Guillermo Alvarez-Morales v. PAMELA J. BONDI, Attorney General of the United States,†

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted November 18, 2025*
Decided November 20, 2025
Before
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
No. 24-3147
GUILLERMO ALVAREZ-MORALES,
Petitioner,
v.
PAMELA J. BONDI, Attorney General
of the United States,†
Respondent.
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals.
No. A206-014-187
O R D E R
Guillermo Alvarez-Morales, a Mexican citizen, petitions for review of an order of
the Board of Immigration Appeals, which summarily dismissed his appeal from the
immigration judge’s decision ordering him removed to Mexico. He argues that the
Board should have equitably tolled the deadline to appeal because, based on his
cultural background, he misunderstood the date his appeal was due. But the record
* By prior order, we granted Alvarez-Morales’s motion to waive oral argument.
† Pamela J. Bondi replaced Merrick B. Garland as Attorney General and is
substituted as the respondent. See FED. R. A PP. P. 43(c)(2).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

-- 1 of 4 --

No. 24-3147 Page 2
shows that the IJ rendered an oral decision in the presence of the petitioner and his
attorney, and that the written summary of the oral decision, which specified the
deadline in writing, was served on the attorney but not on the petitioner himself.
Because counsel was notified of the appeal deadline, the petitioner’s argument is
meritless, and we therefore deny the petition.
Alvarez-Morales was admitted to the United States in 2005 on a B-2 visa but
remained beyond the 180 days permitted. In 2013, the Department of Homeland
Security charged him as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) for having remained
beyond the period of authorized presence. In 2018, Alvarez-Morales applied for
cancellation of removal for non-permanent residents, claiming his removal would result
in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his then 11-year-old United States
citizen son. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).
In 2022, Alvarez-Morales married a United States citizen. Alvarez-Morales’s
counsel prepared, on the wife’s behalf, an I-130 petition for an alien relative. If
approved, the I-130 would establish Alvarez-Morales’s eligibility to apply to adjust his
status to lawful permanent resident as the spouse of a U.S. citizen. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 204.2(a). But his wife decided she did not wish to remain married to Alvares-Morales
and did not sign the I-130 petition. Alvarez-Morales thus requested a continuance so he
could attempt to reconcile with his wife.
On December 1, 2023, the IJ denied the motion for continuance, found
Alvarez-Morales removable and, in an oral decision, ordered his removal to Mexico.
Alvarez-Morales withdrew his application for cancellation of removal without
prejudice. The written summary of the oral decision stated that an appeal would be due
by “01/02/2024,” and the summary was served on Alvarez-Morales’s counsel but,
notably, not on Alvarez-Morales himself. The first page of the written summary lists his
attorney’s name and business address in the upper left corner of the page, and the
certificate of service contains an “[M],” reflecting service by mail to both DHS and the
petitioner’s attorney. The box for “Noncitizen” is left blank, reflecting no service on the
petitioner personally.
On February 1, 2024, Alvarez-Morales, with assistance of counsel, filed his notice
of appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals, along with a motion to excuse the
late filing. In his motion, he explained that he misinterpreted the due date as February 1
(rather than January 2) because in Mexico written dates begin with the day, not the
month. Construing the motion as a request for equitable tolling, the Board rejected
Alvarez-Morales’s argument that his misunderstanding was an extraordinary

-- 2 of 4 --

No. 24-3147 Page 3
circumstance, see Matter of Morales-Morales, 28 I. & N. Dec. 714, 716–17 (BIA 2023), and
summarily dismissed the appeal as untimely, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(G).
Alveraz-Morales maintains that the Board should have equitably tolled the
deadline for his appeal. The Board has held that deadlines to file a notice of appeal may
be equitably tolled, borrowing from the standard applied by the Supreme Court to
habeas petitions. Morales-Morales, 28 I. & N. Dec. at 716–17 (citing Holland v. Florida,
560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010)). We have taken the same approach with other immigration
deadlines. See, e.g., Herrera-Garcia v. Barr, 918 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Holland,
560 U.S. at 649). A deadline may be equitably tolled if a petitioner shows that he
pursued his rights diligently and that an extraordinary circumstance prevented him
from filing on time. Id.
Alvarez-Morales argues that he presented an extraordinary and compelling
circumstance: his cultural misunderstanding of how dates are written in the United
States. But this is contradicted by the record. Alvarez-Morales was represented
throughout his immigration proceedings by counsel—the same lawyer who represents
him in this petition. Counsel had notice of the appeal deadline, through both the oral
decision and the written summary provided afterward.
The decision of an IJ may be either oral or written. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.12(a). In this
case, the IJ issued an oral decision, which, by regulation, must be rendered in the
presence of the noncitizen, 8 C.F.R. § 1240.13(b), and which should include a
notification of the appeal deadline, see IMMIGRATION C OURT P RACTICE MANUAL § 4.16(h)
(after the IJ renders his decision at an individual hearing, he should “inform[] the
parties of the deadline for filing an appeal … unless the right to appeal is waived.”).
Even if the IJ did not state the appeal deadline on the record, counsel represented the
petitioner at the time the oral decision was rendered. Thus, at a minimum, he was
constructively aware of the appeal deadline because he was aware of the date on which
the IJ ordered Alvarez-Morales removed.
Furthermore, the record shows that counsel—not Alvarez-Morales—was served
with the written summary of the IJ’s oral decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.13(b).
Alvarez-Morales makes no argument that the record does not accurately reflect the
proceedings. And, in any event, we apply a presumption of regularity to immigration
proceedings. See Kiorkis v. Holder, 634 F.3d 924, 928 (7th Cir. 2011), as amended (Mar. 10,
2011). This includes the certificate of service on the written summary, electronically
signed by an immigration court clerk. Alvarez-Morales could not have misunderstood
the date on the written summary that was mailed to his attorney but not to him.

-- 3 of 4 --

No. 24-3147 Page 4
We need not decide whether a noncitizen’s cultural misunderstanding of dates
could be an extraordinary and compelling circumstance because the record does not
support even an opportunity for such a misunderstanding. Rather, the issue is that
Alvarez-Morales’s lawyer was notified of and then missed the deadline. We and the
Supreme Court have both said, in the parallel habeas context, that an attorney’s failure
to meet a known deadline is not an extraordinary and compelling circumstance
warranting equitable tolling. E.g., Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336–37 (2007); Conner
v. Reagle, 82 F.4th 542, 551 (7th Cir. 2023).
Alvarez-Morales also suggests that the Board gave inadequate consideration to
his argument for equitable tolling. When reviewing an administrative agency’s decision
not to excuse a late filing, this court requires that the agency “weigh intangible factors
specific to the individual case.” See Madison v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 924 F.3d 941, 946
(7th Cir. 2019). Here, the Board addressed the sole factor that Alvarez-Morales raised in
his motion, his purported misunderstanding, and determined that such a
misunderstanding was not an extraordinary and compelling circumstance. This
determination was commensurate with the cursory argument raised in his motion.
Alvarez-Morales does not suggest in his brief that the Board overlooked any other
circumstance in his favor.
For these reasons, we DENY Alvarez-Morales’s petition for review.

-- 4 of 4 --