United States of America v. Charles Cui

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-2495
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
C HARLES C UI ,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 19-cr-00322(3) — Virginia M. Kendall, Chief Judge.
____________________
A RGUED O CTOBER 29, 2025 — DECIDED J ANUARY 9, 2026
____________________
Before SYKES, ST. EVE, and M ALDONADO, Circuit Judges.
ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Federal prosecutors charged Charles
Cui with bribing Edward Burke, the longest serving alderman
in Chicago history, to secure Burke’s influence in a permit
matter before the Chicago Department of Buildings
(“CDOB”). Following a six-week trial, a jury convicted Cui.
The district court then denied Cui’s motions for acquittal and
for a new trial and sentenced him to 32 months in prison. Cui
appeals, raising challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence,

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2 No. 24-2495
the jury instructions, the court’s admission of certain evidence
under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), and his sentencing, all
of which the district court rejected. We affirm.
I. Background
Through Irving Park Property Holdings LLC (“IPPH”),
Cui owned 4901 West Irving Park Road, commercial real es-
tate in Chicago’s 45th ward. In 2015, Cui leased the property
to Binny’s Beverage Depot. The lease gave Binny’s the exclu-
sive right to use a thirty-foot pole sign adjacent to the prop-
erty. To use the pole sign, however, Binny’s needed a permit
from the CDOB. The CDOB denied the permit in spring 2017,
finding the City had rezoned the area for pedestrian use and
the pole sign was not eligible for a nonconforming use as the
property had remained vacant for too long.
The denial of the permit posed a particular problem for
Cui because a year earlier he had entered into an agreement
with the City to finance the redevelopment of the property.
Cui would receive up to $2 million in tax increment financing,
conditioned on Binny’s continuing to lease the property. After
the CDOB denied the pole sign permit, Cui and Binny’s nego-
tiated a rent reduction if Cui could not resolve the permit de-
nial. The denial also jeopardized Cui’s financing as Binny’s
could pull out of the lease altogether if the CDOB did not is-
sue the permit.
Cui turned to Burke for help. Cui’s friend, Raymond Chin,
had originally introduced the two. Burke served on the City
Council, was chair of the City’s finance committee, and, con-
currently, operated a private law firm—Klafter & Burke—that
represented clients in property tax appeals before the City.
Burke was neither Cui’s alderman nor the alderman for the

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No. 24-2495 3
site of the pole sign, but he was influential. He had served on
the City Council for nearly 50 years by then.
Cui first reached out to Burke on August 23, 2017. After
calling and leaving a voicemail, Cui emailed Burke (at his per-
sonal email address), explaining that “zoning” had denied the
pole sign permit because the “pole sign was abandoned for
several years, and now is illegal.” He asked Burke to “look
into the matter, and advise how to proceed,” adding that
“Binny’s really needs it, otherwise they will either cancel the
lease, or ask for significant rent deduction.” Burke did not re-
spond.
The next day, Cui forwarded the email to Chin and said
“[m]aybe he thinks there is [a] conflict of interest, because of
his position. I’ll ask him to represent me for property tax ap-
peal, which will be a big bite, comparing with this.” Cui also
emailed his current property tax appeal lawyer, George Rev-
eliotis, explaining that he wanted “Edward Burke [to] handle
4901 W. Irving Park property tax appeal for me, at least for
this year? I have [a tax increment financing] deal going with
the City, and he is the Chairman of Finance Committee. He
handled [sic] his tax appeal business card to me, and I need
his favor for my [financing] money. In addition, I need his
help for my zoning etc for my project. He is a powerful broker
in City Hall, and I need him now. I’ll transfer the case back to
you after this year.” Cui directed Reveliotis to continue work-
ing on appeals for other properties he owned. Reveliotis re-
plied that he understood, adding “[t]here’s nothing like Chi-
cago politics!”
Shortly after, Cui emailed Burke again, copying Chin:
“Dear Mr. Burke, I currently have this property 4901 … W.
Irving Park Road under development. I may need your

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4 No. 24-2495
representation for tax appeal.… Please let me know if you
have time to handle this matter for me.” An hour later, Chin
called Burke and explained that “the guy that I brought to in-
troduce to you, he’s been trying to get ahold of you to … get
some tax work, and … apparently some legal—[.]” Burke re-
sponded that he had seen Cui’s earlier email and would “get
together with him and … see if we can do somethin[g] to help
him.”
Burke responded to Cui’s second email the next day, say-
ing that someone from his firm would reach out to Cui about
the property tax appeal work. Cui replied, thanking Burke
and asking if Burke would “be able to represent [him] for the
pole sign matter.”
On August 30, an attorney at Burke’s firm reached out to
Cui to formalize the tax appeal work. The same day, Burke
directed his assistant to reach out to CDOB Commissioner
Judy Frydland to “ask her to take a look at that uh, situation
where [Cui] called about [] Binny’s liquor store … and the
pole [sign]” and “see if [Frydland would] … review it and []
if they … can … help [Cui].” Burke called Frydland the next
day, and his assistant wrote Cui, confirming that Frydland
would reach out to him.
On September 1, Cui emailed his zoning attorney, Tom
Moore, an image purporting to show the pole sign in use. Cui
asked Moore to send the photograph to the CDOB and ask for
a continuous use exception, which Moore did. But, in an email
to Frydland and Moore, CDOB First Deputy Commissioner
Matt Beaudet affirmed the permit denial, in part because he
personally knew the pole sign had not been in continuous use
and he concluded that Cui had photoshopped the

