United States of America v. Demetris Campbell

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted June 20, 2025
Decided June 23, 2025
Before
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 24-3142
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DEMETRIS CAMPBELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:20-CR-00194-001
Tanya Walton Pratt,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
After a jury trial, Demetris Campbell was convicted of conspiracy to commit
Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (Count 1); three counts of Hobbs Act robbery
(Counts 2, 4, 6) and attempted Hobbs Act robbery (Count 8), id. §§ 1951(a), 2; and three
counts of aiding and abetting the brandishing of a firearm during a crime of violence,
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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id. §§ 924(c)(1)(A), 2 (Counts 3, 5, 7). The district court imposed 600 months’
imprisonment and 5 years’ supervised release.
Campbell has appealed, but his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is
frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
Counsel explains the nature of the case and addresses the potential issues that an
appeal like this could involve. Because the analysis appears thorough, we limit our
review to the subjects that counsel discusses, see United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776
(7th Cir. 2014), as well as the issues Campbell raises in his response to counsel’s motion.
See C IR . R. 51(b). Mindful of the large number of potential issues, we grant the motion
and dismiss the appeal.
Campbell and his co-defendant Angel Montano planned and executed three
armed robberies in Indianapolis in July 2020. On each occasion, Campbell offered to sell
electronic goods to the victims on an internet-based marketplace and then arranged to
meet them in Indianapolis to complete the sale. Campbell then told Montano when the
victims would arrive and what type of car they would be driving. During the first
robbery on July 19, two men (including Montano) approached the victims’ car,
brandished firearms, and struck one victim with a pistol. The men then stole cash,
shoes, and other valuable items from the victims. During the second robbery on July 20,
Montano approached the victim’s car and pointed a gun at her. He then stole cellphones
and cash from the victim and her two children. During the third robbery on July 22,
Montano approached the victim’s car, showed her a gun, and stole her phone and cash.
Campbell and Montano attempted to rob an additional victim and his younger
brother on July 28. Two days before the attempted robbery, Campbell communicated
with the victim through an internet-based marketplace about selling iPhones and then
lured him to an arranged location. The victim arrived, but the purported sale fell
through because he wanted to pay for the phones electronically rather than with cash.
On the day of the attempted robbery, Campbell provided a new meeting location in
front of an abandoned house. This time, the victim drove to the meeting spot with his
younger brother.
After the brothers arrived at the location, they felt uncomfortable and decided to
leave. As the victim tried to drive away, Campbell messaged him and asked where he
was going. A car then blocked the victim’s car from leaving, and Montano exited the car
with a handgun. When the victim did not open his car door, Montano shot into the car
several times, striking the brothers. The intended target of the robbery, who was shot in
the arm, drove away, but his younger brother, who was shot in the chest, died.

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Soon after, Campbell and Montano were arrested. After Campbell withdrew
from a plea agreement in 2024, a grand jury issued a superseding indictment charging
him with conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery; three counts of Hobbs Act robbery
for the completed robberies; three counts of aiding and abetting the brandishing of a
firearm during crimes of violence (the three completed robberies); and one count of
attempted Hobbs Act robbery for the failed robbery that led to a death.
Campbell filed few pretrial motions and opposed only one of the
government’s—a motion in limine to admit evidence that one of the victims of the
July 28 attempted robbery died. The district court granted that motion, rejecting
Campbell’s argument that the evidence should be excluded under Federal Rule of
Evidence 403.
The jury trial came next. Federal agents testified about how they connected
Campbell to the online accounts that communicated with the victims before the
robberies. Five victims testified about their communications with Campbell and about
the armed robberies and attempted robbery. Campbell testified and acknowledged that
he planned each of the three robberies and the attempted robbery. He admitted that he
coordinated the robberies with Montano and that he knew Montano often possessed
firearms. But Campbell denied advance knowledge that Montano would be armed
during the planned robberies or that he would brandish any firearms. The jury found
Campbell guilty on all eight counts.
Before sentencing, a probation officer filed a presentence investigation
report (PSR). The officer grouped the offenses. The offense level for Group 4, which
included the conspiracy and attempted robbery on July 28, was the highest. The base
offense level was 43 because one of the victims of the attempted robbery was killed
under circumstances that would constitute murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111. See U.S.S.G.
§§ 2B3.1(c), 2A1.1(a). The officer also added two levels for Campbell’s leadership role.
See id. § 3B1.1(c). The resulting offense level was 45. Because the other groups were
more than 9 levels less serious than Group 4, the offense level was not increased based
on those offenses. See id. § 3D1.4. The total offense level of 45 was treated as an adjusted
offense level of 43. See id. ch. 5, pt. A, cmt. n.2.
With an offense level of 43 and a criminal history category of I, Campbell’s
guidelines range was life. Campbell objected to the leadership adjustment and argued
that he should receive a downward departure for the attempted robbery because he did
not knowingly or intentionally cause the death. See id. § 2A1.1, cmt. n.2(B). But the
district court rejected Campbell’s arguments and adopted the PSR’s calculations.

