in R E : Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation Carina Ventures LLC v. Pilgrim’ S Pride Corporation

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-1110
IN R E : BROILER CHICKEN A NTITRUST LITIGATION
C ARINA VENTURES LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
P ILGRIM’ S P RIDE C ORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:16-cv-08637 — Thomas M. Durkin, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED NOVEMBER 13, 2025 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 5, 2026
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK , HAMILTON, and MALDONADO,
Circuit Judges.
HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. This appeal from a broader anti-
trust action asks whether two parties’ settlement negotiations
produced a binding agreement in the absence of a formal, in-
tegrated, and signed writing that the parties contemplated.
The parties agreed here, at least in principle, that one plaintiff

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2 No. 25-1110
would release its antitrust claims against one defendant in
three cases in return for $50 million. But other terms were not
agreed upon at the time of the critical exchange that ended
with an email saying “We accept.”
If material terms—terms either party deems essential—are
left open to future negotiations, an initial agreement in prin-
ciple cannot be binding for an entirely executory contract like
this proposed settlement agreement. See Ocean Atlantic Dev.
Corp. v. Aurora Christian Schools, Inc., 322 F.3d 983, 1000–01
(7th Cir. 2003); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 34 cmt. c
(1981) (contract is not enforceable before “preliminary mani-
festations” become definite terms).
This appeal turns on whether several terms left open at the
time of the “We accept” email were material. Undisputed
facts show that the parties treated those terms as material, and
the open terms directly affected the value of the exchange at
the heart of the proposed settlement. We therefore reverse the
summary judgment in favor of defendant that was granted on
the theory that the parties had in fact settled plaintiff’s claims
in this case. See generally Abbott Laboratories v. Alpha Therapeu-
tic Corp., 164 F.3d 385, 389 (7th Cir. 1999); Empro Mfg. Co. v.
Ball-Co Mfg., Inc., 870 F.2d 423, 426 (7th Cir. 1989).
I. Factual and Procedural Background
A. The “Broilers” Litigation
This contract dispute is an offshoot from a much larger
multidistrict antitrust action alleging price-fixing in sales of
broiler chickens. In September 2016, commercial and individ-
ual chicken purchasers filed suit alleging that industrial
chicken producers conspired to raise broiler chicken prices.
See In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 772,

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No. 25-1110 3
779–87 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (summarizing history of Broilers litiga-
tion). Two parallel class actions in the pork and beef industries
are pending in the District of Minnesota. See In re Pork Anti-
trust Litig., No. 18-cv-01776 (D. Minn.); In re Cattle & Beef An-
titrust Litig., No. 22-md-03031 (D. Minn.).
Defendant-appellee Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation is a
global producer and supplier of meat products, including
broiler chickens. It is a defendant in all three cases. Sysco Cor-
poration, the original plaintiff in this dispute, buys chicken,
beef, and pork from Pilgrim’s and was a plaintiff in all three
cases. Complicating matters, Sysco obtained litigation fund-
ing from Burford Capital. One condition of that funding was
that Sysco “shall not accept a settlement offer without [Bur-
ford Capital’s] prior written consent, which shall not be un-
reasonably withheld.”1
Early in the Broilers antitrust case, Pilgrim’s and many
other defendants entered into a “Judgment Sharing Agree-
ment,” which was a response to the joint and several liability
that can apply to all conspirators under antitrust law. See, e.g.,
In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1257 (7th Cir.
1980). This agreement allows a Broilers defendant to settle
with a plaintiff so as to escape possible joint and several lia-
bility for that plaintiff’s claims against other defendants that
succeed in the future. To gain that benefit, a settlement must
be “qualified” under the Judgment Sharing Agreement.
1 This funding agreement and other documents and briefs are under
seal in the district court. All references to such documents in this opinion
draw only from the parties’ appellate briefs, which are not sealed, and
from the public versions of documents filed in the district court.

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4 No. 25-1110
To be qualified under the Judgment Sharing Agreement, a
settling plaintiff must agree to subtract damages stemming
from its purchases with the settling defendant in any later set-
tlements with or judgments against other defendants. Partic-
ularly relevant here, to qualify under the Judgment Sharing
Agreement, a settling defendant must provide written notice
of its settlement to other Judgment Sharing Agreement de-
fendants within seven days after executing that settlement.
Pilgrim’s is a party to the Judgment Sharing Agreement.
B. Settlement Efforts
Pilgrim’s and Sysco began settlement discussions in April
2021. Most communications were between Sysco associate
general counsel Barrett Flynn and Pilgrim’s corporate counsel
Ted Sangalis. Pilgrim’s made offers in May and November
2021. Both offers attached certain amounts to Sysco’s claims
in each of the markets—at that time, only Broilers and Pork—
and were conditioned on the full release of Sysco’s claims. The
November 2021 offer was expressly contingent upon any set-
tlement complying with the Judgment Sharing Agreement.
Sysco rejected both offers.
In early 2022, the parties tried to mediate their Broilers dis-
pute and exchanged their relevant sales data. Pilgrim’s said it
would move forward using Sysco’s sales numbers, subject to
any assignments of Sysco’s claims to third parties. In June
2022, Sysco made its first offer for global settlement of its
chicken, beef, and pork claims. Sysco’s offer allocated
amounts among the three cases and contemplated the draft-
ing of a formal settlement release in the following weeks. Pil-
grim’s countered with its own global settlement offer, also
with amounts allocated among the three cases, subject to

