion to admit Brown’s prior child pornography
convictions as propensity evidence under Federal Rule of Ev-
idence 414 and to prove knowledge under Federal Rule of Ev-
idence 404(b). It also held that Brown’s supervised release sta-
tus was admissible as evidence.
At the three-day trial, the jury heard testimony from three
government witnesses and two defense witnesses. The gov-
ernment’s first witness, probation officer Michael Bice, testi-
fied to his supervision of Brown and his discovery of the cell
phone. Bice explained that he informed Brown that he could
only use one cell phone, which must be registered with pro-
bation. Brown told Bice he used a Gabb-brand phone, an in-
ternet-restricted phone often “recommended for persons un-
der supervision that have a sex offense conviction.” Bice also
acknowledged that the one-phone restriction was set by pro-
bation and not contained in the court’s conditions of super-
vised release.
Bice recounted the April 2023 visit to Brown’s apartment,
where he seized the Consumer Cellular Link II cell phone that
Brown had not reported to probation. Bice noted that like the
Gabb phone that Brown reported, the Cellular Link II cell
phone could not connect to the internet. He also observed that
the cell phone was powered on when he first saw it because it
rang while it was in the evidence locker.
Next, the government called Jim Kerner, an Urbana, Illi-
nois police detective assigned to the Department of Home-
land Security. Kerner explained that he arrested Brown on

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4 Nos. 24-1581 & 24-1582
May 17, 2023, and conducted a search of Brown’s apartment
that failed to uncover anything of evidentiary value.
Kerner additionally testified that he interviewed Brown in
custody, and the government played clips from the interview.
In those videos, Brown recognized that although the unre-
ported phone was not internet accessible, it could receive im-
ages, audio, and video through a Bluetooth connection.
Brown said that he had paid someone to put music and music
videos on the phone but denied ever asking anyone to place
child pornography images on the phone. Brown stated that he
was “not a dummy” and “pretty computer savvy.” He pre-
dicted that any child pornography found on the phone must
be inaccessible to a regular user and stored in “shadow
memory.”
The government also played a portion of the interview
where upon prompting from Kerner, Brown agreed that he
had an interest in “petite women” and “younger, petite girls.”
Brown would not admit that he liked “young” individuals be-
cause he said he was concerned that “young” was not a “safe
word” for him to use. In response to Kerner’s questioning,
Brown insisted he had never touched any children and never
produced child pornography. Yet, he eventually answered
“yes” when Kerner asked Brown if the whole matter was
about the fact that Brown liked to “look at a few pictures
every now and then.”
The third and final government witness was Kurt Ben-
doraitis, an FBI special agent assigned to child exploitation
cases. Bendoraitis testified to his experience in digital extrac-
tion and forensic analysis of electronic devices. Based on the
extracted data, Bendoraitis concluded that Brown was the pri-
mary user of the unreported phone.

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Nos. 24-1581 & 24-1582 5
Bendoraitis further testified that he found approximately
75 thumbnail images of “clear and obvious minors engaged
in sex acts with adults or lascivious displays of their genitals”
located in the same cache file location on the phone.1 Each
thumbnail meant the corresponding full image had been
viewed on the phone at some point. Five of the thumbnails
were briefly shown to the jury.
In addition to the cached thumbnails, Bendoraitis identi-
fied a separate database that contained artifacts of files once
associated with the device. Those artifacts included titles of
file images that were suggestive of child pornography, includ-
ing words like “tiny,” “little,” and “teen,” although the actual
images (including the thumbnails) were no longer accessible.
The data indicated that one such file was viewed or trans-
ferred to the phone on November 27, 2022 at 6:34 a.m. Who-
ever interacted with that file then scrolled through a series of
approximately ten images, pausing for as long as eight
minutes on an image. Bendoraitis conceded that he could not
link the file names to specific pictures and could not say with
certainty that the files were child pornography.
The defense’s first witness was Robert Benesiewicz, a spe-
cial agent with the Department of Homeland Security.
Benesiewicz reiterated the deficiencies in the data, including
the lack of evidence on when the 75 thumbnail images were
created, accessed, or deleted. He agreed it was “very unusual”
for there to be no data associated with the pictures.
1 The parties stipulated to the accuracy of the data extraction, that cell
phones are a means, facility, or instrumentality of interstate commerce,
and that the thumbnail images were child pornography involving minors
under the age of twelve.

