Marwan Mahajni v. VU DO and SCOTT WOIDA

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-3175
M ARWAN M AHAJNI ,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
VU DO and S COTT WOIDA,
Defendants-Appellants.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 2:24-cv-00416 — Pamela Pepper, Chief Judge.
____________________
A RGUED NOVEMBER 5, 2025 — DECIDED A PRIL 13, 2026
____________________
Before R IPPLE, K IRSCH , and LEE, Circuit Judges.
R IPPLE, Circuit Judge. Marwan Mahajni brought this sec-
tion 1983 action against two deputies in the Wisconsin state
court system. Deputy Vu Do and Deputy Scott Woida super-
vised the jury during deliberations in a state criminal case
where he was the defendant. In his complaint, Mr. Mahajni
claimed that the deputies violated his constitutional rights by
telling the jury during deliberations that it had to reach a
unanimous verdict and that a hung jury was not a permissible

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2 No. 24-3175
outcome of its deliberations. He further alleged that this epi-
sode resulted in his wrongful conviction.1
The deputies filed an answer asserting qualified immunity
as an affirmative defense. They then filed a Rule 12(c) motion
for judgment on the pleadings. In an oral ruling, the district
court denied qualified immunity to Deputy Do, who had
made the statement to the jury. In the same ruling, the district
court also denied without prejudice qualified immunity to Dep-
uty Woida and invited him to submit further arguments at
summary judgment. Unlike Deputy Do, Deputy Woida had
not spoken to the jury. According to the complaint, he had
violated Mr. Mahajni’s rights by failing to stop his colleague’s
advice to the jury and by failing to report the incident to the
presiding judge.
Following the district court’s oral ruling, Deputy Woida
filed this appeal challenging the denial of qualified immunity.
We now hold that the district court’s action did not constitute
a final adjudication of the qualified immunity issue as it re-
lated to Deputy Woida. An appeal under the collateral order
doctrine is therefore not currently available to him and we
dismiss this appeal for want of appellate jurisdiction.
1 Mr. Mahajni’s conviction was reversed by the state courts because of the
deputies’ unauthorized intervention into the jury’s deliberations. State
prosecutorial authorities declined further prosecution.

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No. 24-3175 3
I
BACKGROUND
A. Facts2
In August 2013, Wisconsin prosecutorial authorities
charged Mr. Mahajni with one count of kidnapping and four
counts of second-degree sexual assault. At trial, the state court
instructed the jury that “before the jury may return a verdict
which may legally be received, that verdict must be reached
unanimously as to each count. In a criminal case all 12 jurors
must agree in order to arrive at a verdict on each count.”3 The
court also instructed the jury:
If you need to communicate with the Court
while you’re deliberating, send a note through
the bailiff signed by the presiding juror. To have
a complete record of this trial, it’s important that
you communicate with the court only by writ-
ten note.
If you have questions, the court will talk with
the lawyers before answering, so it may take
some time before I can get you an answer. You
should continue your deliberations while you
wait for an answer. The court will answer any
questions in writing or orally with anyone here
in open court.4
2 At this stage of the proceedings, we accept as true the allegations in the
complaint.
3 R.35-1 at 130:06–10.
4 Id. at 130:16–131:03.

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4 No. 24-3175
Deputies Do and Woida were the bailiffs assigned for jury
deliberations. The trial court administered the following oath
to them:
Do you solemnly swear or affirm under penalty
of law that you will keep this jury together as
ordered, that you will not permit any person to
speak to them, and that you will not speak to
them yourself unless by order of the court[?]5
During deliberations, a juror asked Deputy Do whether the
jurors could be deadlocked on any of the counts. Deputy Do
told the jurors that they all had to agree on guilty or not guilty
and that they were not allowed to be hung or deadlocked.
Deputy Woida was present when Deputy Do made these
comments, but he did not intervene to stop Deputy Do. Nor
did he report the incident to the trial court. Mr. Mahajni does
not allege that Deputy Woida spoke to any jurors.
The jury returned a guilty verdict on one count of kidnap-
ping and one count of second-degree sexual assault. After re-
turning the verdict, two jurors spoke to the trial judge and for
the first time learned that a hung jury was a permissible out-
come. Mr. Mahajni was sentenced to thirty years in prison fol-
lowed by twenty years of extended supervision.
Mr. Mahajni filed a motion for a new trial, contending that
Deputy Do’s comments prejudiced the jury. The trial court
denied the motion as well as a motion for reconsideration. On
appeal, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that the trial
court had erred by denying the motion for a new trial without
first holding an evidentiary hearing.
5 R.1, ¶ 26.