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No. 25-1110 5
obtaining Sysco’s assignment data for each case. The parties
could not agree on an overall dollar amount.
Then we get to the events at the center of this appeal. On
August 24, 2022, Flynn and Sangalis spoke on the phone. They
ended the call having reached an agreement, at least in prin-
ciple, for Sysco to release its Broilers, Beef, and Pork claims for
a total of $50 million. Following the call, Sangalis sent two
emails to Flynn. First, later on August 24, Sangalis wrote: “We
have a deal at $50M for settlement of Broilers, Pork, and Beef
antitrust cases. Let me know the assignments in each case
(prioritizing Broilers), and we will figure out the allocation
and draw up the agreements.” The next day, on August 25,
Sangalis wrote Flynn again: “As discussed, I am confirming
that JBS and Pilgrim’s are offering $50M for a global settle-
ment of Broilers, Pork, and Beef antitrust cases.” On Septem-
ber 9, Flynn responded “We accept,” and he requested that
both parties’ outside counsel connect “to work on the re-
lease.” Sangalis answered: “Before we draft the releases, can
you confirm the assignments in Broilers?”
This email exchange does not indicate agreement on any
terms other than $50 million and releases of claims in all three
cases. The parties disagree about which other terms had been
agreed upon up to that point. Flynn testified that the $50 mil-
lion agreement was an agreement in principle but was still
subject to negotiation and mutual assent to other material
terms and execution of a formal agreement. Flynn Decl. ¶ 8.
Flynn said further that Pilgrim’s did not communicate to him
until two months later, in November 2022, that it needed the
settlement agreement to be qualified under the Judgment
Sharing Agreement. Id. at ¶ 10. Sangalis testified, however,
that he and Flynn had agreed orally that any settlement

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6 No. 25-1110
agreement would be “qualified” under the Judgment Sharing
Agreement. Sangalis Decl. ¶ 17. Sangalis also testified that he
and Flynn agreed in their phone call that the settlement would
contain a “most favored nation” clause with language exclud-
ing certain categories of restaurants. Id.
Later communications between the parties show that ne-
gotiations continued on the following terms: assignments, al-
locations, a “most favored nation” clause, and Judgment
Sharing Agreement compliance. Assignments were the
amounts of Sysco’s claims that it had assigned to other par-
ties. Allocations were the percentages of the total settlement
sum for each of the three chicken, beef, and pork cases based
on the parties’ valuation of each category of claims. The “most
favored nation” clause would allow Sysco to recover addi-
tional money from Pilgrim’s if Pilgrim’s later settled on more
generous terms with similarly situated Broilers plaintiffs. Pil-
grim’s would also have had to pay more money to plaintiffs
it had settled with earlier if the Sysco agreement turned out to
be more generous to Sysco than the earlier settlements. Judg-
ment Sharing Agreement compliance would require a written
agreement in which Sysco agreed to waive joint and several
liability against Pilgrim’s in any future settlements with or
judgments against other Broilers defendants.
After Flynn’s “We accept” email on September 9, 2022, Pil-
grim’s took the first stab at drafting a settlement agreement.
Pilgrim’s asked Sysco to send its Broilers assignment data to
Pilgrim’s before it drafted the agreement. After Flynn sent the
requested Broilers data, Sangalis also asked for assignment
data for the Beef and Pork cases. The negotiators went back
and forth about how to estimate the assignments of those
claims based on the Broilers data as Flynn searched internally

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No. 25-1110 7
for the Beef and Pork data. Two weeks later, Sangalis informed
Flynn that the drafted agreements were almost ready for cir-
culation and that he was waiting for an internal decision
about the allocations among the three cases.
Sangalis sent Pilgrim’s first drafts of the settlement agree-
ments to Sysco on October 7, 2022, noting that the allocations
in the agreements were not final and again asking for the as-
signment data for the Beef and Pork cases. That draft, like all
drafts that would follow, contained an integration clause in
which both parties agreed to refrain from bringing any claim
based on an alleged agreement relating to this settlement
agreement that was not in writing and signed by both parties.
Flynn responded that the draft did not have a “most favored
nation” clause and that Sysco required that clause be added.
Sangalis then sent back a new Broilers draft agreement includ-
ing a “most favored nation” clause. While Sysco awaited re-
view of the draft from its outside counsel, Sangalis asked
Flynn if he could also review the draft and return comments
promptly, noting that Pilgrim’s accounting department had
been pressuring Sangalis to fully complete the deal.
In November 2022, the parties exchanged further drafts.
These included edits to the “most favored nation” and Judg-
ment Sharing Agreement clauses and definitions. Most strik-
ing for purposes of this appeal, Pilgrim’s outside counsel sent
an email to Flynn and Sysco’s outside counsel threatening to
walk away from the settlement in late November in response
to Sysco’s proposed edits narrowing the Judgment Sharing
Agreement clause. Pilgrim’s outside counsel also insisted that
the proposed settlement ratio in the draft, a key factor in the
“most favored nation” clause, was not final without confirma-
tion of Sysco’s assignment data.

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8 No. 25-1110
After all of these continuing negotiations, in early Decem-
ber 2022, Sysco sent revised drafts to Pilgrim’s, and Pilgrim’s
asked Sysco to move forward with executing and finalizing
the settlement.
C. Burford Intervention
In December, Burford Capital asserted its right under its
agreement with Sysco to withhold its consent to this settle-
ment. After the August 2022 phone call between Sangalis and
Flynn, Sysco informed Burford of its discussion with Pil-
grim’s, characterizing the call and later communication as a
global settlement offer. After learning about the negotiations
and the $50 million global figure, Burford formally objected
to settling on those terms.
In September 2022, Sysco’s outside counsel communicated
to Burford’s chief investment officer that Sysco viewed the
deal as nearly complete and just in need of being written and
formalized. Worried that Sysco was on the brink of executing
a formal settlement agreement, Burford filed an expedited re-
quest for arbitration with the tribunal designated by its fund-
ing agreement with Sysco to resolve their disputes.
Contrary to this comment that Sysco considered the deal
nearly complete, Sysco continued to tell Burford that it was
still in the negotiations phase. In October 2022, Sysco told Bur-
ford that it had reached an understanding with Pilgrim’s but
that there was not yet agreement as to all material terms nor
an executed agreement. In November 2022, Sysco reiterated
to Burford that it had not executed any settlement agreements
and that it would notify Burford before doing so. In early De-
cember 2022, Sysco shared a draft of the Broilers settlement
agreement with Burford, saying it was still a draft in progress.