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After weighing the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court imposed
an aggregate sentence of 600 months’ imprisonment and 5 years’ supervised release. To
reach this sentence, the court imposed 92 months’ imprisonment for each Hobbs Act
robbery charge and conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery to be served concurrently
(Counts 1, 2, 4, 6); a consecutive 84 months’ imprisonment on each of two charges of
brandishing a firearm (Counts 3, 7); a consecutive 100 months’ imprisonment on the
third brandishing charge (Count 5); and a consecutive 240 months’ imprisonment on
the attempted Hobbs Act robbery charge (Count 8).
Counsel first considers a potential challenge to the district court’s ruling on the
government’s motion in limine. The district court rejected Campbell’s argument that the
evidence that the victim of the attempted robbery died should have been excluded
under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. In Campbell’s view, its probative value was
substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice, especially where he did not
intend to dispute that the victims were shot during the attempted robbery. We would
review that ruling for abuse of discretion and reverse “only when ‘no reasonable person
could take the view adopted by the trial court.’” United States v. Johnson, 89 F.4th 997,
1002 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. LeShore, 543 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2008)).
Counsel rightly rejects any potential argument as frivolous. Acknowledging the
risk of prejudice, the district court reasonably ruled that the evidence did not run afoul
of Rule 403. As the court explained, the victim’s death was relevant to the use of force
during the attempted robbery. Further, Campbell’s statements immediately after the
shooting about the victim’s death, which showed his lack of surprise that Montano
brandished a firearm during the attempted robbery, were probative of his advance
knowledge that Montano would brandish a firearm during the earlier robberies.
See United States v. Kapp, 419 F.3d 666, 677 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that evidence
probative of issue relevant to element of the offense “must be admitted in all but the
most extreme cases”); cf. United States v. Cooper, 591 F.3d 582, 589 (7th Cir. 2010)
(concluding that district court abused its discretion in admitting prejudicial evidence of
fatal overdoses that “had nothing to do with” drug trafficking charges). Moreover,
excluding testimony about the victim’s death could have created “[g]aps in the
government’s narrative [that] risk[ed] the jury drawing an unfair negative inference
against the government,” see Johnson, 89 F.4th at 1006, such as confusion about why the
deceased victim did not testify at trial.
Moreover, the government introduced overwhelming evidence of Campbell’s
guilt, so any error in admitting the evidence of the victim’s death would have been

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harmless. See Cooper, 591 F.3d at 590 (evidentiary error harmful only where “in the mind
of the average juror, the prosecution’s case would have been significantly less
persuasive had the improper evidence been excluded”). Campbell testified that he used
an internet-based marketplace to target his victims and that he coordinated the
robberies and attempted robbery with Montano. As for the brandishing charges, the
government introduced evidence that Campbell had advance knowledge that Montano
would brandish a firearm during the robberies. This included Campbell’s own
statements that Montano “hit licks” for Campbell (which an agent testified was slang
for committing armed robberies); photos of Campbell and Montano with firearms a few
weeks before the robbery spree; and evidence that Campbell and Montano discussed
firearms at least seventeen times in July 2020.
Counsel also considers but rightly rejects any challenge to the jury instruction
regarding the elements of the brandishing charges under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Campbell
argued at trial that the government needed to prove (1) that Campbell had “advance
knowledge that another participant would brandish a firearm” during the robbery; and
(2) that with such knowledge, he “intentionally facilitated the brandishing of the firearm”
during the robbery. The government countered that, as to the second element, it merely
had to prove that Campbell, “having such knowledge, intentionally facilitated the
robbery.” The district court adopted the government’s proposed instruction over
Campbell’s objection. Counsel correctly observes that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Rosemond v. United States directly supports that ruling. See 572 U.S. 65, 82 (2014). In
Rosemond the Court held that active participation in the underlying offense “is sufficient
for § 924(c) liability … so long as the defendant had prior knowledge of the gun’s
involvement.” Id. Campbell asserts in his Rule 51(b) response that Rosemond was
wrongly decided, but this argument is frivolous—we are bound to follow controlling
Supreme Court precedent. See United States v. White, 97 F.4th 532, 539 (7th Cir. 2024).
In his Rule 51(b) response, Campbell asserts that the jury instructions failed to
define “advance knowledge” or to instruct the jury that the government needed to
prove that he intended to aid the armed robberies. But Campbell’s assertions are
unsupported by the record: The jury instructions defined “advance knowledge” and
properly instructed the jury that the government needed to prove that Campbell
intentionally facilitated the robberies.
We also agree with counsel that any argument that the evidence was insufficient
to convict would be frivolous. Campbell did not move for judgment of acquittal under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 at the close of evidence or through a timely