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No. 24-2495 5
photograph. Cui forwarded Beaudet’s message to Burke and
then emailed Frydland about the photograph.
A couple weeks later, Frydland confirmed the permit de-
nial to Burke’s assistant and relayed that Cui had submitted a
photoshopped image. Burke’s assistant told Burke that
Frydland had “been trying to look into how to get this to
work. But she can’t seem to figure out a way.” At Frydland’s
suggestion, Burke later contacted Zoning Administrator Pa-
tricia Scudiero, asking her to look into the pole sign issue. But
Scudiero took no action. Ultimately, the CDOB did not re-
verse its denial of the pole sign permit.
On September 5, Cui and Klafter & Burke signed a contin-
gency fee agreement for the tax appeal work. The agreement
provided that Cui would pay Burke’s firm 33% of any savings
the firm obtained for Cui during the appeal. Burke’s firm
worked on Cui’s tax appeal, but it could not reduce his tax
liability. As a result, Cui did not have to pay Burke’s firm.
In 2018, as part of a broader investigation into Burke, the
FBI interviewed Cui. During the investigation, the govern-
ment issued a search warrant and, later, obtained a grand jury
subpoena for Cui’s records. The search warrant revealed
some of the emails between Cui and Burke, Cui and Chin, and
Cui and Reveliotis. In responding to the grand jury subpoena,
Cui produced his records to the government but failed to in-
clude certain key emails with Reveliotis and with Chin.
On May 30, 2019, a grand jury indicted Burke on a series
of corruption-related counts, stemming from his dealings
with Cui and other, unrelated issues. The grand jury also in-
dicted Cui on one count of offering a bribe to a public official,
18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2), three counts under the Travel Act, 18

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6 No. 24-2495
U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3), and one count of making a false statement
to the government, 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2).
Burke, Cui, and a third codefendant, Peter Andrews, went
to trial. Before trial, the district court denied Cui’s motion in
limine to exclude the photoshopped pole sign photograph
from evidence. Cui argued the photograph was impermissi-
ble propensity evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b), but the district court found the photograph admissible
under Rule 404(b)(2)’s permitted uses.
The trial lasted six weeks. Cui asked the court to modify
the Seventh Circuit’s pattern jury instructions for § 666(a)(2).
Specifically, Cui sought to clarify the bribery and gratuity the-
ories of liability and to amend the instructions’ definition of
“corruptly” for purposes of the statute. The district court de-
nied Cui’s requests. During the trial, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Snyder v. United States, No. 23-108 (Dec.
13, 2023), on the question of whether § 666(a) criminalizes gra-
tuities. In response, the government clarified it was not seek-
ing to convict Cui under a gratuity theory, but only under a
bribery theory.
The jury found Cui guilty on all five counts. It also con-
victed Burke on thirteen counts. The district court denied
Cui’s motions for acquittal and for a new trial, Fed. R. Crim.
P. 29, 33, finding the evidence sufficient and Cui’s other argu-
ments without merit. See United States v. Cui, No. 19-cr-00322,
2024 WL 3848513 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2024). Before the district
court’s decision, the Supreme Court held that accepting a gra-
tuity is not a crime under § 666(a). See Snyder v. United States,
603 U.S. 1, 19 (2024). In its decision, the district court ex-
plained that Snyder did not impact Cui’s convictions. Cui,
2024 WL 3848513, at *12–14.

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No. 24-2495 7
The district court sentenced Cui to 32 months in prison
and two years’ supervised release, and it sentenced Burke to
24 months in prison. At sentencing, the court considered and
found warranted the disparity between Cui’s 32-month sen-
tence and Burke’s 24-month sentence. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(6). It also applied a two-level sentencing enhance-
ment because it found Cui had obstructed justice by failing to
produce the two key emails to the government. See U.S.S.G.
§ 3C1.1.
This appeal followed.
II. Discussion
Cui brings a series of challenges to both his conviction and
sentence. Grouped together, he raises: (1) sufficiency of the
evidence challenges to each of his convictions; (2) jury in-
structions challenges to the § 666(a)(2) instructions; (3) a Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 404(b) challenge to the introduction of
the photoshopped pole sign photograph at trial; and (4) chal-
lenges to his sentence. We consider each in turn.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
We start with Cui’s sufficiency of the evidence challenges
to his three convictions: bribery, 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2), the
Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3), and making a false state-
ment to the government, 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2).
We review de novo the district court’s decision denying
Cui’s motion for acquittal. United States v. Lee, 77 F.4th 565,
572 (7th Cir. 2023); see also United States v. Clark, 140 F.4th 395,
409–10 (7th Cir. 2025) (reviewing sufficiency of the evidence
de novo). We owe deference to the jury’s verdict, not to the
district court’s “assessment of the trial evidence.” United
States v. Jones, 79 F.4th 844, 853 (7th Cir. 2023). Given this

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8 No. 24-2495
deference and viewing the evidence in the light most favora-
ble to the government, United States v. Perryman, 20 F.4th 1127,
1133 (7th Cir. 2021), we will overturn a conviction only when
“the record is devoid of evidence from which a reasonable
jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” United
States v. Leal, 72 F.4th 262, 267 (7th Cir. 2023) (quoting United
States v. Godinez, 7 F.4th 628, 638 (7th Cir. 2021)). This standard
is “nearly insurmountable.” Id. (quoting United States v. Gray-
son Enters., 950 F.3d 386, 405 (7th Cir. 2020)).
1. Section 666(a)(2)
Section 666(a)(2) provides that
[w]hoever … corruptly gives, offers, or agrees to give
anything of value to any person, with intent to influ-
ence or reward an agent of an organization or of a
State, local or Indian tribal government, or any agency
thereof, in connection with any business, transaction,
or series of transactions of such organization, govern-
ment, or agency involving anything of value of $5,000
or more; shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not
more than 10 years, or both.
Its companion provision, § 666(a)(1)(B), applies to those who
“corruptly solicit[, ] demand[,] … accept[,] or agree[] to ac-
cept, anything of value .…” In other words, § 666(a)(2) covers
the “bribe giver” while § 666(a)(1)(B) covers the “bribe taker.”
A bribe is a payment “made or agreed to before an official
act in order to influence the official with respect to that future
official act.” Snyder, 603 U.S. at 5. Section 666(a) has always
reached “bribes.” Historically, however, the circuits disa-
greed over whether § 666(a) also reached “gratuities.” A gra-
tuity is a payment “made to an official after an official act as a

