P.a.-V. v. PAMELA J. BONDI , Attorney General of the United States

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-2737
P.A.-V.,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
PAMELA J. BONDI , Attorney General of the United States,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
On Petition for Review of an Order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals.
A000-000-000
____________________
A RGUED F EBRUARY 27, 2025 — DECIDED A UGUST 4, 2025
____________________
Before S T. EVE, LEE, and M ALDONADO, Circuit Judges.
M ALDONADO, Circuit Judge. P.A.-V. is a citizen of Mexico.
He first entered the United States in 1995 but was removed in
1998 and again in 1999. He re-entered in 1999 and has re-
mained here since. In 2020, he was arrested for driving under
the influence and the Department of Homeland Security rein-
stated his prior removal order. P.A.-V. applied for protection
under the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Conven-
tion Against Torture. Like many applicants for withholding

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2 No. 21-2737
of removal, P.A.-V. fears violence in his home country if he is
removed. An immigration judge denied him relief, and the
Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The standard for
granting the relief P.A.-V. seeks is stringent, and we are bound
by an extremely deferential standard of review. Because the
record before us does not compel a different conclusion, we
deny the petition for review.1
I.
When the Department of Homeland Security reinstated
P.A.-V.’s removal order in 2020, he applied for withholding of
removal under section 241(b)(3) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3)(A), and under the CAT, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16–
1208.18. An asylum officer conducted a reasonable fear inter-
view of P.A.-V. and concluded that he failed to establish past
1 We provisionally granted P.A.-V.’s motion to proceed using a pseu-
donym and to keep personally identifying case documents under seal
based on his claim that if he is removed to Mexico, identifying information
could place him and his family in danger of retaliation. We now grant the
motion in full out of an abundance of caution. The “danger of retaliation”
is often a “compelling ground” to allow the use of a pseudonym. See Doe
v. City of Chicago, 360 F.3d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 2004). While we ultimately
deny P.A.-V.’s petition under the substantial evidence standard on the rec-
ord before us, we acknowledge (and the government does not dispute)
that P.A.-V. fears drawing attention and violence to himself and his family
in Mexico through public court documents that connect his name to the
arguments he raises on appeal. See, e.g., Doe v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 445, 446
(7th Cir. 2007) (fear of retaliation in home country sufficient to allow peti-
tioner to litigate with a pseudonym). This fear of retaliatory acts of vio-
lence, even if not sufficient to meet the legal standards on this appeal, ren-
ders anonymous litigation prudent in this case. Further, the potential
harm from disclosure outweighs any potential harm of concealing
P.A.-V.’s full name. Roe v. Dettelbach, 59 F.4th 255, 259 (7th Cir. 2023).

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No. 21-2737 3
persecution or a reasonable possibility of future persecution
or torture sufficient to withhold removal. P.A.-V. then re-
quested review by an immigration judge who vacated the asy-
lum officer’s decision and initiated proceedings to determine
if P.A.-V. was entitled to withholding of removal. The IJ held
an evidentiary hearing on P.A.-V.’s petition where P.A.-V. ap-
peared remotely and was represented by counsel.
P.A.-V. testified that he feared for his life if he returns to
Mexico because of cartel violence linked to his parents’ land.
That land sits above a gas line that the cartels in the area rou-
tinely tap for fuel, a practice referred to by P.A.-V.’s expert as
“huachicolero.” P.A.-V. recounted several incidents of direct
threats and assaults against him and his extended family,
which he believes were connected to his parents’ property
ownership.
For example, before he returned to the United States in
1999, P.A.-V. was in his hometown dining with a friend when
a group of armed men came into the restaurant, kicked their
table over, and threatened them. He and his friend escaped
unscathed, but P.A.-V. believed, without any specific corrob-
oration, that the incident was a warning from the cartel. Fear-
ing for his life, he sought refuge in the United States. After-
wards, his parents began receiving anonymous calls warning
that a family member would be kidnapped if they refused to
“pay the quota.” P.A.-V. did not testify whether his parents
paid the money demanded.
In 2012, P.A.-V.’s cousin and her children were kidnapped
by cartel members just fifteen minutes from his family’s
home. They were held for three months until the family could
pay the ransom, after which they were released. In 2018, ac-
cording to P.A.-V., cartel members killed three of his family

