United States of America v. Eduardo Luciano

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted September 29, 2025
Decided September 30, 2025
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 24-1251
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
EDUARDO LUCIANO,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, Hammond Division.
No. 2:18CR007-002
Jon E. DeGuilio,
Judge.
O R D E R
Eduardo Luciano was convicted by a jury of crimes related to gang activity, drug
possession, and two murders. He was sentenced to life in prison. Luciano filed a notice
of appeal, but his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to
withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Counsel explains the nature
of the case and addresses the potential issues that an appeal like this could involve.
Because the analysis appears thorough, we limit our review to the subjects that counsel
discusses, see United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014), and the issues
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

-- 1 of 6 --

No. 24-1251 Page 2
Luciano raises in response, see C IR . R. 51(b).* We grant the motion and dismiss the
appeal.
Luciano was a leader of the Latin Counts gang in Hammond, Indiana. The Latin
Counts frequently engaged in drug dealing and violence, particularly against a rival
gang known as the Latin Kings. One day in 2015, Luciano noticed a large crowd of Latin
Kings and other community members holding a vigil. Luciano met with three other
Latin Counts and made a plan to shoot into the crowd, with the goal of killing Latin
Kings. Two Latin Counts, not including Luciano, drove to the vigil and opened fire,
killing a 16-year-old girl and a former Latin King.
In February 2020, Luciano was charged with one count of conspiring to
participate in racketeering activity, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); one count of conspiring to
possess with intent to distribute marijuana and cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 846; and two counts
of using a firearm in relation to murder, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c)(1)(A), (j).
1. Pretrial Motions
Counsel first considers challenging the district court’s rulings in limine. Relevant
here, Luciano’s trial attorney had opposed the government’s motion to prohibit the
lawyers from defining “beyond a reasonable doubt” to the jurors. Trial counsel
anticipated that he would want to discuss and define reasonable doubt throughout the
trial, as he said was permissible in Indiana court. But appellate counsel rightly rejects
this challenge because, as we have repeatedly admonished, lawyers should not define
“reasonable doubt” to a jury in criminal prosecutions. United States v. Alt, 58 F.4th 910,
919 (7th Cir. 2023).
2. Trial
a. Juror Issues
Counsel also considers raising two potential juror issues but rightly concludes
that it would be frivolous to do so. First, counsel considers challenging the district
court’s decision to remove an alternate juror who fell asleep multiple times during the
first couple days of testimony at trial. But a district court has ample discretion in
choosing how to handle a sleeping juror, see United States v. Freitag, 230 F.3d 1019, 1023
* Luciano later moved for counsel and raised additional arguments. We construe the motion as
one to supplement the Rule 51(b) response, grant the motion, and consider both his filings.

-- 2 of 6 --

No. 24-1251 Page 3
(7th Cir. 2000), and we see no error in removing a juror who slept through parts of a
witness’s testimony.
Second, counsel considers arguing that the district court should have removed
one juror, who, after opening statements and the start of testimony, alerted the court
that she used to clean the house of the mother of one of the prosecuting attorneys. But
to prevail on appeal, Luciano would have to show that the juror did not honestly
answer a material question on voir dire and that a correct answer would have
supported a challenge for cause. United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 780–81 (7th Cir.
2011). And the record does not support a valid for-cause challenge because the juror in
question unequivocally assured the court that she could be fair and impartial to both
parties. See United States v. Taylor, 777 F.3d 434, 440–41 (7th Cir. 2015).
In his Rule 51(b) response, Luciano insists on arguing that failing to remove the
juror was a structural error, meaning that the error could never be treated as harmless.
See Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 876 (1989). But the court did not err in retaining
the juror, so there is no reason to consider harmlessness.
b. Sufficiency of Evidence
Counsel next considers but rightly rejects challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence to convict. We would reverse only if no rational jury could have found
Luciano guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Johnson, 874 F.3d 990, 998
(7th Cir. 2017). But the government introduced sufficient evidence for each count. For
the racketeering conspiracy, the parties stipulated that the Latin Counts were an
enterprise, and testimonial evidence—from law enforcement, other Latin Counts, and
rival Latin Kings—established that Luciano led the gang in acts of violence and drug
distribution. For the drug conspiracy, two Latin Counts testified to the conspiracy and
Luciano’s personal involvement. As for the two firearm offenses, even though all
witnesses agreed that Luciano was not present at the shooting, his co-conspirators
testified that he played an active role in its planning.
In his Rule 51(b) response, Luciano proposes contesting the evidence that he
used a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(j). He argues that his convictions cannot
rely on the uncorroborated testimony of a co-conspirator who initially was charged as
the conspiracy’s leader. See United States v. Nichols, 910 F.2d 419, 421 (7th Cir. 1990). But
it is well established that jurors may rely on a co-conspirator’s uncorroborated
testimony. United States v. Ofcky, 237 F.3d 904, 909 (7th Cir. 2001); see also United States v.
Henderson, 58 F.3d 1145, 1148–49 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Byerley, 999 F.2d 231,

