Francisco Vazquez-Rodriguez v. PAMELA J. BONDI, Attorney General of the United States

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued November 4, 2025
Decided January 13, 2026
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2997
FRANCISCO VAZQUEZ-RODRIGUEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
PAMELA J. BONDI, Attorney General
of the United States,
Respondent.
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals.
No. A089-088-608
O R D E R
Francisco Vazquez-Rodriguez petitions for review of a decision by the Board of
Immigration Appeals. He argues the board erred when it dismissed his appeal from an
immigration judge’s order to deport him. We disagree and deny his petition.
Background
In 2010, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings
against Vazquez-Rodriguez. It did so by filing a notice to appear in immigration court
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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charging him with removability as an alien present in the United States without
admission or parole. The notice included the wrong address for Vazquez-Rodriguez
and omitted the date and time of his initial hearing. Vazquez-Rodriguez did not appear
at his initial hearing, and the immigration judge ordered his removal in absentia.
In 2013, Vazquez-Rodriguez moved to reopen the proceedings because the notice
listed the wrong address. He did not raise the date-and-time issue. An immigration
judge granted the motion. In these reopened proceedings Vazquez-Rodriguez conceded
he was removable because he entered the United States from Mexico illegally. But he
moved to cancel his deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D), arguing that, if he was
removed, his three U.S.-citizen children would face exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship. Vazquez-Rodriguez said his family would have to accompany him to Mexico
because he is the sole breadwinner. He said his children would struggle there because
English is their primary language. He worried about their safety because of persistent
crime, and their education because the town where he is from, and where his extended
family lives, does not have a high school. Vazquez-Rodriguez worried especially about
his middle child because she struggles with behavioral issues that had prompted a
school social worker to refer the child to a psychologist.
The immigration judge held Vazquez-Rodriguez was not eligible for cancelation
under section 1229b(b)(1)(D). The judge acknowledged that relocating Vazquez-
Rodriguez’s family would cause them hardship but concluded the hardship would not
be “substantially beyond that which is typically experienced when a family is removed
from the United States.” Vazquez-Rodriguez appealed to the Board of Immigration
Appeals. There he argued for the first time that the immigration court lacked
jurisdiction to hear his case because the original notice to appear did not include the
time and date of the hearing. He also argued the immigration judge erred in finding he
did not show exceptional and unusual hardship. The board disagreed and dismissed.
Discussion
Vazquez-Rodriguez argues the board erred in two ways by dismissing his
appeal.
First, Vazquez-Rodriguez argues the board erred in holding the immigration
judge had jurisdiction to deport him because his original notice to appear did not
provide a date and time for his initial hearing. No party disputes the notice to appear
omitted both the date and time of his initial hearing and that this violates 8 U.S.C.

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§ 1229(a)(1)(G)(i). But this non-jurisdictional error does not automatically divest an
immigration judge of authority.
“Our case law is clear that the statutory requirement that a [notice to appear]
include [date and time] information is a claim-processing rule, not a limit on our
jurisdiction.” Santiago Lopez v. Garland, 105 F.4th 907, 911 (7th Cir. 2024). Thus, “an
objection to a violation of the rule can be forfeited if not raised in a timely manner.” Id.
(citing Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956, 958 (7th Cir. 2019)). If a petitioner raises a
timely objection we must dismiss, Arreola-Ochoa v. Garland, 34 F.4th 603, 608 (7th Cir.
2022), and the government must start removal proceedings anew (if it wishes to
proceed with deportation and the petitioner remains deportable), see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(1)(B). We will excuse a petitioner’s tardy objection and dismiss anyway if the
petitioner “provide[s] an excuse for the delay” and “show[s] prejudice from the lack of
prompt information about time, place, or both.” Arreola-Ochoa, 34 F.4th at 608 (citing
Ortiz-Santiago, 924 F.3d at 965). We have held that asserting the objection for the first
time before the board is too late and results in forfeiture. Santiago Lopez, 105 F.4th at 911.
Vazquez-Rodriguez says he objected to the defective notice before the
immigration judge. But he cites nothing in the record showing that he raised this
objection, and we have found nothing to support his assertion. Rather, it appears he
raised this argument for the first time before the board, over a decade after proceedings
began, rendering his objection untimely. Vazquez-Rodriguez does not attempt to excuse
his untimeliness or explain whether he suffered prejudice from the defective notice.
Accordingly, we hold the board did not err in concluding he forfeited this argument.
Second, Vazquez-Rodriguez argues the board erred on the merits. He urges us to
hold he met his burden to show exceptional and extremely unusual hardship or,
alternatively, to remand for a new hardship hearing. Where, as here, the board agrees
with the immigration judge’s reasoning and adds its own, we review the immigration
judge’s decision “as supplemented by” the board’s. Juarez v. Holder, 599 F.3d 560, 564
(7th Cir. 2010).
We have limited jurisdiction over a petition for review of a board decision to
deny cancellation of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). But we do have jurisdiction to
review questions of law, id. § 1252(a)(2)(D), including those Vazquez-Rodriguez raises:
whether the board (1) correctly concluded Vazquez-Rodriguez did not show sufficient
hardship, Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 212 (2024); (2) applied the wrong legal
standard by failing to consider evidence in the aggregate, Cruz-Moyaho v. Holder, 703

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F.3d 991, 997 (7th Cir. 2012); and (3) ignored evidence, Iglesias v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 528,
531 (7th Cir. 2008).
That said, we do not apply de novo review to all these questions just because they
are “questions of law” for jurisdictional purposes. We review whether the undisputed
facts show “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”—a mixed question of law
and fact—for clear and unmistakable error. Santos Mendoza v. Bondi, 151 F.4th 900, 905
(7th Cir. 2025). And we review whether the immigration judge applied the wrong
standard or failed to consider evidence—pure legal questions—de novo. Bernardo-De La
Cruz v. Garland, 114 F.4th 883, 888 (7th Cir. 2024).
The immigration judge did not clearly and unmistakably err in holding Vazquez-
Rodriguez cannot show exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. “The requisite
hardship for this purpose must be ‘substantially different from, or beyond, that which
would be normally expected from the deportation of an alien with close family
members in the United States.’” Martinez-Baez v. Wilkinson, 986 F.3d 966, 975 (7th Cir.
2021) (quoting Cruz-Moyaho, 703 F.3d at 995). No doubt, Vazquez-Rodriguez’s family
will suffer hardship resulting from his deportation. But we, like the immigration judge
and the board, conclude it is hardship all too common for a family in removal
proceedings. Santos Mendoza, 151 F.4th at 906.
Nor is Vazquez-Rodriguez entitled to a new hardship hearing. Contrary to his
assertions, the immigration judge carefully reviewed all key evidence individually and
cumulatively. An immigration judge does not err “every time an item of evidence is not
explicitly considered or is described with imperfect accuracy[.]” Martinez-Baez, 986 F.3d
at 976. Instead, we reverse only when “facts important to the subtle determination of
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” have been “seriously mischaracterized[.]”
Id. (internal quotations omitted). The immigration judge did not mischaracterize key
facts, let alone seriously. After carefully walking through the evidence and testimony,
the judge considered it in the aggregate: “Even if not individually exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship, circumstances taken together may satisfy [petitioner’s]
burden.” The judge then considered the entire body of evidence and concluded
Vazquez-Rodriguez did not meet his burden. We agree with the board that the
immigration judge considered all key evidence and did so cumulatively.
* * *
For these reasons, we DENY the petition for review.

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