Patrick M. Ferrari v. Todd Link

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 1, 2025*
Decided May 5, 2025
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2106
PATRICK M. FERRARI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
TODD LINK, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Illinois.
No. 3:22-CV-00217-SPM
Stephen P. McGlynn,
Judge.
O R D E R
Patrick Ferrari sued the Village of Glen Carbon, Illinois, the police chief, and
various public officials, asserting that they violated his constitutional rights by
requiring him to be escorted by a police officer when conducting business on Village
property. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After giving Ferrari multiple chances to amend his
complaint, the district court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim because the
* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs and record
adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the
court. FED . R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-2106 Page 2
complaint lacked a plausible claim that the defendants acted in a way that violated the
Constitution. We affirm.
The parties dispute which facts and arguments are properly before this court, so
we first recount the procedural background of this case. In February 2022, Ferrari and
his wife, Barbara, filed this lawsuit in federal court. They amended their complaint
three times in response to the court’s screening order and the defendants’ motions to
dismiss. In October 2022, the district court consolidated the case with three other
matters that had recently been removed from state court—all pertaining to the notice or
Ferrari’s associated arrests, see F ED. R. C IV. P. 42(a)—and ordered the plaintiffs to file
another amended complaint.
The Ferraris did so in November 2022. The district court later granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss that complaint, reasoning that it was “not only
unorganized but utterly confusing” and failed to give notice to the defendants of the
nature of the claims against them. (The thirty-page complaint repeatedly used
“plaintiffs” and “defendants” without specifying which facts pertained to which of the
two plaintiffs and fourteen defendants.) The district court dismissed the complaint with
prejudice and entered judgment.
Represented by counsel from the Maag Law Firm, LLC, the Ferraris timely
moved to alter the judgment under Rule 59(e) and for leave to amend the complaint as
to only Patrick Ferrari, to avoid “manifest injustice.” See F ED. R. C IV. P. 59(e). The district
court granted that motion.
In September 2023, Patrick Ferrari (through attorney Peter Maag) filed a much
shorter fifth amended complaint against the Village, the police chief, and two police
officers.1 Ferrari alleged that in 2019, the Village sent him a notice informing him that a
uniformed police officer must stand by whenever Ferrari wishes to conduct “in person
business” on Village property because his past behavior had placed workers in fear.
Ferrari further alleged that in September 2019 and January 2020, he was conducting
business at Village Hall, unescorted, when the police chief ordered his arrest by the two
officers, based in part on Ferrari’s use of “harsh or coarse words.” This, he alleged, was
1 Barbara Ferrari is listed as an appellant on the notice of appeal and briefing. Although she
purports to be a party to the appeal, she was not a listed plaintiff on the operative, fifth amended
complaint, and the district court therefore terminated her as a party on October 23, 2023. We therefore
refer to Patrick as the only appellant, and we have revised the caption accordingly.

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No. 24-2106 Page 3
unlawful because the restrictions in the notice violated his rights under the First
Amendment.
Eventually Ferrari’s attorney moved to withdraw, citing his inability to contact
Ferrari. The district court granted that motion. Shortly thereafter, the defendants moved
to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the notice did not violate the First Amendment.
About a month later, Ferrari explained to the court that he had technical
difficulties receiving calls from Peter Maag, the attorney who had filed the most recent
complaint. Ferrari did not, however, express dissatisfaction with Maag’s prior
representation or the contents of the operative complaint, nor state that Maag was not
previously authorized to represent him.
Ferrari later received multiple extensions of time to respond to the defendants’
motion to dismiss. In granting the final extension of time, the district court ordered
Ferrari to respond to the motion to dismiss the fifth amended complaint, specifying that
it was the operative complaint. But Ferrari failed to respond before the deadline.
The district court then granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim. See F ED. R. C IV. P. 12(b)(6). It concluded that the notice did not violate the
First Amendment: Ferrari was not excluded from Village Hall because of his viewpoint
and was required only to have an escort while conducting business there. Because
citizens do not necessarily have a First Amendment right to access public buildings or
remain there, see Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983), the
district court dismissed the suit with prejudice.
Ferrari then filed several motions for reconsideration under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 59 and 60(b) in quick succession, asserting, among other things, that he
had not authorized the attorney to file the fifth amended complaint and had not wanted
to limit his legal theories to alleged First Amendment violations. He asked the court for
permission to file another amended complaint. The court promptly denied the motions.
The attorney had properly filed the fifth amended complaint; though Ferrari argued
that the attorney was an unauthorized “subcontractor,” he was just another attorney
employed by the law firm Ferrari had hired to represent him. Further, even though
Ferrari had mentioned the complaint in previous filings, he had never asserted that
Peter Maag was not authorized to file it. Regardless, because the fifth amended
complaint had been operative for months after Maag withdrew from the case, Ferrari
could not blame attorney error for his failure to respond to the motion to dismiss.

