Sanaullah Khan Mohammed v. TODD W. BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General of the United States

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-1901
S ANAULLAH K HAN M OHAMMED,
Petitioner,
v.
TODD W. BLANCHE,*
Acting Attorney General of the United States,
Respondent.
____________________
Petition for Review of an Order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals.
No. A201-643-458
____________________
A RGUED F EBRUARY 18, 2026 — DECIDED M AY 5, 2026
____________________
Before S CUDDER , JACKSON -A KIWUMI , and PRYOR , Circuit
Judges.
S CUDDER , Circuit Judge. Sanaullah Khan Mohammed en-
tered the United States on a visitor visa in 2016. He overstayed
and did not apply for asylum until a year and a half after the
* We have substituted Todd W. Blanche, the current Acting Attorney
General of the United States. See Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).

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2 No. 25-1901
deadline. An immigration judge found his request for asylum
untimely, rejected his other requests for relief, and ordered
his removal. After the Board of Immigration Appeals dis-
missed his appeal, Mohammed petitioned for our review. His
petition does not address our jurisdiction to review the immi-
gration judge’s dismissal of his asylum claim as untimely—a
question that, in light of recent Supreme Court precedent, has
divided other circuits and which we leave for another day.
Absent adversarial presentation of this issue, we rely on our
own precedent and hold that we lack jurisdiction to review
the timeliness of Mohammed’s request for asylum. We other-
wise deny his petition, as we see no error in the denial of his
request to withhold removal.
I
A
The administrative record supplies the operative facts.
Mohammed comes from a Muslim family in India. The
family ran a slaughterhouse business that would buy cows,
butcher them, and pack and sell the meat. Tension arose with
Hindus in the area who both considered cows sacred and
claimed affiliation with the Bharatiya Janata Party, a domi-
nant political party in India. After Mohammed began running
the slaughterhouse in 2014, he witnessed increased attempts
to interfere with the business.
By Mohammed’s telling, the most serious incident oc-
curred around May 2016. It was then that a group confronted
him and his mother, threw rocks at him, and then beat him,
all the while admonishing them to shutter the slaughterhouse.
When Mohammed yelled for help, local police responded and

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No. 25-1901 3
dispersed everyone. The attack left Mohammed with minor
injuries that required little medical attention.
About a month later, on June 26, 2016, Mohammed en-
tered the United States on a visitor visa. He remained beyond
the expiration date of December 25, 2016. He did not apply
for asylum until January 28, 2019.
B
Having received Mohammed’s asylum application well
beyond the one-year deadline of June 26, 2017, the U.S. Citi-
zenship and Immigration Services denied it. From there Mo-
hammed received a notice to appear on a charge of remova-
bility. In time an immigration judge held a hearing and con-
sidered Mohammed’s claims for asylum, withholding of re-
moval, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. Mo-
hammed testified as the sole witness at the hearing.
Finding no extraordinary circumstances justifying an ex-
ception to the one-year deadline to apply for asylum, the im-
migration judge denied Mohammed’s application as un-
timely. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D). The immigration judge
also denied his request to withhold removal, finding that Mo-
hammed showed neither past persecution nor a meaningful
risk of future persecution, and denied him relief under the
Convention Against Torture. The Board of Immigration Ap-
peals agreed and dismissed Mohammed’s appeal.
Before us is Mohammed’s petition for review.
II
A
The Attorney General urges us to conclude that we lack
jurisdiction to review the dismissal of Mohammed’s asylum

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4 No. 25-1901
application as untimely, relying in part on our decision in
Khan v. Filip, 554 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2009). There we concluded
that although 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) permitted judicial re-
view of “constitutional claims” or “questions of law,” “factual
determinations (such as whether the asylum application was
filed within the one-year deadline) and discretionary deci-
sions (such as whether the alien has demonstrated ‘extraordi-
nary circumstances’ justifying the delay) do not” qualify for
review. Id. at 687. Our holding in Khan controls, leaving us
without jurisdiction to consider Mohammed’s asylum claim.
To be sure, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Guer-
rero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221 (2020), and Wilkinson v. Gar-
land, 601 U.S. 209 (2024), have spawned a split among the cir-
cuits over whether a circuit court has the authority to review
an immigration judge’s determination that an asylum appli-
cation is untimely. No doubt these decisions will require us to
revisit Khan, but this case does not provide that occasion.
Mohammed’s opening brief does not address the ques-
tion. And, in response to the government’s contention that we
lack jurisdiction, he failed to file a reply brief—supplying no
adversarial presentation on the question. In these circum-
stances, the most prudent course is to adhere to Khan.
Our recent decision in Gulomjonov v. Bondi, 131 F.4th 601
(7th Cir. 2025), is not to the contrary. Indeed, the course we
chart here aligns with the one we traveled there. Like Moham-
med, Gayratjon Gulomjonov challenged an immigration
judge’s denial of an asylum claim as untimely. See id. at 610–
11. He argued that the immigration judge committed error in
determining the date on which the one-year limitation for
seeking asylum began to run. See id. We saw the contention
“as a factual argument, not a legal one” and thereby

