William Gardner v. Kwame Raoul

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 20, 2026*
Decided May 26, 2026
Before
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 25-2008
WILLIAM GARDNER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KWAME RAOUL,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:25-cv-00058
Martha M. Pacold,
Judge.
O R D E R
William Gardner brought two federal actions seeking to enjoin officials in Illinois
from enforcing state criminal laws against him. At the time of the first suit, his state
criminal proceedings were ongoing, so the district court dismissed the suit without
prejudice based on the abstention doctrine set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,
* The appellee was not served with process and is not participating in this appeal. We have
agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and record adequately present the facts
and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED . R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-2008 Page 2
43–45 (1971). Gardner then filed a second suit raising similar, but not identical, claims.
The same judge who had handled the first suit struck Gardner’s filings in the second as
“duplicative” and dismissed it. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of the second
suit, but on other grounds.
In 2018, Gardner was convicted of multiple offenses in the Circuit Court of Cook
County, Illinois. While his direct appeal was pending in the state appellate courts,
he filed a federal lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that state officials violated his
rights under the Due Process Clause by initiating criminal proceedings without a valid
indictment, denying him a trial by jury, altering the indictment by judicial order after
the jury verdict, and refusing to acknowledge his postconviction motions.
The district court explained to Gardner that the proper vehicle for challenging
his state criminal conviction is a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 and advised Gardner to file such a petition or amend his complaint to avoid
seeking relief that falls within the scope of collateral review. Gardner then amended his
complaint to clarify that he did not seek to overturn his conviction, but instead sought a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to halt the continuation of his
case through the state’s appellate process.
The district court dismissed sua sponte Gardner’s complaint without prejudice
under Younger. On appeal, we affirmed, explaining that federal courts must abstain
from enjoining ongoing state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances,
see Younger, 401 U.S. at 53–54, and that Gardner failed to establish any such
extraordinary circumstances.
While that appeal was pending, however, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed
Gardner’s conviction, and the Illinois Supreme Court denied Gardner’s petition for
leave to appeal, rendering his conviction final.† People v. Gardner, 2024 IL App (1st)
211304-U; People v. Gardner, 244 N.E.3d 225 (Ill. 2024). Gardner did not inform this court
or the district court of these developments.
† We take judicial notice of the state court records. See Patrick v. City of Chicago, 81 F.4th 730, 734
n.2 (7th Cir. 2023) (citing Ewell v. Tony, 853 F.3d 911, 917 (7th Cir. 2017)) (state court proceedings are a
proper subject of judicial notice). Gardner also filed multiple petitions for relief from judgment, all of
which were denied. See People v. Gardner, No. 1-24-0753, 2025 WL 2491156 at *2–3 (Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 29,
2025).

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No. 25-2008 Page 3
After his conviction became final, Gardner filed a second suit in federal court. He
again sought an injunction preventing Illinois from enforcing its criminal laws against
him. He reasserted his earlier claim that the state violated his rights under the Due
Process Clause by prosecuting him without first securing a proper indictment, but in
the second suit he added a new claim that the state lacks constitutional authority to
enact and enforce criminal laws. He also moved for entry of default judgment.
Before service of process, the same judge who handled the first suit struck
Gardner’s filings in the second suit as a “duplication” of the first.
On appeal, Gardner argues that the district court erred in dismissing his second
suit as duplicative. We agree. “No rule of federal law requires the dismissal of a second
or successive civil suit, even if another concerning the same controversy is pending.
…Even when prudence calls for putting a redundant suit on hold, it must be stayed
rather than dismissed unless there is no possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff.” Gleash
v. Yuswak, 308 F.3d 758, 760 (7th Cir. 2002).
That standard is not satisfied here. Although Gardner’s first suit remained
pending on appeal when the district court dismissed the second, the second differed
from the first in at least two material respects. First, it included a new claim that the
state exceeded its constitutional authority by enacting criminal laws—a theory not
raised, and therefore not resolvable, in the first suit. Second, Gardner filed the second
action after his conviction became final, so Younger abstention—the reason the district
court dismissed the first suit—no longer applied. We therefore cannot say that the first
suit offered a comprehensive solution or that dismissal of the second posed “no
possibility” of prejudice, so the district court should have stayed, rather than dismissed,
the second suit.
Ultimately, however, the district court was correct to dismiss Gardner’s second
suit. His claims—requesting relief from imprisonment by Illinois officials who he
believes prosecuted him upon a defective indictment and under unconstitutional
statutes—fall within the exclusive province of habeas corpus. See Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475, 489, 500 (1973). The Supreme Court has explained that proceedings under
42 U.S.C. § 2254 are “the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact
or duration of his confinement.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994));
see also Huber v. Anderson, 909 F.3d 201, 207–08 (7th Cir. 2018). This is true of both
Gardner’s direct attack that the indictment in his case was unlawful and his indirect
attack that the statutes underlying his prosecution were unlawful. See Wilkinson v.
Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005) (habeas is the exclusive remedy whether attacking custody

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No. 25-2008 Page 4
directly or by implication). Therefore, his claims are not cognizable under § 1983 and
must be dismissed. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 481; Clayton-El v. Fisher, 96 F.3d 236, 244 n.4
(7th Cir. 1996) (explaining that after Heck, § 1983 claims that should have been brought
under § 2254 must be dismissed).
Gardner also argues that the district court should have entered default judgment
because the defendants did not respond to Gardner’s complaint. But because no
defendants were served, it would not have been appropriate for the clerk to enter
default or the district court to enter default judgment. See F ED. R. CIV. P. 55.
AFFIRMED

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