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No. 24-2495 9
token of appreciation.” Id. The difference between a bribe and
a gratuity is one of timing. Under § 666(a)(2), a bribe occurs
when one corruptly gives, offers, or agrees to give the thing
of value before the official acts, while a gratuity exists when
one gives, offers, or agrees to give the thing of value after the
official has acted. We consistently held that § 666 reached gra-
tuities in addition to bribes. United States v. Hawkins, 777 F.3d
880, 881 (7th Cir. 2015) (collecting cases).
The Supreme Court took up the circuit split, rejected our
position, and held that § 666 criminalizes bribery, not gratui-
ties. See Snyder, 603 U.S. 1. It reiterated that, from the bribe-
taker’s perspective, bribes exist when the official takes or ac-
cepts payment before acting and “American law generally
treats bribes as inherently corrupt and unlawful.” Id. at 5. But,
it noted, gratuities are more complicated: Because gratuities
exist when the official takes or accepts payment after acting,
“[s]ome gratuities can be problematic, [while o]thers are com-
monplace and might be innocuous.” Id. at 5–6. The Court held
that § 666 does not reach gratuities, id., explaining that “[b]y
including the term ‘rewarded[]’ [in the statute,] Congress
made clear that the timing of the agreement is the key, not the
timing of the payment, and thereby precluded such a poten-
tial defense.” Id. at 19 (quoting § 666(a)). Ultimately, a “state
or local official can violate § 666 when he accepts an up-front
payment for a future official act or agrees to a future reward
for a future official act. But a state or local official does not
violate § 666 if the official has taken the official act before any
reward is agreed to, much less given.” Id. (citation modified).
The Supreme Court decided Snyder after Cui had filed his
post-trial motions. On appeal, Cui relies on Snyder for much

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10 No. 24-2495
of his sufficiency of the evidence argument. He presents three
specific sufficiency challenges to his § 666(a)(2) conviction.
First, Cui contends the government’s evidence, at best,
only supported the now-impermissible gratuity theory of lia-
bility because, he says, after Snyder bribery requires a “preex-
isting agreement” between the one giving and the one taking
the bribe—Cui and Burke, respectively. Cui claims there is no
evidence of a “preexisting agreement” before Burke contacted
the CDOB about the pole sign because the earliest they could
have “agreed” was September 5, when Cui signed the formal
agreement with Burke’s law firm.
To be sure, Snyder did not address this issue. And we need
not reach Cui’s argument regarding a “preexisting agree-
ment” because the evidence is sufficient to affirm Cui’s con-
viction even if such an agreement is required. But we do note
that § 666(a)(2) penalizes one who “gives, offers, or agrees to
give anything of value.” (emphasis added). Such language is
broader than Cui’s read. See, e.g., United States v. Whiteagle, 759
F.3d 734, 753 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Because it is phrased in the dis-
junctive, section 666(a)(2) separately proscribes giving, offer-
ing, or agreeing to give a thing of value to someone with the
corrupt intent to influence a transaction covered by the stat-
ute.”); United States v. O’Donovan, 126 F.4th 17, 44 (1st Cir.
2025) (explaining § 666(a)(2) “does not require a belief that
there was a completed agreement; rather, as the Eighth Cir-
cuit has explained, the offeror, provided he acts with corrupt
intent, ‘completes the crime’ of federal programs bribery
upon the offering of a bribe ‘even if the payee does nothing or
immediately turns him in to law enforcement’” (quoting
United States v. Suhl, 885 F.3d 1106, 1113 (8th Cir. 2018))); cf.
United States v. Shen Zhen New World I, LLC, 115 F.4th 1167,

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No. 24-2495 11
1177, 1179 n.5 (9th Cir. 2024) (“When the defendant is the
bribe-giver, [] the bribery offense does not require an agree-
ment to enter into a quid pro quo with the public official.…
‘[T]he crime of offering a bribe is completed when a defend-
ant expresses an ability and a desire to pay the bribe.’” (quot-
ing United States v. Rasco, 853 F.2d 501, 505 (7th Cir. 1988)));
United States v. Ring, 706 F.3d 460, 467 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“[Sec-
tion 201(b)(1)] expressly criminalizes a mere ‘offer’ of some-
thing of value with the intent to influence an official act. That
the official need not accept that offer for the act of bribery to
be complete is evident from the structure of the statute, which
defines two separate crimes: the act of offering a bribe and the
act of soliciting or accepting a bribe.”).
Even if § 666(a)(2) requires a “preexisting agreement,” the
“agreement” does not need to be formal, signed, or in writing.
In the federal bribery context, 18 U.S.C. § 201(b), “[t]he agree-
ment need not be explicit.” McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S.
550, 572 (2016). Rather, it “is up to the jury, under the facts of
the case, to determine whether the public official agreed.” Id.;
see also United States v. Synowiec, 333 F.3d 786, 789 (7th Cir.
2003) (“It is not necessary for a briber to be familiar with Wil-
liston on Contracts in order to make an illegal offer.”). This rule
similarly applies to bribery under § 666(a). See Snyder, 603
U.S. at 10–11 (“Congress modeled the text of § 666(a)(1)(B) …
on § 201(b) ….”).
Cui “offer[ed]” the bribe in his August 23 and 24 emails to
Burke asking for help with the pole sign permit and raising
the property tax appeal work when Burke did not respond to
his initial request. Burke “accepted” when he responded to
Cui on August 25 and agreed to take on Cui’s property tax
appeal. Only after Burke responded did he act by directing