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No. 25-1110 9
Things changed when Sysco notified Burford on Decem-
ber 12, 2022, of its intent to execute the settlement agreement
by the end of the year. Burford swiftly moved for a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction from the arbitral
tribunal to prevent Sysco from executing the agreement. The
tribunal issued an arbitral TRO on December 14, 2022.
That same day, Sysco’s Flynn called Pilgrim’s Sangalis and
told him Burford had won a TRO that meant Sysco could not
finalize the settlement. Flynn detailed his expected timeline of
Sysco’s arbitration with Burford and said he wanted to con-
tinue to finalize the draft agreements so they could be exe-
cuted promptly if injunctive relief were lifted. Accordingly,
Sysco and Pilgrim’s continued to make small edits to the draft
agreements, including adding language about the ongoing
Burford arbitration. On December 22, 2022, Pilgrim’s sent fi-
nal versions of the agreements for Sysco to execute.
Flynn testified that in January 2023, Pilgrim’s followed up
with Sysco, saying it would not keep its settlement offer open
indefinitely. Flynn also testified that Pilgrim’s communicated
a desire to pursue litigation if the TRO were not lifted. There
is ambiguity as to whether Pilgrim’s threat was to continue
litigating the antitrust claims or to ask the court to enforce a
settlement it would argue already existed. Flynn sent another
draft in February 2023, making a small change to language in
the release provision, which Sangalis accepted.
In March 2023, after a multi-day evidentiary hearing, the
arbitral tribunal issued a preliminary injunction preventing
Sysco from executing the proposed settlement agreements.
That same day, Pilgrim’s outside counsel reiterated a commit-
ment to settlement on the parties’ already negotiated terms
because of the ongoing business relationship between

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10 No. 25-1110
Pilgrim’s and Sysco. He did not assert that a binding agree-
ment was in place, and the draft settlement agreements re-
mained unsigned.
In June 2023, Burford and Sysco entered into a settlement
to resolve their disputes with each other. As part of the settle-
ment, Sysco assigned its claims in the Broilers, Beef, and Pork
cases to Burford’s affiliate, Carina Ventures LLC, which is
now the plaintiff-appellant in this appeal.
D. Procedural History
During the negotiations over a written agreement, in Oc-
tober 2022, Pilgrim’s moved for summary judgment in the
Broilers case against the last remaining “Track 1” plaintiff with
a claim against Pilgrim’s. See In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust
Litig., 133 F.4th 761, 763 (7th Cir. 2025) (explaining difference
between Track 1 and Track 2 plaintiffs). The district court de-
nied Pilgrim’s motion in June 2023, increasing the value of the
Track 2 plaintiffs’ claims, which included Sysco’s claims that
it had assigned to Carina.
Then, on September 9, 2023, a year after the “We accept”
email, Pilgrim’s moved to enforce the Broilers settlement
agreement. Its motion argued that the “We accept” email had
created a binding settlement agreement on September 9, 2022.
Pilgrim’s asserted that when Flynn sent that email, the parties
had already agreed on all material terms of the agreement.
Carina opposed the motion, arguing that neither Sysco nor
Pilgrim’s had intended to be bound by the September 2022
email exchanges and that several material terms had not been
resolved as of September 9, 2022.
The district court granted Pilgrim’s motion to enforce. The
court wrote that the “heart” of the agreement, and its only two

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No. 25-1110 11
material terms, was the release of all claims in exchange for
the $50 million global sum, to which both parties had as-
sented. The district court also relied on the finalized draft
agreements, which it said memorialized the parties’ agree-
ment on additional, immaterial terms, even though the drafts
were never signed. The district court rejected Carina’s laches
argument that Pilgrim’s had waited too long to enforce the
agreement and its jurisdictional argument that the court could
not enforce a global settlement agreement that involved Beef
and Pork claims pending in a different court.
Carina tried to appeal the district court’s decision then, ar-
guing that it operated as an injunction. This court dismissed
that appeal, finding that the decision did not operate as an
appealable injunction so that we lacked jurisdiction to review
it. In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litig., Nos. 24-2100 & 24-2202,
2024 WL 5153588, at *1 (7th Cir. Aug. 14, 2024).
On July 22, 2024, Pilgrim’s sent a total of $50 million in
three separate checks to Sysco, one for each of Sysco’s Broilers,
Beef, and Pork settlements, with amounts corresponding to the
allocations in the unexecuted settlement agreements. Sysco
deposited the checks and transferred the funds to Carina. Ca-
rina maintains, however, that the payments were not valid
under the settlement draft agreement, that they did not affect
its right to pursue this appeal, and that it stands ready to re-
turn the money to Pilgrim’s.
Pilgrim’s then moved for summary judgment on Carina’s
Broilers claims. Although the motion was not framed this way,
it amounted to a motion for summary judgment on a new af-
firmative defense of accord and satisfaction. In the judgment
now before us, the district court granted Pilgrim’s motion for
summary judgment and entered a separate judgment under

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12 No. 25-1110
Rule 54(b). The court relied on its earlier decision that a bind-
ing settlement agreement existed and found that Pilgrim’s
had fulfilled its obligations under the contract by paying the
amount due. Pilgrim’s then successfully moved for summary
judgment on Carina’s Beef and Pork claims in the District of
Minnesota. Carina has appealed the Broilers judgment on the
claims Sysco assigned to it.
II. Standard of Review
The district court found, without holding an evidentiary
hearing, that undisputed facts in the record demonstrated an
unambiguous meeting of the minds on all material terms of
the settlement agreement. As a result, we review de novo both
the summary judgment order and the underlying decision to
enforce. See Newkirk v. Village of Steger, 536 F.3d 771, 774 (7th
Cir. 2008).
III. Material Terms
Defendant Pilgrim’s presents the settlement here as a sim-
ple exchange: $50 million for releases of all of Sysco’s antitrust
claims against it. Any other terms, it contends, were not actu-
ally material. The parties’ negotiations and actions refute that
theory. Four terms that the parties negotiated for months after
September 9, 2022, directly affected the value of the deal and
the scope of the release, showing that these terms were both
material and unresolved at the time of the initial agreement.
Those terms were compliance with the Judgment Sharing
Agreement, the scope of Sysco’s assignments, the most fa-
vored nation clause, and the allocations among the three
cases.
Illinois law requires mutual assent to all material terms be-
fore an agreement can be said to have a binding effect. Abbott

