David Japheth Fiddler v. PAMELA J. BONDI , Attorney General of the United States

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-2604
DAVID J APHETH F IDDLER ,
Petitioner,
v.
PAMELA J. BONDI , Attorney General of the United States,
Respondent.
____________________
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals.
No. A041-653-380
____________________
A RGUED M AY 15, 2025 — DECIDED A UGUST 7, 2025
____________________
Before R IPPLE, K IRSCH , and K OLAR , Circuit Judges.
R IPPLE, Circuit Judge. In April 2021, the Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) initiated removal proceedings
against David Fiddler, a citizen of Jamaica. Mr. Fiddler re-
quested deferral of removal under the Convention Against
Torture (“CAT”). The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied relief,1
1 A.R. 157.

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2 No. 24-2604
and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”) af-
firmed that decision.2 We now deny Mr. Fiddler’s petition for
review.3
I
BACKGROUND
A.
Mr. Fiddler was admitted to the United States on May 10,
1988, when he was ten years old. On February 19, 1998, he
was convicted in Illinois of first-degree murder and of at-
tempted first-degree murder and sentenced to twenty-eight
years in prison. On April 2, 2021, the DHS initiated removal
proceedings, charging Mr. Fiddler with removability under
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).4
Mr. Fiddler suffers from severe mental illness that began
when he was a child. He has been diagnosed with schizophre-
nia, characterized by hallucinations, delusional thinking, and
erratic behavior. His schizophrenia often went untreated dur-
ing his childhood, and he has been hospitalized thirty times.
When he has been in treatment, he has complied, and his
symptoms have significantly subsided.
As part of the removal proceedings, the IJ assessed
Mr. Fiddler for competency and appointed a representative to
assist him. His representative conceded removability;
2 Id. at 5.
3 Our jurisdiction is secure under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4).
4 The notice to appear cited as grounds for Mr. Fiddler’s removal his con-
victions for aggravated felonies relating to murder and attempted murder.
See A.R. 1511.

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No. 24-2604 3
however, Mr. Fiddler applied for deferral of removal under
the CAT.5 In support of his petition, Mr. Fiddler submitted
that, if deported, he is likely to face violence due to his mental
illness. Specifically, he believes that he will be unable to find
adequate mental health care and will become homeless. He
maintains that, consequently, he will be targeted by Jamaican
police and face violence in prison. He also fears that private
individuals, with the acquiescence of Jamaican law enforce-
ment authorities, will target him.
At a hearing on Mr. Fiddler’s petition, an expert witness
testified on mental health stigma and mental health services
in Jamaica. The expert testified about the many risks of vio-
lence and stigma that mentally ill individuals face in Jamaica.
He explained that individuals who are deported to Jamaica
are stigmatized and “local police are informed about arriving
deportees and may track and harass them.”6 Mr. Fiddler sub-
mitted evidence suggesting that mentally ill individuals make
up a disproportionate amount of the victims of police killings,
but it is unclear exactly how many instances of police violence
involve mentally ill individuals.7 He also submitted a 2013 ar-
ticle in which a Jamaican government official said that “some
75 percent of the police confrontations with the mentally ill
5 Mr. Fiddler does not dispute that he is ineligible for asylum or withhold-
ing of removal because he has been convicted of a particularly serious
crime. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). His claim is solely for
deferral of removal under the CAT.
6 A.R. 146.
7 Id. at 151. Specifically, Mr. Fiddler cites evidence that in 2016, there were
55,000 mentally ill people in Jamaica, out of 3 million total people, making
up 1.8% of the population but 19% of police shootings in 2020. Appellant’s
Br. 39–40.

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4 No. 24-2604
end with fatalities, while 25 percent end in injuries.”8 How-
ever, he did not submit more recent or more concrete evi-
dence to support this assertion.
Mr. Fiddler also provided articles documenting poor con-
ditions in prisons and instances of vigilante violence by pri-
vate individuals targeting the mentally ill. The expert witness
testified that, ultimately, “it is highly likely [that Mr. Fiddler]
will end up homeless and untreated, which could lead him to
him being victimized by vigilante justice or coming to the at-
tention of the police, who could arrest, detain, and/or subject
him to police brutality.”9 The IJ issued a written decision on
October 6, 2021, denying Mr. Fiddler relief.
B.
In May 2022, the BIA remanded the case and directed the
IJ to provide further analysis and factual development. The IJ
handed down a new decision on August 30, 2022. This deci-
sion provided more extensive discussion but nevertheless
reached the same conclusion. The IJ held that Mr. Fiddler had
not established that he would face a substantial risk of torture
if he returned to Jamaica. The IJ accepted much of the expert
witness’s testimony and agreed that Mr. Fiddler is likely to
become homeless and “come to the attention of law enforce-
ment or the public generally.”10 However, the IJ concluded
that when his evidence was “considered cumulatively,
8 A.R. 607.
9 Id. at 146.
10 Id. at 148.