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12 No. 24-2495
his assistant to contact the CDOB about the pole sign permit.
It is irrelevant that Cui did not formalize the tax appeal work
with Burke’s firm until September 5. Based on this evidence,
the jury reasonably could have found an agreement sufficient
to support bribery by August 25, before Burke acted.
Second, Cui invokes § 666’s safe harbor provision. Sec-
tion 666(c) shields from liability the “bona fide salary, wages,
fees, or other compensation paid, or expenses paid or reim-
bursed, in the usual course of business.” See United States v.
Robinson, 663 F.3d 265, 272 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[C]ompensation
paid in the ordinary course shall not be construed as a
bribe.”). At trial, Cui raised § 666(c) as an affirmative defense,
United States v. Lupton, 620 F.3d 790, 802 (7th Cir. 2010), and
the district court instructed the jury accordingly on § 666(c)’s
protection. ECF No. 384, at 243.
Whether wages are bona fide is a question of fact for the
jury to decide. Lupton, 620 F.3d at 802. When evaluating if
§ 666(c) applies, some factors to consider include the underly-
ing corrupt intent for the job, whether the compensation was
paid in the ordinary course, the defendant’s actions and be-
havior, how the money was spent, and the defendant’s enti-
tlement to the money. See Robinson, 663 F.3d at 272; Lupton,
620 F.3d at 801–02; United States v. George, 841 F.3d 55, 62–63
(1st Cir. 2016) (rejecting broad definition of “bona fide salary”
under § 666(c) that would have allowed “a fraudster … to
structure his loot as salary to evade prosecution”); United
States v. Schmitz, 634 F.3d 1247, 1264 n.13 (11th Cir. 2011) (“‘[A]
salary is not bona fide or earned in the usual course of busi-
ness under § 666(c) if the employee is not entitled to the
money.’ And, whether wages are bona fide and earned in the
usual course of business is generally a question of fact for the

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No. 24-2495 13
jury to decide.” (quoting United States v. Williams, 507 F.3d
905, 908 (5th Cir. 2007))).
Section 666(c) provides no shield for Cui because the prop-
erty appeal work was itself the bribe—we cannot separate the
work from the (possible) compensation Cui would have paid.
Cui did not simply offer compensation for legal work. Rather,
Cui offered the property appeal as a bribe because it was legal
work. Cui already had a tax attorney, and his emails to Rev-
eliotis and Chin make clear Cui wanted to entice Burke to
work on the pole sign permit issue by offering the supposedly
“bona fide,” more lucrative legal work. Cui’s focus was the
permit, and his motivation was Burke’s power and influence,
not Burke’s legal expertise. Cf. Whiteagle, 759 F.3d at 756 (find-
ing that hiring individual who is “duplicat[ive]” can create in-
ference that hiring was meant to “influence or reward” offi-
cial). And Burke only took action regarding the pole sign per-
mit after replying to the email regarding the property appeal
work. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government, a reasonable jury could easily reject application
of § 666(c)’s safe harbor provision—as the jury did at trial.
Third, Cui returns to Snyder. He argues Snyder requires ev-
idence he sought, and Burke engaged in, an “official act.”
[A]n “official act” is a decision or action on a question,
matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy[,] … in-
volv[ing] a formal exercise of governmental power that
is similar in nature to a lawsuit before a court, a deter-
mination before an agency, or a hearing before a com-
mittee.… To qualify as an “official act” the public offi-
cial must make a decision or take an action on that
question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or contro-
versy, or agree to do so. That decision or action may

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14 No. 24-2495
include using his official position to exert pressure on
another official to perform an “official act” ….
McDonnell, 579 U.S. at 574 (citation modified) (defining “offi-
cial act” for § 201 purposes).
While Snyder did not hold that bribery under § 666(a) has
an “official act” requirement, the Court repeatedly referred to
an “official act” in discussing the statute. See generally Snyder,
603 U.S. 1; compare O’Donovan, 126 F.4th at 39 n.14 (“Whether
§ 666 includes an official-act requirement was not [] a question
presented or expressly addressed in Snyder.”), with United
States v. Macrina, 109 F.4th 1341, 1351 (11th Cir. 2024) (“As the
Supreme Court recently explained in Snyder v. United States, a
payment after an official act can violate section 666 if an offi-
cial earlier agrees to the future reward and accepts payment
after completion of the act.”). Indeed, Snyder’s definition of
“bribery” under § 666(a)(1)(b) included “official act”: “bribes
are payments made or agreed to before an official act in order to
influence the official with respect to that future official act.” 603
U.S. at 5 (emphasis added).
But Cui’s framing of the issue is incorrect. Sec-
tion 666(a)(2) applies to one who “corruptly gives, offers, or
agrees to give anything of value to any person, with intent to
influence or reward.” (emphasis added). It focuses on whether
there was a corrupt “intent to influence or reward,” not
whether the official took an official act or succeeded. Snyder
confirms this, explaining that, from the bribe-taker’s perspec-
tive, the focus of bribery is the “intent to be influenced in the
official act.” Snyder, 603 U.S. at 12; see also, e.g., Hawkins, 777
F.3d at 883–84 (“A plan to take money in exchange for an offi-
cial act constitutes a scheme to defraud, whether or not the
plan succeeds.”); Whiteagle, 759 F.3d at 753 (“[S]ection

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No. 24-2495 15
666(a)(2) [] proscribes giving, offering, or agreeing to give a
thing of value to someone with the corrupt intent to influence
a transaction covered by the statute.”); United States v. Sitten-
feld, 128 F.4th 752, 770 (6th Cir. 2025) (“It is bribery to know-
ingly accept a bribe even if the official does not intend to be
influenced by the bribe in any official act despite the claimed
promise to the contrary.”). Section § 666(a)(2) asks only
whether Cui offered the tax appeal work with the corrupt in-
tent to influence an official act—not whether Burke took official
action.
Cui certainly intended for Burke to take official action—he
wanted Burke to convince the CDOB to reverse the pole sign
permit denial. At minimum, the evidence shows Cui sought
Burke’s “us[e of] his official position to exert pressure on an-
other official to perform an ‘official act.’” McDonnell, 579 U.S.
at 572. Viewed this way, there is sufficient evidence to meet
any “official act” requirement.
2. Section 1952(a)(3)
Moving to Cui’s next conviction, § 1952(a)(3) reaches any-
one who “travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses the
mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, with in-
tent to … promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate
the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on,
of any unlawful activity.” The statute defines “unlawful ac-
tivity” as including “extortion, bribery, or arson in violation
of the laws of the State in which committed or of the United
States.” § 1952(b). “A Travel Act violation consists of three
basic elements: (1) traveling in, or using a facility of, interstate
or foreign commerce, (2) with the intent to commit a specified
unlawful act, and (3) thereafter performing or attempting to
perform that act.” United States v. Dvorkin, 799 F.3d 867, 876