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No. 25-1110 13
Laboratories v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 164 F.3d 385, 387 (7th
Cir. 1999), citing SBL Assocs. v. Village of Elk Grove, 617 N.E.2d
178, 182 (Ill. App. 1993); Beverly v. Abbott Laboratories, 817 F.3d
328, 334 (7th Cir. 2016) (“A settlement agreement may be en-
forceable despite the omission of certain terms so long as
those terms are not material.”). In other words, if material
terms are left unresolved, even if both parties intended to be
bound, there is no enforceable contract. Ocean Atlantic Dev.
Corp. v. Aurora Christian Schools, Inc., 322 F.3d 983, 1000 (7th
Cir. 2003), citing Academy Chicago Publishers v. Cheever, 578
N.E.2d 981, 983 (Ill. 1991) (offers without material terms
would be unenforceable even if parties intended signed offers
to bind them).
Courts look to whether the parties have objectively
manifested an intent to be bound by all material terms in the
contract. Citadel Group Ltd. v. Washington Regional Med. Ctr.,
692 F.3d 580, 589 (7th Cir. 2012); Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 212 cmt. a (1981) (“But the relevant intention of a
party is that manifested by him rather than any different
undisclosed intention.”). And we look at the parties’ intent to
be bound and the agreement on the material terms at the time
of contracting, not in its aftermath. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 164
F.3d at 387–89.
The central legal question here is how we should decide
which terms the parties considered to be material. This ques-
tion must be answered “in the context of the particular con-
tract and the precise dispute.” E. Allan Farnsworth & Zachary
Wolfe, Farnsworth on Contracts § 6.07 (4th ed. 2026). The
court must step into the shoes of the parties and evaluate ma-
teriality based on what the parties have indicated they find
important, rather than making the assessment from our own

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14 No. 25-1110
perspective or general abstractions. See PFT Roberson, Inc. v.
Volvo Trucks North America, Inc., 420 F.3d 728, 731 (7th Cir.
2005) (“And whether extra elements are essential is for the
parties themselves to say….”); Shann v. Dunk, 84 F.3d 73, 79
(2d Cir. 1996) (determining materiality of contract terms “in
accordance with economic reality and the views of the par-
ties”).
Generally, places helpful to look are “(1) the language
used, (2) the circumstances surrounding the transaction, and
(3) the purpose that [the parties] sought to accomplish.” 1 Wil-
liston on Contracts § 4.36 (4th ed.); see generally Brian A.
Blum, The Protean Concept of Materiality in Contract Law, 2020
Mich. St. L. Rev. 643 (2020) (compiling sources showing that
materiality can vary depending on the nature of the contract
dispute). Material terms are those that materially change the
substance of the agreement or affect a party’s intent to be
bound by the agreement, as shown by the evidence. See KR
Enterprises, Inc. v. Zerteck Inc., 999 F.3d 1044, 1054 (7th Cir.
2021) (materiality is “slippery term” in contract law, so it is
best to assess materiality of breach by focusing “on conse-
quences and remedies”); Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 33 cmt. b (1981) (courts should not step in to supply terms
where the matter “has been the subject of controversy be-
tween parties,” but might be more appropriate where matter
was raised “only as an afterthought”).2
2 Our reasoning here applies when the dispute is whether the parties
have agreed to a binding contract. On the other hand, when there is no
doubt a contract exists—such as where performances have actually been
exchanged—courts face somewhat different problems and use additional
methods to determine the terms of the contract. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-207(3)

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No. 25-1110 15
Where courts typically review an informal agreement to
determine whether the material terms are sufficiently definite,
here we have even less: a barebones email exchange that fails
to mention terms other than the price and release of claims.
Pilgrim’s contends that an enforceable settlement agreement
resolving damages claims requires only two material terms:
the payment amount and the release of claims. The district
court was persuaded by Pilgrim’s argument and found that
the “heart” of the agreement was the sum of money in ex-
change for release of all Sysco’s claims against it.
That view may hold true in some or even many cases that
are much simpler than the one here. We also do not wish to
discourage parties from reaching binding agreements in prin-
ciple during settlement discussions. But we cannot remove
these parties’ negotiations from the larger context in which
they took place. See Yash Venture Holdings, LLC v. Moca Finan-
cial, Inc., 116 F.4th 651, 658 (7th Cir. 2024) (“The question of
whether any given term may or may not be material is highly
fact-dependent….”); Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 164 F.3d at 389
(no binding settlement agreement, in part because “magni-
tude of [the] deal require[d] careful scrutiny of any claim that
informal letters in the course of freewheeling settlement ne-
gotiations constitute a binding agreement”); PFT Roberson,
420 F.3d at 730 (no binding agreement, recognizing party
wanted full written agreement because “caution is to be ex-
pected in a multi-million-dollar deal that would last for many
years”).
(discussing the terms of a contract for sale when parties perform despite
indefiniteness in terms).

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16 No. 25-1110
Here, Pilgrim’s itself said repeatedly—after the suppos-
edly enforceable deal had been reached—that it simply would
not enter into a settlement that was not qualified under the
Judgment Sharing Agreement. The “qualified settlement” lan-
guage here was so important to Pilgrim’s that it told Sysco
over two months after the parties reached the supposedly
binding agreement that it would walk away from the settle-
ment if it were not compliant with the Judgment Sharing
Agreement. That evidence by itself defeats Pilgrim’s argu-
ment. Pilgrim’s conduct shows this was a material term that
had not been resolved at the time of the supposedly binding
agreement.
Looking more broadly, the combination of the amount of
money, the number of moving parts in this settlement, the ef-
fect of the open terms on the value of the parties’ exchange,
and the need to work through those terms all combine to
show those terms were material. The $50 million payment is
larger than most this court has dealt with in disputed settle-
ments, precisely because parties have strong incentives to ap-
proach a deal of this size with caution and to work out the
nuanced terms before consummating an agreement. Practi-
cally, it “defies logic” that a party would agree to enter a set-
tlement agreement of this magnitude based on three emails
with only two material terms. See Citadel Group Ltd., 692 F.3d
at 590 (no binding agreement where parties did not sign
leases with price terms, given “complex multi-million dollar
construction project and long-term lease-back arrangement”).
Instead, as of September 9, 2022, there were still at least
four material terms left unresolved: compliance with the
Judgment Sharing Agreement, the volume of assignments,