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6 Nos. 24-1581 & 24-1582
The second and final defense witness was Scott Bokal, who
operated a digital forensics business. Bokal explained that he
had been provided with the data extraction from the phone,
and like Bendoraitis and Benesiewicz, did not find any
metadata associated with the images or any evidence that
Brown interacted with them.
Bokal observed that the data showed the phone was first
turned on in March 2020, with one other date of activity on
July 5, 2021, when a user account named “Me” was created.
Bokal confirmed an earlier statement from Bendoraitis that
several devices, including a Samsung TV and a Gabb phone,
were paired with the phone via Bluetooth on that same day.
The next activity was June 30, 2022, when the phone acquired
a cellular network connection and shortly thereafter “normal
cell phone usage” began.
Brown’s closing argument emphasized the missing
metadata and relied on Bendoraitis and Bokal’s testimony as
an alternative explanation for how the child pornography
thumbnails ended up on the phone: someone else viewed the
images in July 2021 when Brown was still incarcerated. The
government pointed to Brown’s previous child pornography
offenses, his recorded interview statements and his conceal-
ment of the phone from probation, calling on the jurors to use
their “common sense.”
The jury convicted Brown. Brown filed a motion for ac-
quittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 or, alter-
natively, a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 33. The district court denied the motion. It recognized a
lack of direct evidence that Brown interacted with child por-
nography images, but found there was sufficient circumstan-
tial evidence to support the jury’s verdict. Specifically, it

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Nos. 24-1581 & 24-1582 7
highlighted Brown’s prior convictions, interview admissions,
and his decision not to report the phone.
The district court sentenced Brown to 78 months’ impris-
onment and a 15-year term of supervised release. At the same
hearing, the district court also revoked Brown’s supervised
release from his prior convictions, sentencing him to 6
months’ imprisonment consecutive to the 78 months, and a
10-year term of supervised release to run concurrently with
the 15 years.
Brown now appeals the denial of his motion for acquittal,
although not the denial of his alternative motion for a new
trial.
II. Analysis
Brown contends that the evidence was insufficient to sup-
port his conviction, focusing solely on whether he “know-
ingly possessed” child pornography images on his cell phone.
18 U.S.C. §2252A(a)(5)(B). We disagree with Brown. No single
piece of evidence is a smoking gun, but the entire case pre-
sented to the jury was sufficient to support the verdict. De-
spite the flaws in the extracted data, the combination of the 75
thumbnail images and the November 2022 activity suggests
that Brown used the Cellular Link phone to look at child por-
nography. That interpretation of the evidence grows stronger
from other facts introduced at trial: Brown’s prior convictions,
his apparent admission of continued interest in child pornog-
raphy, his technological knowledge, and his failure to tell pro-
bation about the phone.
Our review here is deferential. “De novo review applies to
the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal; practically
speaking, however, the standard of review is that for