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16 No. 24-2495
(7th Cir. 2015). The jury found that Cui violated Illinois state
law, specifically bribery, 720 ILCS 5/33-1(a), (d), and commer-
cial bribery, id. § 5/29A-1.
To the extent Cui has not waived his underdeveloped ar-
gument that the government did not prove he “intended” to
bribe Burke, see Brockett v. Effingham County, 116 F.4th 680, 686
(7th Cir. 2024) (appellant waives underdeveloped argument
on appeal), we reject it. Illinois’s bribery statue provides that
“[a] person commits bribery when[,] … [w]ith intent to influ-
ence the performance of any act related to the employment or
function of any public officer, public employee, juror or wit-
ness, he or she promises or tenders to that person any prop-
erty or personal advantage which he or she is not authorized
by law to accept.” § 5/33-1(a). The government presented suf-
ficient evidence to find Cui intended “to influence the perfor-
mance of any act related to the employment, or function, of
any public officer [or] public employee.” He, repeatedly,
emailed Burke asking for help resolving the permit denial
and, at the same time, offered the property tax work. And, in
his own words, he did so because Burke was a “powerful bro-
ker in City Hall” and Cui “need[ed] his favor.”
Accordingly, Cui’s challenge to his § 1952(a)(3) conviction
fails.
3. Section 1001(a)(2)
Finally, § 1001(a)(2) provides that it is a crime to “know-
ingly and willfully” make a materially false statement “in any
matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or
judicial branch of the Government of the United States.” See
United States v. Edwards, 869 F.3d 490, 503–04 (7th Cir. 2017).
To be material, the statement “must have a natural tendency

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No. 24-2495 17
to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the
decisionmaking body to which it was addressed.” United
States v. Turner, 551 F.3d 657, 663 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation mod-
ified) (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509
(1995)). “[T]he ‘knowingly and willfully’ requirement … re-
lates only to the defendant’s knowledge and intent that the
statements he made to a government entity were false or were
made with the conscious purpose of evading the truth.”
Lupton, 620 F.3d at 806. It is not “necessary for an allegedly
false statement to have any ill effect at all, as long as it is ca-
pable of having such an effect.” United States v. Ranum, 96 F.3d
1020, 1028 n.12 (7th Cir. 1996).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government, the evidence at trial was more than sufficient to
support Cui’s conviction for making false statements during
his 2018 interview with the FBI. The jury heard the recording
of Cui’s 2018 interview, which further enabled it to evaluate
the tone and substance of Cui’s statements. True, during the
interview Cui told the FBI he offered Burke “property tax ap-
peal” work the first time the FBI asked if he had “offered or
suggested any business” to Burke during the time he was try-
ing to resolve the pole sign matter. But the FBI asked that
question several additional times during the interview. Each
time, Cui responded that it was “not true” he offered Burke
the tax appeal work while asking for help with the pole sign,
and he answered “no” when the FBI asked if he “ever … of-
fer[ed] business to [Burke] again, right around the time when
[he was] seeking help about the pole sign issue?” Perhaps
most definitively, he concluded by saying “[t]here was no
such offer.… [I]t’s just [] false fabricated .… [sic].”

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18 No. 24-2495
Continuing, Cui said he hired Burke for the tax appeal
work “just because he’s a good tax appeal lawyer” at least
three times. Given the evidence at trial, particularly his emails
with Chin and Reveliotis, it is not a stretch to conclude there
were reasons Cui hired Burke beyond “just” Burke’s profi-
ciency as a lawyer—namely, Burke’s political influence. Be-
cause there was sufficient evidence to find these two sets of
statements false, there was sufficient evidence to find Cui
falsely told the FBI that everything he said during his inter-
view was accurate.
* * *
Cui’s sufficiency arguments, at best, pose alternative inter-
pretations of the evidence. Cui had an opportunity to raise
these arguments when he went to trial and, after hearing
them, the jury convicted Cui. His challenges fail before us as
well. The government presented sufficient evidence to convict
Cui, and we find his arguments to the contrary unavailing.
B. Jury Instructions
Moving to the denial of Cui’s Rule 33 motion, he first ar-
gues the district court erred in its § 666(a)(2) jury instructions
by omitting that the jury must find a “quid pro quo” between
Cui and Burke to convict Cui and incorrectly defining the stat-
ute’s use of “corruptly,” warranting a new trial.
“We review the legal accuracy of jury instructions de
novo, but we evaluate their particular phrasing for abuse of
discretion.” United States v. Siepman, 107 F.4th 762, 765 (7th
Cir. 2024). The district court has “substantial discretion” in
constructing the exact language of jury instructions so long as
“the instructions as a whole ‘represent a complete and correct
statement of the law.’” United States v. Hofschulz, 105 F.4th 923,

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No. 24-2495 19
928 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Bonin, 932 F.3d 523,
538 (7th Cir. 2019)). We review for abuse of discretion the
court’s decision to give or refuse a particular instruction.
Siepman, 107 F.4th at 765.
1. Quid Pro Quo
As part of its § 666(a)(2) jury instruction, the district court
instructed the jury that to convict Cui, it had to find that he
“gave, offered, or agreed to give a thing of value to another
person … corruptly with the intent to influence or reward an
agent of a local government, or any agency thereof, in connec-
tion with some business, transaction, or series of transactions
of the government.” ECF No. 384, at 239 (emphasis added);
see also The William J. Bauer Pattern Criminal Jury Instruc-
tions of the Seventh Circuit at 304 (2023 ed.). At trial, however,
Cui proposed instructions that stated the jury must find there
was a “quid pro quo” between Cui and Burke and explained
that “[a] quid pro quo is an agreement to exchange this for that,
to exchange money or something else of value for influence in
the future.” ECF No. 375 at 9 (emphasis added). Cui sees “ex-
change [for]” as critical to convey that a “quid pro quo” is re-
quired, rather than the “in connection with” language of the
district court’s instruction.
Previously, we have held that § 666(a) does not contain an
“additional, specific quid pro quo requirement.” United States
v. Agostino, 132 F.3d 1183, 1190 (7th Cir. 1997); see also United
States v. Boender, 649 F.3d 650, 655 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Absent any
reasons to reconsider our precedent—and indeed in light of
the clear statutory text—we conclude that the government
was not required to establish a specific quid pro quo of money
in exchange for a legislative act.”). We grounded this conclu-
sion in our holding that § 666(a) reaches gratuities. See