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No. 24-3175 5
On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing.
Two jurors testified that Deputy Do had told them that they
must reach a unanimous decision of guilty or not guilty. They
further testified that Deputy Do’s statement had influenced
their decision. The trial court found that at least one juror re-
ceived prejudicial extraneous information. It then vacated
Mr. Mahajni’s convictions and ordered a new trial. Approxi-
mately two years later, the State moved to dismiss the
charges, and the state court granted the motion. By this time,
Mr. Mahajni had been imprisoned for approximately six years
and eight months.
B. Proceedings in the District Court
Mr. Mahajni filed the present action in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. He named
as defendants Deputy Do, Deputy Woida, Milwaukee
County, Sheriff David Clarke, ABC Insurance Company, and
John Does 1 through 5.6 The complaint set forth ten claims, six
of which are relevant to this appeal.7 Count 1 alleged that all
6 According to the complaint, David Clarke was the Sheriff of Milwaukee
County at the time. John Does 1 through 5 are individuals employed by
Milwaukee County who were operating under color of state law and ei-
ther contributed to or failed to prevent Mr. Mahajni’s constitutional harm.
ABC Insurance Company is allegedly the company that provides liability
insurance to Milwaukee County. None of these entities are parties to this
appeal.
7 Counts 4, 8, 9, and 10 are not directed at Deputy Do or Deputy Woida.
Count 4 alleged Monell liability against Milwaukee County and Sheriff
Clarke. Count 8 alleged that Milwaukee County negligently hired,
trained, and supervised Deputy Do and Deputy Woida. Count 9 is a claim
for state law indemnification, asserting that under Wisconsin law, the
County is obligated to pay any tort judgment entered against its

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6 No. 24-3175
of the defendants violated Mr. Mahajni’s right to a fair trial
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Count 2 al-
leged that all the defendants had violated Mr. Mahajni’s due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Count 3 al-
leged that Deputy Woida and Does 1 through 5 had failed to
intervene to prevent a violation of Mr. Mahajni’s constitu-
tional rights in violation of Wisconsin state law. Invoking
§ 1983, Count 5 alleged that Deputy Do and Deputy Woida
violated Mr. Mahajni’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights against cruel and unusual punishment. Count 6 alleged
that Deputy Do and Deputy Woida negligently inflicted emo-
tional distress on Mr. Mahajni by violating his Fourth Amend-
ment rights. Count 7 alleged that Deputy Do and Deputy
Woida intentionally inflicted emotional distress on Mr. Ma-
hajni by violating his Fourth Amendment rights. Deputy Do
and Deputy Woida filed an answer asserting qualified im-
munity.
Milwaukee County, Sheriff Clarke, Deputy Do, and Dep-
uty Woida moved for judgment on the pleadings. The defend-
ants submitted that Mr. Mahajni’s claims were barred by the
statute of limitations. Deputy Woida also argued that he was
entitled to absolute and qualified immunity. Deputy Do ar-
gued that he was entitled to qualified immunity.
A single section of the defendants’ briefing on this motion
addressed both Deputy Do’s and Deputy Woida’s qualified
immunity defenses. Deputy Do and Deputy Woida did not
distinguish between Mr. Mahajni’s Fourth, Sixth, and Four-
teenth Amendment claims, instead stating broadly that, even
employees. Count 10 is a claim under the Wisconsin Direct Action Statute
against ABC Insurance Company.

