Albert Thomas v. Chicago Teachers’ Pension Fund

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued December 10, 2025
Decided January 21, 2026
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Chief Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
Nos. 25-1623 & 25-1818
ALBERT THOMAS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CHICAGO TEACHERS’ PENSION
FUND,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeals from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 1:21-cv-01844
Sharon Johnson Coleman,
Judge.
O R D E R
Albert Thomas worked as a Senior Accountant for the Chicago Teachers’ Pension
Fund (“the Fund”) from 2015 to 2022. He sued the Fund, alleging he was denied
promotion and a pay raise because of race-, age-, and sex-discrimination. The district
court dismissed his suit. Thomas appealed and this court affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded some of his claims. After the pleadings were updated and
discovery took place, the Fund moved for summary judgment, which the district court
granted. Asserting this was error, Thomas again appeals, but we affirm.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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Nos. 25-1623 & 25-1818 Page 2
Background
Because we are reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we recount the facts in
the light most favorable to the nonmovant, Thomas. See Thompson v. Holm, 809 F.3d 376,
378 (7th Cir. 2016).
Thomas, an African American man born in June 1956, worked as a Senior
Accountant at the Fund beginning in March 2015. Assigned to the Reporting Team,
Thomas handled monthly and annual financial reports and managed banking and
health insurance benefit payment reconciliations.
Between 2017 and 2019, Thomas was supervised by Michael Aguilar, who left the
Fund in November 2019 but returned in mid-2021. Thomas alleges that in 2018, Aguilar
called him the n-word while no one else was present. Aguilar denies the allegation, and
no other Fund employee testified ever hearing Aguilar use the racial epithet. Thomas
did not report this alleged incident to the Fund’s Human Resources unit, nor could he
recall whether he reported it as part of other internal complaints he made.
In July 2018, Thomas was formally disciplined for poor work performance. Then
in 2019 he applied for promotion to the position of Manager of Accounting Operations
at the Fund. An African American woman was selected for the position instead of him.
Thomas later applied for the same position two other times. In February 2020, he was
not offered an interview, and in January 2021, he applied but Michael Aguilar was
rehired for the position (the name of which had changed).
Sometime in January 2022, Thomas’s supervisors met with him to listen to his
concerns about Aguilar’s directions on internal accounting controls on bank
reconciliations. The next month the Fund placed Thomas on a thirty-day paid
suspension for failing to timely and accurately complete bank reconciliations. Following
his suspension, Thomas was granted a leave of absence pursuant to the Family Medical
Leave Act (“FMLA”). Upon his return from leave in July 2022, Thomas was assigned to
work on outstanding health insurance reconciliations. In August 2022, Thomas’s
employment was terminated for failure to timely complete assignments.
Thomas sued the Fund in April 2021, alleging a variety of discrimination claims,
including under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq., and the
Illinois Human Rights Act (“IHRA”), 775 ILCS 5, et seq. In November 2021, the district
court granted the Fund’s motion to dismiss all of Thomas’s claims.
Thomas appealed. In a December 6, 2022 Order, we affirmed in part, vacated in
part, and remanded this case to the district court. Several of Thomas’s claims, including

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Nos. 25-1623 & 25-1818 Page 3
alleged sex-discrimination, were time-barred because Thomas’s charge of
discrimination—which was required to exhaust his administrative remedies before
suit—did not cover specific claims in his amended complaint. But we also ruled that
Thomas could proceed on certain race- and age-discrimination claims based on his
February 2020 failure to promote claim and his failure to receive a pay raise claim.
On remand, the operative pleading was Thomas’s Third Amended Complaint
against the Fund, which alleged race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title
VII and the IHRA, and age discrimination in violation of the ADEA and the IHRA. In
July 2024, after the parties engaged in discovery, the district court set a briefing
schedule for dispositive motions. The Fund moved for summary judgment, which
Thomas opposed. The district court granted the Fund summary judgment on all counts
in March 2025. Thomas moved to reconsider, but the district court struck the motion for
failure to follow Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 5.3 and the district judge’s
standing order requiring that there be notice of the motion’s presentment. The district
court also entered an order taxing Thomas with $3,253.40 of the Fund’s costs. Thomas
appeals.
District Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order
The district court’s consideration of the Fund’s summary judgment motion began
with procedural deficiencies in Thomas’s filings under Northern District of Illinois
Local Rule 56.1. That rule sets the requirements for litigation of a summary judgment
motion. The movant is to file “a statement of material facts … that attaches the cited
evidentiary material.” Id. at (a)(2). The nonmovant is to file a response to the movant’s
statement of material facts “that attaches any cited evidentiary material not attached to
the [movant’s] statement [of material facts].” Id. at (b)(2). In responding, the nonmovant
must admit, dispute, or admit in part and dispute in part the asserted facts. Id. at (e)(2).
A response is not to set forth any new facts, that is “facts that are not fairly responsive
to the asserted fact to which the response is made.” Id. If the nonmovant wants to assert
a new fact non-responsive to the movant’s asserted facts, the nonmovant can file a
statement of additional material facts. Id. at (b)(3). That statement is to attach any cited
evidentiary material not attached in the statement filed under Local Rule 56.1(a)(2) or in
the Local Rule 56.1(b)(2) response.
Local Rule 56.1 proved to be the undoing of Thomas’s case in the district court.
The Fund’s reply brief identified that several of his responses did not adhere to the
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Local Rule 56.1. The district
court agreed with the Fund. Thomas admitted to many of the Fund’s material
statements, but in violation of Local Rule 56.1(b)(3), he also improperly provided
additional information in his responses. This resulted in the court striking many of