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20 No. 24-2495
Boender, 649 F.3d at 654–55 (holding no “specific quid pro quo”
required under § 666(a)(2), in part because “§ 666(a)(2) []
criminalizes both bribes and [gratuities] in the same section”).
In Boender we explained that 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)—the federal
gratuity statute—does not require a quid pro quo but instead
“requires only the identification of a specific official act ‘for or
because of which’ a [gratuity] was given.” Id. at 655 (quoting
United States v. Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. 398, 406 (1999)). Be-
cause, at the time, § 666(a) “criminalize[d] both bribes and
[gratuities] in the same section,” we declined to import a
“quid pro quo” requirement into § 666(a). Boender, 649 F.3d at
655. But in Boender, we also recognized that § 201(b)—the fed-
eral bribery provision—requires a “quid pro quo.” Id. (citing
Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 404); see also United States v. Jones, 993
F.3d 519, 533 (7th Cir. 2021) (federal bribery “requires evi-
dence of a quid pro quo, the exchange of a thing of value for
the violation of an official duty,” and “[t]he existence of a quid
pro quo is what chiefly distinguishes a bribe from a gratuity”).
Snyder’s holding that § 666(a) does not reach gratuities
now undermines the basis on which we declined to find a
quid pro quo requirement in the statute. Because § 666(a) only
reaches bribes and a “bribe [under § 666] requires a quid pro
quo,” United States v. Snyder, 71 F.4th 555, 579 (7th Cir. 2023),
overruled on other grounds 603 U.S. 1, it is a fair reading of
Snyder to find § 666(a) now requires a corrupt intent to enter
a “quid pro quo.” See Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 404–05 (defin-
ing a “quid pro quo” as “a specific intent to give or receive
something of value in exchange for an official act” (emphasis
added)). Snyder made clear that “[a] state or local official can
violate § 666 when he accepts an up-front payment for a future of-
ficial act or agrees to a future reward for a future official act.”
Snyder, 603 U.S. at 19 (emphasis added); see id. at 23 (Jackson,

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No. 24-2495 21
J., dissenting) (“There is no dispute that § 666 criminalizes
bribes. This Court has also been clear about what a bribe re-
quires: ‘a quid pro quo.’” (quoting Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at
404)).
This requirement does not mean the district court gave er-
roneous jury instructions. The instructions track the language
of § 666(a), which uses the “in connection with” language Cui
disputes, and Snyder does not suggest an issue with that lan-
guage. Cui’s proposed “exchange [for]” language is certainly
sufficient to convey that a “quid pro quo” is required. See, e.g.,
Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 404–05; Salinas v. United States, 522
U.S. 52, 55 (1997) (characterizing a “series of bribes” as “in ex-
change for” government action); United States v. Blagojevich,
794 F.3d 729, 735 (7th Cir. 2015) (defining “a quid pro quo: a
public official performs an official act (or promises to do so)
in exchange for a private benefit, such as money”); United
States v. Peleti, 576 F.3d 377, 384 (7th Cir. 2009). Indeed, as Cui
points out, in other cases the government has agreed to in-
clude the language Cui proposed here.
But this language is not required. There are no “magic
words” needed to convey a “quid pro quo.” See, e.g., United
States v. Gee, 432 F.3d 713, 714 (7th Cir. 2005) (characterizing
“[a] quid pro quo [as] money for a specific legislative act” (em-
phasis added)). “In exchange [for],” “in connection with,”
“for a specific act,” and “in return [for]” can all sufficiently
convey that a quid pro quo is required under § 666(a). That is,

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22 No. 24-2495
the language of the district court’s instructions already con-
veyed the “quid pro quo” Cui claims necessary.*
The district court’s jury instructions tracked the language
of § 666(a)(2) and made the “quid pro quo” requirement suf-
ficiently clear. Moreover, here, where the evidence showed
Cui intended a “quid pro quo” with Burke—he would give
Burke the tax appeal work “in connection with” Burke’s effort
to reverse the permit denial—the district court did not err.
2. “Corruptly”
Section 666(a)(2) requires a defendant act “corruptly.” The
district court instructed the jury that “[a] person acts cor-
ruptly when that person acts with the intent that something
of value is given or offered to reward or influence an agent of
a government in connection with the agent’s official duties.”
ECF No. 384, at 239; see also The William J. Bauer Pattern Crim-
inal Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit at 304. At trial, Cui
objected to this definition of “corruptly” and asked the court
to additionally explain that “[a] person acts corruptly when
that person acts … with the knowledge that giving or offering the
thing of value is forbidden.” ECF No. 375 at 12 (emphasis
added). The district court denied the proposed language,
which Cui contends was in error.
* At oral argument, the government conceded that the “in connection
with” language in the jury instructions could be problematic in a case
where the evidence might suggest the payment was a gratuity rather than
a bribe. Because the evidence here did not suggest Cui offered Burke a
gratuity, the instructions were not erroneous. We encourage the Commit-
tee on Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit to address
this issue.