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No. 24-3175 7
if Mr. Mahajni could establish a violation of “his constitu-
tional rights, these rights were not clearly established at the
time of the alleged conduct.”8 Notably, the briefing did not
address specifically Deputy Woida’s alleged conduct.
In response to this motion to dismiss, Mr. Mahajni argued
that it is clearly established that a bailiff violates a defendant’s
Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury when he provides
the jury with extraneous information.9 Mr. Mahajni pointed
to United States ex rel. Tobe v. Bensinger, 492 F.2d 232 (7th Cir.
1974), where we decided that a bailiff had violated a defend-
ant’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury by telling
the jurors that there could not be a hung jury and that the gov-
ernment had failed to prove that the communication was not
prejudicial. Notably, Mr. Mahajni did not cite any cases dis-
cussing a failure to intervene and did not mention Deputy
Woida’s conduct specifically, instead treating Deputy Do and
Deputy Woida as having engaged in the same conduct.
The district court decided the motion by rendering an oral
ruling. On the immunity issues, it denied qualified immunity
to Deputy Do, ruling that United States ex rel. Tobe was an anal-
ogous case and clearly established that Deputy Do’s conduct
violated Mr. Mahajni’s Sixth Amendment right to an impar-
tial jury. As to Deputy Woida, the district court stated that
“the question is a little more complicated … because neither
party separated out the allegations against Woida from the
allegations against Do.”10 More specifically, the district court
8 R.21 at 11.
9 Mr. Mahajni did not address whether there was a similar clearly estab-
lished right under the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments.
10 R.47 at 38:08–11.

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8 No. 24-3175
explained that neither party had properly addressed the qual-
ified immunity issue as it applied to Deputy Woida:
And neither party went into any discussion an-
alyzing the claims against Woida specifically.
Both parties lumped Do and Woida together
and spent a lot of time talking about qualified
immunity and what qualified immunity is and
what qualified immunity means and various
cases on it, but nobody actually applied it to dis-
cuss a claim of failure to intervene and failure to
report. So I don’t really have any help from ei-
ther side in determining whether qualified im-
munity applies to Woida.11
The court then explained that, in the absence of any argu-
ment on the issue, it had three options. First, it could rule that
Mr. Mahajni had failed to meet his burden of persuasion be-
cause he did not present argument against Deputy Woida
specifically. However, the court decided against this course
because it determined that Deputy Woida had not presented
specific arguments in favor of qualified immunity to which
Mr. Mahajni could respond. The court then passed over the
second option—ordering additional briefing—and settled on
the third option, denying qualified immunity to Deputy
Woida without prejudice while specifically instructing him to
raise an argument that addresses Deputy Woida’s conduct at
summary judgment. The court explained:
I am not going to extend qualified immunity to
Deputy Woida at this time, but I’m making that de-
cision without prejudice, which means that if the
11 Id. at 38:21–39:04.

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No. 24-3175 9
defendants do have an argument and -- and a
detailed argument regarding the allegations
with regard to Woida, they have the option to
raise the qualified immunity issue again at the
summary judgment phase if they choose to do
so, but I am not going to dismiss him based on
qualified immunity today.12
The district court also stated that “Woida’s the one I have ab-
solutely no information on one way or the other.”13
Following the entry of the order, Deputy Do and Deputy
Woida filed a Notice of Interlocutory Appeal.14
II
DISCUSSION
Although the parties have not questioned our jurisdiction
to entertain this interlocutory appeal, we have the independ-
ent duty to ensure that we have such authority. When faced
with an invocation of the collateral order doctrine, our obliga-
tion to scrutinize the legitimacy of our jurisdiction is, in many
ways, especially important. Although Congress has delegated
substantial authority to identify exceptions to the federal
courts’ rule making process under the Rules Enabling Act, see
28 U.S.C. § 1292(e), the Federal Judicial Code still makes clear
that, generally, federal appellate resources are to be reserved
12 Id. at 39:20–40:02 (emphasis added).
13 Id. at 53:25–54:01.
14 While Deputy Do remains a party to the appeal, no arguments have
been raised that the court erred in denying qualified immunity to him.