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post-trial motion. Therefore, we would review any sufficiency challenge for plain error
and reverse the jury verdict only if the record were “devoid of evidence pointing to
guilt.” United States v. Wright, 85 F.4th 851, 860 (7th Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v.
Lundberg, 990 F.3d 1087, 1095 (7th Cir. 2021)). As previously discussed, the evidence of
Campbell’s guilt was overwhelming, so any argument that Campbell’s convictions were
a “manifest miscarriage of justice” would be frivolous. Id. (quoting United States v.
Owens, 301 F.3d 521, 528 (7th Cir. 2002)).
In his Rule 51(b) response, Campbell makes statements that suggest he would
like to argue that his trial attorney was ineffective, but any challenge to Campbell’s
criminal judgment based on ineffective assistance of counsel is best saved for collateral
review, where a record can be fully developed. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500,
503–05 (2003).
As for sentencing, counsel correctly concludes that the district court properly
calculated the guidelines range. Counsel first considers whether Campbell could argue
that the district court erred in adding two points for Campbell’s leadership role in the
offenses. A defendant generally qualifies for the adjustment if he “[told] people what to
do” and determined whether they had done it. United States v. Figueroa, 682 F.3d 694,
697 (7th Cir. 2012). Counsel correctly concludes that an argument that Campbell does
not qualify for the adjustment would be frivolous because Campbell supervised
Montano and directed his actions. Campbell planned the robberies by setting up the
online accounts and luring the victims; instructed the victims where to go; coordinated
the robberies by telling Montano when the victims would arrive and what type of car
they would be driving; had advance knowledge that Montano would brandish firearms
during the robberies; and met with Montano after each robbery to divide the proceeds.
Further, Campbell took steps to ensure that Montano was armed with a firearm during
at least one of the robberies.
We also agree with counsel that it would be frivolous to argue that the district
court abused its discretion in rejecting Campbell’s argument, relying on U.S.S.G.
§ 2A1.1, cmt. n.2(B), that the court should have departed downward in calculating
Campbell’s offense level for the armed robbery that resulted in the victim’s death. The
court had wide discretion in deciding whether to grant the departure, see United States v.
Jones, 56 F.4th 455, 511 (7th Cir. 2022), which it exercised reasonably here. It denied the

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departure because the victim’s death was intentional, resulted from criminal activity for
which Campbell was responsible, and occurred while Campbell was nearby.
Counsel also rightly concludes that a challenge to the substantive reasonableness
of Campbell’s sentence would be frivolous. The district court adequately justified the
sentence based on the § 3553(a) factors. The court reasonably balanced Campbell’s
personal history and characteristics, observing his minimal criminal history and
difficult childhood, with the seriousness of the offense, noting that Campbell was the
“mastermind” behind the violent robberies. The court also considered the need to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities: Montano largely followed Campbell’s instructions
and received 480 months’ imprisonment. Thus, Campbell could not overcome the
presumption that his sentence is reasonable. See United States v. Horton, 770 F.3d 582, 585
(7th Cir. 2014) (any sentence presumptively reasonable where guidelines range is life).
Finally, Campbell could not make a nonfrivolous challenge to the term or
conditions of his supervised release. The district court’s reasons for imposing the term
of imprisonment are sufficient to justify the term of supervised release. See United States
v. Bloch, 825 F.3d 862, 869–70 (7th Cir. 2016). And Campbell waived any appellate
challenge to the imposed conditions of supervised release because he told the court that
he had no objections to them. See United States v. Flores, 929 F.3d 443, 449 (7th Cir. 2019).
We thus GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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