Julius H. Schoeps v. Sompo Holdings , Inc .

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-1405
JULIUS H. S CHOEPS , et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
S OMPO HOLDINGS , I NC ., et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:22-cv-07013 — Jeremy C. Daniel, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED S EPTEMBER 18, 2025 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 21, 2025
____________________
Before R IPPLE, LEE, and PRYOR , Circuit Judges.
R IPPLE, Circuit Judge. Julius Schoeps, Florence von Kes-
selstatt, and Britt-Marie Enhoerning,1 acting as the heirs of
1 Mr. Schoeps is a German citizen residing in Berlin, Germany. Ms. En-
hoerning is a dual citizen of the United States and Sweden, residing in
Sweden. Ms. Kesselstatt is a resident of Munich, Germany. Ms. Kes-
selstatt’s citizenship is not specified in the complaint. The plaintiffs do not
invoke the jurisdiction of the district court on the ground of diversity.

-- 1 of 24 --

2 No. 25-1405
Paul von Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, a German art collector who
was persecuted by the Nazi government, brought this action
against Sompo Holdings, Inc. (“Sompo Holdings”), Sompo
International Holdings Ltd. (“Sompo International”), Sompo
Japan Insurance, Inc. (“Sompo Japan”), and Sompo Fine Art
Foundation (“Sompo Foundation”).2 They seek to recover
Sunflowers, a painting by Vincent van Gogh. According to the
allegations of the complaint, the defendants wrongfully con-
verted the painting and exploited it for financial gain.
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the
judgment of the district court.
2 Sompo Japan is incorporated in Japan. Its headquarters and principal
place of business are also in Japan, although it has subsidiaries throughout
the world. The other three defendants are affiliates of Sompo Japan.
Sompo International is incorporated in Bermuda and has its principal
place of business in Bermuda. Sompo International was established in
2017. Sompo Foundation is incorporated in Japan and has its principal
place of business in Japan. Sompo Foundation was established in 1976 as
a public interest corporation. Its activities include collecting and preserv-
ing art for display in the Sompo Museum of Art in Tokyo, where Sunflow-
ers is currently on permanent display. Sompo Holdings is incorporated in
Japan and has its principal place of business in Tokyo. It is the parent com-
pany of Sompo Japan, Sompo International, and Sompo Foundation.
Sompo Holdings was established in 2010. The Sompo family of companies
(except for Sompo Foundation) engages in the sale of property and casu-
alty insurance. In conducting their business, the Sompo companies coor-
dinate with each other to some degree.

-- 2 of 24 --

No. 25-1405 3
I
BACKGROUND
A. Facts
This appeal comes to us from the district court’s grant of a
motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We therefore take as true the
allegations of the complaint and base this present recitation
on those allegations. However, we also may rely on each
party’s written declarations, resolving all factual disputes in
the plaintiffs’ favor. B.D. ex rel. Myers v. Samsung SDI Co., 143
F.4th 757, 763 (7th Cir. 2025).
Vincent van Gogh painted Sunflowers in 1888. Paul von
Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, a German banker and art collector,
later acquired the painting. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy was the
co-owner and director of an international bank, Mendelssohn
& Co., which was one of the five largest private banks in Ger-
many. He also was a prominent member of the finance indus-
try and held a seat on the board of the Berlin Stock Exchange.
When the Nazi Party came to power, it targeted Mendels-
sohn-Bartholdy for persecution because he was Jewish.
Throughout the 1930s, he suffered increasingly severe sanc-
tions that ultimately eroded his livelihood. In 1934, he was re-
moved from participation in the Reich Insurance Corporation
and the Central Union of German Banking and Bankers. He
also was removed from the board of the Berlin Stock Ex-
change. Mendelssohn & Co. was transferred forcibly to non-
Jewish ownership.
Finding himself in an untenable financial situation, Men-
delssohn-Bartholdy had to liquidate his art collection. In 1934,
he placed Sunflowers on consignment with Paul Rosenberg, a

-- 3 of 24 --

4 No. 25-1405
Parisian art dealer. Rosenberg sold Sunflowers to Edith Beatty,
a British-American heiress. Sunflowers was sold again in 1987
at Christie’s auction house in London. It was purchased for
$40 million by Yasuda Fire and Marine Insurance Company
(“Yasuda”), the predecessor-in-interest of defendant Sompo
Japan. Yasuda kept Sunflowers in Japan until 2001. It then
loaned the painting to the Art Institute of Chicago for tempo-
rary exhibition. That exhibition—titled “Van Gogh and Gau-
guin: The Studio of the South”—lasted approximately four
months, from September 2001 to January 2002. Following the
Chicago exhibition, the Van Gogh Museum in Amsterdam
displayed Sunflowers for approximately four months. As part
of its loan agreements with the Art Institute of Chicago and
the Van Gogh Museum, Yasuda received reciprocal promises
from both to lend Van Gogh paintings to an exhibition in To-
kyo in 2003.
While coordinating the exhibition in Chicago, a repre-
sentative of Yasuda emailed a representative of the Art Insti-
tute of Chicago, stating concerns about the provenance of
Sunflowers and the possibility that it was Nazi-looted art.3
3 In an email to both the Art Institute of Chicago and the Van Gogh Mu-
seum, a Yasuda representative stated: “In regard to the ownership issue,
we can not [sic] change the ownership during this loan period under no
circumstances even Nazis [sic] confiscation problem may arise in America
and in Holland. We would like to include the clear terms in the loan agree-
ment to protect our paintings against this problem.” R.39-1. In another
email, they wrote “[w]e are deeply concerned about our Gogh’ and Gau-
guin’ provenance. We think our two works have nothing to do with Nati-
looted [sic] art, but we are not 100% sure. Could you advise us with your
suggestion on this issue?” R.39-16.

