Pamela Kibbons v. ANTHONY PELOSO and BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TAFT SCHOOL DISTRICT 90

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 28, 20251
Decided December 12, 2025
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Chief Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1390
PAMELA KIBBONS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ANTHONY PELOSO and BOARD OF
EDUCATION OF TAFT SCHOOL
DISTRICT 90,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division
No. 19-cv-01468
Sara L. Ellis,
Judge.
O R D E R
Pamela Kibbons sued her former employer, Taft School District 90 in Lockport,
Illinois, claiming a hostile work environment and constructive discharge in violation of
1 We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs
and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would
not significantly aid the court. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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Title VII, breach of contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district
court granted the School District summary judgment. On appeal, Kibbons’s arguments
are waived because she failed to develop them, and her brief does not comply with
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28. Accordingly, we affirm the district court and
we order Kibbons’s attorney to show cause as to why he should not be sanctioned
under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.
I. Background
In 2016, Taft School District 90 hired Dr. Pamela Kibbons on a two-year contract
in a dual role as superintendent and principal. During her time with the School District,
Kibbons felt that some of her interactions with Anthony Peloso, the School District’s
Board President, were unpleasant or harassing. On several occasions, Peloso asked
Kibbons if she wanted to go across the street to a cemetery and drink. Peloso also would
frequently enter Kibbons’s office to work on his laptop and watch Kibbons work. Peloso
twice instructed Kibbons to climb a ladder to the school rooftop to address concerns he
had about the roof. On each occasion, Kibbons was wearing high-heeled shoes and a
skirt, and she felt embarrassed to climb the ladder while Peloso watched.
After declining an offer to renew her contract and resigning upon its expiration,
Kibbons filed a charge with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for
alleged harassment, retaliation, and constructive discharge. The EEOC issued a right to
sue letter on November 30, 2018. In February 2019, Kibbons sued the defendants.
In her First Amended Complaint, Kibbons alleged that Peloso subjected her to a
hostile work environment and constructively discharged her from her job because of
her sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
(Counts 1 and 2); that the Board breached its employment contract with her (Count 3);
and that Peloso subjected her to intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED)
(Count 4). Kibbons based her claims on Peloso’s actions as described above.
After the close of discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment in
December 2023. While that motion was pending, in April 2024, Kibbons moved for
sanctions, claiming misconduct by defendants’ counsel. In June 2024, the magistrate
judge presiding over the case issued a report and recommendation denying Kibbons’s
sanctions motion because it was untimely and she had failed to identify a discovery
violation warranting sanctions. In September 2024, the district court granted the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment, holding that Kibbons had abandoned her
claims by failing to meaningfully respond to the defendants’ arguments. The court also

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denied Kibbons’s objections to the magistrate judge’s order and found that the
magistrate judge properly denied her sanctions motion as untimely. In response,
Kibbons moved for reconsideration of the district court’s opinion and order. In
December 2024, the defendants moved for sanctions based on Kibbons’s “vexatious
motions and filings.”2 In March 2025, the court denied Kibbons’s motion for
reconsideration. The court also granted the defendants’ sanctions motion under Rule 11
because Kibbons’s counsel “did not possess a subjective good faith basis that the claims
were well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law.” It further found sanctions
appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 because Kibbons’s motions “showed a serious and
studied disregard for the orderly process of justice.” This appeal followed.
II. Discussion
A. The District Court’s Summary Judgment Decision
This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the record in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable inferences
in that party’s favor. Osborn v. JAB Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 126 F.4th 1250, 1258 (7th Cir. 2025).
To obtain summary judgment, a party must demonstrate that “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); id.
The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all
four of Kibbons’s claims because “she failed to substantively respond to any of
Defendants’ arguments in her responsive brief and because there is no material dispute
of fact that would allow a reasonable jury to find in Kibbons’s favor on any of her
2 Kibbons previously had filed: (1) “Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions for
Defendants’ Discovery Violations, their Failure to Preserve and Produce ESI Evidence,
their Failure to Fulfill Discovery Requests, their Attorney’s Inappropriate and
Obstructive Behavior Before and During Depositions, their Attorney’s
Contumacious Conduct, His Dishonest Statements to the Court to Mislead the Court
and Opposition Counsel, and their Attorney’s Failure to Observe the Local Rules
Requiring Meet and Confer Among Lawyers”; (2) “Plaintiff’s Objections to the
Magistrate Judge’s Order and in Support of Imposing Sanctions Against Defendants
and Their Attorneys For Discovery Violations and For Suborning Perjury And/or
Perjurious Behavior Before the Court”; and (3) “Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider the
Court’s Order Granting Summary Judgment to Defendants.”