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Nos. 25-1623 & 25-1818 Page 4
Thomas’s responses, which meant that the Fund’s material statements were deemed
admitted. In violation of Local Rule 56.1(e)(3), Thomas failed to attach evidentiary
material to dispute another of the Fund’s material statements, which was deemed
uncontested and admitted in full. Two of Thomas’s responses relied on inadmissible
hearsay (in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(2)), so those Fund
statements were deemed admitted. Thomas further attempted to submit additional
material facts without following Local Rule 56.1(b)(3) and (d), so those were stricken.
The resulting undisputed facts, per the district court, could be summarized in
just a few pages. Those facts included Thomas’s race, the job he held at the Fund, who
his supervisors were, descriptions of his job applications, who was placed in those jobs,
and their credentials. The undisputed facts also noted that Thomas alleged race
discrimination by Aguilar for allegedly using the n-word, and they surveyed Thomas’s
performance reviews, which led to his suspension and ultimately his termination.
Based on the record before it, the district court dismissed Thomas’s IHRA claims
because he failed to include evidence that he had exhausted his administrative
remedies. The district court also granted the Fund summary judgment on Thomas’s
race- and age-discrimination claims and his claim of retaliation because the undisputed
facts showed that Thomas’s job performance did not meet the Fund’s legitimate
expectations to sufficiently prove his claims.
We review summary judgment decisions de novo, resolving “factual disputes in
[the nonmovant’s] favor and granting him the benefit of all reasonable inferences that
may be drawn from the evidentiary record.” Adams v. Reagle, 91 F.4th 880, 887 (7th Cir.
2024). The “movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law” upon a showing “that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.” F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(a).
Discussion
In this successive appeal, Thomas argues that he should be allowed to proceed to
a jury trial on his various claims. Whether he was qualified to perform his job is a
genuine question of material fact, which he submits cannot be disregarded just because
the local rules were not followed. Thomas maintains that a procedural issue should not
result in a case being dismissed on its merits when there is a genuine dispute of facts.
Thomas argues there is evidence of pretext—the person who was promoted over him is
the same person who purportedly called him the n-word. And Thomas was chosen to
train those who were selected over him for the Manager of Accounting Operations
position because they did not know the job. Thomas can understand summary
judgment being granted to the Fund if there was no evidence in support of his claims.
But that is not the case here, he asserts, so Thomas submits that the Fund in effect has
been granted default judgment.

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Nos. 25-1623 & 25-1818 Page 5
The Fund responds that Thomas’s poor job performance was a legitimate reason
for its decisions not to promote him, to suspend him, and ultimately to terminate his
employment. According to the Fund, the district court did not abuse its discretion in its
application of the local rules, including as to summary judgment practice and requiring
notice of presentment of the motion for reconsideration, as well as in its award of costs
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54.
First, we consider the district court’s application of Local Rule 56.1 to the
summary judgment submissions, which we review for abuse of discretion. Igasaki v. Ill.
Dep’t of Fin. & Pro. Regul., 988 F.3d 948, 956–57 (7th Cir. 2021); Curtis v. Costco Wholesale
Corp., 807 F.3d 215, 218–19 (7th Cir. 2015).
Evaluation of Thomas’s responses to the Fund’s statement of material facts bears
out the district court’s decisions. In its memorandum opinion and order, the court
supplied reasons for its decisions, which accurately tracked the local rule’s
requirements. At various points in his submissions, Thomas inserted additional non-
responsive facts, did not attach evidentiary material, relied on hearsay, and failed to
properly submit additional material facts. So, the district court was well within its
discretion to deem the Fund’s material statements admitted and to strike Thomas’s
responses. Because Local Rule 56.1 was properly applied to the parties’ submissions, the
district court did not abuse its discretion.
“The purpose of Rule 56.1 is to have the litigants present to the district court a
clear, concise list of material facts that are central to the summary judgment
determination.” Curtis, 807 F.3d at 219. Thomas incorrectly asks us to ignore the local
rule. “Compliance with local rules like Rule 56.1 ensures the facts material to the issues
in the case and the evidence supporting such facts are clearly organized and presented
for the court’s summary judgment determination.” Id. That is precisely what occurred
here. The roll of undisputed facts the district court gleaned from the record was shaped
by the parties’ submissions, followed by the district court’s correct application of Local
Rule 56.1.
Given the four-plus year duration of this case, its extensive discovery, the
parties’ broad summary judgment filings, and the district court’s close review of their
submissions, Thomas cannot correctly claim that a “default judgment” has been entered
against him.
Second, we review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the
Fund. Thomas has advanced claims of race discrimination (Count I), age discrimination
(Count III), and retaliation (Count V). To survive an employer’s summary judgment
motion on those claims, an employee’s job performance must meet the employer’s

