United States of America v. Joshua L. Metts

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued June 4, 2025
Decided June 13, 2025
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
No. 24-3196
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JOSHUA L. METTS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, South Bend Division.
No. 3:21-cr-00091-DRL-SJF-1
Damon R. Leichty,
Judge.
O R D E R
Three months into his two-year term of federal supervised release, Joshua Metts
refused to stop his vehicle after a South Bend, Indiana, police officer put on his lights
and thereby ordered him to pull over. A lengthy chase ensued and culminated in the
officer arresting Metts for resisting law enforcement in violation of Indiana law. This led
a federal district court to revoke Metts’s supervised release because it found that he had
committed a state crime, which violated the terms of his federal release.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-3196 Page 2
On appeal, Metts contends that the Indiana crime of resisting law enforcement
cannot be committed unless the officer’s initial order to stop was lawful—a question the
district court failed to resolve in the course of finding a supervised release violation. But
as video evidence shows, the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion of a traffic
violation when he ordered Metts to stop his vehicle, so we affirm.
I
Metts began federal supervision in November 2023 after serving 30 months in
prison for possessing a firearm as a felon. One condition of his release was that he
commit no new federal or state crime.
Indiana law makes it a misdemeanor to flee when a police officer orders a person
to stop, see Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3), and a felony to do so in a motor vehicle, see id.
§ 35-44.1-3-1(c)(1)(A). A police officer may order someone to stop by activating their
siren or emergency lights. See id. § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3). What went unsaid at Metts’s
revocation hearing is that Indiana courts have read a limiting principle into the statute:
the officer’s order to stop must itself be lawful, meaning that the officer who attempted
to pull Metts over needed reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation at the time he
initiated the stop. See Gaddie v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1249, 1255 (Ind. 2014).
At the revocation hearing, the government had to prove each element of this
Indiana statute by a preponderance. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3); United States v. Golden,
843 F.3d 1162, 1165 (7th Cir. 2016). The government’s main witness was arresting officer
Conor Redden, who testified that, on the evening of February 15, 2024, he saw “a
vehicle rapidly accelerating recklessly … that appeared to not have a back left taillight.”
He added that the car moved erratically after hitting a speed bump and created a “large
… plume of smoke.”
At this point, Officer Redden turned on his flashing lights and pulled up behind
Metts. But Metts did not stop or yield. Redden then activated his siren, only to see Metts
speed away. Metts concedes on appeal that at this point he started violating traffic laws
by speeding away from Redden in a residential area, running stop signs, and veering
into oncoming traffic. Eventually Metts parked in a wooded area and fled on foot.
Redden yelled for him to stop, but Metts continued to run until he fell and then found
himself under arrest.
Metts, who represented himself at the revocation hearing, cross-examined Officer
Redden and attempted to poke holes in his account of why he initiated the stop. Metts
established that there was no speed bump on the road and questioned Redden’s speed
estimate. Metts also made much of the fact that although his driver-side taillight was

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No. 24-3196 Page 3
out, the passenger-side taillight included multiple light panels, which he believed
complied with Indiana’s requirement that a car have two working taillights. See Ind.
Code § 9-19-6-4(c).
The district court found that Metts violated the Indiana statute. Despite “some
credibility issues with respect to Officer Redden’s observations,” the court concluded
that “[w]hatever may have transpired at the beginning of the interaction,” Metts used a
vehicle to resist law enforcement. At no point, however, did the district court resolve
whether reasonable suspicion supported Redden’s initial order to stop.
Because the crime of resisting law enforcement with a vehicle is a felony under
Indiana law, it qualified as a Grade B violation of Metts’s supervised release, yielding
an advisory policy-statement range of 8 to 14 months’ reimprisonment. See U.S.S.G.
§§ 7B1.1, 7B1.4. The district court imposed a revocation sentence of 14 months.
II
On appeal, Metts contends that without a finding by the district court that
reasonable suspicion supported Officer Redden’s initial order to stop, his ensuing flight
cannot qualify as resisting under Indiana Code § 35-44.1-3-1 based on the Indiana
Supreme Court’s decision in Gaddie, 10 N.E.3d at 1255. Although Metts admits to
various traffic violations during the chase, he stresses that those infractions do not make
Redden’s initial order to stop lawful, as required to establish a violation of § 35-44.1-3-1.
But the evidence before the district court—particularly the dashcam video—
establishes the lawfulness of the officer’s order to stop, so we see no reason to remand
for further factfinding by the district court. Cf. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378–81 (2007)
(explaining that appellate courts can use clear video evidence to resolve what may
otherwise be a material dispute of fact); see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18–19
(1999) (holding that harmless error review applies where a district court omits an
element of an offense). Even a “quite minor” traffic violation can give rise to reasonable
suspicion to justify a vehicular stop, and the dashcam video here is replete with such
violations. United States v. Smith, 32 F.4th 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2022).
Before Officer Redden activated his flashing lights, the video shows Metts
backing up across the road and then accelerating into a parking lot with smoke
billowing from his car. Metts’s sudden acceleration into a parking lot and erratic
driving pattern provided the officer with a “particularized and objective basis” to
suspect Metts of a traffic violation—at the very least, engaging in reckless driving or
driving a damaged vehicle. See Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014); see also

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No. 24-3196 Page 4
Ind. Code § 9-21-7-1 (requiring a car to be in good working order). There is no doubt,
then, that the initial order to stop was lawful.
Further, Metts concedes that after the flashing lights activated, he then proceeded
to violate several traffic laws. By any account, the video shows him speeding, see id.
§ 9-21-5-2(a)(1); running stop signs, see id. § 9-21-8-32; and veering into oncoming
traffic, see id. §§ 9-21-8-2(a), 9-21-8-24(a)(3). He committed these violations during
Officer Redden’s continued pursuit with the lights and siren on the whole time. All of
this is enough to support an Indiana conviction for vehicular resisting. See Gaddie,
10 N.E. at 1256 n.4 (recognizing that fresh misconduct in response to an order from
police can generate further cause for stop orders and, thus, grounds to prosecute for
resisting if flight continues).
AFFIRMED

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