-- 4 of 24 --

No. 25-1405 5
They concluded that the provenance was “clear.”4 Sunflowers
returned to Japan in 2002, where it has remained.
In 2002, following a merger, Yasuda changed its name to
Sompo Japan Insurance, Inc. Sompo Japan remains the owner
of Sunflowers to this day.
Sompo International’s website states that “Sompo Interna-
tional is backed by the financial strength of Sompo Holdings,
Inc., which holds more than $100 billion in total assets.”5
Sompo Holdings and Sompo International have interlocking
office space in Tokyo and at least four individuals hold exec-
utive positions in both companies. Additionally, Sompo
Holdings has encouraged its stakeholders and clientele to
view the Sompo family of companies as “One Sompo.” The
corporate family has a large global footprint, including ap-
proximately 80,000 employees in 228 cities across thirty coun-
tries.
Sompo Holdings and Sompo International each maintain
separate websites that are accessible internationally, includ-
ing in Illinois. The Sompo Holdings website contains an im-
age of Sunflowers. Sompo International’s website includes a
page stating that it has an office in Chicago, Illinois. However,
the “Sompo International” office in Chicago is operated by a
Sompo International subsidiary called Endurance Services
Limited (“Endurance”), which uses the trade name “Sompo
4 R.39-17. Plaintiffs allege that the Art Institute of Chicago and Yasuda
colluded to file a false application with the United States Department of
State to obtain assurance that the painting would not be seized as Nazi
contraband. Sompo Japan filed a declaration refuting this factual allega-
tion. R.58-2, ¶ 17.
5 R.39-8.

-- 5 of 24 --

6 No. 25-1405
International” and the Sompo International logo to sell insur-
ance in Illinois.6 None of the defendants directly write insur-
ance or do business in Illinois.7
In 2022, the plaintiffs, through their counsel, contacted
Sompo Holdings and requested a meeting to discuss and set-
tle their claim to Sunflowers. Sompo Holdings refused the
meeting, expressing doubt about the jurisdiction of Illinois
courts and the applicability of United States law. This lawsuit
followed.
B. Proceedings in the District Court
The plaintiffs brought this action in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois. They sought
the recovery of Sunflowers (or alternatively, the current fair
value of the painting), damages, and injunctive relief. For our
analysis, their claims may be categorized in two groups. The
first group contains state law claims for replevin (Count I),
6 R.72-1, ¶¶ 9, 10; R.39-6.
7 Defendants support this claim with a series of declarations, which the
plaintiffs have not refuted. See R.58-1; R.58-2; R.58-3; R.58-4. As stated
above, the Sompo corporate family does include at least one entity, En-
durance, that sells insurance within Illinois. According to the defendants,
Endurance is an indirect subsidiary of Sompo International. R.72-1, ¶ 10.
Endurance sells insurance under the tradename “Sompo International”
and leases office space in Chicago, Illinois for that purpose. Federal due
process does not permit personal jurisdiction premised on corporate affil-
iation alone “where corporate formalities are substantially observed and
the parent does not exercise an unusually high degree of control over the
subsidiary.” Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Reimer Express
World Corp., 230 F.3d 934, 943 (7th Cir. 2000). As explained below, it would
make no difference in this case even if Endurance’s activities in Illinois
could be attributed to one or more of the defendants because the sale of
insurance does not relate to the plaintiffs’ claims.