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No. 25-1110 17
the “most favored nation” clause, and the allocation of the
global settlement sum.
A. Joint Settlement Agreement
Undisputed evidence of Pilgrim’s statements and conduct
shows that the Joint Settlement Agreement provision was a
material term left open when Flynn “accepted” the global set-
tlement offer on September 9, 2022.
Pilgrim’s had made clear that it considered the provision
making the settlement qualified under the Judgment Sharing
Agreement to be material, including by making an early offer
expressly contingent on this provision. Most telling is Pil-
grim’s conduct following Flynn’s “We accept” email, which
does not conform to its assertion that a binding agreement
had been reached. First, during negotiations, Sysco proposed
narrowing the Judgment Sharing Agreement qualification
language in the settlement agreement. In response, Pilgrim’s
did not assert that Sysco had already agreed to that provision
as part of a binding agreement. Rather, as noted, Pilgrim’s
said it would walk away from the supposedly binding deal
without satisfactory language on this issue.
Second, recall that the Judgment Sharing Agreement re-
quires the settling defendant to provide written notice of a
signed settlement agreement to the other Judgment Sharing
Agreement defendants within seven days of reaching that
agreement. We see no evidence that Pilgrim’s ever attempted
to satisfy this Judgment Sharing Agreement term. More to the
point, Pilgrim’s has not offered any theory for concluding that
its supposed deal with Sysco satisfies that requirement. Given
Pilgrim’s firm insistence that the Judgment Sharing

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18 No. 25-1110
Agreement be satisfied by its agreement with Sysco, Pilgrim’s
actions back then are flatly inconsistent with its position now.
The openness of this term, and Pilgrim’s conduct sur-
rounding enforcement of the Judgment Sharing Agreement
requirements, is enough by itself to reverse the district court’s
judgment. The three other open terms similarly warrant re-
versal.
B. Assignments
Pilgrim’s argues that, contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, the
agreement was not contingent on the content of the assign-
ment data. This assertion is inconsistent with the logic of the
supposed deal and with the parties’ actions.
First, and most central, the assignments have a direct effect
on the value of the exchange of money for releases. The as-
signment data told Pilgrim’s which claims Sysco still pos-
sessed and therefore could release, making the data critical to
the value of the most central term: Sysco’s release of its claims
for the $50 million price. See Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 164 F.3d
at 388 (finding that “details” of release provisions are “inher-
ently material” in settlement of complex case). The release of
claims was not only material for Pilgrim’s but the very core of
the exchange for Pilgrim’s. Yet Pilgrim’s arguments in this ap-
peal do not address the fact that the volume of the assign-
ments would directly alter the value of such a release to Pil-
grim’s.
Second, in November 2022 in the negotiations on a defini-
tive agreement, Pilgrim’s outside counsel said to Flynn and
Sysco’s outside counsel that any proposed settlement ratio
was not final until Pilgrim’s received Sysco’s full assignment
data. Back in June 2022, Pilgrim’s had also conditioned one of

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No. 25-1110 19
its prior settlement offers on full knowledge of Sysco’s assign-
ment data. These communications show objective manifesta-
tions of the significance Pilgrim’s placed on having this infor-
mation showing an acceptable volume of assignments. Yet
Pilgrim’s did not have this key information as of September 9,
2022.
Third, the assignment data were also necessary to calcu-
late the “most favored nation” ratio, which Pilgrim’s calcu-
lated depending on the volume of sales to Sysco, accounting
for any assignments. In other words, the volume of assign-
ments would change the estimated volume of sales used to
calculate a settlement ratio that would or would not trigger
payouts to other Broilers plaintiffs with whom Pilgrim’s had
settled earlier. The importance of the assignments to the set-
tlement ratio explains, then, Pilgrim’s repeated requests for
Sysco’s assignment data before and after September 2022, and
its circulation of the draft written agreements only after it had
obtained the Broilers assignments and could estimate the Beef
and Pork assignments.
The materiality of this term at the time of the supposed
binding agreement is not affected by the fact that the parties
later agreed on the term. What matters is the status of the term
when the parties supposedly reached a binding agreement. It
is not difficult to imagine that Sysco might have reported to
Pilgrim’s higher volumes of assignments than Pilgrim’s had
anticipated or assumed. In that scenario, we have no doubt,
Pilgrim’s would have insisted and would have been entitled
to insist on a reduction of the $50 million payment. The un-
certainty about this effect on the value of the exchange at the
time of the supposed binding agreement shows this open
term was in fact material.

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20 No. 25-1110
C. “Most Favored Nation” Clause
Pilgrim’s says that the parties had agreed upon inclusion
of a “most favored nation” clause at the time the settlement
agreement was reached. But mutual assent to the inclusion of
some sort of “most favored nation” clause is very different
from agreement on the actual substance of such a clause, es-
pecially where the substance directly affects the overall value
of the settlement to both parties. Sysco had told Pilgrim’s that
it considered the “most favored nation” clause to be a material
term of the settlement. Sangalis Decl. ¶ 17. A “most favored
nation” clause that gave Sysco a more valuable settlement ra-
tio would have been costly to Pilgrim’s, requiring Pilgrim’s to
pay more to other Broilers plaintiffs with whom it had settled
earlier using settlement ratios lower than the effective ratio
with Sysco.
After Flynn sent his “We accept” email, the parties contin-
ued for months to negotiate the scope of the “most favored
nation” clause. Pilgrim’s itself changed the scope of the “most
favored nation” clause over the course of those negotiations,
first omitting it, and then negotiating which Broilers plaintiffs
would fall under the definition of a “Substantially Similar Di-
rect Action Plaintiff” in the agreement. These changes were
not immaterial quibbles, given that the language of the provi-
sion altered Sysco’s ability to recover in the future for Pil-
grim’s later settlements and Pilgrim’s potential obligation to
pay more to previously settling plaintiffs if its Sysco agree-
ment contained a higher settlement ratio. Again, we do not
evaluate materiality based on whether, in the end, the parties
reached agreement on a term. The record shows that im-
portant aspects of the “most favored nation” provision,