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No. 24-2604 5
[Mr. Fiddler] has not established a substantial risk of future
torture.”11
Examining police violence in non-custodial settings, the IJ
further ruled that Mr. Fiddler did not establish a substantial
risk of “being shot and killed by police,” because “it appears
that mentally ill individuals make up a relatively small num-
ber of police shooting deaths each year.”12 Moreover, Mr. Fid-
dler did not show that police practices embodied the requisite
intent or purpose of torture. Rather, “instances of violence
against mentally ill individuals appear to be the unfortunate
result of a combination of stigma, lack of training, and lack of
resources, which does not amount to torture.”13
The IJ also held that Mr. Fiddler had not established a sub-
stantial risk of torture if he were to be detained or imprisoned.
The IJ explained that although Jamaican prisons can be life-
threatening, and “individuals with mental disabilities are par-
ticularly vulnerable,” these conditions do not establish the
requisite intent to engage in torture.14 The IJ also concluded
that any reported intentional harm appears to be in isolated
instances and thus is unlikely to occur.
Mr. Fiddler appealed this IJ decision, and the BIA af-
firmed. It held that Mr. Fiddler “did not show that the harm
he fears would be the result of a specific intent to torture him,”
and that he therefore “did not meet his burden of proof to
11 Id.
12 Id. at 151.
13 Id. at 153.
14 Id. at 154.

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6 No. 24-2604
establish his eligibility for deferral of removal under the
CAT.”15
Mr. Fiddler then sought further review in our court, but at
the BIA’s request, we remanded to the BIA.16 The Board then
affirmed again, with one judge dissenting. The Board reiter-
ated its first holding and held that Mr. Fiddler had not
demonstrated the specific intent to torture mentally ill indi-
viduals by Jamaican officials, nor had he established that Ja-
maican officials acquiesce to harm by private individuals. By
contrast, the dissent viewed the “alarming pattern of police
shootings and killings of mentally ill individuals in Jamaica”
as involving intentional acts.17 Moreover, the dissenting judge
believed that Mr. Fiddler would be at “significant risk” of a
violent encounter with police due to his “erratic and opposi-
tional behavior”18 were he to be removed to Jamaica. Finally,
in the dissent’s view, if Mr. Fiddler were to be arrested or
15 Id. at 87.
16 The BIA sought remand to consider further the issue of specific intent.
In particular, it intended to evaluate whether the IJ’s ruling on specific in-
tent was dispositive of Mr. Fiddler’s entire CAT claim, whether wide-
spread police violence can evince specific intent, and whether the ele-
ments of specific intent and proscribed purpose require separate findings.
The Government’s request to remand is not a confession of error in the
single-judge BIA opinion. See Ren v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir.
2006). Rather, the Government may request a remand to have “an oppor-
tunity to reconsider” its position. Id. However, the BIA is not required to
consider those issues on remand.
17 A.R. 6 (Saenz, J., dissenting).
18 Id.

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No. 24-2604 7
institutionalized, he would likely endure physical and sexual
assault amounting to torture.
II
DISCUSSION
A.
We begin with an examination of the legal landscape. Un-
der the CAT, the United States must withhold or defer re-
moval to countries where an applicant will, more likely than
not, be subject to torture. The CAT is implemented in 8 C.F.R.
§§ 208.16, 208.17, and 208.18. These regulations provide that
applicants are eligible for protection under the CAT if they
can “establish that it is more likely than not that he or she
would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of re-
moval.” § 208.16(c)(2). Under the regulations:
Torture is defined as any act by which severe
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person … for any
reason based on discrimination of any kind,
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at
the instigation of or with the consent or acquies-
cence of a public official acting in an official ca-
pacity or other person acting in an official ca-
pacity.
§ 208.18(a)(1). Further, the regulations require specific intent:
“In order to constitute torture, an act must be specifically in-
tended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering.”
§ 208.18(a)(5).
The BIA also has said that, for an act to amount to torture,
the act “must be an extreme form of cruel and inhuman

