Steven Curry v. MARY CERDA and ADOBERTO TORREZ

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 26, 2026 *
Decided May 28, 2026
Before
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1298
STEVEN CURRY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MARY CERDA and ADOBERTO
TORREZ,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 23-1058
Colleen R. Lawless,
Judge.
O R D E R
Steven Curry, an Illinois prisoner, appeals the district court’s summary judgment
against him for failing to exhaust administrative remedies before he filed this suit. We
affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-1298 Page 2
Curry, who is incarcerated at the Pontiac Correctional Center, has faced
discipline on multiple occasions for sexual misconduct and other violations of prison
rules. After holding disciplinary hearings on these violations, the adjustment committee
(including defendants Mary Cerda and Adoberto Torrez) recommended that Curry be
punished with yard restrictions and time in segregated housing. Between 2021 and
2023, Curry filed a dozen grievances related to his disciplinary proceedings. In these
grievances, Curry complained about the adjustment committee’s consideration of
certain evidence, the timing of his hearings, Cerda’s qualifications, and bias on the part
of both Cerda and Torrez. Curry also wrote numerous letters to the Administrative
Review Board reiterating his dissatisfaction with Cerda’s and Torrez’s handling of his
disciplinary proceedings.
Curry then turned to federal court, asserting constitutional violations in
connection with his disciplinary proceedings. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court
screened Curry’s amended complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and allowed him to
proceed on a claim that Cerda and Torrez violated his First Amendment rights by
punishing him with unusually long periods of segregation in retaliation for his
grievances against them. Curry later attempted to file a second amended complaint
alleging additional facts and a claim under the Eighth Amendment against different
prison officials.
Cerda and Torrez moved for summary judgment based on Curry’s failure to
exhaust administrative remedies, as required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Cerda and Torrez argued that there is no record that
Curry submitted any grievances to the Administrative Review Board related to the
alleged retaliation.
The district court agreed with Cerda and Torrez and granted their motion. None
of Curry’s twelve grievances, the court explained, raised the issue of Cerda’s and
Torrez’s alleged retaliation against him. Moreover, Curry’s letters to the Administrative
Review Board were insufficient because they failed to comply with the prison’s
administrative rules. The court also struck Curry’s second amended complaint because
he did not follow the court’s instructions for seeking leave to amend—as set out in a
prior scheduling order—that directed him to explain how the amended complaint
differed from the operative complaint.
On appeal, Curry continues to assert that the twelve grievances he filed—
generally attacking Cerda’s and Torrez’s handling of his disciplinary proceedings—

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No. 25-1298 Page 3
were sufficient to satisfy the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. But to exhaust
administrative remedies under the PLRA, a prisoner must comply with every step of
the prison’s grievance process, Breyley v. Fuchs, 156 F.4th 845, 847–48 (7th Cir. 2025)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)), and this includes providing specific “factual details
regarding each aspect of [his] complaint” in a prison grievance, ILL. A DMIN . C ODE tit. 20,
§ 504.810(c). As the district court meticulously showed, Curry faltered in this regard.
Although some of his grievances and letters complained about Cerda and Torrez in
relation to other aspects of his disciplinary hearings, not one alluded to retaliation or to
his term of his disciplinary segregation being unusually long.
Curry also asserts that the court disregarded his pro se status by striking his
second amended complaint. But the court’s decision to strike this complaint was within
its discretion. See Heng v. Heavner, Beyers & Mihlar, LLC, 849 F.3d 348, 353 (7th Cir. 2017).
Even pro se litigants are subject to the rules of civil procedure, see Bowman v. Korte,
962 F.3d 995, 998 (7th Cir. 2020), and Curry failed to comply with the court’s
instructions for seeking leave to amend. He did not supply, for example, a separate
attachment explaining how the amendment differed from the previous complaint. We
note, too, that Curry had already amended his complaint once as a matter of course.
See F ED. R. C IV. P. 15(a)(1).
We have considered Curry’s other arguments, and none requires discussion.
AFFIRMED

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