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23-1144•Gentian Shegaj v. PAMELA J. BONDI, Attorney General of the United States
23-1144Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit15.01.2026
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted December 9, 2025*
Decided January 15, 2026
Before
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-1144
GENTIAN SHEGAJ,
Petitioner,
v.
PAMELA J. BONDI, Attorney General
of the United States,
Respondent.
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals.
No. A099-345-915
O R D E R
Gentian Shegaj, an Albanian native and citizen, failed to comply with federal
regulations requiring he submit biometrics to support his applications for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”)
on penalty of dismissal. Shegaj challenges the dismissal of his applications on the basis
he lacked sufficient notice of the biometrics requirement in advance of his third merits
hearing. The Board of Immigration Appeals (the “Board”) acted within its discretion in
* We granted the petitioner’s unopposed motion to waive oral argument, and the
appeal is therefore submitted on the briefs and the record. F ED. R. APP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1
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No. 23-1144 Page 2
finding Shegaj received adequate notice, and Shegaj’s additional arguments are not
properly before us. We therefore deny Shegaj’s petition for review.
Shegaj claims he left Albania due to political persecution in 1996, and he entered
the United States in 2005. In 2006, he filed for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under CAT. Shegaj’s applications informed him of the biometrics
requirement, a central component of which constitutes Shegaj providing his
fingerprints. Before reaching this court, Shegaj proceeded through three merits
hearings, four master calendar hearings preparing him for those merits hearings, and
three appeals. Counsel represented Shegaj at all but one hearing.
After Shegaj submitted biometrics in 2006 as part of his initial applications, an
immigration judge (“IJ”) at a 2007 merits hearing denied his claims for relief. Shegaj
appealed, and the Board remanded on the basis that a transcription error precluded
review of the record. The IJ held another merits hearing, which again resulted in the
denial of Shegaj’s claims. The Board remanded again on the basis it lacked a complete
record for review, this time because the IJ cited a report absent from the record. After
Shegaj’s appearance without counsel at a hearing in 2012 led to a continuance, Shegaj
appeared with counsel at a March 2014 master calendar hearing to schedule his third
merits hearing. At several points in the proceedings up to this stage, the IJ and the
government provided Shegaj with notice and instructions surrounding the biometrics
requirement, including information that the government only deemed biometrics
current if they were submitted within roughly a year before any merits hearing. See
Yang v. Holder, 760 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2014) (recognizing this policy). Thus, Shegaj
would need to resubmit biometrics for successive merits hearings. The IJ set the third
merits hearing for 2018 and instructed Shegaj’s counsel to get Shegaj “printed” to
ensure he would have current biometrics.
Shegaj did not submit his biometrics in advance of his 2018 hearing. The IJ
deemed Shegaj’s applications abandoned, and denied his motion for a continuance. In
doing so, the IJ referenced 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(c) (2025), which provides that “[f]ailure to
… comply with the requirement[] to provide biometrics … constitutes abandonment of
the application and the immigration judge may enter an appropriate order dismissing
the application….” See also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(d). The IJ subsequently ordered Shegaj’s
removal. The Board affirmed the IJ and dismissed Shegaj’s appeal. Shegaj petitions for
our review.
We review an abandonment ruling for abuse of discretion. See Umezurike v.
Holder, 610 F.3d 997, 1002 (7th Cir. 2010); Juarez v. Holder, 599 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir.
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No. 23-1144 Page 3
2010). This review is “highly deferential” and “[u]nless the Board’s decision ‘was made
without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or
rested on an impermissible basis,’ we will deny the petition for review.” Umezurike, 610
F.3d at 1002 (citations omitted). Where, as here, “the Board ‘adopted the view of the IJ
and affirmed with additional analysis, we review both opinions.’” See Mateo-Mateo v.
Garland, 124 F.4th 470, 474 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting Osorio-Morales v. Garland, 72 F.4th
738, 741 (7th Cir. 2023)).
Shegaj argues that the IJ and Board abused their discretion in finding his
applications abandoned because he did not receive adequate notice under 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.47(d) and Matter of D-M-C-P-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 644, 648–49 (BIA 2015), an
argument he makes by focusing on the oral instructions from his 2014 hearing. As the
Board noted, however, this argument ignores the ample notice Shegaj received in light
of “the entire record.” This notice includes a disclaimer on Shegaj’s applications for
relief, two written orders from the IJ describing the biometrics requirement and the
consequences of his failure to comply with it, as well as two written forms from the
Department of Homeland Security providing similar information alongside instructions
on how Shegaj could submit his biometrics. Moreover, two of his prior hearings before
the IJ included substantive discussions on submitting biometrics and Shegaj previously
complied with this requirement. Finally, the IJ orally reiterated the biometrics
requirement at the 2014 hearing. The Board, in concluding this record rebutted Shegaj’s
claim that he lacked adequate notice of the biometrics requirement, did not abuse its
discretion. See Umezurike, 610 F.3d at 1003 (“It clearly was not an abuse of discretion for
the immigration judge to find that Umezurike had not supplied good cause for failing
to present fingerprint data despite having three warnings that he needed to comply,
and two-and-a-half years in which to do so.”).
In his brief to this court, Shegaj argues that the entire record of notice “does not
amount to adequate notification under the … regulations” because the IJ had an
“independent duty” at the 2014 hearing to provide each of the forms of notice described
in Matter of D-M-C-P- and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(d). “A court may review a final order of
removal only if the applicant first exhausts ‘“all administrative remedies available to the
alien as of right,” and … this includes the obligation first to present to the Board any
arguments that lie within its power to address.’” Munoz-Rivera v. Garland, 81 F.4th 681,
687 (7th Cir. 2023) (quoting Issaq v. Holder, 617 F.3d 962, 968 (7th Cir. 2010)); see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(d)(1). To exhaust an argument, the petitioner must make it “specifically” and
provide “enough detail to put the Board on notice that the petitioner is trying to
challenge the immigration judge’s decision based on that argument.” Munoz-Rivera, 81
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No. 23-1144 Page 4
F.4th at 687–88 (citing Kithongo v. Garland, 33 F.4th 451, 458 (7th Cir. 2022)). “It is not
enough that the new argument bears some relation to the evidentiary record.” Id. at 688
(quoting Nyandwi v. Garland, 15 F.4th 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2021)).
We do not reach the merits of Shegaj’s “independent duty” argument because he
did not raise it before the Board. Shegaj never claimed below that the notice
requirements under § 1003.47(d) and Matter of D-M-C-P- apply anew each time an
applicant must update his biometrics, without regard to prior notice.
Shegaj raises two additional arguments. First, he claims that federal regulations
obligate the IJ to provide him a specific appointment at which he can submit his
fingerprints. But see Mejia-Velasquez v. Garland, 26 F.4th 193, 201 (4th Cir. 2022) (rejecting
that proposition). Second, he argues that the IJ erred in denying his motion for a
continuance on the basis he showed good cause for his failure to submit his biometrics.
Shegaj, however, raised neither argument before the Board. Thus, they are not properly
before us.
For the reasons discussed, we DENY Shegaj’s petition for review.
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