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8 No. 24-2604
treatment, not lesser forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment that do not amount to torture.” In re
J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 297 (B.I.A. 2002) (en banc). Also, “the
act must be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or
mental pain or suffering. … [R]ough and deplorable treat-
ment, such as police brutality, does not amount to torture.” Id.
at 298. Additionally, the regulations address the reason for
possibly torturous acts, which courts have referred to as the
“proscribed purpose” requirement. See Bopaka v. Garland, 123
F.4th 552, 563 (1st Cir. 2024); see also In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec.
at 298 (“[T]he act must have an illicit purpose.”). These two
aspects of torture, intent and purpose, have a symbiotic rela-
tionship. The BIA has explained:
The definition of torture illustrates, but does not
define, what constitutes a proscribed or prohib-
ited purpose. Examples of such purposes in-
clude the following: obtaining information or a
confession; punishment for a victim’s or an-
other’s act; intimidating or coercing a victim or
another; or any discriminatory purpose. The
Foreign Relations Committee noted that these
listed purposes indicate the type of motivation
that typically underlies torture, and it recog-
nized that the illicit purpose requirement empha-
sizes the specific intent requirement.
In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 299 (emphasis added).
The regulations also contain guidelines for assessing these
claims:
In assessing whether it is more likely than not
that an applicant would be tortured in the

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No. 24-2604 9
proposed country of removal, all evidence rele-
vant to the possibility of future torture shall be
considered, including, but not limited to:
(i) Evidence of past torture in-
flicted upon the applicant;
(ii) Evidence that the applicant
could relocate to a part of the
country of removal where he
or she is not likely to be tor-
tured;
(iii) Evidence of gross, flagrant or
mass violations of human
rights within the country of re-
moval, where applicable; and
(iv) Other relevant information re-
garding conditions in the
country of removal.
§ 208.16(c)(3). Finally, “evidence about generalized violence
or danger within a country is not sufficient to make a claim
that it is more likely than not that a petitioner would be tor-
tured upon return to his home country.” Lozano-Zuniga v.
Lynch, 832 F.3d 822, 830 (7th Cir. 2016). “That [an applicant] is
returning to a dangerous country, by itself, does not permit
him to make out a CAT claim.” Sumba-Yunga v. Garland, No.
23-3046, 2024 WL 4930396, at *6 (7th Cir. Dec. 2, 2024) (un-
pub.).
B.
We now apply this framework to the merits of Mr. Fid-
dler’s petition. First, he challenges the Board’s determination

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10 No. 24-2604
that he did not establish that governmental actors in Jamaica
with whom he might come into contact would act with the
specific intent to torture him. He believes that the frequency
of police encounters with mentally ill individuals that result
in the use of firearms by the authorities establishes specific
intent. He also takes issue with the Board’s holding that there
is insufficient evidence that Jamaican authorities acquiesce in
torture by private actors.
1.
The BIA characterized the major inquiry on Mr. Fiddler’s
attempt to establish specific intent as whether there is “spe-
cific intent to torture mentally ill individuals.”19 Mr. Fiddler
regards this approach as overly simplistic and misleading. In
his view, such an articulation impermissibly conflates the spe-
cific intent requirement with the proscribed purpose require-
ment. Furthermore, he submits that the Board misunderstood
the role of each of those elements. From his perspective, “in-
tent” and “purpose” are two separate aspects of torture that
require two distinct inquiries. He believes that a police shoot-
ing, by the very nature of the act, satisfies the specific intent
requirement because it inflicts severe pain. The “purpose” el-
ement, he continues, is satisfied because the target of the
shooting is a member of a group of people (the mentally ill)
who are stigmatized in contemporary Jamaican society.
The BIA’s interpretative approach comports well with the
nature and purpose of the CAT and with the practicalities of
its operation. Subsection 208.18(a) sets forth the general defi-
nition of torture and the following subsections elaborate on
various aspects of that definition. But the particularized
19 Id. at 4.

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No. 24-2604 11
subsections hardly describe discrete elements that ought to be
considered as hermetically sealed off from one another.
Indeed, both commentators and case law recognize that
“specific intent” and “proscribed purpose” are, conceptually
and pragmatically, “closely linked.”20 When courts previ-
ously have considered cases that present difficult questions of
intent and purpose, they have recognized the symbiotic rela-
tionship of these two terms. CAT cases considering subpar
prison conditions have confirmed repeatedly this dynamic.
See Oxygene v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 541, 550 (4th Cir. 2016) (collect-
ing cases). In these cases, courts have explained that
“[a]lthough … authorities are intentionally detaining criminal
deportees knowing that detention facilities are substandard,
there is no evidence that they are intentionally and deliber-
ately creating and maintaining such prison conditions in or-
der to inflict torture.” In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 301; see also
Matter of J-R-G-P-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 482, 486–87 (B.I.A. 2018)
(holding that Mexican officials did not have “specific intent to
torture” the petitioner); Oxygene, 813 F.3d at 551 (using simi-
lar language); Escobar v. Garland, 55 F.4th 662, 670 (8th Cir.
2022) (same). In this context, the purpose, or lack thereof, of
poor detainment conditions informs the BIA’s determination
of whether there is sufficient evidence of intent.
In the present case, the BIA’s analysis reflects accurately
the relationship between specific intent and the purpose of
the Jamaican authorities. The BIA correctly held that Mr. Fid-
dler failed to establish specific intent to torture. It distin-
guished between police acting to inflict severe pain and
20 Deborah E. Anker & Jeffrey S. Chase, Law of Asylum in the United
States § 7.27 (2024).