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No. 25-1110 21
materially affecting the parties’ obligations under the pro-
posed settlement, remained open as of September 9, 2022.
D. Allocation Among Three Cases
We also agree with plaintiff’s argument that the allocation
of the $50 million global settlement among the three cases—
Broilers, Beef, and Pork—was material. Pilgrim’s tries to refute
this assertion by citing a Section 1983 case involving a $6,000
settlement offered to members of one family in exchange for
release of their claims against a police officer and a restaurant
owner after an altercation at a restaurant. Elustra v. Mineo, 595
F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 2010). There, we reviewed de novo the dis-
trict court’s finding of a valid agreement between the parties
and determined that the allocation of the $6,000 among the
plaintiff family members was not a material term. Id. at 709.
Again, in this $50 million settlement for claims involving
three large commercial industries, the allocation would affect
the rights of the defendant and of other plaintiffs in three an-
titrust actions. In this different context, we are not compelled
to reach the same result on materiality.
Like the assignment data, the amount allocated to the
Broilers case was important to the “most favored nation” set-
tlement ratio. The ratio calculation divided the Broilers alloca-
tion by the Broilers volume of sales. The resulting ratio af-
fected the value of Sysco’s settlement and Sysco’s ability to
recover if Pilgrim’s later settled on more favorable terms with
similarly situated Broilers plaintiffs, which Sysco viewed as
material. Further, the allocations required each party to deter-
mine the worth of Sysco’s claims in each of the three cases.
Prior settlement offers show the parties did not agree upon
those. The parties had not agreed on allocations by the time
Pilgrim’s circulated a first draft of a written agreement, let

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22 No. 25-1110
alone by the time of Flynn’s “We accept” email on September
9, 2022. As a result, although the parties agreed on the global
settlement amount, the specific allocation of that amount to
each group was a material term, left open at the time the par-
ties agreed to the $50 million sum.
E. Reliance on Later Drafts
Finally, we reject Pilgrim’s argument that we can fill in
material blanks by looking to the settlement drafts from De-
cember 2022 to show mutual assent to all material terms. Illi-
nois law requires material terms to be definite at the time the
supposedly binding agreement was reached, without indica-
tion from the parties that further negotiation on material
terms was to follow. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 164 F.3d at 387–
89. In other words, we cannot substitute a party’s assent to
material terms in later drafts for the party’s lack of assent at
the time the agreement was said to have been reached. Each
of those later drafts said it would not be binding on the parties
unless and until it were signed by the parties, which never
happened.
Contrary to Pilgrim’s argument and the district court’s
judgment, the parties continued to negotiate terms they said
were essential long after the “We accept” email in September
2022. The evidence also shows that Pilgrim’s repeatedly fol-
lowed up in January 2023, after Burford had obtained a TRO
preventing Sysco from executing any agreement, and threat-
ened to revoke its settlement offer. Pilgrim’s theory would re-
quire us to ignore the integration clause in all of those drafts.
Its reliance on later agreements on particular issues shows the
holes that existed on September 9, 2022, and those holes un-
dermine its theory that the parties had agreed by then on all
material terms.

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No. 25-1110 23
To sum up, the August and September 2022 exchanges and
objective expressions of the parties show an agreement in
principle on the most important terms but not all material
terms, which the parties expected to and did continue to ne-
gotiate for months. When given the opportunity during oral
argument, Pilgrim’s did not point us to a disputed issue of
material fact in the record. Accordingly, we reverse the dis-
trict court’s judgment as a matter of law.
That leaves the small matter of the $50 million. Plaintiff
Carina Ventures has said it is willing and able to return Pil-
grim’s funds. Pilgrim’s has not argued that its payments to
Sysco somehow prevent Carina Ventures from seeking what
amounts to rescission of the deal as found by the district
court. Nevertheless, our decision here is contingent on Ca-
rina’s immediate tender of the settlement amount to Pilgrim’s.
We will not issue the mandate accompanying this opinion un-
til plaintiff confirms that $50 million has been deposited into
escrow with the district court (or with another escrow agent
acceptable to both parties), to be released to Pilgrim’s upon
issuance of our mandate. To the extent Pilgrim’s might be-
lieve it is entitled to interest on the $50 million, it can pursue
the issue with Carina Ventures or in the district court, but we
will not delay remand pending any question about interest.
The judgment of the district court in favor of Pilgrim’s
Pride is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. We will hold our
mandate as indicated above.

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24 No. 25-1110
MALDONADO, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment.
There is nothing technically wrong with the majority opin-
ion’s approach. Nevertheless, the opinion skims over much of
the context giving rise to Carina’s role in this case as well as
the complex procedural posture surrounding the order under
review. But, as the majority notes, the central legal questions
here should be decided within “the context of the particular
contract and the precise dispute.” Maj. Op. 13 (quoting E. Al-
lan Farnsworth & Zachary Wolfe, Farnsworth on Contracts
§ 6.07 (4th ed. 2026)). Therefore, I write separately to fill in the
context that explains how we got here—a postmortem of
sorts.
I.
First, it bears stating the obvious: Sysco and Pilgrim’s were
on the cusp of finalizing a settlement agreement before the in-
tervention of Sysco’s litigation funder, Burford Capital Lim-
ited. As we’ve explained elsewhere, “[l]itigation funding in-
volves a financial arrangement where, in the typical circum-
stances, third parties unrelated to a lawsuit provide plaintiffs
with capital to cover their costs. In return, the funder receives
a portion of the settlement or judgment if the case is success-
ful.” Signal Funding, LLC v. Sugar Felsenthal Grais & Helsinger
LLP, 136 F.4th 718, 721 (7th Cir. 2025). Here, Sysco and Bur-
ford entered into a Capital Provision Agreement (“CPA”)
through which Burford invested more than $140 million in ex-
change for a share of the proceeds from a favorable settlement
or judgment in the Broilers, Pork, and Beef antitrust litigations.
Order at 6–7, In re Pork Antitrust Litig., No. 18-cv-1776, ECF
No. 2104 (D. Minn. Feb. 9, 2024). The CPA required Sysco to
immediately communicate to Burford any settlement offers
Sysco received and prevented Sysco from accepting a