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claims.” In its order, the court characterized Kibbons’s response brief on summary
judgment as “invit[ing] the [c]ourt to tie disjointed factual assertions with under-
developed arguments to construct a clear version of her rebuttal argument: courts
generally decline such invitations.”
The district court’s rulings on Kibbons’s claims are material to our consideration
of this appeal. First, the court found that Kibbons failed to address the defendants’
arguments that the sexual harassment claims were time-barred, resulting in waiver.
Next, the court found that Kibbons waived her constructive discharge claim by failing
to respond to the defendants’ arguments. Then, the court ruled that Kibbons’s breach of
contract claim was based on similar allegations as her constructive discharge claim, and
thus similarly deficient. Because Kibbons failed to identify any breached contractual
term or evidence that would support an allegation of breach, she waived her breach of
contract claim. Finally, the court found that Kibbons abandoned her IIED claim because
she did not respond to the defendants’ argument. In fact, Kibbons’s response brief did
not even mention “intentional infliction of emotional distress.”
The district court correctly observed that it was Kibbons’s job, not the court’s, to
develop and to present her arguments. See, e.g., Williams v. Dieball, 724 F.3d 957, 961 (7th
Cir. 2013) (appellant waived argument by failing to present it with any level of
specificity in district court); Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2012)
(“arguments not raised to the district court are waived on appeal”). The district court
concluded that Kibbons abandoned all four of her claims by failing to respond to the
arguments set forth in the defendants’ summary judgment motion.
B. Waiver
“Waiver occurs when a party intentionally relinquishes a known right.”
Lukaszczyk v. Cook County, 137 F.4th 671, 674 (7th Cir. 2025). An appellant can waive an
argument by failing to (1) raise the issue or argument in the district court, either at all or
in a timely fashion, (2) raise the issue or argument in the party’s opening brief on
appeal, (3) present a developed argument on appeal that engages with the district
court’s reasoning, or (4) respond in a reply brief to a new argument raised by appellee.
Bradley v. Village of University Park, 59 F.4th 887, 897 (7th Cir. 2023). We review the legal
question of waiver de novo and the factual determinations predicating a finding of
waiver for clear error. Smith v. GC Servs. Ltd. P'ship, 907 F.3d 495, 499 (7th Cir. 2018).
Ordinarily, an appellant is expected to assert any available grounds for reversal
on penalty of waiver. Bradley, 59 F.4th at 897. Arguments raised to the district court