-- 6 of 24 --

No. 25-1405 7
conversion (Count II), trover (Count III), imposition of a con-
structive trust (Count IV), unjust enrichment (Count V),
breach of fiduciary duty (Counts VI and VII), and slander of
title (Count VIII). The second group contains claims for unjust
enrichment and restitution under federal common law
(Counts IX and X) and also invokes what it terms the court’s
“Plenary Equitable Authority … under Article III, Section 2 of
the U.S. Constitution” (Counts XI and XII).
With respect to the timeliness of their claims, the plaintiffs
relied entirely on the federal Holocaust Expropriated Art Re-
covery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-308, 130 Stat. 1524 (2016)
(“HEAR Act”). The HEAR Act preempts state and federal
statutes of limitations for civil claims to recover artwork lost
between 1933 and 1945 because of Nazi persecution. Id.
§§ 4(3), 5(a). The Act allows litigants to bring such civil claims
within six years of the actual discovery of the identity and lo-
cation of the artwork and of a plaintiff’s possessory interest in
the artwork. Id. § 5(a). However, the HEAR Act does not itself
supply a cause of action. Id. § 5(f).
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. They ar-
gued a lack of standing, a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a
lack of personal jurisdiction, and forum non conveniens. After
ruling that the plaintiffs had standing, the district court dis-
missed all the claims. It first turned to the second group of
claims and dismissed Counts IX, X, XI, and XII for lack of fed-
eral subject matter jurisdiction. It concluded that no such
claims existed under federal common law because the plain-
tiffs had failed to show that there was a conflict between fed-
eral policy and Illinois state law. Moreover, continued the
court, the invocation of the court’s “plenary equitable

-- 7 of 24 --

8 No. 25-1405
authority” did not permit it to hear claims that do not arise
under federal law or diversity jurisdiction.
The court then turned to the counts in the first group. By
way of a footnote, it held that the HEAR Act’s extension of the
state limitations period for these state claims was sufficient to
vest the district court with federal subject matter jurisdiction.
In that respect, it expressed agreement with the decision of
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania in Holtzman as Trustee of Elizabeth McManus
Holtzman Irrevocable Trust v. Philadelphia Museum of Art,
No. 22-cv-0122, 2022 WL 2651851, at *7 (E.D. Pa. July 7, 2022).
In that case, the Pennsylvania district court had held that the
extension of a state limitations period for a cause of action
pursuant to the HEAR Act was sufficient to vest a district
court with federal question jurisdiction. The Pennsylvania
district court reasoned that the vindication of the plaintiffs’
state law claims depended on the interpretation and applica-
tion of the HEAR Act, a task that presented substantial issues
of federal law. In this case, the district court decided in sum-
mary fashion that it had federal question jurisdiction over the
state-based claims. But it then devoted the bulk of its opinion
to determining that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the de-
fendant corporations and that dismissal of Counts I to VIII
was therefore appropriate.
II
DISCUSSION
The plaintiffs now appeal the district court’s judgment.
They submit that the district court erred in dismissing Counts
IX to XII for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and in dismiss-
ing Counts I to VIII for lack of personal jurisdiction. They also

-- 8 of 24 --

No. 25-1405 9
maintain that the court abused its discretion by refusing to
permit the plaintiffs to file a second amended complaint. We
review de novo the denial of the motion to dismiss; we review
the denial of leave to file a second amended complaint for
abuse of discretion. We will address these issues in the same
order as the district court.
A.
As we noted earlier, the district court first addressed the
allegations in Counts IX to XII. These counts invoke explicitly
the “federal question” jurisdiction of the district court under
28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we therefore must determine whether
the district court had the authority to adjudicate these claims
on that basis.
We begin with the allegations of the complaint. The plain-
tiffs set forth claims for restitution and unjust enrichment un-
der federal common law (Counts IX and X). Also, in Counts
XI and XII, they seek the same relief under what they describe
as the court’s “Plenary Equitable Authority … under Article
III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution.”
1.
With respect to Counts XI and XII, the plaintiffs take the
view that a district court has inherent equitable authority un-
der the Constitution to fashion restitution and unjust enrich-
ment remedies and is deprived of that authority only if Con-
gress negates that authority by prescribing discreet statutory
remedies either expressly or by implication. Because the
HEAR Act does not expressly deprive the district court of its
equitable authority and does not create a discreet statutory
remedy, they continue, the court retains the equitable author-
ity to issue unjust enrichment and restitution remedies.

-- 9 of 24 --

10 No. 25-1405
We cannot accept the plaintiffs’ view. It overlooks the fun-
damental principle that a federal court has no authority to im-
ply a remedy unless that remedy is predicated on a cogniza-
ble cause of action. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239
(1979) (“If a litigant is an appropriate party to invoke the
power of the courts, it is said that he has a ‘cause of action’
under the statute, and that this cause of action is a necessary
element of his ‘claim.’ So understood, the question whether a
litigant has a ‘cause of action’ is analytically distinct and prior
to the question of what relief, if any, a litigant may be entitled
to receive.”); cf. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor,
478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (“Article III does not confer on liti-
gants an absolute right to the plenary consideration of every
nature of claim by an Article III court.”).
Here, the text of the statute is clear: “Nothing in this Act
shall be construed to create a civil claim or cause of action un-
der Federal or State law.” HEAR Act § 5(f). It clearly would
be inconsistent with the text and design of the statute to find
an implied federal cause of action.8 If there is no federal cause
of action, there can be no implied remedy.
2.
Counts IX and X fare no better. Decades of case law firmly
establish that federal courts can create federal common law
only when “strict conditions” are satisfied. Rodriguez v. Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp., 589 U.S. 132, 135–36 (2020). Federal common
law must either be authorized by Congress or “necessary to
protect uniquely federal interests.” Id. at 136 (quoting Texas
8 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has refused to create “a fed-
eral common law cause of action for replevin” under the HEAR Act. Zuck-
erman v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, 928 F.3d 186, 195, n.9 (2d Cir. 2019).

