George Tolbert v. Nationstar Mortgage Llc, doing business as MR. COOPER

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 27, 2025*
Decided May 27, 2025
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 24-3310
GEORGE TOLBERT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC,
doing business as MR. COOPER,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 21-cv-6922
Jeffrey I. Cummings,
Judge.
O R D E R
George Tolbert challenges the summary judgment rejecting his claim that his
former mortgage servicer violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 2605. We affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 24-3310 Page 2
Tolbert sued Mr. Cooper (Nationstar Mortgage LLC) in 2021 after it foreclosed
on his Illinois home. He brought this suit under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act, a consumer-protection statute that, as relevant here, requires a covered loan
servicer to respond to a borrower’s “qualified written request” for information relating
to the servicing of the loan. 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e), (f); see Diedrich v. Ocwen Loan Servicing,
LLC, 839 F.3d 583, 587 (7th Cir. 2016). Tolbert alleged that Mr. Cooper did not respond
properly to a notice of error he had sent about his mortgage. The suit proceeded with
limited discovery to determine whether Mr. Cooper had records of any correspondence
from Tolbert that would meet the Act’s definition of a qualified written request. After
prodding from the district judge, Mr. Cooper produced records of several written
communications with Tolbert about the mortgage.
The district judge granted Mr. Cooper’s motion for summary judgment, finding
that none of Tolbert’s communications was a qualified written request under the Act.
Accepting Mr. Cooper’s statement of facts (because Tolbert’s numerous responsive
filings failed to identify facts in dispute or properly cite evidence in the record to
support his factual assertions, in violation of local rules, see N.D. ILL . L.R. 56.1(b)), the
judge ruled that the parties’ communications either were time-barred under the Act’s
three-year statute of limitations, see 12 U.S.C. § 2614, or did not meet the Act’s definition
of a qualified written request, see id. § 2605(e)(1)(B).
On appeal, Tolbert mostly rehashes his grievances with the state court’s
foreclosure proceedings, but we understand him also to argue that the district judge
erred by failing to order Mr. Cooper to cooperate in discovery. But Tolbert asserts only
that Mr. Cooper failed to respond to discovery requests and does not explain how the
district judge erred in handling discovery; such an undeveloped argument is waived.
See Greenbank v. Great Am. Assurance Co., 47 F.4th 618, 629 (7th Cir. 2022). To the extent
Tolbert contests the entry of summary judgment, he does not point to evidence in the
record calling into question the conclusion that no reasonable jury could find in his
favor.
AFFIRMED

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