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“may still be waived on appeal if they are underdeveloped, conclusory, or unsupported
by law.” Puffer, 675 F.3d at 718. Likewise, “perfunctory and undeveloped arguments,
and arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority, are waived.” United States
v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir. 1991). And “a skeletal argument, really
nothing more than an assertion, does not preserve a claim.” United States v. Dunkel, 927
F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). It is not enough to preserve an issue by
presenting an argument in general terms. See Fednav Int’l Ltd. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 624 F.3d
834, 841 (7th Cir. 2010). This court has recognized that “[i]t is the parties’ responsibility
to allege facts and indicate their relevance under the correct legal standard.” Econ.
Folding Box Corp. v. Anchor Frozen Foods Corp., 515 F.3d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation
omitted). Because Kibbons does not come close to developing any arguments to
challenge the district court’s bases for granting summary judgment, her arguments are
waived.
On appeal, Kibbons has waived each of her four claims by failing to present a
developed argument. In her opening brief, she does not clearly identify which of the
district court’s rulings she challenges. Instead, Kibbons requests a special master to
conduct an evidentiary hearing on allegations of perjury and fabrication of evidence,
and reversal of sanctions awards against Kibbons and her counsel. And though she asks
for reversal of summary judgment, Kibbons merely recites the standard of review
governing a motion for summary judgment and quotes case law unsupported by any
facts from the record. She does not engage with either the district court’s decision or the
defendants’ arguments, instead devoting the majority of her brief to an attempt to
rewrite the factual record or dispute settled discovery issues. The little attention
dedicated to the arguments is spent on accusing opposing counsel of perjury, “bad
behavior” throughout litigation, and fabrication of evidence.
Kibbons’s “few bare assertions” that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment and denying the sanctions motion are insufficient to preserve either issue for
appeal. Puffer, 675 F.3d at 720. Her arguments are underdeveloped, conclusory, and
unsupported by law. Id. at 718. And an appellant who does not engage with the reasons
for which she lost “has no prospect of success.” Klein v. O’Brien, 884 F.3d 754, 757 (7th
Cir. 2018). Thus, Kibbons has waived her arguments for reversal of summary judgment
for the defendants.
C. Kibbons’s Motion for Sanctions
In an October 17, 2023 minute entry, the magistrate judge expressed concerns
about Kibbons’s anticipated sanctions motion because “it is unclear why plaintiff

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intends to seek discovery related sanctions now, more than two months after fact
discovery cutoff and presumably even longer after the underlying misconduct that
defendants allegedly engaged in.” Six months after these concerns were raised, Kibbons
moved for sanctions. In a June 3, 2024 recommendation to deny sanctions, the
magistrate judge commented that, “[d]espite the breadth of its title and its length (41
pages and more than 300 pages of exhibits), the motion is nothing more than a laundry
list of plaintiff’s counsel’s grievances with how defendants and their attorneys have
comported themselves during the discovery process and a rehashing of multiple
discovery disputes that plaintiff brought and lost—some on multiple occasions.”
Ultimately, the magistrate judge found the motion untimely after properly considering
the required factors, including “when the movant learned of the discovery violation,
how long [Kibbons] waited before bringing it to the court’s attention, and whether
discovery has been completed.”
Kibbons objected to the magistrate judge’s order denying sanctions. In doing so,
she made unsupported arguments, cited irrelevant cases, and then attempted to
relitigate discovery disputes. For example, she began her objections by citing our
decision in Pope v. Taylor, 100 F.4th 918 (7th Cir. 2024), which upheld a district court’s
decision to conditionally grant a habeas corpus petition. She then cited Novotny v. Plexus
Corp., 777 F. App’x 164 (7th Cir. 2019), which affirmed the entry of summary judgment
against the plaintiff-debtor based on judicial estoppel. Neither case is relevant to the
magistrate judge’s order. Kibbons continued by accusing defendants and their counsel
of perjury because “[d]efendants’ testimony under oath at depositions taken many
months apart is so consistent among them that it must have been carefully crafted
among them and their counsel.” Further, she insisted Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36
(2022), a case reviewing a malicious prosecution claim under the Fourth Amendment,
gives her the right to use evidence—which she fails to specify—before the trier of fact.
The district court concluded that Kibbons waived her objections by failing to
respond to the magistrate judge’s order. She “submit[ed] an oversized brief that
addresses irrelevant areas of law and throws block quotations from other cases at the
Court, with no effort to show how the precedent is relevant to her objections to the
magistrate judge’s recommendation.”
An appellant waives an issue or argument by failing to raise them in the district
court, “either at all or in a timely fashion.” Bradley, 59 F.4th at 897. We agree with the
magistrate judge’s conclusion that Kibbons’s arguments were unsupported and with
the district court’s finding that Kibbons’s failed to respond to the magistrate judge.