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8 Nos. 24-1581 & 24-1582
sufficiency of the evidence.” United States v. Peterson, 823 F.3d
1113, 1120 (7th Cir. 2016). “[W]e review the evidence pre-
sented at trial in the light most favorable to the government
and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.” United States
v. Hidalgo-Sanchez, 29 F.4th 915, 924 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting
United States v. Anderson, 988 F.3d 420, 424 (7th Cir. 2021)). We
do not reassess witness credibility nor reweigh the evidence.
United States v. Farmer, 38 F.4th 591, 602 (7th Cir. 2022). Ulti-
mately, we overturn a conviction “only where no rational jury
could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” United States v. Conley, 875 F.3d 391, 397 (7th Cir.
2017).
A. Brown’s “Possession” of Images
Before we evaluate the evidence, we must confront a
threshold question: what, exactly, was Brown convicted of
possessing? The 75 cached thumbnail images only existed be-
cause the original full-size images were also at one point on
the phone, but at a basic technical level, the thumbnails are
not the same files.
Under 18 U.S.C. §2252A(a)(5)(B), an individual commits a
crime when he “knowingly possesses, or knowingly accesses
with intent to view, any book, magazine, periodical, film, vid-
eotape, computer disk, or any other material that contains an
image of child pornography....” The indictment charged
simply that Brown “knowingly possessed” images of child
pornography “[o]n or about April 13, 2023.” Portions of the
government’s argument at trial, as well as its briefing on ap-
peal, imply that Brown was prosecuted for knowing posses-
sion of the 75 thumbnail images.

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Nos. 24-1581 & 24-1582 9
If that is the theory of the case, we have concerns. Recall
that the images were found in the cache of a flip phone. Based
on the testimony elicited at trial, neither Brown nor any other
person interacting with the phone’s user interface would have
been able to access the thumbnail images or see that the
thumbnails were on the phone. Law enforcement only discov-
ered the thumbnails with forensic extraction software. There
is evidence that Brown was aware of the general principle that
deleted images can remain in a cache folder—which he re-
ferred to as “shadow memory”—but no evidence that Brown
was using the cache folder as a hiding place.
Without evidence that Brown could access the images, or
knew he could obtain the means of access, we cannot say he
was in “possession” of the images on April 13, 2023. That con-
clusion follows from our prior statements in this area. In
United States v. Seiver, we said that if a defendant who pos-
sessed child pornography “deleted the incriminating files”
such that the files were not accessible through a device’s user
interface, he no longer knowingly possessed those files if he
“could no longer access them because he lacked the software
that he would have needed to be able to recover them from
the hard drive’s slack space.” 692 F.3d 774, 778 (7th Cir. 2012).
To be sure, this language is dicta: Seiver was not a challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction for
possession of child pornography. Instead, it held that because
forensic evidence of child pornography tends to persist even
after a user has deleted the images, a warrant to search a com-
puter that was reasonably believed to contain child pornogra-
phy seven months beforehand was supported by probable
cause. Id. at 776–78. But we see no reason to question Sevier’s
logic.

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10 Nos. 24-1581 & 24-1582
Indeed, as Seiver observed, several of our sister circuits
have reached the same conclusion. The Tenth Circuit has ex-
plained that the “ordinary, everyday meaning” definition of
“possession” requires an individual to have “control” over a
“material or immaterial” item. United States v. Tucker, 305 F.3d
1193, 1204 (10th Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Dobbs, 629
F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir. 2011) (overturning conviction for re-
ceipt, not possession, of child pornography because the gov-
ernment presented no evidence that the defendant knew of or
could access images in his computer’s cache). The Fifth Cir-
cuit similarly held that a defendant cannot be convicted for
possessing digital images that were “not in plain view” on a
computer’s interface and “accessible only to a knowledgeable
person using special computer software, [when] there was no
circumstantial indicium that established that [the defendant]
knew of the images or had the ability to access them.” United
States v. Moreland, 665 F.3d 137, 152 (5th Cir. 2011). And the
Ninth Circuit has also agreed, overturning a conviction when
“[n]o evidence indicated that on or about April 13, 2004, [the
defendant] could recover or view any of the charged images
in unallocated space or that he even knew of their presence
there” and the government conceded “it presented no evi-
dence that [the defendant] had the forensic software required
to see or access the files.” United States v. Flyer, 633 F.3d 911,
920 (9th Cir. 2011).
We think the prevailing approach to possession is sound,
but we emphasize that the existence of inaccessible child por-
nography images on a device can be strong evidence of previ-
ous possession of child pornography. See Seiver, 695 F.3d at
775 (“Even if he had deleted the child pornography, a success-
ful recovery of the images from his hard drive by an FBI com-
puter forensic expert would establish that he had possessed