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12 No. 24-2604
suffering on mentally ill individuals when unnecessary to
achieve a permissible purpose and police using deadly force
for a permissible purpose. In this context, distinguishing be-
tween lawful and unlawful purposes is intertwined with dis-
tinguishing between lawful and unlawful intent.
Mr. Fiddler has not presented sufficient evidence that po-
lice engage in the use of deadly force against mentally ill in-
dividuals simply to “inflict severe physical … pain,” nor has
he presented sufficient evidence of intent to use force for any
reason beyond legitimate law enforcement purposes.
§ 208.18(a)(5). The instances of police violence cited by
Mr. Fiddler depict police officers responding to threats to
public safety, and he has not identified a practice of police of-
ficers using deadly force when such a purpose is not pre-
sent.21
2.
The BIA also affirmed the IJ’s determination that Mr. Fid-
dler submitted insufficient evidence to show that the Jamai-
can government would acquiesce in or “‘exhibit willful blind-
ness’ to” future torture by private actors.22 Mr. Fiddler sub-
mits that there is evidence of lengthy delays in criminal trials
and that violence is rarely investigated, indicating acquies-
cence by Jamaican officials.
21 The IJ, in weighing the factual evidence, explained that in the police
shootings cited by Mr. Fiddler, “the police were responding in the line of
duty to situations in which mentally ill persons posed an immediate risk
to public safety.” A.R. 151.
22 Id. at 4. (quoting Lozano-Zuniga v. Lynch, 832 F.3d 822, 831 (7th Cir.
2016)).

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No. 24-2604 13
To the degree that Mr. Fiddler fears violence from private
individuals, that violence must be done with the acquiescence
of public officials to qualify as torture under the CAT. See
§ 208.18(a)(1) (requiring that “such pain or suffering is in-
flicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acqui-
escence of a public official”). “Acquiescence of a public official
requires that the public official, prior to the activity constitut-
ing torture, have awareness of such activity and thereafter
breach his or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent
such activity.” § 208.18(a)(7).
Although Mr. Fiddler presented some evidence that pri-
vate individuals may harm individuals with mental illnesses,
he has not demonstrated that this would take place with the
acquiescence of Jamaican officials. The Board noted that in the
instances cited by Mr. Fiddler, Jamaican authorities investi-
gated the instances of violence, and charges were brought
against the offenders. For example, although the 2020 Free-
dom House report cited by Mr. Fiddler explained that “[g]ang
and vigilante violence remain common” and “crime and vio-
lence remain deeply entrenched,” the report also noted that
“[a] range of initiatives to address the problem have been un-
dertaken by successive governments.”23 Moreover, “evidence
about generalized violence or danger within a county is not
sufficient to make a claim that it is more likely than not that a
petitioner would be tortured upon return to his home coun-
try.” Lozano-Zuniga, 832 F.3d at 830. Mr. Fiddler also chal-
lenges the efficacy of the Jamaican criminal justice system, cit-
ing reports of long delays and backlogs. But these reports do
not necessarily establish acquiescence to violence or “that
23 Id. at 402.

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14 No. 24-2604
impunity for violence against mentally ill people is wide-
spread.”24 They instead suggest that criminal charges are be-
ing brought for violent crimes.
Without evidence indicating government acquiescence to
the violence, reports of widespread crime do not amount to
torture. The record indicates that the Jamaican government
generally investigates violence by private individuals and
brings charges against them. Further, the reports of vigilante
violence cited by Mr. Fiddler do not suggest that “in the ma-
jority of cases, police fail to investigate and prosecute such vi-
olence.”25 Therefore, based on the record, we affirm the IJ’s
weighing of the evidence, as affirmed by the BIA, and cannot
conclude that the “evidence compels a contrary conclusion.”
Lopez v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 484, 492 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Len-
jinac v. Holder, 780 F.3d 852, 855 (7th Cir. 2015)).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petition for review.
PETITION DENIED
24 Appellant’s Br. 36.
25 Id. at 37.

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