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Propositions were stated without any citation. The cases that were cited did not relate to
the claims at issue but instead were used to ask the district court for extraordinary
remedies, such as judicial estoppel to “prevent[] improper use of judicial machinery and
protect[] the integrity of judicial proceedings.” Thus, the district court correctly denied
Kibbons’s motion for sanctions.
D. Fed. R. App. P. 28 Noncompliance
As one might anticipate from the discussion above, Kibbons’s written
submissions to this court are deficient. Both her principal and reply briefs fail to comply
with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28 and Circuit Rule 28. Neither brief contains
“a concise statement of the case setting out the facts relevant to the issues submitted for
review.” Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(6). Nor do they contain a summary of the argument with
“a succinct, clear, and accurate statement of the arguments made in the body of the
brief.” Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(7). Finally, the briefs neglect to include citations to
authorities and the record and fail to include reasons for Kibbons’s contentions. Fed. R.
App. P. 28(a)(8).
Representative examples from Kibbons’s principal brief show her unsupported
assertions and undeveloped arguments. That brief:
• makes sweeping and unsupported declarations that “[p]rinciples enunciated
in important landmark decisions and holdings of the United States Supreme
Court and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals are disregarded”;
• charges opposing counsel with “find[ing] ways to ignore discovery
obligations and later their obligations to tell the truth under oath in judicial
proceedings”;
• contends opposing counsel must “prepare a Supplemental Privilege Log
clearly indicating who is present at each closed session board meeting”
because opposing counsel “are asserting privileges over all the recorded
closed session board meetings”; and
• includes unsupported headings such as, “Litigation Over Attorneys’ Fees Is a
Waste of Judicial Resources.”
Kibbons’s reply brief is similarly deficient. The reply brief:
• makes several arguments, unrelated to the district court’s reasoning, touting

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Kibbons’s performance as superintendent and principal by accomplishing
tasks such as procuring funding for textbooks and soliciting donations “to
beautify[] the school”;
• includes 14 pages of images displaying examples of such improvements to
the school grounds—none of which are relevant to the claims underlying
summary judgment;
• refuses to engage with either the district court’s opinion or the defendants’
brief, relying on claims without citations to the record, such as “[a] reasonable
jury can easily conclude” why Kibbons was subject to constructive discharge
and sexual harassment;
• continues to allege the defendants committed perjury, spoliation of evidence,
and falsely drafted discovery certifications, without support from the record.
Although the bar for a Rule 28-compliant brief is low, “briefs containing only
minimal legal support do not pass muster.” Sullers v. Int’l Union Elevator Constructors,
Loc. 2, 141 F.4th 890, 896 (7th Cir. 2025). For instance, in another Title VII discrimination
suit, we concluded that a brief “laden with assertions that ha[d] no basis in the record
and arguments that ha[d] no basis in the law” was frivolous and violated Rule 28.
McCurry v. Kenco Logistics Servs., LLC, 942 F.3d 783, 791 (7th Cir. 2019). Likewise, in
Shipley v. Chicago Board of Election Commissioners (7th Cir. 2020), we decided that several
claims were waived and a brief was noncompliant under Rule 28 when the appellants
“offer[ed] only a few cursory sentences in support of their … claims, buried in the
middle of other arguments, and without any adequate explanation at all that would aid
our review.” 947 F.3d 1056, 1062–63. Meanwhile, in Sullers, we held the appellant
avoided waiver despite a sparse brief of less than three pages containing minimal legal
authority, “given our preference for a merits disposition and our ability to discern, from
the briefs and the record, the basic facts … and general contentions.” 141 F.4th at 897.
The purpose of appellate review “is to evaluate the reasoning and result reached
by the district court.” Jaworski v. Master Hand Contractors, 882 F.3d 686, 690 (7th Cir.
2018); U NITED S TATES C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE S EVENTH C IRCUIT, P RACTITIONER ’ S
HANDBOOK FOR A PPEALS 154 (2020 ed.). Thus, we “insist on meticulous compliance with
rules sensibly designed to make appellate briefs as valuable an aid to the decisional
process as they can be.” Avitia v. Metro. Club of Chi., Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 1224 (7th Cir.
1995).