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No. 24-2495 23
“Corruptly” in § 666(a)(2) refers to the “state of mind” of
the individual offering the thing of value. Cf. Blagojevich, 794
F.3d at 736 (citing Hawkins, 777 F.3d at 882) (explaining, for
§ 666(a)(1)(B), that “‘[c]orruptly’ refers to the recipient’s state
of mind”). Because bribery is “inherently corrupt,” a person
acts “corruptly” when he understands the payment is a bribe.
See Snyder, 603 U.S. at 5 (“American law generally treats bribes
as inherently corrupt and unlawful.”); see also Shen Zhen New
World I, 115 F.4th at 1178 n.3 (“‘[C]orruptly’ … protects
against the possibility that goodwill gift-givers, harboring no
intent to receive official action in exchange for their gifts, will
later be deemed to have given a bribe.”); United States v. Lind-
berg, 39 F.4th 151, 172 (4th Cir. 2022) (“One has the intent to
corrupt an official only if he makes a payment or promise with
the intent to engage in a fairly specific quid pro quo with that
official.” (quoting United States v. Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006,
1018–19 (4th Cir. 1998))). That is, if the individual acts “ex-
pect[ing] to achieve a forbidden influence,” the individual
acts corruptly. Hawkins, 777 F.3d at 882; see also United States
v. Mullins, 800 F.3d 866, 870 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v.
Curescu, 674 F.3d 735, 742 (7th Cir. 2012) (“To be guilty of so-
liciting or accepting a bribe in violation of section 666(a)(1)(B)
requires knowing that the money or other thing of value re-
ceived was indeed a bribe, which is to say an inducement to
do a corrupt act.”). Because a person acts “corruptly” so long
as he acts intending the payment to be a bribe, there was no
error here—the district court’s jury instructions correctly de-
fined “corruptly.”
* * *
The district court’s § 666(a)(2) instructions accurately re-
flected the law’s quid pro quo requirement and the correct

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24 No. 24-2495
definition of “corruptly,” and the “particular phrasing” of the
instructions was far from an abuse of the court’s discretion.
Siepman, 107 F.4th at 765.
C. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)
Next, we turn to Cui’s objection to the government’s intro-
duction of the photoshopped pole sign photograph Cui sent
the CDOB—a separate basis on which Cui seeks a new trial.
We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s “de-
cision to admit or exclude evidence,” United States v. Jarigese,
999 F.3d 464, 470 (7th Cir. 2021), but we will only reverse and
order a new trial where the error was not harmless, United
States v. Simon, 727 F.3d 682, 696 (7th Cir. 2013).
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1) prohibits admission of
“[e]vidence of any other crime, wrong, or act” if introduced
“to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a par-
ticular occasion the person acted in accordance with the char-
acter.” That is, evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts”
cannot be introduced “if the purpose is to show a person’s
propensity to behave in a certain way.” United States v. Gomez,
763 F.3d 845, 855 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc). Rule 404(b)(2) pro-
vides a non-exhaustive list of permissible uses for such evi-
dence, including “proving motive, opportunity, intent, prep-
aration, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack
of accident.” See also Gomez, 763 F.3d at 855.
Of course, “Rule 404(b) only curtails the introduction of
‘evidence of other acts.’” United States v. Han, 105 F.4th 986, 993
(7th Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Thomas, 986 F.3d 723,
728 (7th Cir. 2021)). Direct evidence is “‘almost always admis-
sible against a defendant’ and is not ‘other act evidence.’”

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No. 24-2495 25
Thomas, 986 F.3d at 728 (quoting United States v. Gorman, 613
F.3d 711, 717 (7th Cir. 2010)).
Finally, as in every case, the court must balance the evi-
dence under Rule 403 and determine “whether the probative
value of the [] evidence is substantially outweighed by the risk
of unfair prejudice.” Gomez, 763 F.3d at 860.
Recall that before trial the district court denied Cui’s mo-
tion to exclude the photoshopped photograph under
Rule 404(b)(1), finding the photograph admissible under Rule
404(b)(2)’s exceptions. The court rejected Cui’s argument that
the government’s use of the photograph might lead to an in-
ference that Cui was the type of person who would lie to the
government, a propensity inference impermissibly based on
evidence of a wrong other than the one at issue.
We agree, moving directly to the district court’s
Rule 404(b) analysis. To admit evidence under Rule 404(b)(2),
“the proponent of the evidence must [] establish that the other
act is relevant to a specific purpose other than the person’s
character or propensity to behave in a certain way,” by
demonstrating “a chain of reasoning that does not rely on the
forbidden inference that the person has a certain character
and acted in accordance with that character on the occasion
charged in the case.” Gomez, 763 F.3d at 860. The district court
found the government satisfied its burden because the photo-
graph went to Cui’s “state of mind” when he contacted Burke.
It noted the photograph showed Cui’s “willingness to take
shortcuts—his desperation, even—to” reverse the permit de-
nial. ECF No. 317, at 5. And it further found that the photo-
graph went to Cui’s motive and intent, neither of which rely
on a propensity-based chain of reasoning. Cui’s contention at
trial was that the tax appeal work was not a bribe to get Burke

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26 No. 24-2495
to resolve the permit issue but rather legitimate work with
which Cui needed assistance. The photograph contextualizes
Cui’s state of mind and motive during this time. That Cui sent
the CDOB a photoshopped image helped show what Cui was
focused on and motivated by at the same time he offered
Burke the tax appeal work—i.e., reversing the pole sign per-
mit. These are permissible uses of “other act” evidence and
“chains of reasoning” that do not rely on Cui’s propensity or
character.
Finally, Rule 403—in Gomez, we explained that “[o]ther-
act evidence raises special concerns about unfair prejudice
because it almost always carries some risk that the jury will
draw the forbidden propensity inference.” 763 F.3d at 857. So,
when weighing “other act” evidence under Rule 403, district
courts should consider “the extent to which the non-
propensity factual proposition actually is contested in the
case.” Id. “Our circuit also requires special caution when
other-act evidence is offered to prove intent, which though a
permissible non-propensity purpose is nonetheless ‘most
likely to blend with improper propensity uses.’” Id. at 858
(quoting United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 698 (7th Cir.
2012)).
Cui’s claim, both in his brief and particularly at oral argu-
ment, is that the district court’s Rule 403 analysis was “boiler-
plate” and insufficient. A district court “must tread carefully
before admitting other act evidence.” United States v. Morgan,
929 F.3d 411, 428 (7th Cir. 2019). It must actually “engage in
Rule 403 balancing to determine whether the probative value
of the other-act evidence is substantially outweighed by the
risk of unfair prejudice.” United States v. Ferrell, 816 F.3d 433,
444 (7th Cir. 2015). Here, the experienced district court found