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10 No. 24-3175
for the scrutiny of “final decisions” of the district courts. 28
U.S.C. § 1291.
The federal courts have long acknowledged that faithful
observance of this congressional policy choice in favor of fi-
nality does not require, or even permit, slavish adherence to
the view that a final decision is necessarily “the last order pos-
sible to be made in a case.” Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S.
148, 152 (1964). Rather, “the requirement of finality is to be
given a ‘practical rather than a technical construction.’” Id.
(quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546
(1949)). This understanding of finality is the established justi-
fication for what has come to be known as the “collateral or-
der doctrine.” Under that doctrine, a decision of the district
court is appealable if it comes within “that small class which
finally determine claims of right separable from, and collat-
eral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be de-
nied review and too independent of the cause itself to require
that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case
is adjudicated.” Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546.
The Supreme Court’s case law, as well as the case law of
this court, firmly establishes that the denial of a claim of qual-
ified immunity is a “final decision” subject to immediate ap-
peal under the collateral order doctrine. See Behrens v. Pelletier,
516 U.S. 299, 307 (1996); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
In Mitchell, the Supreme Court set forth succinctly the reason-
ing animating this principle. The Court noted that qualified
immunity is not only separate conceptually from the under-
lying merits of the case but is also a right the protection of
which will be lost irretrievably if it is not available to the de-
fendant at the outset of the litigation. Immunity protects the
government official not only from the jeopardy of incurring a

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No. 24-3175 11
monetary judgment but also from the burden of having to lit-
igate claims of no legal merit. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526–27.
If the district court had ruled definitively that Deputy
Woida is not entitled to qualified immunity, the reasons un-
derlying the collateral order doctrine certainly would justify
an immediate appeal. A close examination of the record con-
vinces us, however, that the district court made no such de-
finitive ruling. Its concern focused on an antecedent problem:
The parties had not recognized that the situation of Deputy
Woida was substantially different from that of Deputy Do
and certainly had not addressed adequately that difference.
A decision to postpone ruling on qualified immunity is not
appealable. Khorrami v. Rolince, 539 F.3d 782, 786 (7th Cir.
2008). The court’s order must have findings of fact and con-
clusions of law deciding qualified immunity to be appealable.
Gosnell v. City of Troy, 979 F.2d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir. 1992). In
Beathard v. Lyons, we held that we did not have appellate ju-
risdiction over an order that postponed ruling on qualified
immunity until the record was more fully developed. 129
F.4th 1027, 1034 (7th Cir. 2025). The order stated that the de-
fendants’ motion to dismiss was “denied,” however, the rest
of the order made clear that “the [district] court did not think
it advisable to address qualified immunity with only the alle-
gations of Beathard’s complaint to inform its assessment.” Id.
at 1033. Because the order did not suggest that the plaintiff
had pleaded enough to overcome qualified immunity nor that
plaintiff had failed to overcome qualified immunity, we held
that the district court “did not settle or even tentatively decide
anything about the merits of the defendants’ qualified-im-
munity arguments.” Id. at 1034 (citation modified).