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Nos. 24-1581 & 24-1582 11
them at one time, well within the five-year statute of limita-
tions.”); see also United States v. Huyck, 849 F.3d 432, 443 (8th
Cir. 2017) (“[T]hough the ninety-five thumbnail images on the
Hitachi hard drive were not viewable without special soft-
ware, they nonetheless constituted evidence of prior posses-
sion of child pornography.”). In addition, we understand
technology is constantly progressing, and we advise that
nothing in this opinion should be taken to question the con-
viction of a defendant who used technical proficiency to hide
images of child pornography. The inquiry into whether a de-
fendant had possession over an image is fact-specific.
That brings us back to Brown. Although we cannot say
that there is sufficient evidence that Brown knowingly pos-
sessed child pornography on April 13, 2023, Brown conceded
that the thumbnails are derivative of identical full-size im-
ages, proving the Cellular Link phone contained accessible
child pornography at some point.
Importantly, the government did not need to show that
Brown knowingly possessed child pornography on the exact
date of April 13, 2023. “Where the indictment alleges that an
offense allegedly occurred ‘on or about’ a certain date, the de-
fendant is deemed to be on notice that the charge is not lim-
ited to a specific date.” United States v. Leibowitz, 857 F.2d 373,
379 (7th Cir. 1988). The jury instructions here accurately re-
flected that the “government must prove that the crime hap-
pened reasonably close to the date. The government is not re-
quired to prove that the crime happened on the exact date.”
Plus, the indictment and jury instructions did not refer specif-
ically to the thumbnail images, instead charging Brown more
generally with possession of “material, being photographs,
containing images of child pornography....” Brown’s “defense

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12 Nos. 24-1581 & 24-1582
counsel affirmatively approve[d]” the jury instructions in this
case, so he “waives his right to challenge them on appeal.”
United States v. Bell, 28 F.4th 757, 763 (7th Cir. 2022).
So, we are able to view the thumbnails as evidence of the
charged offense. The thumbnails were a way for the govern-
ment to talk about and establish Brown’s knowing possession
of the original child pornography images, even though those
images disappeared from the cell phone before April 13, 2023.
Having said that, we have delineated limits on the vari-
ance between the date charged in an indictment and the evi-
dence presented, depending on the offense and whether the
delay was prejudicial to the defendant. See United States v.
Ross, 412 F.3d 771, 774 (7th Cir. 2005). For instance, with felon-
in-possession firearm charges, “a few weeks of variance is al-
lowable” but eight and nine month variances between the ev-
idence and the date alleged in the indictment are generally
impermissible. United States v. Musgraves, 831 F.3d 454, 466–
67 (7th Cir. 2016). In this case, while the maximum variance is
an admittedly long nine and a half months (starting from
Brown’s release and acquisition of the Cellular Link phone in
June 2022), we see no prejudice because the probative value
of the evidence had little to do with the timing of events
within that window. Even if the jury believed it was convict-
ing Brown for possessing the thumbnails on April 13, 2023, it
could have only reached that conclusion if it also believed
Brown possessed the original images at an earlier time. Brown
knew what he was accused of, and his theory of defense ac-
cordingly relied on the proposition that the thumbnails were
a vestige of activity from before he took possession of the
phone. The trial was about the government’s burden to prove