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4 No. 21-2737
members; the sister of his aunt and her son, who also owned
land above the pipeline, as well as P.A.-V.’s brother. Since his
brother’s death, P.A.-V.’s family has not reported any inci-
dents of violence (threatened or actual). But P.A.-V. still fears
he will be subject to the same violence if he returns to Mexico.
During the hearing, P.A.-V. presented the expert testi-
mony of Dr. Everard Meade, a professor of Peace Studies at
the University of San Diego. Dr. Meade discussed the safety
conditions in Mexico and the rising crime rates in P.A.-V.’s
hometown, where his parents still reside. Dr. Meade also tes-
tified about drug cartels stealing gas from underground pipe-
lines, explaining that this theft and sale of petroleum was be-
coming a significant source of violence between rival drug
cartels. Dr. Meade supported P.A.-V.’s testimony that the vi-
olence P.A.-V.’s parents experienced was likely connected to
the location of their property in proximity to the gas line.
Dr. Meade then explained the danger P.A.-V. could face if
he returns to Mexico. He testified that drug cartels often pay
lookouts to pass on information about individuals returning
to Mexico from the United States, particularly in areas of high
organized crime. Dr. Meade acknowledged that P.A.-V. could
safely relocate temporarily but testified that he could not pre-
dict whether safe conditions would persist over time.
The IJ issued an oral decision denying P.A.-V.’s applica-
tion for withholding of removal under both the INA and the
CAT. The IJ found P.A.-V.’s testimony credible but concluded
that he had not shown past persecution because the evidence
failed to establish a direct link between the violence suffered
by his family members and any threat to P.A.-V. himself. The
IJ further determined that the violence was consistent with the

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No. 21-2737 5
general uptick in violence in the region. Finally, the IJ con-
cluded that P.A.-V. could safely relocate within Mexico.
P.A.-V. appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals.
The BIA affirmed the IJ’s order on the same grounds. P.A.-V.
then petitioned this Court for review.
II.
We review questions of law de novo and findings of fact
for substantial evidence. Lozano-Zuniga v. Lynch, 832 F.3d 822,
826 (7th Cir. 2016). We will affirm the agency decision if it is
supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evi-
dence. Id. “The standard is extremely deferential,” and we
will not reverse “simply because we would have decided the
case differently, but rather only if the facts compel the oppo-
site conclusion.” Id. “When the Board agrees with the decision
of the immigration judge, adopts that decision and supple-
ments that decision with its own reasoning,” which the Board
did here, this Court reviews “the immigration judge’s deci-
sion as supplemented by the Board.” Id. (citation omitted).
A. P.A.-V.’s Petition for Withholding of Removal
The INA prohibits the removal of an individual “to a coun-
try … [where his] life or freedom would be threatened … be-
cause of [his] race, religion, nationality, membership in a par-
ticular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3)(A). To demonstrate eligibility for withholding of
removal under the INA, an applicant must show a clear prob-
ability that his life or freedom will be threatened upon return
to his country of origin. Lozano-Zuniga, 832 F.3d at 826–27. A
clear probability means that it is more likely than not that the
applicant will suffer persecution if removed. Id. at 827.

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6 No. 21-2737
If an applicant has demonstrated that he was persecuted
in his country of origin, this creates a rebuttable presumption
that he has a reasonable fear of future persecution if removed
to that country.2 Id. (citing Zeqiri v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 364, 370
(7th Cir. 2008)). If the applicant cannot demonstrate past per-
secution, the burden remains with him to show that he has a
reasonable fear of future persecution. Lozano-Zuniga, 832 F.3d
at 827.
P. A.-V. seeks withholding of removal based on member-
ship in a social group, his family, and must show that there is
a connection between his family and the persecution alleged.
Plaza-Ramirez v. Sessions, 908 F.3d 282, 286 (7th Cir. 2018). The
government does not dispute that P.A.-V.’s membership in
his family constitutes membership in a particular social group
under the INA. Gonzales Ruano v. Barr, 922 F.3d 346, 354 (7th
Cir. 2019).
1. Past Persecution
We first determine whether P.A.-V. established past perse-
cution, or whether he showed a “nexus between the persecu-
tion he experienced and his membership” in his family. Id.
P.A.-V. contends that the threat he received in the restaurant
in 1999 and the violence his family has experienced since con-
stitutes past persecution.
Aside from the restaurant incident, P.A.-V. essentially
seeks to assert a theory of derivative persecution: that his
2 Persecution means “the use of significant physical force against a per-
son’s body,” “the infliction of comparable physical harm without direct
application of force,” or “a credible threat to inflict grave physical harm.”
Stanojkova v. Holder, 645 F.3d 943, 948 (7th Cir. 2011).