-- 10 of 24 --

No. 25-1405 11
Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981)).
Federal common law is necessary to protect uniquely federal
interests when either “the authority and duties of the United
States as sovereign are intimately involved” or when “the in-
terstate or international nature of the controversy makes it in-
appropriate for state law to control.” Texas Indus., Inc., 451
U.S. at 641.
Despite these well-established principles, the plaintiffs ar-
gue that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over
Counts IX and X, which seek restitution and unjust enrich-
ment under federal common law, because the HEAR Act im-
plicates United States foreign policy. In the plaintiffs’ view,
American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 420–25
(2003), supports their contention that the HEAR Act impli-
cates United States foreign policy. In that case, the Supreme
Court determined that a California law imposing economic
sanctions on insurers to the benefit of Holocaust-era insur-
ance claimants undermined the President’s authority where
the President already had entered into specific agreements
with Germany and Austria to address Holocaust-era insur-
ance claimants. The Court explained that the resolution of in-
surance claims held by United States residents against foreign
nations has long been considered to fall within the executive
responsibility over foreign affairs. Id. at 420 (citing Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 679 (1981)). The Court stated fur-
ther that the “exercise of the federal executive authority
means that state law must give way where, as here, there is
evidence of clear conflict between the policies adopted by the
two.” Id. at 421.
So too, when state law clearly conflicts with a specific for-
eign policy of the United States, state law cannot control. For

-- 11 of 24 --

12 No. 25-1405
instance, in Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227
(11th Cir. 2004), the Eleventh Circuit applied federal common
law because there was an executive agreement between the
United States and Germany addressing litigation against Ger-
man companies arising from the Nazi era. Id. at 1233. Because
the state law at issue conflicted with that executive agree-
ment, federal common law applied.
However, when there is no evidence that the application
of state law would interfere with the foreign policy of the
United States, state law can govern the dispute. Von Saher v.
Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 754 F.3d 712 (9th Cir.
2014), articulates firmly that principle. Although the court de-
scribed United States policy on the restitution of Nazi-looted
art,9 it explicitly held that under Garamendi, the plaintiff’s
state law restitution and conversion claims were not
preempted by federal law and that the state law at issue did
not conflict with United States foreign policy on Nazi-
9 “In sum, U.S. policy on the restitution of Nazi-looted art includes the
following tenets: (1) a commitment to respect the finality of ‘appropriate
actions’ taken by foreign nations to facilitate the internal restitution of
plundered art; (2) a pledge to identify Nazi-looted art that has not been
restituted and to publicize those artworks in order to facilitate the identi-
fication of prewar owners and their heirs; (3) the encouragement of pre-
war owners and their heirs to come forward and claim art that has not
been restituted; (4) concerted efforts to achieve expeditious, just and fair
outcomes when heirs claim ownership to looted art; (5) the encourage-
ment of everyone, including public and private institutions, to follow the
Washington Principles; and (6) a recommendation that every effort be
made to remedy the consequences of forced sales.” Von Saher v. Norton
Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 754 F.3d 712, 721 (9th Cir. 2014).

-- 12 of 24 --

No. 25-1405 13
expropriated art. Von Saher, 754 F.3d at 723–24.10 The Ninth
Circuit noted that, unlike in Garamendi, there was no Holo-
caust-specific state legislation at issue, no claim for relief
against a foreign government, and the defendant museum
“had no connection to the wartime injustices committed.” Id.
In sum, the plaintiffs have established that United States
foreign policy supports, as a general proposition, restitution
of Nazi-looted art between private parties. However, they
have not established that state law causes of action necessarily
conflict with that United States foreign policy in a way that
requires the application of federal common law rather than
state law.11
10 The Ninth Circuit was tasked with determining whether the plaintiff’s
lawsuit, which sought conversion and replevin under a state statute of
general applicability, undermined the federal policy on the restitution of
Nazi-expropriated art by challenging a foreign nation’s determination as
to the ownership of the painting at issue. Id. at 719.
11 The plaintiffs discuss the Terezin Declaration, but they have failed to
demonstrate any conflict between it and state law. In 2009, the United
States participated in the Holocaust Era Assets Conference, resulting in
the Terezin Declaration, which in part represented a commitment to “en-
sure that their legal systems or alternative processes, while taking into ac-
count the different legal traditions, facilitate just and fair solutions with
regard to Nazi-confiscated and looted art, and to make certain that claims
to recover such art are resolved expeditiously and based on the facts and
merits of the claims and all the relevant documents submitted by all par-
ties.” Prague Holocaust Era Assets Conference, Terezin Declaration (June
30, 2009), https://www.state.gov/prague-holocaust-era-assets-conference-
terezin-declaration. Unlike the agreement between the United States and
Germany in Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir.
2004), there is no apparent conflict between the United States’s commit-
ment in the Terezin Declaration and the application of state law as envi-
sioned by the HEAR Act.