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Nos. 24-1581 & 24-1582 13
otherwise. Our job now is to assess whether the government
did enough to meet that burden.
B. The Evidence Supports Brown’s Conviction
We start by saying, once again, that the forensic evidence
of the 75 cached thumbnails is far from conclusive. Standing
alone, that data establishes only that Brown owned a phone
that was used to view child pornography at an unknown
point in time. Compare the facts here to United States v. Chap-
arro, where “[f]orensic analysis of the smartphone showed
that a user performed searches for terms related to child por-
nography on the morning of November 24, 2014” and uncov-
ered that “[t]he smartphone had saved to its memory thumb-
nail versions of child pornography images that a user viewed
that morning.” 956 F.3d 462, 471 (7th Cir. 2020). There was
powerful evidence that the defendant was the same user: of-
ficers seized the smartphone from him eight days later, and a
text sent on November 24, 2014 identified the defendant as the
sender. Id. at 471–72. The data-based case against Brown is
different—and weaker. With no timestamp information for
the creation of the 75 thumbnails, the government cannot
prove Brown’s knowing possession of child pornography by
reference to his close-in-time activity on the phone.2
Still, the forensic data may not reveal when the 75 thumb-
nails (and therefore the original images) were created, but it
2 Brown argues a jury cannot infer a defendant’s knowledge solely
based on evidence that a device containing child pornography was in his
exclusive possession. We have not spoken on that issue and we have no
occasion to do so here. The government did not rely on an exclusive pos-
session theory and asked the jury to infer Brown’s knowledge from the
totality of the evidence.

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14 Nos. 24-1581 & 24-1582
does tell us that in November 2022, the user of the phone in-
teracted with about 10 images with file names indicative of
child pornography.3 Although we cannot know the content of
those files with certainty, our suspicion from the names is bol-
stered by the fact that the files were located on a device that
was indisputably used to store other images of child pornog-
raphy.
If the November 2022 files were likely child pornogra-
phy—which would have been a reasonable way for the jury
to view the evidence—the forensic data is much more incrim-
inating. There is no evidence that anyone other than Brown
was using the phone at the time. It would stretch the govern-
ment’s case too far to argue that the November 2022 files
could be “knowing possession” of child pornography that
sustains Brown’s conviction. But when it appears plausible
that Brown viewed child pornography on the phone at least
once, it becomes more probable that he was also responsible
for the 75 images captured as thumbnails.
That leads, naturally, to Brown’s prior convictions. Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 414 “constitutes an exception to the rule
that evidence of prior bad acts is not admissible to show a de-
fendant’s propensity to commit the offense charged.” United
States v. Loughry, 660 F.3d 965, 969 (7th Cir. 2011); see also
United States v. Foley, 740 F.3d 1079, 1087 (7th Cir. 2014) (stat-
ing that Rule 414 applies to possession of child pornography).
Said differently, “it is not improper to draw the inference
that the defendant committed this sexual offense because he
has a propensity to do so.” Loughry, 660 F.3d at 969 (quoting
United States v. Rogers, 587 F.3d 816, 822 (7th Cir. 2009)).
3 For example, “little-teen-accidental-flash.jpg.”

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Nos. 24-1581 & 24-1582 15
Nevertheless, evidence admitted under Rule 414 is not a
shortcut to defeat a sufficiency challenge. Just as a jury may
not convict because “it is appalled by a prior crime the de-
fendant committed rather than persuaded that he committed
the crime charged,” Rogers, 587 F.3d at 822, our appellate re-
view must be a safeguard against that possibility. We must
consider exactly how a prior offense logically supports a de-
fendant’s guilt.
Here, Brown’s “criminal history is proof of his long-stand-
ing sexual interest in children, and a reasonable trier of fact
could find that it establishes motive beyond any reasonable
doubt.” United States v. Niggemann, 881 F.3d 976, 981 (7th Cir.
2018). It shows not only his desires but also that he prefers to
act upon them through viewing child pornography. Cf. United
States v. Sebolt, 460 F.3d 910, 917 (7th Cir. 2006) (“The motive
to molest children does not completely overlap with the pro-
pensity to possess, transport, or advertise child pornogra-
phy.”). It would usually be a shock to find out that any given
person was charged with possessing child pornography. We
cannot say the same for Brown.
Beyond Rule 414, the jury saw evidence—portions of
Brown’s recorded interview with Kerner—that Brown’s pre-
dilection toward possessing child pornography persisted af-
ter his prior convictions and release from incarceration. De-
pending on how the listener interprets Brown’s responses to
Kerner, Brown may have outright admitted that he continued
to enjoy looking at child pornography. An alternative inter-
pretation is that Brown was merely acknowledging his past
offenses or got tripped up by Kerner’s questions. Either way,
Brown was focused on whether it was “safe” for him to admit
what he was attracted to. Brown also explained his familiarity

