Timothy Ryan Gove v. Sargento Foods, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted July 9, 2025*
Decided July 9, 2025
Before
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2691
TIMOTHY RYAN GOVE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SARGENTO FOODS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 18-cv-1335-pp
Pamela Pepper,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
Timothy Gove’s suit alleging employment discrimination and retaliation was
dismissed at summary judgment because he failed to respond to Sargento Foods Inc.’s
statement of material facts and did not support his own factual assertions with citations
to admissible evidence in the record. As such, applying the local rules, the district court
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 24-2691 Page 2
deemed Sargento’s facts admitted and, based on those admissions, entered summary
judgment in its favor. Because district courts may reasonably require that even pro se
litigants strictly comply with local rules, the district court did not abuse its discretion,
and therefore we affirm.
Gove worked at Sargento from 2012 to 2018. He did not have any issues
concerning his workplace behavior until 2017, when a female coworker reported that he
engaged in harassing behavior towards her. No disciplinary action was taken against
him. Over the next year, Gove raised several complaints of his own concerning
coworkers. A representative from human resources investigated Gove’s complaints but
could not substantiate any of them.
Based on the unsubstantiated nature of Gove’s complaints and his distress in the
workplace (he took two days off work due to stress), the human resources
representative referred Gove to Sargento’s employee assistance program (EAP) for
mandatory counseling. Gove signed an EAP referral-and-consent form, which stated
that failure to complete the program could result in disciplinary action, including
termination of employment. He had an initial assessment through the EAP and then
scheduled a counseling appointment with a counselor. But he refused to participate in
counseling without added conditions (e.g., Gove added a condition that the counselor
was prohibited from consulting an expert without his permission), and these additional
conditions prevented the counselor from proceeding with the appointment. Because
Gove refused to comply with its EAP counseling requirements, Sargento fired him.
Gove then filed this suit in federal court, alleging, among other things, that
Sargento retaliated against him for raising complaints about workplace harassment,
see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), and discriminated against him based on his sex, age, and
religion, see id. § 2000e-2(a)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). Sargento later moved for summary
judgment and submitted a statement of material facts in compliance with Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the local rules. See E.D. WIS . C IV. L. R. 56(a). The
local rules required Gove to file a response to Sargento’s statement along with his own
statement of any additional material facts, and to cite supporting evidence in the record.
See E.D. W IS . C IV. L. R. 56(b)(2)(B). But Gove failed to respond to Sargento’s statement or
file his own proposed statement of material facts.
The district court entered summary judgment for Sargento. Because Gove failed
to dispute Sargento’s statement of material facts, the court deemed admitted Sargento’s
version of the facts. Based on the facts before it, the court proceeded to find undisputed

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No. 24-2691 Page 3
that Gove’s refusal to participate in the employee assistance program was a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for Sargento to fire him.
In this appeal, Gove mainly challenges the district court’s decision to deem
admitted Sargento’s proposed findings of fact, which he characterizes as “full of lies
and vanity.” But even pro se litigants, like Gove, are not exempt from procedural rules
or the consequences of failing to comply with them. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S.
106, 113 (1993); McCurry v. Kenco Logistics Servs., LLC, 942 F.3d 783, 787 n.2 (7th Cir.
2019). Because Gove did not file a separate response to Sargento’s proposed findings of
fact, the district court appropriately exercised its discretion under the local rules to treat
Sargento’s proposed facts as admitted. See E.D. WIS . C IV. L. R. 56(b)(4); Robinson v.
Waterman, 1 F.4th 480, 483 (7th Cir. 2021). Moreover, although Gove disagrees with
Sargento’s proposed facts, he did not support his assertions with citations to admissible
evidence in the record. See F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(c)(1)(A). For example, Gove referred to
notes that he had created throughout his employment, but he has not shown how these
hearsay documents would be admissible at trial to forestall summary judgment.
See Cairel v. Alderden, 821 F.3d 823, 830 (7th Cir. 2016).
AFFIRMED

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