-- 3 of 6 --

No. 24-1251 Page 4
235 (7th Cir. 1993). And anyway, more than one of Luciano’s co-conspirators
corroborated Luciano’s role in planning the shooting.
c. Credibility of Cooperating Witnesses
At Luciano’s urging, counsel considers but rightly rejects challenging the
credibility of Luciano’s co-conspirators, who agreed that Luciano was at least one of
two leaders who planned the shooting. It was up to the jury to weigh each witness’s
credibility, accounting for inconsistent details or testimony that was self-serving. And
district courts should reserve credibility determinations for the jury unless a witness
testifies to seeing something “that would have been physically impossible for them to
see or impossible under the laws of nature.” United States v. Nieto, 29 F.4th 859, 868
(7th Cir. 2022) (citation modified). Neither Luciano nor his counsel points to any
impossibilities, and we see none either.
Counsel also rightly declines to challenge the admissibility of Luciano’s
co-conspirators’ statements. Co-conspirators’ statements are admissible against a
defendant in a conspiracy case. See F ED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E); see also United States v.
Davis, 845 F.3d 282, 288 (7th Cir. 2016). The government gave notice that it planned to
admit statements from some of Luciano’s co-conspirators, see United States v. Santiago,
582 F.2d 1128, 1130–31 (7th Cir. 1978), and Luciano confirmed that he did not object to
the admission of those statements.
d. Jury Instructions
Counsel next rightly rejects raising a challenge that Luciano wishes to make to a
“mere presence” jury instruction. Near the close of evidence, the district court proposed
removing the instruction—that Luciano’s “mere presence” at the shooting would not be
sufficient to convict him—because Luciano was not present at the shooting. Luciano’s
counsel asked that the instruction be revised to consider Luciano’s “mere presence” at
the planning meeting. The government objected, arguing that the instruction was not
appropriate for aiding-and-abetting charges. Both parties then agreed to an instruction
that read: “The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was present at the time and place of the planning of the offenses. The defendant need
not be present at the time and place of the shootings.” But by agreeing to the proposed
instruction, Luciano waived the issue for appeal. United States v. LeBeau, 949 F.3d 334,
341–42 (7th Cir. 2020).

-- 4 of 6 --

No. 24-1251 Page 5
e. Jury Verdict Form
In his Rule 51(b) response, Luciano generally proposes arguing that the jury
verdict form did not comply with the Supreme Court’s holding in Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). But Luciano does not point to any fact that was not submitted
to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by Apprendi, see id.
at 476, nor have we found one in our independent review of the record.
f. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Counsel mentions that Luciano would like to argue that his trial attorneys were
ineffective but correctly notes that any challenge to Luciano’s criminal judgment based
on ineffective assistance of counsel is best saved for collateral review, where a record
can be fully developed. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 503–05 (2003).
3. Sentencing
a. Statutory Maximums
Counsel correctly explains that Luciano’s sentence did not exceed the statutory
maximum for any of the four charges. The maximum sentences for his racketeering and
firearm charges were life, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(d), 1963(a), 924(j)(1), and the maximum
sentence for his drug charge was 20 years, 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(b)(1)(C).
b. Calculation of Guidelines Range
Counsel next correctly concludes that the district court properly calculated the
guidelines range. Luciano’s base offense level was 43 because the underlying
racketeering activity was murder. U.S.S.G. §§ 2A1.1(a), 2E1.1(a)(2). The court properly
added four levels based on Luciano’s role in the offense and two levels for the
combination of multiple offenses. See id. §§ 3B1.1(a), 3D1.4. Even if the court incorrectly
applied those adjustments, Luciano’s offense level would still be 43, the highest possible
offense level. See id. § 5A, cmt. n.2. Counsel also points out that although Luciano
received the lowest possible criminal history category, he did not qualify for a reduction
as a zero-point offender because he had one criminal history point and his current
offense resulted in death. Id. § 4C1.1(a)(1), (4).
c. Unwarranted Disparities
Counsel tells us that Luciano would like to argue that his sentence created an
unwarranted sentencing disparity because his co-conspirators’ sentences were much
lower than his. But counsel correctly concludes that any such argument would be

-- 5 of 6 --

No. 24-1251 Page 6
frivolous. At sentencing, the district court must consider “the need to avoid
unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have
been found guilty of similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). And here the district court
distinguished Luciano’s conduct from that of his co-conspirators, finding that it was
more serious and that he did not accept responsibility. Further, we presume that
Luciano’s within-guidelines sentence implicitly accounts for consistency among
similarly situated defendants. See United States v. King, 910 F.3d 320, 330 (7th Cir. 2018).
d. Substantive Reasonableness
We also agree with counsel that any challenge to the substantive reasonableness
of Luciano’s within-guidelines sentence would be frivolous. We presume a within-
guidelines sentence to be reasonable. See United States v. Jones, 56 F.4th 455, 513 (7th Cir.
2022). The district court adequately justified the life term based on the sentencing
factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See United States v. Cook, 108 F.4th 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2024).
The court appropriately balanced the nature and circumstances of the offense (noting
that they were “shockingly violent and showed an incomprehensible amount of
disregard for human life”) with Luciano’s history and characteristics (considering his
difficult upbringing, role as a father, deceptively low criminal history category, “severe
substance abuse issues,” and consistent employment). See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
e. Supervised Release
Lastly, counsel correctly rejects as frivolous any argument that the district court
erred by imposing concurrent three-year terms of supervised release on each count. The
court’s reasons for imposing the term of imprisonment were sufficient to justify the
term of supervised release. See United States v. Bloch, 825 F.3d 862, 869–70 (7th Cir. 2016).
And counsel correctly concludes that Luciano waived any appellate challenge to the
conditions of supervised release when he told the district court that he did not object to
them. See United States v. Flores, 929 F.3d 443, 449 (7th Cir. 2019.)
As a final note, we were unable to find some of the cases Luciano cited in his
Rule 51(b) response. Whether these errors were the result of mistaken transcription or
the use of generative AI, we encourage all litigants to carefully review their submissions
before filing in this court.
We thus GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw, DENY Luciano’s motion to
appoint new counsel, and DISMISS the appeal.

-- 6 of 6 --