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16 Nos. 24-1581 & 24-1582
with technology, including an awareness that the Bluetooth
transfers that put music onto the phone could have been used
to transfer child pornography onto the phone, and he specu-
lated how the phone’s storage might have retained unviewa-
ble thumbnails from previously accessed child pornography.
Under our obligation to construe Brown’s statements in the
manner most favorable to the government, this evidence am-
plifies the other signals that Brown had both a motive and
means of committing the charged offense.
Finally, and especially considering the forensic data and
Brown’s sexual proclivities, it is difficult to devise an innocu-
ous explanation for why Brown did not disclose the Cellular
Link phone to probation.4 The jury saw Brown’s statement
that he thought he was okay to have multiple phones if only
one was in service. Putting aside the evidence that the Cellu-
lar Link phone was in service, because it rang after it was
seized, Bice testified that probation is clear with supervisees
that the one phone rule applies regardless of service. Brown
only told probation about his Gabb phone, so despite Brown’s
contention that the Cellular Link phone was in open view in
his apartment, a reasonable jury could infer that he was trying
to hide it from probation. And why would Brown hide it? He
used the Cellular Link phone to listen to music and watch mu-
sic videos, but there is no evidence that he was unable to do
that on the Gabb phone too. The inference is both obvious and
incriminating.
4 Brown correctly says that the conditions of supervised release set by
the district court did not limit him to one phone, but he does not argue
probation lacked authority to impose that restriction.

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Nos. 24-1581 & 24-1582 17
In response to the many signs of guilt, Brown put forward
a defense theory that the thumbnails were already on the Cel-
lular Link phone when he acquired it. Yes, the forensic data
showed Bluetooth activity on the Cellular Link phone on one
occasion while Brown was incarcerated, and yes, as Brown’s
closing noted, the Cellular Link phone was the type of non-
internet capable device that a sex offender might use. In iso-
lation, it is not impossible that Brown was unlucky enough to
take possession of a phone that someone else once used to
look at child pornography.5 Yet when one remembers that
Brown owned the phone surreptitiously and very likely used
it to look at pornography that at the very least played to his
admitted ongoing sexual interest in young individuals, that
scenario becomes very unlikely. The government held the
burden of proof, but Brown’s attempt at offering his own ver-
sion of events was weak.
Taken as a whole, the evidence that Brown knowingly
possessed child pornography was significant. The shortfalls
in the forensic data were addressed by the circumstantial ev-
idence of Brown’s proclivities and behavior.6 See Chaparro, 956
F.3d at 469 (looking at the “circumstantial evidence that
5 During his interview with Kerner, Brown wondered out loud
whether the person he paid to put music on the phone also put child por-
nography on it. Brown’s closing argument addressed this possibility only
in passing and primarily relied on the previous-user theory. In any event,
there is no evidence that such a mysterious transfer was responsible for
the existence of the thumbnails.
6 The district court allowed the government to introduce Brown’s su-
pervised release as evidence; Brown does not challenge that decision on
appeal. We note that although Brown’s release status provided context for
his restricted phone usage and the search of his apartment, it is not itself
evidence of guilt.

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18 Nos. 24-1581 & 24-1582
[defendant] was the user” of a hard drive containing child
pornography); see also United States v. Memar, 906 F.3d 652, 656
(7th Cir. 2018) (“[T]here is nothing wrong with circumstantial
evidence of guilt.”). Thus, the jury had a sufficient basis to
find Brown guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
One last issue. Brown argued that if we reverse his convic-
tion, we should also overturn the revocation of his supervised
release because the district court relied on Brown’s conviction
as the sole basis for revocation. See, e.g., United States v. Flem-
ing, 9 F.3d 1253, 1255 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[W]hen the probationer
has been convicted of the offense, there is sufficient evidence
to meet the lower revocation standard.”). We uphold his con-
viction, so the argument is moot.
III. Conclusion
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district
court.

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