-- 13 of 24 --

14 No. 25-1405
Moreover, here we have an explicit congressional expres-
sion of confidence in the capacity of state law to address the
matter effectively without undue interference with the con-
duct of the Country’s foreign policy. Congress enacted the
HEAR Act to ensure the availability of state law claims to
plaintiffs who would otherwise have no such recourse be-
cause of the state statutes of limitations. HEAR Act § 2(6)–(7).
In doing so, it specifically stated that the purpose of the HEAR
Act is to “ensure that laws governing claims to Nazi-confis-
cated art and other property further United States policy as
set forth in the Washington Conference Principles on Nazi
Confiscated Art, the Holocaust Victims Redress Act, and the
Terezin Declaration.” HEAR Act § 3(1). There can be no seri-
ous doubt that Congress has made the judgment that reliance
on claims based on state law was consistent with these United
States foreign policy objectives.
The district court properly dismissed Counts IX to XII.
These claims do not implicate the federal question jurisdiction
of the district court.
B.
1.
We now turn to the allegations in Counts I to VIII. As we
noted earlier, relying on the analysis of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania in Holtzman as Trustee of Elizabeth McManus
Holtzman Irrevocable Trust v. Philadelphia Museum of Art,
No. 22-cv-0122, 2022 WL 2651851, at *7 (E.D. Pa. July 7, 2022),
the district court held summarily that it had federal question
jurisdiction over these state law claims. This determination is
not contested by the parties and, consequently, it has not been
briefed before us.

-- 14 of 24 --

No. 25-1405 15
Our usual first task is to undertake an independent inves-
tigation of our subject matter jurisdiction over each count be-
fore us. Here, however, where the subject matter jurisdiction
question involves an “unruly”12 doctrine on which we have
little independent analysis by the district court and no appel-
late briefing by the parties, we believe that the most prudent
course is to decide this case on the alternate ground of lack of
personal jurisdiction over the parties. See Ruhrgas AG v. Mar-
athon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999). The personal jurisdic-
tion question is squarely presented, elaborately discussed by
the district court and the parties, and susceptible to easy res-
olution.
2.
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for lack of
personal jurisdiction. Curry v. Revolution Lab’ys, LLC, 949 F.3d
385, 392–93 (7th Cir. 2020). We must accept all well-pleaded
facts alleged in the complaint as true and resolve any factual
disputes in the plaintiffs’ favor. Felland v. Clifton, 682 F.3d 665,
672 (7th Cir. 2012). The plaintiffs bear the burden of establish-
ing personal jurisdiction, but when the issue is raised on a
motion to dismiss, that burden is met by making a prima facie
showing of jurisdictional facts. Curry, 949 F.3d at 393.
When no federal statute authorizes nationwide service of
process, personal jurisdiction is governed by the law of the
forum state, which in this case is Illinois. Tamburo v. Dworkin,
601 F.3d 693, 700 (7th Cir. 2010). Illinois’s long-arm statute
12 Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258 (2013).

-- 15 of 24 --

16 No. 25-1405
allows for personal jurisdiction to the full extent authorized
by the Illinois and United States Constitutions.13
To satisfy due process, a foreign defendant must have suf-
ficient contacts with a forum to ensure that the exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction over that defendant would “not offend tra-
ditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal
quotation and citation omitted). There are two types of per-
sonal jurisdiction: general and specific. The parties agree that
the district court cannot exercise general personal jurisdiction
13 The Illinois Constitution provides that personal jurisdiction is proper
“only when it is fair, just, and reasonable to require a nonresident defend-
ant to defend an action in Illinois, considering the quality and nature of
the defendant’s acts which occur in Illinois or which affect interests lo-
cated in Illinois.” Rollins v. Ellwood, 565 N.E.2d 1302, 1316 (Ill. 1990); I LL.
C ONST. art. 1, § 2; RAR, Inc. v. Turner Diesel, Ltd., 107 F.3d 1272, 1276 (7th
Cir. 1997) (quoting Rollins, 565 N.E.2d at 1316). We have previously ob-
served that the Illinois Due Process Clause is, at least hypothetically, more
restrictive than the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. RAR,
Inc., 107 F.3d at 1276 (“The Illinois Supreme Court has made clear that the
Illinois due process guarantee is not necessarily co-extensive with federal
due process protections.”); Illinois v. Hemi Group LLC, 622 F.3d 754, 757
(7th Cir. 2010). Thus, it is possible that the federal constitution would per-
mit personal jurisdiction in a situation where the Illinois Constitution
would not. However, no arguments to that effect have been raised in this
case. For purposes of our present analysis, if jurisdiction is not available
under the federal constitutional standard, it will not be available under
the Illinois standard. KM Enters., Inc. v. Global Traffic Techs., Inc., 725 F.3d
718, 732 (7th Cir. 2013). Therefore, it is only necessary to conduct the fed-
eral analysis, id., and the only relevant inquiry is whether the exercise of
personal jurisdiction is permissible under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