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No. 25-1901 5
concluded that it fell “outside our limited jurisdiction.” Id. at
611. In doing so, we relied on Khan as well as our 2014 deci-
sion in Yang v. Holder, 760 F.3d 660, 665 (7th Cir. 2014). See id.
We then made a broader observation. To the extent
Gulomjonov somehow sought to rely on the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Guerrero-Lasprilla as part of urging us to see
his challenge to the immigration judge’s decision as one in-
volving a mixed question of law and fact, we declined the in-
vitation. See id. Indeed, “Gulomjonov neither cited Guerrero-
Lasprilla nor made any effort to explain how the immigration
judge’s finding about” when the one-year limitations period
for the asylum claim began to run “might be characterized as
a mixed question of law and fact.” Id. Even more, we empha-
sized that “[a]lthough we have an independent obligation to
address potential barriers to our jurisdiction, we need not
bend over backwards to construct alternate theories to sup-
port jurisdiction when the party asserting it hasn’t done so.”
Id. (cleaned up).
Put most simply, Gulomjonov did not purport to answer a
broader jurisdictional question or to unsettle or recognize
Khan as overruled by Guerrero-Lasprilla. Our jurisdictional
analysis in Gulomjonov spanned just over one page and, if an-
ything, reinforced that Khan remains the law of the circuit.
And it is that legal reality—mindful that Mohammed alto-
gether failed to engage with the government’s jurisdictional
challenge—that precludes our review of the immigration
judge’s dismissal of his asylum application as untimely.
B
The jurisdictional question we leave unresolved today is
one that warrants careful consideration at a later date.

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6 No. 25-1901
Knowing the issue will return, we offer a few observations to
benefit our future consideration.
The Immigration and Nationality Act gives non-citizens
one year from arrival to file for asylum. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a)(2)(B). The statute contains a limited exception, how-
ever: “[a]n application for asylum of an alien may be consid-
ered, notwithstanding [a late or successive application], if the
alien demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Attorney General
either the existence of changed circumstances which materi-
ally affect the applicant’s eligibility for asylum or extraordi-
nary circumstances relating to the delay in filing an applica-
tion within the” one-year limit. Id. § 1158(a)(2)(D).
The INA also speaks to judicial review and related ques-
tions of jurisdiction. Congress provided that “[n]o court shall
have jurisdiction to review any determination of the Attorney
General” regarding, among other things, whether an un-
timely application warrants review. Id. § 1158(a)(3). But ex-
ceptions once again add complexity to the analysis. In
§ 1252(a)(2)(D), a provision that applies to federal court re-
view of asylum applications, Congress provided that no lim-
its it placed on judicial review “shall be construed as preclud-
ing review of constitutional claims or questions of law”
brought by a petitioner. Id. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Put in positive
terms, Congress authorized judicial review of legal questions,
including claims under the Constitution.
The question then is whether an immigration judge’s de-
termination that a non-citizen seeking asylum has failed to
present an extraordinary circumstance excusing an untimely
application is reviewable in a federal circuit court. Or framed
with stricter legal precision, the question asks whether the ju-
dicial review being sought is that of “constitutional claims or

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No. 25-1901 7
questions of law” as Congress used those terms in
§ 1252(a)(2)(D).
The Supreme Court provided guidance for what counts as
a “question of law” within the meaning of § 1252(a)(2)(D) in
Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221 (2020) and Wilkinson v.
Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024). In Guerrero-Lasprilla, the Court
explained that a question of law “includes the application of
a legal standard to undisputed or established facts.” 589 U.S.
at 225. And circuit courts can review a petitioner’s claim that
his removal proceeding should be reopened under equitable
tolling principles. See id. at 227.
A few years later, in Wilkinson, the Court treated as a ques-
tion of law, and thus reviewable by a circuit court under
§ 1252(a)(2)(D), a petitioner’s claim that removal would result
in “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to his fam-
ily member, who was a citizen. 601 U.S. at 216–17. In reaching
this conclusion, the Court considered that Congress had re-
moved the discretionary language “in the opinion of the At-
torney General” from the hardship determination statute at
issue. Id. at 224. And the Court acknowledged that Congress
left similar discretionary language in various other sections of
the INA. See id. Recall here that Mohammed sought to excuse
his untimely asylum application by invoking § 1158(a)(2)(D),
which required him to show “to the satisfaction of the Attor-
ney General” either changed circumstances materially affect-
ing his eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances
relating to his missing the one-year filing deadline.
In evaluating the reach of § 1158(a)(2)(D) after Guerrero-
Lasprilla and Wilkinson, other circuits have divided. At least
four (and maybe five) circuits have concluded that they lack
jurisdiction to review the Attorney General’s decision