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12 No. 24-3175
The order here is similar to the order in Beathard. The dis-
trict court started by explaining that both parties had misap-
prehended the qualified immunity issue as it applied to Dep-
uty Woida: “so I don't really have any help from either side in
determining whether qualified immunity applies to
Woida.”15
Although the court technically denied the motion, it did
not address the merits of qualified immunity, nor did it hold
that either party had waived its arguments. Additionally, it
specifically stated that it was “not going to extend qualified
immunity to Deputy Woida at this time, but I'm making that
decision without prejudice” which evinces an intent to postpone
ruling on the merits of the issue.16 At the conclusion of the
order, when defense counsel asked whether the ruling on
Deputy Do’s immunity was with or without prejudice, the
court distinguished its rulings on Deputy Do and Deputy
15 R.47 at 39:02–04. It is true that we have found no appellate jurisdiction
where the district court withholds decision on qualified immunity be-
cause of a lack of factual development, because appellate review of quali-
fied immunity decisions is limited to questions of law. See, e.g., Villalobos
v. Picicco, 168 F.4th 1057, 1061 (7th Cir. 2026). But our precedent demon-
strates that it is not the case that we have jurisdiction to hear all other qual-
ified immunity orders. If the order does not “settle or even tentatively de-
cide anything” about qualified immunity, we lack jurisdiction, whether
the district court premised its refusal to decide on a lack of factual devel-
opment or on the absence of relevant legal argument. Beathard v. Lyons,
129 F.4th 1027, 1034 (7th Cir. 2025) (citation modified); Gosnell v. City of
Troy, 979 F.2d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding no appellate jurisdiction
where the district court dismissed defendants’ summary judgment mo-
tion without discussing their bid for qualified immunity); see also Coopers
& Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468–69 (1978).
16 R.47 at 39:20–22 (emphasis added).

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No. 24-3175 13
Woida, saying that its conclusion as to Deputy Do was a legal
conclusion that his conduct violated a clearly established
right, but by contrast, it had “absolutely no information on
[Deputy Woida] one way or the other.”17 Like the order in
Beathard, this order reserves a decision on qualified immunity
for a later time, specifically summary judgment. The district
court simply ruled that the question of Deputy Woida’s im-
munity was not ripe for adjudication.18 There is no substan-
tive district court decision on qualified immunity for us to re-
view. The policy concerns animating the collateral order doc-
trine therefore do not justify our permitting an interlocutory
appeal.
Conclusion
The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The par-
ties will bear their own costs.
APPEAL DISMISSED
17 Id. at 53:25–54:01.
18 It is worth noting that the district court’s ruling does not inevitably sub-
ject Deputy Woida to unnecessary discovery. Deputy Woida has the op-
tion to move for summary judgment at any time. See Jacobs v. City of Chi-
cago, 215 F.3d 758, 775–76 (7th Cir. 2000) (Easterbrook, J. concurring) (ex-
plaining procedural tools for resolving qualified immunity after the mo-
tion to dismiss stage without engaging in discovery); see also Henry v.
Hulett, 969 F.3d 769, 786 (7th Cir. 2020) (“The most appropriate time to
raise the qualified immunity issue is in a motion for summary judgment
filed before allowing discovery.” (citation modified)).

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14 No. 24-3175
K IRSCH , Circuit Judge, dissenting. We shouldn’t have to de-
cide this case, but not because we lack jurisdiction. Marwan
Mahajni’s lawsuit against Deputy Scott Woida should have
been over when Mahajni failed to respond to Deputy Woida’s
qualified immunity argument. The claims against Deputy
Woida should have been dismissed a second time after the
district court found that Mahajni hadn’t carried his burden to
show that qualified immunity didn’t apply. And the claims
against Deputy Woida should meet a swift end on remand
because Mahajni still can’t point to any clearly established law
that Deputy Woida violated (because it doesn’t exist). We
should reverse the district court, and so I respectfully dissent.
I
I agree with my colleagues about the general outlines of
the collateral order doctrine. While interlocutory orders (in-
cluding those deciding motions to dismiss) usually are not ap-
pealable, there are exceptions, including for orders rejecting
the defense of qualified immunity at the dismissal stage. See
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524–30 (1985); Behrens v. Pelle-
tier, 516 U.S. 299, 307 (1996). A denial of qualified immunity
that “turns on an issue of law” is an appealable final decision
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 527–30.
We lack appellate jurisdiction when a district court de-
clines to decide qualified immunity because the facts need
further development. See Beathard v. Lyons, 129 F.4th 1027 (7th
Cir. 2025); Khorrami v. Rolince, 539 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2008). But
“[a]n order denying qualified immunity that turns on a pure
legal issue is a ‘final decision’ under § 1291,” such that the col-
lateral order doctrine applies, and appellate jurisdiction is se-
cure. Harer v. Casey, 962 F.3d 299, 305 (7th Cir. 2020); see
Chasensky v. Walker, 740 F.3d 1088 (7th Cir. 2014). This