-- 16 of 24 --

No. 25-1405 17
over the defendants. Therefore, we need to address only
whether specific personal jurisdiction is proper.
Recently, in B.D. ex rel. Myers v. Samsung SDI Co., 143 F.4th
757, 765 (7th Cir. 2025), we began our examination of the re-
quirements for exercising specific personal jurisdiction by set-
ting forth the Supreme Court’s long-standing articulation of
the basic judicial undertaking: “Whether specific personal ju-
risdiction exists turns on ‘the relationship among the defend-
ant, the forum, and the litigation.’” Id. (quoting Walden v.
Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283–84 (2014)).14 We further noted that we,
14 The phrase “the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation” has been the analytical touchstone of the Supreme Court’s ex-
ploration of the due process limitations on a state’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction for many years. Among contemporary cases, Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186 (1977), was the first occasion where we encountered the Su-
preme Court’s use of this phrase. Id. at 204 (“Thus, the relationship among
the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, rather than the mutually ex-
clusive sovereignty of the States on which the rules of Pennoyer rest, be-
came the central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction.”). See
also Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 327 (1980) (“In determining whether a
particular exercise of state-court jurisdiction is consistent with due pro-
cess, the inquiry must focus on ‘the relationship among the defendant, the
forum, and the litigation.’” (quoting Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204)); Calder v.
Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788 (1984) (“In judging minimum contacts, a court
properly focuses on ‘the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and
the litigation.’” (quoting Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204)); Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984) (“When a controversy is re-
lated to or ‘arises out of’ a defendant’s contacts with the forum, the Court
has said that a ‘relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the liti-
gation’ is the essential foundation of in personam jurisdiction.” (quoting
Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204)); Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 775 (1984)
(“In judging minimum contacts, a court properly focuses on ‘the relation-
ship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’” (quoting Shaffer,
433 U.S. at 204)); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)
( … continued)

-- 17 of 24 --

18 No. 25-1405
along with other circuits, have distilled this basic guidance
into a more practical application. First, the defendant must
“purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activ-
ities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws.” Id. (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235 (1958)) (citation modified). Second, there must be an
adequate connection between the defendant’s activities in the
forum and the suit, such that the suit “arise[s] out of or re-
late[s] to” the forum contacts. Id. at 766 (quoting Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017)). Third, per-
sonal jurisdiction must accord with notions of fairness. Id. The
approach set forth in Samsung must guide our present task of
assessing whether the district court had personal jurisdiction
over the Sompo entities.
(“Where a forum seeks to assert specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state
defendant who has not consented to suit there, this ‘fair warning’ require-
ment is satisfied if the defendant has ‘purposefully directed’ his activities
at residents of the forum, and the litigation results from alleged injuries
that ‘arise out of or relate to’ those activities.” (internal citations omitted)
(first quoting citing Keeton, 465 U.S. at 774; and then Helicopteros Nacionales
de Colombia, S.A., 466 U.S. at 414)); Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283–84
(2014) (“The inquiry whether a forum State may assert specific jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant focuses on the relationship among the de-
fendant, the forum, and the litigation.” (citation modified)); Daimler AG v.
Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 126 (2014) (“Following International Shoe, ‘the rela-
tionship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, rather than
the mutually exclusive sovereignty of the States on which the rules of Pen-
noyer rest, became the central concern of the inquiry into personal juris-
diction.’” (quoting Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204)); Ford Motor Co. v. Montana
Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 371 (2021) (“For all the reasons we have
given, the connection between the plaintiffs’ claims and Ford’s activities
in those States—or otherwise said, the ‘relationship among the defendant,
the forum[s], and the litigation’—is close enough to support specific juris-
diction.” (quoting Walden, 571 U.S. at 284)).