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No. 25-1110 25
settlement “without [Burford’s] prior written consent, which
shall not be unreasonably withheld, provided however, that
[Burford] shall have no right to exercise control over the inde-
pendent professional judgment of its Nominated Lawyers
and shall not seek to impose a commercially unreasonable re-
sult.” Declaration of Barrett G. Flynn in Support of Petition to
Vacate Arbitration Award at ¶ 9, Sysco Corp. v. Glaz LLC, et al.,
No. 1:23-cv-01451, ECF No. 1-1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2023).
In late August 2022, Sysco informed Burford that it had ne-
gotiated a settlement with Pilgrim’s to resolve the Broilers
case, but Burford, thinking the $50 million settlement amount
too low, withheld its approval. Shortly thereafter, Burford
filed a Request for Arbitration, seeking to block Sysco from
settling. According to Sysco’s lawyers, Burford refused to pro-
vide any information supporting its assertion that the $50 mil-
lion Broilers settlement was too low. As a result of Burford’s
interference, Sysco contends it was “forced to indefinitely lit-
igate against its will against key suppliers who have offered
fair and reasonable settlement payments to Sysco, all the
while risking adverse court rulings, the decline of the value of
Sysco’s claims, and harm to important business relation-
ships.” See Amended Petition to Vacate Arbitration Award
¶ 74, Sysco Corp. v. Glaz LLC, et al., No. 1:23-cv-01451, ECF No.
18 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2023). Eventually, Sysco—in an attempt
to extricate itself from further litigation—reached an agree-
ment with Burford under which Sysco’s claims were assigned
to Carina, which is indirectly owned by Burford.
Litigation finance is a relatively new industry, first emerg-
ing in the United States in 2006. A Brief History of Litigation
Finance, at 5, Harvard Law Sch. Ctr. Legal Profession (2019)
[https://perma.cc/PZ2Y-7MFD]. Burford is the market leader

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26 No. 25-1110
in litigation finance, and as of 2024, it reported a portfolio of
over $7 billion in commercial litigation and arbitration assets.
Burford Capital, Legal finance at 15: Global law firm professionals
on the state of the industry (Oct. 1, 2024),
[https://perma.cc/V54B-6TGJ]. Litigation finance no doubt can
offer significant benefits such as providing smaller entities
and individuals the chance to have their day in court where
they would otherwise be kept out by ever-increasing litiga-
tion costs. But this case presents perhaps the foremost danger
of litigation finance: funders aggressively interfering with,
and exerting control over, ongoing litigation, while rejecting
the funded party’s preferences with the hope of maximizing
returns. As the Chamber of Commerce explained as amicus in
Sysco Corp. v. Glaz LLC, “third-party funders often have dif-
ferent interests than the parties in the case, and this diver-
gence of interests naturally incentivizes funders to take con-
trol of litigation in order to maximize the return on their in-
vestment.” Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chamber of Commerce
of the United States of America in Support of Petition to Va-
cate the Arbitral Award at 2, No. 1:23-cv-01451, ECF No. 36
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2023).
I say all of this to flag that Carina’s—that is, Burford’s—
appeal before us is motivated far more by its speculative fi-
nancial investment than by a desire to seek justice for Sysco,
the true injured party. Having turned the courtroom into a
trading floor, and calculated that continued litigation was
more profitable than settlement, Burford wrested total control
over the settlement of Sysco’s claims. And but for this legal
maneuvering, this litigation could have been resolved long
ago. This case is a cautionary tale to any party who seeks to
fund its litigation through a third party.

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No. 25-1110 27
II.
Second, two procedural oddities complicated this case,
and both worked to Pilgrim’s disadvantage. First, the District
Court, arguably most familiar with all aspects of this litiga-
tion, never analyzed whether an enforceable settlement agree-
ment existed under the summary judgment standard. Second,
because we previously dismissed Carina’s appeal of the set-
tlement order for lack of jurisdiction due to the order’s proce-
dural defects, Carina effectively made an end-run around the
abuse of discretion standard by teeing up the issue of enforce-
ability at the summary judgment stage, ultimately triggering
our de novo review on appeal. All of this is concerning, and
perhaps a preferable approach would have been to remand to
the District Court to conduct the proper summary judgment
analysis in the first instance. The background provided below
is lengthy but necessary, I think, to grasp the procedural ir-
regularities of this case.
This saga began when the District Court, sitting as trier of
fact and applying Illinois’s preponderance of the evidence
standard, found that a settlement agreement existed between
Pilgrim’s and Sysco and granted Pilgrim’s motion to enforce
it. See Mulliken v. Lewis, 615 N.E.2d 25, 27 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)
(Under Illinois law, “[w]hether a contract exists, its terms, and
the intent of the parties are questions of fact for the trier of
fact.”) (emphasis in original) (collecting cases); Panko v. Ad-
vanced Appliance Serv., 371 N.E.2d 3, 6 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (the
party alleging the existence of a contract has the burden of es-
tablishing its existence by a preponderance of the evidence).
Specifically, the District Court stated, “[t]he question is
whether the steps the parties completed—the emails and
drafts exchanged—are sufficient to establish an agreement

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28 No. 25-1110
from an objective perspective[,]” and “[t]he objective facts
here are emails from August, September, and December 2022
that demonstrate an agreement.” R. 7272 at 2-3 (quoting
Dillard v. Starcon Int’l, Inc., 483 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir. 2007)).
Weighing the evidence, the District Court added that even
though the written draft settlement agreements “were never
signed,” “the parties indicated their agreement by email,” and
“[t]hat is sufficient objective evidence of an agreement to en-
force it.” Id. at 3.
Carina appealed the settlement order, R. 7287, but, metic-
ulous about procedural compliance, we dismissed the appeal
for lack of jurisdiction, determining that the District Court did
not comply with Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. R. 7373 at 2. We held sua sponte that the settlement or-
der did not “describe in reasonable detail the acts restrained
or required,” nor did it “set forth” the injunction “in a docu-
ment separate from the court’s opinion.” We concluded that
these failures “‘render[ed] the order issued by the district
court not an injunction and place[d] [appellants] under no ob-
ligations.’” Id. (quoting Reich v. ABC/York-Estes Corp., 64 F.3d
316, 320 (7th Cir. 1995)).
We did not “order a limited remand with instructions to
enter the injunction on a document separate from the opin-
ions.” Cf. MillerCoors LLC v. Anheuser-Busch Companies, LLC,
940 F.3d 922, 923 (7th Cir. 2019) (dismissing appeal for lack of
jurisdiction due to order’s non-compliance with Rule 65). Nor
did Pilgrim’s move to bring the settlement order into compli-
ance with Rule 65 once appeal of that order was no longer
pending, as would have been permitted under Rule 60(a). Nor
did the District Court—which, at that time, was fielding al-
most daily filings—do so sua sponte.