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No. 21-2737 7
family was persecuted “in an effort to persecute him.” Zhou Ji
Ni v. Holder, 635 F.3d 1014, 1018 (7th Cir. 2011) (e.g., if “your
child is killed in order to harm you, the fact that you are not
touched does not mean that those acts cannot constitute per-
secution of you.” (citation modified)).
While the violence experienced by P.A.-V.’s family is
tragic, the IJ did not err in finding that P.A.-V. failed to present
evidence that this violence targeted him. Here, the record was
insufficient to tie these violent acts to persecution directed at
P.A.-V. Take, for instance, the murder of P.A.-V.’s brother.
Even assuming the cartel intended to target his brother (rather
than another passenger in the car), there is no evidence that
the attack was carried out to harm or threaten P.A.-V. Simi-
larly, P.A.-V. did not produce evidence that the kidnapping
and murder of his other extended family members were
meant to threaten or harm him. As for the threatening inci-
dent P.A.-V. experienced at a restaurant nearly fifteen years
ago, he presented no evidence regarding the motive or any
nexus to his parents’ property. In short, P.A.-V. failed to pro-
duce sufficient evidence to establish that he suffered past per-
secution and thus is not entitled to the rebuttable presump-
tion. Contrast N.L.A. v. Holder, 744 F.3d 425, 434–42 (7th Cir.
2014) (petitioner granted asylum where evidence showed that
her father was kidnapped by gang members and told to relay
the message to petitioner that she would be killed if she failed
to comply with their demands), with Zhou Ji Ni, 635 F.3d at
1018–19 (evidence did not show that petitioner’s parents were
arrested in an effort to persecute petitioner himself on account
of his religion).
P.A.-V. resists this conclusion and argues that remand is
necessary because the BIA did not fully consider his evidence

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8 No. 21-2737
of past persecution. He relies on our decision in Chen v. Holder,
604 F.3d 324, 333 (7th Cir. 2010), where the BIA misread circuit
precedent in dismissing petitioner’s argument. Remand was
required there for the BIA to consider the argument in the first
instance. Id. Here, P.A.-V. seizes on the BIA’s description of it
being “undisputed” that he did not experience past persecu-
tion, arguing that this proves the agency disregarded “the to-
tality of the circumstances” including “whether harm suf-
fered by family members in combination with other factors
may constitute past persecution.” Id. But this case is not like
Chen. The BIA reasonably relied on the IJ’s findings that P. A.-
V.’s evidence of past persecution—namely the restaurant in-
cident and the violence his family members have experi-
enced—lacked a nexus to his parents’ property and were not
meant to target P.A.-V. himself. Substantial evidence supports
the IJ’s conclusion that P.A.-V. failed to establish past perse-
cution. Remand is not required.
2. Future Persecution
For similar reasons, we find that P.A.-V. has not met his
burden of establishing that he has a reasonable fear of future
persecution if returned to Mexico. See Lozano-Zuniga, 832 F.3d
at 827. To show a reasonable fear of future persecution, a pe-
titioner “must set forth specific evidence indicating that it
would be more likely than not that he would be individually
targeted for harm.” Id. at 828 (citing Salim v. Holder, 728 F.3d
718, 722–24 (7th Cir. 2013)). “Fears of generalized harms are
not enough.” Id. (citing Kobugabe v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 900, 902
(7th Cir. 2006)).
P.A.-V. argues that he will be subject to violence if he re-
turns to Mexico because of his membership in his family. The
IJ, however, found that P.A.-V. did not establish that the

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No. 21-2737 9
violence his family experienced was connected to their own-
ership of this land, rather than the increasing crime and vio-
lent trends in the area. We hold that the agency’s decision was
supported by substantial evidence. P.A.-V. failed to introduce
specific evidence that he is more likely than not to be targeted
as a member of his family.
3. Relocation
P.A.-V. also challenges the agency’s finding that he could
reasonably relocate within Mexico. While we need not ad-
dress relocation given our finding that P.A.-V. has not shown
a reasonable fear of future persecution, the evidence nonethe-
less supports the agency’s conclusion. Because the alleged
persecutor is not the government, P.A.-V. bears the burden of
establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it
would be unreasonable for him to relocate within Mexico.
8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(3)(i), (iii). To make this determination,
we ask “(1) whether safe relocation is possible, and if so, (2)
whether it would be reasonable to expect the applicant to
safely relocate.” Ndonyi v. Mukasey, 541 F.3d 702, 712 (7th Cir.
2008).
The IJ concluded that Dr. Meade’s testimony that P.A.-V.
could not safely relocate in Mexico in the long-term was in-
sufficient to meet this burden because he only described a fear
of generalized violence throughout Mexico. But P.A.-V. ar-
gues that this conclusion was short-sighted. While the IJ con-
sidered the first question, whether P.A.-V. could safely relo-
cate, he argues that the IJ did not answer the second ques-
tion—whether such relocation would be reasonable. He also
argues that the BIA erred in finding that he could safely relo-
cate “temporarily,” because the regulations do not contem-
plate any temporal limitation on safe relocation.