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8 No. 25-1901
whether to consider an untimely asylum application. See
Zapet-Alvarado v. Bondi, 152 F.4th 329, 334–36 (1st Cir. 2025)
(concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction to review an
agency’s decision under § 1158(a)(2)(D) in light of Guerrero-
Lasprilla and Wilkinson because of the discretionary language
in the statute), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Mar. 11, 2026) (No.
25-1081); Real v. Att’y Gen., 147 F.4th 361, 366–68 (3d Cir. 2025)
(applying the same reasoning); Osabas-Rivera v. Bondi, 161
F.4th 446, 452–54 (6th Cir. 2025) (same), petition for cert. filed
(U.S. Mar. 4, 2026) (No. 25-1080); A.P.A. v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 104
F.4th 230, 236–41 (11th Cir. 2024) (same); see also Pacheco-Mo-
ran v. Garland, 70 F.4th 431, 438 (8th Cir. 2023) (considering
only Guerrero-Lasprilla and “refus[ing] to adopt a reading of
§ 1252(a)(2)(D) that vitiates § 1158(a)(3)” (cleaned up)).
Only the Ninth Circuit has reached the opposite conclu-
sion. See Ruiz v. Bondi, 163 F.4th 586, 597–99 (9th Cir. 2025)
(considering Wilkinson and concluding that the court had ju-
risdiction to review, albeit with deference, the Attorney Gen-
eral’s determination under § 1158(a)(2)(D) as a mixed ques-
tion of law and fact).
Identifying and settling the scope of § 1158(a)(3)’s jurisdic-
tional bar in the wake of recent Supreme Court precedent will
be consequential for non-citizens seeking asylum and the At-
torney General. For today, however, we adhere to Khan and
conclude that we lack jurisdiction over Mohammed’s chal-
lenge to the immigration judge’s dismissal of his asylum ap-
plication as untimely.

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No. 25-1901 9
III
Mohammed also challenges the denial of his request for
the withholding of removal. All agree we have jurisdiction to
consider this claim.
When the Board of Immigration Appeals adopts and af-
firms an immigration judge’s decision and provides its own
analysis, we review both. See Urzua Ortega v. Garland, 97 F.4th
496, 499 (7th Cir. 2024). And when evaluating an agency’s per-
secution determination, we “review the entirety of the
agency’s conclusions—both the underlying factual findings
and the application of the INA to those findings—for substan-
tial evidence.” See Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 146 S. Ct. 845, 851
(2026).
Mohammed’s request for withholding of removal falls
short on the merits. A non-citizen may not be removed to a
country if his “life or freedom would be threatened in that
country because of the [petitioner’s] race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). A finding of past persecution on a
protected basis in a country gives rise to a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the non-citizen’s “life or freedom would be
threatened” when returned. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1). Absent
such past persecution a petitioner must show that, upon re-
turn to his country of origin, it is “more likely than not that he
or she would be persecuted” because of a protected basis. Id.
§ 1208.16(b)(2).
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination
that Mohammed did not establish past persecution or a like-
lihood of future persecution. Persecution involves “the use of
significant physical force against a person’s body” or some

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10 No. 25-1901
comparable nonphysical harm. Stanojkova v. Holder, 645 F.3d
943, 948 (7th Cir. 2011). The actions of private citizens gener-
ally “do not suffice ‘unless the government is complicit in
those acts or is unable or unwilling to take steps to prevent
them.’” Urzua Ortega, 97 F.4th at 499 (quoting Halim v. Holder,
755 F.3d 506, 512 (7th Cir. 2014)).
The bumps, scrapes, and bruises Mohammed received in
the May 2016 incident do not compel the conclusion that he
suffered persecution. See Zhu v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 316, 318,
320 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding no persecution based on a single
incident that involved the use of a brick and resulted in
stitches). Nor has Mohammed demonstrated that the Indian
government allowed the violence. Indeed, local police
stopped the attack.
Moving to future persecution, Mohammed’s challenges
are even weaker because his family’s local slaughterhouse
business that provoked the past violence is no longer in oper-
ation. Even more, Mohammed could live somewhere else
within the very large country of India. See Martinez-Martinez
v. Bondi, 147 F.4th 831, 837 (7th Cir. 2025).
Mohammed presents no basis to disturb the agency’s de-
cision.
IV
The immigration judge and Board also rejected Moham-
med’s request for relief under the Convention Against Tor-
ture. During oral argument, Mohammed’s counsel clarified
that his petition for review does not challenge that ruling.
For these reasons, Mohammed’s petition for review is
DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part.

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