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No. 24-3175 15
distinction—between denials that turn on undeveloped facts
and those that turn on abstract legal analysis—is well-estab-
lished. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 311 (1995).
I part ways with the majority on its conclusion that we lack
appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of
Deputy Woida’s motion to dismiss. Citing the absence of a
definitive merits ruling or other findings about the defense,
my colleagues hold that the district court postponed a deci-
sion on qualified immunity, such that the denial isn’t final and
we lack appellate jurisdiction. Ante, at 11–13 & n.15. But the
district court ruled on qualified immunity in a way that se-
cures our jurisdiction: the court made a “decision” to “not ex-
tend qualified immunity to Deputy Woida at this time” and
made adequate factual and legal findings for us to review.
It’s true that the district court suggested that its decision
could change down the road and that it wanted to hear addi-
tional legal argument. But “no interlocutory decision is defin-
itive” and “a paucity of legal analysis may be a reason to re-
verse an order but is not a reason to pretend that the judge
never entered an order.” Asher v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 505 F.3d 736,
740 (7th Cir. 2007) (citation modified); see Moses H. Cone
Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12 n.14 (1983)
(noting that while “virtually all interlocutory orders may be
altered or amended” that does not make them inherently ten-
tative for purposes of collateral order reasoning). In the im-
munity context, we have found a final decision at the motion
to dismiss stage despite a district court’s insistence that denial
was not on the merits, Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d
661, 668–69 (7th Cir. 2012), when a district court denied a mo-
tion to dismiss based on an erroneous holding of waiver (and
so provided no merits analysis), Chasensky, 740 F.3d at 1093–

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16 No. 24-3175
95, and when a district court denied a motion to dismiss with-
out discussing qualified immunity at all. Hanes v. Zurick, 578
F.3d 491, 492–94 (7th Cir. 2009). We did so in each instance
because the decision was final in the way that matters for in-
terlocutory review—the facts didn’t require development and
the law was clear.
That’s what we have in this case, too. The district court
made three findings of fact and conclusions of law that went
to the merits of Deputy Woida’s qualified immunity argu-
ments, and that—combined with an adequately developed
factual record—are sufficient to secure our appellate jurisdic-
tion. See Gosnell v. City of Troy, 979 F.2d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir.
1992); Beathard, 129 F.4th at 1034. First, the district court found
that Deputy Woida “raised qualified immunity.” Second, the
district court found that, with the defense having been raised,
it was Mahajni’s burden to show that qualified immunity did
not apply. And third, the district court found that Mahajni
had not carried that burden.
These findings were all correct. Defendants spent six
pages of their brief in support of the motion on qualified im-
munity and noted the specific wrongful conduct (a failure to
intervene) that Deputy Woida was alleged to have commit-
ted. See Hernandez v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 634 F.3d 906, 913
(7th Cir. 2011) (“[I]t is absolutely clear that the defendants’
undeveloped opening brief argument supplied adequate no-
tice [of a qualified immunity defense] to the plaintiffs and
caused them no prejudice.”). Once the defense was raised,
Mahajni bore the burden of showing that it didn’t apply. See
Fosnight v. Jones, 41 F.4th 916, 924 (7th Cir. 2022). And in re-
sponse to the motion, Mahajni cited no authority suggesting