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10 No. 21-2737
We find that the evidence does not compel a different re-
sult. P.A.-V. bore the burden of proof that relocation was un-
reasonable. Dr. Meade testified about the general country
conditions in Mexico and P.A.-V. did not present any other
evidence establishing that relocation would be unreasonable.
See Bernard v. Sessions, 881 F.3d 1042, 1049 (7th Cir. 2018) (find-
ing that testimony about general violence and vague threats
were too speculative to support petitioner’s contention that he
could not safely relocate). The agency’s determination that
P.A.-V. could reasonably relocate within Mexico was sup-
ported by substantial evidence and P.A.-V. therefore failed to
meet his burden of demonstrating a clear probability of future
persecution.
B. P.A.-V.’s Petition for Relief under the CAT
To qualify for relief under the CAT, an applicant must “es-
tablish that it is more likely than not that he or she would be
tortured if removed.” Mabuenza v. Garland, 16 F.4th 1222, 1225
(7th Cir. 2021) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2)). Unlike an ap-
plication for withholding of removal under the INA, a CAT
petitioner does not need to show that the torture is because of
any protected grounds, but rather “the torture must be ‘in-
flicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acqui-
escence of a public official.’” W.G.A. v. Sessions, 900 F.3d 957,
968 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1)). Torture
is defined as “any act by which severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a per-
son” for the purpose of coercion, punishment, or discrimina-
tion. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).
Because P.A.-V. has not established a clear probability of
future persecution under the INA, he cannot meet the higher
burden of showing a likelihood of torture required for CAT

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No. 21-2737 11
relief. Khan v. Filip, 554 F.3d 681, 692 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[A] pe-
titioner’s failure to show a clear probability of future persecu-
tion also means he cannot show a likelihood that he will be
tortured.”). And contrary to P.A.-V.’s argument, the IJ consid-
ered the evidence of violence against his family but reasona-
bly found no sufficient connection among the incidents. Fur-
ther, as explained above, substantial evidence supports the
agency’s determination that P.A.-V. could safely relocate
within Mexico.
We reach the same conclusion even if we consider the mer-
its of P.A.-V.’s arguments under the CAT on appeal. To deter-
mine whether an applicant has met his burden under the
CAT, the IJ must address the regulatory factors, including ev-
idence of past torture, ability to relocate within the country,
evidence of grave human rights violations, and other relevant
country conditions. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3)(i)–(iv); Orellana-
Arias v. Sessions, 865 F.3d 476, 489 (7th Cir. 2017). Here, the IJ
looked to these factors and determined that P.A.-V. did not
suffer past torture and could relocate safely within Mexico.
While the IJ recognized widespread violence and impunity
within the country, he concluded this alone did not qualify
P.A.-V. for protection under the CAT.
P.A.-V. argues that the agency improperly disregarded ev-
idence relevant to his CAT claim. He specifically challenges
the IJ’s conclusion that, although his family had been ex-
torted, this evidence was insufficient to support CAT relief.
He also argues that he presented evidence showing that the
Mexican government has failed to address the huachicolero
problem and related violence.
We disagree and conclude that substantial evidence sup-
ports the agency’s determination. P.A.-V. put forth no

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12 No. 21-2737
evidence that the Mexican government would consent or ac-
quiesce to any harm that he might experience. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.18(a)(1), (7). On his extortion argument, there is actu-
ally no evidence in the record that P.A.-V.’s family paid any
of the extortion money. In addition, Dr. Meade explained that
the government amped up law enforcement efforts directed
specifically at the huachicolero problem. While he questioned
the efficacy of these efforts—and such efforts are not alone
dispositive, see Herrera-Garcia v. Barr, 918 F.3d 558, 562 (7th
Cir. 2019)—P.A.-V. submitted no additional evidence beyond
Dr. Meade’s broad allegations of government acquiescence.
See id. The record therefore does not compel a different con-
clusion.
We conclude that substantial evidence supports the
agency’s denial of relief under the CAT. Accordingly, we must
affirm.
*
In sum, the record does not compel a conclusion that P.A.-
V. proved eligibility for withholding of removal under the
INA or protection under the CAT. The petition for review is
DENIED.

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