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No. 24-2106 Page 4
After his motions were denied, Ferrari filed a timely notice of appeal. See F ED. R.
A PP . 4(a). (Because it was filed within 30 days of the judgment, the notice of appeal is
timely without regard to the timing of the many motions for reconsideration or the
court’s ruling on them. F ED. R. A PP . P. 4(a)(1)(A), (a)(4). Therefore, our jurisdiction is not
at issue.)
On appeal, Ferrari first contests the district court’s consolidation of his cases. We
review a decision to consolidate cases involving a “common question of law or fact”
only for an abuse of discretion. See Star Ins. Co. v. Risk Mktg. Grp. Inc., 561 F.3d 656, 660
(7th Cir. 2009). The district court did not abuse its discretion here. Each of the three
complaints stemmed from the same grievance: that the 2019 notice violated the
Constitution, rendering unlawful Ferrari’s arrests for allegedly violating the terms of
that notice. Consolidation was appropriate. See id.
Ferrari next disputes the district court’s dismissal of the pro se, fourth amended
complaint, which included allegations—omitted in the fifth amended complaint—about
being mistreated during and after the arrests. The appellees appear to assert that we
cannot review the dismissal of the fourth amended complaint because the notice of
appeal did not reference that ruling. But a notice of appeal encompasses all orders that
merge into the designated judgment, including any interlocutory actions along the way.
See F ED. R. A PP . P. 3 (c)(4); Carnes v. HMO Louisiana, Inc., 114 F.4th 927, 929–30 (7th Cir.
2024). The notice of appeal does not have to designate particular rulings when it is
taken from the final judgment. Id. at 930.
Nevertheless, the decision to dismiss the fourth amended complaint is not
properly before us. Ferrari chose not to stand on that complaint after it was dismissed;
he could have done so and appealed the dismissal. See McElroy v. Lopac, 403 F.3d 855,
858 (7th Cir. 2005). Now it is too late to challenge the ruling because he amended the
complaint again. See Alejo v. Heller, 328 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 2003). And because Ferrari
omitted from the operative fifth amended complaint the allegations regarding his
mistreatment, claims based on those allegations are abandoned. See Anderson v. Donahoe,
699 F.3d 989, 997 (7th Cir. 2012).
As for the fifth amended complaint, Ferrari advances no argument on appeal that
engages with the district court’s reasoning that the notice did not violate his First
Amendment rights. He has therefore waived any argument otherwise. See Bradley v.
Vill. of Univ. Park, 59 F.4th 887, 897 (7th Cir. 2023) (citing Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
675 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2012) (arguments may be waived if underdeveloped,
conclusory, or unsupported by law); Klein v. O’Brien, 884 F.3d 754, 756–57 (7th Cir.

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No. 24-2106 Page 5
2018). And his arguments that the complaint set forth sufficient facts to show that the
notice and subsequent arrests violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments fare no
better. Those arguments, too, are conclusory and contain no citation to pertinent
authority. See Bradley, 59 F.4th at 897. Even though we construe Ferrari’s pro se filings
liberally, this court will not conduct legal research or develop arguments on his behalf.
See Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2001).
Next, Ferrari argues that the district court erred when, in response to Ferrari’s
assertion that the fifth amended complaint was unauthorized, it refused to reopen the
case and allow another amended complaint. This court reviews denials of a motion for
reconsideration and a motion for leave to amend for an abuse of discretion. O’Brien v.
Vill. of Lincolnshire, 955 F.3d 616, 628 (7th Cir. 2020). Here, the district court
appropriately explained that Ferrari’s contemporaneous pro se filings and his failure to
move to withdraw or amend the complaint before the district court entered judgment
undermined his claims that the attorney’s actions were unauthorized. And because
Ferrari had hired the law firm, he is bound by his counsel’s actions and must seek relief
against the attorney, not continue a suit against these defendants, if he contends that
counsel acted inappropriately. See S.E.C. v. Yang, 795 F.3d 674, 679 (7th Cir. 2015).
AFFIRMED

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