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No. 24-2495 27
that “[n]ext to the high probative value of the evidence, the
risks that [the photograph] will result in unfair prejudice, con-
fusion, or a minitrial appear minimal,” ECF No. 317, at 6, and
explained that “every piece of negative evidence does not cre-
ate undue prejudice under Rule 403,” Cui, 2024 WL 3848513,
at *15.
The district court’s balancing and ultimate admission of
the photograph was not an abuse of discretion. While “a ‘bare
bones’ recitation of Rule 403” can result in an abuse of discre-
tion, we decline to find that here, particularly as the district
court engaged in a thorough Rule 404(b) analysis twice before
moving to Rule 403—it analyzed the photograph in denying
Cui’s motion in limine and repeated that analysis in its post-
trial denial of Cui’s motion for a new trial. See United States v.
Adkins, 743 F.3d 176, 184 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[I]n this case, the
district court provided a sufficiently thorough analysis be-
cause it appears, in context, that the district court was relying
upon the reasons articulated in its 404(b) analysis.”). The pho-
tograph went to Cui’s state of mind, motive, and intent when
offering Burke the tax appeal work, permissible and relevant
uses of the photograph. “[I]ntent” is at the crux of liability un-
der § 666(a)(2) and Cui “contested” intent, Gomez, 763 F.3d at
857, so the photograph was especially probative. While per-
haps brief, the district court’s Rule 403 analysis, following its
thorough Rule 404(b) analysis, did not amount to an abuse of
discretion requiring a new trial. Jarigese, 999 F.3d at 470.
Moreover, any error is harmless. See Gomez, 763 F.3d at
863. Harmless error asks whether “in the mind of the average
juror, the prosecution’s case would have been significantly
less persuasive had the improper evidence been excluded.”
Id. (quoting United States v. Vargas, 689 F.3d 867, 875 (7th Cir.

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28 No. 24-2495
2012)). True, the photograph was probative, but, as discussed
at length, there was plenty of evidence from which the jury
could conclude that Cui intended to and did bribe Burke. Un-
der these circumstances, even if the district court erroneously
admitted the photoshopped photograph, its decision was
harmless.
D. Sentencing
Finally, we turn to Cui’s sentence. We review the substan-
tive “reasonableness” of the district court’s sentence for abuse
of discretion, Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007), its
“application of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines de novo,” and
the “underlying factual findings for clear error,” United States
v. Flores-Olague, 717 F.3d 526, 530 (7th Cir. 2013).
1. Obstruction of Justice
A district court applies a two-level offense enhancement
“[i]f (1) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or at-
tempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice
with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing
of the instant offense of conviction, and (2) the obstructive
conduct related to (A) the defendant’s offense of conviction
and any relevant conduct; or (B) a closely related offense.”
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Relevant here, Application Note 4 to § 3C1.1
provides a “non-exhaustive list” of covered conduct, includ-
ing “destroying or concealing or directing or procuring an-
other person to destroy or conceal evidence that is material to
an official investigation or judicial proceeding.” Failing to
comply with a grand jury subpoena, for example, can provide
the basis for a § 3C1.1 enhancement. See, e.g., United States v.
Powell, 576 F.3d 482, 498 (7th Cir. 2009).

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No. 24-2495 29
At sentencing, the district court applied the § 3C1.1 en-
hancement because it determined that Cui obstructed justice
when he failed to turn over two key emails to the government
following a grand jury subpoena. The district court explained
that Cui “was specifically asked for those emails, and he did
not turn them over.” ECF No. 538, at 23. It found Cui demon-
strated the specific intent to obstruct justice because Cui “un-
derstood how relevant those emails were,” id. (citation modi-
fied), and Cui exhibited “the proper mens rea” because, at the
time, his counsel told the government that “no communica-
tions are being withheld,” which “wasn’t really accurate” and
showed “his desire to keep those highly relevant emails away
from the government,” id.
We decline to disturb a § 3C1.1 enhancement when the
district court’s findings are “more than plausible.” United
States v. DeLeon, 603 F.3d 397, 404 (7th Cir. 2010). Cui withheld
two key emails directly responsive to a grand jury subpoena.
The district court’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous.
And those factual findings support concluding Cui exhibited
the specific intent to obstruct justice by withholding inculpa-
tory emails from the government. As such, the district court
appropriately enhanced Cui’s sentence under § 3C1.1.
2. Sentence Disparity
Section 3553(a)(6) requires courts consider “the need to
avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants
with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
conduct,” including “between co-defendants.” United States v.
Moore, 50 F.4th 597, 603 (7th Cir. 2022). The “best way” to
avoid disparities is to “follow the Guidelines.” United States v.
Bartlett, 567 F.3d 901, 908 (7th Cir. 2009). “[A] sentence within
or below a properly calculated Guidelines range necessarily

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30 No. 24-2495
complies with § 3553(a)(6).” United States v. Perez, 21 F.4th 490,
491 (7th Cir. 2021). Indeed, § 3553(a)(6) does not prohibit dis-
parities. Some are okay, even warranted. See Moore, 50 F.4th
at 606. “[T]he disparity provision ‘leaves plenty of room for
differences in sentences when warranted under the circum-
stances.’” United States v. Bridgewater, 950 F.3d 928, 936 (7th
Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Brown, 732 F.3d 781, 788
(7th Cir. 2013)). There are a “wide range of circumstances”
where a disparity is permitted. Jarigese, 999 F.3d at 474.
Cui contends the district court erred, pointing to the 8-
month disparity between his sentence and his co-defendant
Burke’s. But the mere existence of a sentencing disparity does
not alone provide a meritorious basis to challenge a sentence.
Rather, a district court errs by failing to appropriately con-
sider whether the disparity is warranted.
There was no error here. The district court’s sentence was
both substantively reasonable—Cui’s sentence is 19 months
below the low end of his Guidelines range—and the district
court properly considered the disparity it created, as
§ 3553(a)(6) requires. The court explained its rationale for
Cui’s and Burke’s sentences and why it decided the disparity
between the sentences was warranted. True, the jury con-
victed Burke on thirteen counts and Cui on five. But the dis-
trict court weighed factors such as Burke’s age and military
service as compared to Cui’s obstruction of justice and false
statements in finding the disparity justified. Cui’s sentence
was substantively reasonable and the disparity within the dis-
trict court’s discretion.

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No. 24-2495 31
* * *
The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.

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