Jasper Frazier v. Jama Jones

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 19, 2026*
Decided May 20, 2026
Before
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
Nos. 24-3334 & 25-1628
JASPER FRAZIER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JAMA JONES,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeals from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:21-cv-02445-SEB-TAB
Sarah Evans Barker,
Judge.
* The appellee did not enter an appearance and is not participating in this appeal.
We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and record
adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

-- 1 of 3 --

Nos. 24-3334 & 25-1628 Page 2
O R D E R
Jasper Frazier, a former prisoner at New Castle Correctional Facility, appeals the
district court’s order awarding nominal damages to him in this suit asserting violations
of his constitutional rights. We affirm.
Frazier brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several prison
employees, including case manager Jama Jones, for retaliating against him in violation
of the First Amendment and subjecting him to cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. Because Jones defaulted, we accept Frazier’s
allegations as true, see Arwa Chiropractic, P.C. v. Med-care Diabetic & Med. Supplies, Inc.,
961 F.3d 942, 948 (7th Cir. 2020), and according to Frazier’s complaint, Jones instructed
officers—during Frazier’s stint in segregation—to deny him access to his personal
belongings, such as a blanket and soap. He also asserted that Jones encouraged other
prisoners to harass him in retaliation for filing a complaint against her. The district
court found Frazier’s evidence insufficient and entered summary judgment in favor of
all defendants except for Jones, who never responded to the suit. Because Jones did not
defend the claim, the court entered a default judgment against her. The court then gave
Frazier an opportunity to provide evidence of his damages.
Frazier responded with several arguments, many which did not relate to his
claim for damages. He argued, as relevant to this appeal, that Jones was indemnified by
her employer. The district court pointed out, however, as it had done previously, that
any liability against Jones did not automatically make her employer liable, and only
she—not Frazier—could seek indemnification for her actions. The court proceeded to
determine that Frazier was entitled neither to compensatory damages under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (because he did not allege that he suffered any physical injury
from his conditions of confinement, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e), nor punitive damages
(because no evidence suggested that Jones would repeat her conduct or that Frazier
suffered actual harm). The court awarded Frazier nominal damages of $1.00.
Frazier filed two notices of appeal—one after the order granting summary
judgment in favor of the other defendants and one after the award of nominal damages.
But because the two notices relate to the same final judgment, see FED. R. C IV. P. 54(b);
FED. R. A PP. P. 4(a)(2), we construed the second as an amended notice and consolidated
the appeals for purposes of briefing and disposition. See Grunt Style LLC v. TWD, LLC,
140 F.4th 839, 847–48 (7th Cir. 2025).

-- 2 of 3 --

Nos. 24-3334 & 25-1628 Page 3
Frazier now challenges the district court’s refusal to require the prison
contractors to indemnify Jones. He asserts that they indemnified her in a different
action. But while Jones may be entitled under Indiana law to indemnification by her
former employers for costs related to this case, see IND. C ODE § 34-13-4-1, any right to
indemnity is Jones’s, not Frazier’s. See Robinett v. City of Indianapolis, 894 F.3d 876, 880
(7th Cir. 2018).
To the extent Frazier means to contest the damages award or the summary
judgment entered for the other defendants, he has not suggested any basis to disturb
the court’s order. See FED. R. A PP. P. 28(a)(8); Behning v. Johnson, 56 F.4th 1137, 1140
(7th Cir. 2023).
AFFIRMED

-- 3 of 3 --