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No. 25-1110 29
Had the District Court’s settlement order complied with
Rule 65, we would have had appellate jurisdiction, and we
would have reviewed the order under the highly deferential
abuse of discretion standard. See Carr v. Runyan, 89 F.3d 327,
331 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Wilson v. Wilson, 46 F.3d 660, 664,
(7th Cir. 1995)) (“[I]n considering a district court’s decision
whether to enforce a settlement agreement, including its
threshold determination of whether the parties actually en-
tered into a valid and enforceable agreement, we will not re-
verse unless the lower court abused its discretion.”).
Instead, the parties were left in an odd limbo. The District
Court had clearly decided in favor of Pilgrim’s, but, per our
order, the defects in the District Court’s order rendered it es-
sentially impotent.
Just five days after we dismissed its appeal, Carina moved
to vacate the District Court’s settlement order. R. 7365-1. The
District Court denied the motion and encouraged Pilgrim’s to
“file a motion” with the District Court “[t]o the extent [it] con-
tinue[d] to seek relief from the [District] Court.” R. 7421. This
could be viewed as an invitation for Pilgrim’s to file a Rule
60(a) motion to bring the settlement order into compliance
with Rule 65. But, two weeks later, Pilgrim’s instead moved
for summary judgment on Carina’s claims. R. 7430-1. The mo-
tion, as the majority observes, “was not framed” as a motion
for summary judgment. Maj. Op. 11. In particular, the motion
consisted of slightly over two pages of text, and the attached
statement of undisputed material facts was just three para-
graphs. R. 7431-1; R. 7431-2. No fact was alleged or argument
made as to the enforceability of the settlement agreement. In-
stead, the motion for summary judgment stated that because
the District Court had enforced the settlement agreement, and

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30 No. 25-1110
because Pilgrim’s had paid the $50 million owed thereunder,
Pilgrim’s was entitled to summary judgment and dismissal of
Sysco’s claims against Pilgrim’s. R. 7431-1 at 2. In effect, Pil-
grim’s was asking the District Court to perform Carina’s end
of the bargain under the settlement agreement.
The District Court granted Pilgrim’s motion, construing it
as, effectively, an effort to enforce the settlement order, not-
ing, consistent with our order dismissing Carina’s appeal,
that “Pilgrim’s might have made a motion for the Court to en-
ter judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d) spe-
cifically stating ‘the act or acts restrained or required,’” but
“[i]nstead, Pilgrim’s more straightforwardly seeks dismissal
of the claims against it[.]” R. 7451 at 4. In key part, the District
Court held that the issue of the enforceability of the settlement
agreement was irrelevant because “the Court already consid-
ered it on Pilgrim’s initial motion to enforce the agreement,”
and there, “[t]he Court found sufficient evidence of agree-
ment based on an email exchange that took place after the Au-
gust phone call Carina relies on in opposition to this motion.”
Id. at 2. And in support of applying the factual determinations
from the settlement order to the summary judgment order,
the District Court stated, “[h]ad the Court identified a genu-
ine issue of material fact on the motion to enforce, the Court
would not have granted the motion and would have sched-
uled an evidentiary hearing or trial so that the necessary find-
ings of fact could be made.” Id. at 3.
The expediency of transposing one similar order into an-
other is understandable given the demands on the District
Court, but the preponderance of the evidence standard that
the District Court applied in the settlement order is different
from the summary judgment standard. Carina had flagged

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No. 25-1110 31
the potential for this mismatch of standards in its response to
Pilgrim’s motion for summary judgment, arguing that the
District Court’s prior order was inapplicable at the summary
judgment stage because it “did not apply summary judgment
standards” and “[i]nstead, sitting as the trier of fact, the [Dis-
trict] Court concluded that there was ‘sufficient objective evi-
dence of an agreement to enforce it.’” R. 7438 at 9 (quoting R.
7272 at 3). Carina was right. At no point did the District Court
assess whether there was any genuine issue of material fact
that might have precluded enforcement of the settlement
agreement.
Carina timely appealed, and despite the confusion de-
scribed above, because the District Court’s order purported to
grant summary judgment, we are exercising de novo review.
As a result, Carina is extracting a substantial victory, effec-
tively circumventing the abuse of discretion standard that we
would have applied in our review of the settlement order had
the District Court complied with Rule 65(d). This is troubling
because we have expressly rejected de novo review of settle-
ment orders. See Dillard, 483 F.3d at 506 (citing Hakim v. Payco-
Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 272 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 2001)).
Because the District Court’s order came to us in this highly
unusual posture, a more restrained approach might have
been for us to remand this matter to the District Court to con-
duct the summary judgment analysis in the first instance, be-
cause of its experience managing this complex multi-district
litigation for years. See, e.g., United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457,
466 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Because the determination involves is-
sues of fact as well as law, they are more properly addressed
by the district court in the first instance.”); Henry v. Hulett, 969
F.3d 769, 788 (7th Cir. 2020) (reversing and remanding “for

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32 No. 25-1110
the district court to assess in the first instance whether Plain-
tiffs have demonstrated that an issue of fact exists” as to the
key legal claims in question). Such an approach might also
have allowed for containment of the ripple effects of our de-
cision to the Pork and Beef litigations in the District of Minne-
sota.
Ultimately, I cannot fault the majority for applying de novo
review to an order purporting to decide a motion for sum-
mary judgment. But I concur in the judgment reluctantly be-
cause the tangled procedural posture before us is ill-suited for
our intervention and is the result of gamesmanship, including
by a third-party litigation funder. It also strikes me that if the
parties are back to square one before the District Court, it
might be in the interest of equity for the parties to explore on
remand whether Pilgrim’s is entitled to interest on the $50
million that Carina accepted for this supposed settlement
back in August 2024.

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