-- 18 of 24 --

No. 25-1405 19
On the facts before us, the second consideration articu-
lated in Samsung provides the key guidance: There must be an
adequate connection between the defendants’ activities in the
forum and the suit, such that the suit “arise[s] out of or re-
late[s] to” the forum contacts. Id. (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co., 582 U.S. at 262). In Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judi-
cial District Court, 592 U.S. 351 (2021), the Supreme Court clar-
ified that such contacts do not need to have a strict causal re-
lationship with the litigation. Id. at 361–62. It explained that
the first half of the standard (“arise out of”) relates to causa-
tion, while the second half (“relates to”) “contemplates that
some relationships will support jurisdiction without a causal
showing.” Id. at 362. Ford Motor Company admitted that it
had purposefully availed itself of the forum through advertis-
ing, selling, and servicing its vehicles there. Id. at 361. It con-
tested, however, personal jurisdiction on the basis that those
contacts did not relate to the case at issue, which involved an
accident in the forum state involving a Ford car that was pur-
chased outside of the forum state. Id. at 355, 361. The Supreme
Court held that personal jurisdiction was proper because the
volume and nature of Ford’s contacts with the forum were
designed to induce consumers in that forum to engage in the
type of behavior from which the case arose. Id. at 367.
Applying Ford in our Samsung decision, we pointed out
that one of the limits of the “relates to” prong is the concept
of “fair warning—knowledge that a particular activity may
subject [the defendant] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sover-
eign.” Samsung SDI Co., 143 F.4th at 771 (quoting Ford, 592
U.S. at 360). We made clear that the defendants’ activities in
the forum must give them clear notice of the particular type
of claims the plaintiffs are bringing. Id. at 771–72.

-- 19 of 24 --

20 No. 25-1405
If the activities of its Illinois subsidiary could be imputed
to Sompo International, it might reasonably foresee that it
may be compelled to answer in an Illinois court for matters
emanating from the operation of an office in Illinois. The ex-
istence of an office and the sale of insurance would give
Sompo International clear notice, for example, of lawsuits re-
lating to its office lease, its various employment agreements
for Illinois-based employees, and the sale of their insurance
products. However, these activities do not give clear notice to
Sompo International that it may be sued over the ownership
of a painting that its parent company purchased in Europe
and regularly displays in Japan. See Advanced Tactical Ordi-
nance Sys., LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 751 F.3d 796, 801
(7th Cir. 2014) (“Specific jurisdiction must rest on the litiga-
tion-specific conduct of the defendant in the proposed forum
state.”).15
The plaintiffs argue that insurance sales are related to Sun-
flowers because the defendants use Sunflowers to market their
business. They submit that, under the prudent investor rule,
Sompo Japan could not have purchased Sunflowers unless that
purchase was “calculated to help Sompo market insurance.”16
15 For the same reason, websites operated by Sompo Holdings and Sompo
International do not provide the necessary litigation-related contacts.
Even if these websites were used to sell insurance products to Illinois res-
idents, see NBA Properties, Inc. v. HANWJH, 46 F.4th 614, 624 (7th Cir.
2022), that forum-related activity has no relevance to the claims in this lit-
igation. The mere fact that an Illinois consumer can view an image of Sun-
flowers on the Sompo Holdings website does not change this conclusion.
The display of an image of the painting on that website has no relation to
any of the plaintiffs’ claims.
16 Plaintiffs’ Reply Br. at 16.

-- 20 of 24 --

No. 25-1405 21
Here, the plaintiffs argue for far too broad an application of
the “arise out of or relates to” requirement. If such were the
rule, then specific personal jurisdiction would exist over a cor-
poration anywhere it did any business because its business
would “relate to” all other acts of the corporation. Such rea-
soning simply cannot live in peace with Walden, Ford, and
Samsung.
Wherever the plaintiffs’ alleged injury occurred, it did not
occur in Illinois. The exhibition in Chicago is only relevant to
the extent that it facilitated Sompo Japan’s sale of insurance
in Illinois. But Sompo Japan sells no insurance in Illinois. Ac-
cordingly, the exhibition in Illinois does not create personal
jurisdiction over Sompo Japan.17 The exhibition in Illinois
17 While not binding on this court, two cases discussed by the parties help
to demonstrate this issue. In Barzilai v. Museum, No. 153086/2022, 2022 WL
16856131, at *1–2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 10, 2022) a New York state court re-
fused to exercise personal jurisdiction over the Israel Museum in an action
for replevin and conversion of the Bird’s Head Haggadah, which was sto-
len from its Jewish owner in the 1930s. Despite the fact that the Bird’s
Head Haggadah was displayed at an art exhibition at the New York Public
Library for approximately four months in 1988 and 1989, the court found
that due process would not permit the exercise of jurisdiction because
“[w]hatever business the Israel Museum may engage in within New York,
it is not substantially related to the claims asserted in the first two causes
of action, that arose out of a theft and subsequent sale far away from New
York.” Id. at *3. Similarly, in Graff v. Leslie Hindman Auctioneers, Inc., 342
F.Supp.3d 819, 826 (N.D. Ill. 2018), vacated on other grounds, No. 17 C
6748, 2019 WL 13196397 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 12, 2019), the district court found
no personal jurisdiction over a conversion claim where the defendant ex-
ercised dominion or control over two paintings in Arizona and later tried
to auction them off in Illinois. Because the injury took place in Arizona,
the subsequent auction in Illinois did not relate to Graff’s claims. Id. (citing
Charash v. Oberlin Coll., 14 F.3d 291, 297 (6th Cir. 1994)). Contrary to the
( … continued)

