Marcus L. Peck v. FIRST TECHNOLOGY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION and AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC.

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 27, 2026*
Decided February 3, 2026
Before
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 25-2360
MARCUS L. PECK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
FIRST TECHNOLOGY FEDERAL
CREDIT UNION and AMERICAN
INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:25-cv-00236-TWP-TAB
Tanya Walton Pratt,
Judge.
O R D E R
Marcus Peck sued First Technology Federal Credit Union for violating federal
consumer-protection statutes when it allegedly collected his debt in satisfaction of a
state court’s garnishment order. The district court dismissed the suit under the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
* The appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this appeal. After
examining the appellant’s brief and the record, we have concluded that the case is appropriate for
summary disposition. See F ED . R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 25-2360 Page 2
263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). But because Peck
does not seek review and rejection of the state court’s garnishment order, we vacate the
judgment and remand for further proceedings.
This case arises out of proceedings that originated in Indiana state court, of
which we take judicial notice. Ewell v. Toney, 853 F.3d 911, 917 (7th Cir. 2017). In 2023,
First Technology sued Peck in Indiana state court for credit-card debt, plus interest. The
state trial court ruled in First Technology’s favor and ordered that Peck’s wages,
commissions, and income could be garnished to fulfill an unsatisfied balance of
$40,275.03, plus postjudgment interest. See First Tech. Fed. Credit Union v. Peck, No.
32D05-2310-CC-001703 (Ind. Super. Ct. Feb. 14, 2024).
Nearly a year later, Peck sued First Technology and American International
Group (which he presumes to be acting as First Technology’s liability carrier) in federal
court for alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), see 15
U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1)–(2), and the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), see 15 U.S.C. § 1601. He
alleged that he had not been notified of the state court’s proceedings nor informed why
his funds had been garnished. He alleged further that he wrote First Technology to
dispute the garnishment and that the company failed to provide accurate loan
information, explain discrepancies in the debt calculation, and validate the debt with
supporting documentation. He sought declaratory relief to suspend the garnishment
actions and require the defendants to validate the debt and correct computational
errors.
The court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and dismissed
it, determining that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprived it of jurisdiction to review the
state court’s debt-collection and garnishment proceedings. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine
imposes a jurisdictional bar if “a plaintiff seeks relief from a federal court that would
reverse a state court judgment.” Gilbank v. Wood Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 111 F. 4th
754, 794 (7th Cir. 2024) (en banc) (holding set forth in Part I of opinion by Kirsch, J.), cert.
denied, 145 S. Ct. 1167 (2025). Even though Peck specifically challenged the validity of
First Technology’s debt under the FDCPA and TILA, the court explained, those claims
were still barred under Rooker-Feldman because those challenges were “inextricably
intertwined” with the state court’s garnishment determinations. Or stated differently,
“Defendants’ alleged violations of the FDCPA or TILA did not cause any loss
independent of the Garnishment Action. If Peck wishes to challenge the validity of First
Technology’s debt, he must do so in state court.” Order of 4/10/2025 (citing Harold v.
Steel, 773 F.3d 884, 887 (7th Cir. 2014) and Mains v. Citibank N.A., 852 F.3d 669, 678

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No. 25-2360 Page 3
(7th Cir. 2017)). The court invited Peck to amend his complaint and show cause why the
case should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Peck amended his complaint and clarified that he challenged not the merits of
the garnishment order itself but the defendants’ “unlawful debt collection conduct”
after the order was entered. After entry of that order, he alleged, the defendants
violated the FDCPA and TILA when they collected additional funds from his account
“beyond the scope authorized by the garnishment order.” More specifically, he alleged
that the defendants violated the FDCPA by failing to validate the debt, misrepresenting
the amount of the debt, and engaging in deceptive postjudgment collection. He also
alleged that the defendants violated the TILA by failing to provide accurate disclosures
about his rights and payment obligations; to correct false information; and to disclose
postjudgment interest, collection fees, and calculation methods in periodic statements.
He replaced his request for declaratory relief with a request for actual and statutory
damages for violations of the FDCPA and TILA, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692k(a)(1)–(2), 1640, as
well as a declaratory judgment that First Technology violated federal consumer-
protection laws by engaging in deceptive postjudgment collections practices.
The court stood by its prior rulings, stating that the alleged debt-collection
misconduct could not be separated from the state court’s garnishment-action orders.
Because Peck could not cure the deficiencies of his complaint, the court dismissed the
action for lack of jurisdiction and entered final judgment accordingly.
On appeal, Peck challenges the district court’s Rooker-Feldman analysis on
grounds that his FDCPA and TILA claims are independent and distinct of the state
court garnishment judgment. He argues that his federal claims arise from “continued
false reporting, post-judgment collection, and unconstitutional enforcement processes,
not the original [state court] judgment itself.”
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only when (1) the federal plaintiff is a state-
court loser, (2) the state court’s judgment became final before the federal proceedings
began, (3) the state court’s judgment caused the injury underlying the federal claim, and
(4) the claim invites a federal court to review and reject the state court’s judgment.
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); see also Gilbank,
111 F.4th at 766 (adding as a fifth element that the state-court loser did not have a
reasonable opportunity to raise the federal issue in state court). Relevant here is the
fourth—“review and reject”—element, which means that the plaintiff asks the federal

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No. 25-2360 Page 4
court to overturn, reverse, or undo the state-court judgment. See Gilbank, 111 F.4th at 795
(holding set forth in Part I of opinion by Kirsch, J.).
If we construe Peck’s filings liberally, as we must, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007), he does not seek the review and rejection of the state court’s garnishment
order. Rather, he asserts in his amended complaint, he wants “redress for independent
and unauthorized post-judgment debt collection misconduct by the Defendants . . .
unlawful acts and omissions that occurred after the entry of the state garnishment
order, and which were neither authorized by the court nor judicially reviewable prior to
this action.” To the extent he alleges that his injuries are separate from the garnishment
order, arising from “deceptive post-judgment collection” and “ongoing account
servicing,” the relief he seeks would not undo or overturn the state court’s judgment.
See Gilbank, 111 F.4th at 795. As such, these claims are not barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine.
The two FDCPA cases relied upon by the district court—Harold v. Steel, 773 F.3d
884 (7th Cir. 2014), and Mains v. Citibank, N.A., 852 F.3d 669 (7th Cir. 2017)—are
distinguishable in that the federal claims there concerned actions that occurred pre-
judgment and likely influenced the state court’s order. See Harold, 773 F.3d at 885–87
(Rooker-Feldman barred judgment debtor’s claim that debt collector made false
statements during a statement garnishment proceeding regarding judgment creditor’s
identity); Mains, 852 F.3d at 676 (Rooker-Feldman barred mortgagor’s claims against
mortgagee and predecessor that were based on allegation that Indiana state court’s
foreclosure judgment erroneously rested on fraud perpetrated by defendants); Here,
Peck challenges not First Technology’s entitlement to garnish his wages but rather its
collection methods and allegedly deceptive postjudgment communications.1
For these reasons, we VACATE the district court’s judgment and REMAND the
case for further proceedings.
1 The district court analyzed whether Peck’s injuries were “inextricably intertwined” with state
court determinations, but “we should no longer rely on the ‘inextricably intertwined’ language that has
contributed to confusion in applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” Gilbank, 111 F.4th at 761, 767 n.5.

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