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No. 24-3175 17
that a failure to intervene to prevent an improper communi-
cation with a juror was unlawful.
The absence of a definitive merits ruling doesn’t mean we
lack jurisdiction. See Abelesz, 692 F.3d at 668–69. “Because the
district court’s refusal to address the merits of defendants’
motion asserting qualified immunity constitutes a conclusive
determination for the purposes of allowing an interlocutory
appeal, and the record permits this court to resolve some of
defendants’ immunity claims, this court will reach the merits
of those claims rather than remand them to the district court.”
Chasensky, 740 F.3d at 1095 (citation modified). To sum up, the
district court decided to deny qualified immunity and that de-
nial turns only on abstract questions of law: (1) whether Dep-
uty Woida was entitled to qualified immunity when Mahajni
failed to carry his burden in showing that it doesn’t apply,
and (2) whether the complaint alleged a claim that a clearly
established right was violated. See Hanson, 967 F.3d at 590.
That distinguishes this case from Beathard, on which the ma-
jority relies, because here the denial doesn’t turn on a need for
development of the factual record. Cf. 129 F.4th at 1034. Be-
cause the denial in this case turns on pure legal issues, the de-
cision was final and we have jurisdiction. Jackson v. Curry, 888
F.3d 259, 262–63 (7th Cir. 2018); Villalobos v. Picicco, 168 F.4th
1057, 1065 (7th Cir. 2026) (“Normally, this court does not send
‘pure questions of law’ back to the district court.”).
II
When, as here, the district court rejects the defense of qual-
ified immunity raised in a motion to dismiss, we review the
ruling de novo, accepting as true all factual allegations in the
complaint and drawing reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s
favor. Chasensky, 740 F.3d at 1093. Applying that standard,

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18 No. 24-3175
Deputy Woida is entitled to qualified immunity for two obvi-
ous reasons.
First, Mahajni’s failure, in response to the motion to dis-
miss, to show that qualified immunity doesn’t apply is fatal
to his claim. Fosnight, 41 F.4th at 924. The district court faulted
Deputy Woida because his brief did not make arguments or
cite authority specific to a failure to intervene. But the defense
brief adequately raised qualified immunity on behalf of both
defendants (as the district court recognized), and at that point
it was Mahajni who faced the burden of overcoming qualified
immunity (Deputy Woida didn’t need to affirmatively show
that qualified immunity applied). See Sinn v. Lemmon, 911
F.3d 412, 418–19 (7th Cir. 2018).
Deputy Woida is entitled to qualified immunity for a sec-
ond reason—there’s no clearly established law that says that
a bailiff who fails to stop someone else from making an im-
proper statement to a juror violates a defendant’s rights. The
complaint says that Deputy Woida “stood by without inter-
vening to prevent” Deputy Do from telling a juror that the
vote needed to be unanimous on all counts, that Deputy
Woida knew that his colleague was violating his oath as bail-
iff, and that he failed to tell the court about it. While there are
cases suggesting that a defendant has a right to be free from
direct juror interference, see, e.g., Remmer v. United States, 347
U.S. 227, 229 (1954); United States ex rel. Tobe v. Bensinger, 492
F.2d 232, 238 (7th Cir. 1974) (same); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S.
363, 365 (1966) (same), Mahajni has repeatedly failed to iden-
tify any precedent that shows that failing to intervene to stop
someone else from making an improper communication with
a juror violates a clearly established right. Such a case does
not exist, which means that Deputy Woida is entitled to

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No. 24-3175 19
qualified immunity. See Ewell v. Toney, 853 F.3d 911, 918–20
(7th Cir. 2017).
Because qualified immunity protects government officials
from both litigation and liability, Behrens, 516 U.S. at 305–06,
federal courts must resolve immunity questions “at the earli-
est possible stage in litigation,” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 232 (2009) (citation modified). The district court didn’t do
that here, despite a factual record that didn’t require further
development. Yet because the district court made adequate
factual and legal findings, denied Deputy Woida’s motion,
and the ruling turned only on an abstract legal analysis, the
decision was final and our jurisdiction is secure. Having
found that defendants raised the issue, and that Mahajni
failed to carry his burden in showing that the defense applied,
the district court had to grant Deputy Woida’s motion. Dep-
uty Woida’s part in this case should have been over then. It
should be over now. And it should be over quickly on re-
mand.

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