-- 21 of 24 --

22 No. 25-1405
does not relate to the plaintiffs’ conversion claim because the
conversion was completed before the exhibition. Moreover,
the parties agree that the painting was obtained by Sompo Ja-
pan’s corporate predecessor in London. Accordingly, plain-
tiffs’ alleged injuries for conversion and trover occurred in
London.18 The place of injury for plaintiffs’ slander of title
claims is most likely their domicile, which would be Germany
and Sweden, so the defendants’ actions leading to that injury
and the injury itself occurred outside of Illinois.19 In other
words, Sompo Japan’s relevant conduct, and the effects of that
conduct, occurred in various European countries, rather than
Illinois.
The place of injury for unjust enrichment is the place
where the plaintiffs allegedly conferred the benefit on the de-
fendant. In re Sears, Roebuck & Co. Tools Mktg. & Sales Pracs.
Litig., Nos. 05 C 4742 & 05 C 2623, 2006 WL 3754823, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 2006). Plaintiffs allege that Sompo Japan’s
plaintiffs’ arguments, the fact that these cases did not deal with Nazi con-
fiscation does not undermine their explanatory value here.
18 The place of injury for conversion is the place where the property was
converted by the defendant. Charash, 14 F.3d at 297. It is not clear where
the breach of a duty to render aid to a tort victim occurs, but it was cer-
tainly not in Illinois. Typically, this duty attaches immediately upon com-
mitting the tort that renders the victim in need of aid. Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts § 322 (A.L.I. 1965). Presumably, the injury occurs where the
tortfeasor fails to act to prevent further harm. Id.; see Taylor v. Meirick, 712
F.2d 1112, 1117 (7th Cir. 1983).
19 The place of injury for slander of title is typically the domicile of the
plaintiff. See Peacock v. Merrill, No. 05-0377, 2009 WL 10704516, at *15 (S.D.
Ala. Nov. 17, 2009) (determining that slander of title occurred in the prop-
erty owner’s domicile because that is where the financial consequences are
felt).

-- 22 of 24 --

No. 25-1405 23
predecessor Yasuda “commercially exploited” the painting
by placing it in the Chicago exhibition.20 They also allege in
conclusory fashion that their claims for unjust enrichment
“arise out of and relate to the commercial wrongdoing of De-
fendants in bringing the Painting to Illinois and displaying it
at the van Gogh Exhibition in 2001”21 and that Sompo Japan
was seeking to “burnish[] its corporate image with the Paint-
ing throughout the U.S.”22 The district court concluded cor-
rectly that the only benefit that Sompo Japan allegedly re-
ceived from the exhibition was “a reciprocal promise” from
the Art Institute and Van Gogh Museum to lend Van Gogh
paintings to an exhibition in Tokyo the following year. Under
Bristol-Myers Squibb, there is simply an insufficient connection
between these claims and Illinois.
Because the defendants’ contacts with Illinois are not re-
lated to the actions alleged in the complaint, we need not en-
gage in further evaluation of whether the exercise of in perso-
nam jurisdiction over the defendants would comport with fair
play and substantial justice. See Samsung SDI Co., 143 F.4th at
775.
In summary, the second prong of the Samsung test pre-
sents a sure path to decision in the present case. There is
simply an inadequate connection between the forum (Illinois)
and the litigation to permit the exercise of in personam juris-
diction over the defendants. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 582
U.S. at 265. None of the claims here “arise out of or relate to”
20 R.39, ¶ 253.
21 R.39, ¶ 109.
22 R.39, ¶ 253.

-- 23 of 24 --

24 No. 25-1405
the exhibition in Illinois. Id. at 262 (citation modified); see also
Walden, 571 U.S. at 291 (Nevada courts lacked jurisdiction be-
cause the “relevant conduct occurred entirely in Georgia”).23
Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Counts IX
to XII present no federal cause of action and, in any event, the
district court lacked in personam jurisdiction over the defend-
ants. With respect to Counts I to VIII, we pretermit a ruling
on subject matter jurisdiction, see Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil
Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999), and affirm the judgment of the district
court on the ground that it lacked in personam jurisdiction
over the defendants.
AFFIRMED
23 The plaintiffs also argue that the district court abused its discretion by
refusing their request to file a Second Amended Complaint to cure the ju-
risdictional deficiencies. Although the district court should have applied
the more lenient Rule 15(a)(2) standard to their motion, O’Brien v. Village
of Lincolnshire, 955 F.3d 616, 629 (7th Cir. 2020), its failure to do so here is
of no consequence to this case. It is apparent from the district court’s opin-
ion dismissing the First Amended Complaint that nothing in the Second
Amended Complaint would have altered its decision. R.74 at 22–23, 31;
O’Brien, 955 F.3d at 629 (“[I]t is apparent from the court’s order and from
the record that, ultimately, the court did not abuse its discretion.”). Nor
would anything in the Second Amended Complaint alter this court’s de-
cision.

-- 24 of 24 --