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Nos. 25-1623 & 25-1818 Page 6
legitimate expectations. That is the case whether the undisputed facts are considered
under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802 (1973) (to determine whether a discrimination claim should survive when there is
no direct evidence), or the alternative approach of Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d
760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016) (to consider whether a reasonable factfinder would conclude
that the plaintiff’s protected characteristic caused the complained-of adverse
employment action).
Examination of the undisputed facts found by the district court show that
Thomas’s performance at work did not satisfy the “legitimate expectations” standard.
He was formally disciplined in July 2018 for poor work, and his performance gradually
declined between 2021 and 2022. Thomas began to argue with his supervisor Aguilar
about how to perform bank reconciliations in late 2021, which delayed his work. In 2021
and 2022, Thomas consistently failed to complete these reconciliations on time or
accurately. In January 2022, he met with Fund leadership, who instructed Thomas that
he must listen to Aguilar and complete his work. Still, Thomas continued to argue with
Aguilar and failed to finish his assignments. He was suspended for thirty days.
Following his suspension, Thomas applied for and was granted a leave of absence
under the FMLA. He returned to work on July 9, 2022 and was assigned outstanding
health insurance reconciliations. Thomas continued to fail to complete his work
responsibilities on time and to be insubordinate, so he was terminated.
These facts show that Thomas failed to meet the Fund’s legitimate expectations
of a Senior Accountant in his position. Therefore, the district court correctly concluded
that Thomas failed at the second prong of the McDonnell Douglas test of proving a prima
facie case for discrimination or a retaliation claim, and that his claims did not survive the
Ortiz standard. Indeed, Thomas does not argue that the record evidence shows that his
work met the Fund’s legitimate expectations. Rather, he submits the district court did
not consider evidence it should have as to his work performance. But for the reasons
relayed above, the district court properly decided the scope of the undisputed facts
based on the parties’ submissions.1
1 On appeal, Thomas does not dispute the district court’s finding that he did not exhaust
administrative remedies under the IHRA. He has thus waived any argument on the
district court’s dismissal of Counts II, IV, and VI of his Third Amended Complaint.
Bradley v. Village of University Park, Illinois, 59 F.4th 887, 897 (7th Cir. 2023) (“An
appellant may waive a non-jurisdictional issue or argument . . . by failing to raise it at
all in the party’s opening brief.”).

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Nos. 25-1623 & 25-1818 Page 7
Two final items: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) allows a party to move to
alter or amend a judgment within 28 days of entry. Northern District of Illinois Local
Rule 5.3, “Review of Judge’s Procedures and Notice of Motions and Objections,”
requires parties to consult the procedures on filing and presenting motions of the judge
to whom a case is assigned. That local rule also provides that a judge may require that a
motion be accompanied by a notice of presentment, specifying the date and time at
which a motion is to be heard. The district judge’s standing order here requires that all
motions must be noticed for presentment pursuant to Local Rule 5.3.
Thomas moved to reconsider the grant of summary judgment to the Fund, but
failed to comply with Local Rule 5.3 when doing so. Accordingly, the district court
declined to hear his motion to reconsider. That court did not abuse its discretion in
doing so. There was no selective invocation of this local rule, as the Fund’s motions
were filed in compliance with it, and the district court heard and resolved those
motions. And the examples Thomas cites in support of his position that the presentment
requirement need not be followed involved different judicial officials than here.
Finally, Thomas objects to the district court taxing $3,253.40 under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 54 for the Fund’s costs of eleven deposition transcripts. Review of
such a decision is for an abuse of discretion. Lauth v. Covance, Inc., 863 F.3d 708, 718 (7th
Cir. 2017). “The proper inquiry is whether the deposition was ‘reasonably necessary’ to
the case at the time it was taken, not whether it was used in a motion or in court.” Cengr
v. Fusibond Piping Sys., Inc., 135 F.3d 445, 455 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Finchum v. Ford
Motor Co., 57 F.3d 526, 534 (1995). Contrary to Thomas’s contention, these transcripts
meet that requirement. Ten of the eleven depositions were noticed by Thomas, and the
eleventh was of Thomas himself. Therefore, we see no abuse of discretion in the district
court’s decision to award costs.
A FFIRMED.

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