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Kibbons’s briefs do not identify which of the district court’s rulings she is
seeking to have this court review. Instead, her conclusory statements attempt to
relitigate factual disputes or request evidentiary hearings based on allegations of
misconduct that the district court already found baseless. Kibbons’s briefs therefore
substantially fail to comply with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28.
E. Fed. R. App. P. 38 Sanctions
This court normally dismisses an appeal “if the appellant fails to supply a
minimally adequate brief,” PRACTITIONER ’ S HANDBOOK 161 (citing Anderson v. Hardman,
241 F.3d 544, 545–46 (7th Cir. 2001)). But under Rule 38, this court can impose sanctions
when an appeal is (1) frivolous and (2) an appropriate case for sanctions. Id. at 125
(citing Harris N.A. v. Hershey, 711 F.3d 794, 802 (7th Cir. 2013); Lorentzen v. Anderson Pest
Control, 64 F.3d 327, 331 (7th Cir. 1995)). An appeal is frivolous when the “result is
foreordained by a lack of substance of appellant’s arguments.” Id. (citing Ashkin v. Time
Warner Cable Corp., 52 F.3d 140, 146 (7th Cir. 1995); see also East St. Louis v. Circuit Court,
986 F.2d 1142, 1145 (7th Cir. 1993); Girard v. Girard, No. 25-1854, 2025 WL 3281313, at *3
(7th Cir. Nov. 25, 2025)). Further, “[n]oncompliance with appellate rules wastes time
and resources and frustrates the review process.” McCurry, 942 F.3d at 790. When these
rules are violated, sanctions are appropriate. See Sambrano v. Mabus, 663 F.3d 879, 881–
82 (7th Cir. 2011).3
We have previously warned parties of the possibility of sanctions for submitting
briefs with “lengthy explications of marginally relevant and irrelevant case law, and
3 The district court ordered Kibbons to pay $75,867.50 in attorneys’ fees to the
defendants as sanctions under Rule 11 for pursuing claims not grounded in fact, not
warranted by existing law, and without a good faith basis in challenging existing law.
Kibbons does not appeal the sanctions, but challenges the award of attorneys’ fees,
claiming she “and her counsel have done absolutely nothing wrong in this case.” But
this argument is undeveloped and therefore waived. See, e.g., Puffer, 675 F.3d at 718;
Berkowitz, 927 F.2d at 1384. Just so, sanctions awarded by the district court do not affect
our evaluation of sanctionable conduct on appeal. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.,
496 U.S. 384, 407 (1990) (“The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure place a natural limit
on Rule 11’s scope” because “[o]n appeal, the litigants’ conduct is governed by Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.”).

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minimal analysis of th[e] case.” Lukaszczyk, 137 F.4th at 675. Like her previous filings in
the district court, Kibbons’s briefs submit a series of unsupported arguments and
assertions, many of which are unrelated to the district court’s rulings. This is not a case
of just poor written advocacy. See Stanard v. Nygren, 658 F.3d 792, 801–02 (7th Cir. 2011).
Rather, Kibbons’s briefs are not even “reasonably coherent.” Id. at 801.
Kibbons’s counsel has fallen short of the reasonable standards of practice in his
briefs and filings. We therefore order him to show cause within 21 days why he should
not be sanctioned or otherwise disciplined under Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
28 and 38.
A FFIRMED WITH O RDER TO S HOW C AUSE.

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