United States of America v. Jesse Mickles

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-2657
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JESSE M ICKLES,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:20-cr-00173 — Sarah Evans Barker, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED M AY 11, 2026 — DECIDED J UNE 4, 2026
____________________
Before R OVNER , SYKES, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.
ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Jesse Mickles admitted during a traf-
fic stop that he was a felon and had a firearm in his car. Police
found that gun under the driver’s seat, and before long, Mick-
les pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He argues on
appeal that the district court plainly erred in accepting this
plea because it lacked a factual basis, but the factual basis is
irrefutable, so we affirm.

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2 No. 25-2657
I. Background
In July 2020, Jesse Mickles was driving down I-70 when an
Indiana state trooper pulled him over. After the trooper asked
Mickles if he had any weapons, Mickles admitted that he had
a firearm in the car—and that he was a felon. The trooper
found that firearm under the driver’s seat.
Two weeks later, a grand jury indicted Mickles under 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which forbids felons from possessing fire-
arms. Mickles entered into a plea agreement that stipulated
the facts above as the basis for his guilty plea. In advance of
his change-of-plea hearing, Mickles submitted an affidavit
signed by Steve Gray, the owner of the firearm that Mickles
admitted to possessing. According to the affidavit, Mickles
was returning the firearm to Gray, who had left it at Mickles’s
home, when the trooper pulled him over.
At the change-of-plea hearing, Mickles confirmed that he
understood the charge against him to be possessing a firearm
as a previously convicted felon. The court asked him if he had
any questions about that charge or its essential elements, to
which Mickles responded he was “very clear on it.” He fur-
ther assured the court that he had read the plea agreement—
which listed the elements of § 922(g)(1) and the factual basis—
and “thoroughly went over it” with his attorney. Mickles later
confirmed that the plea agreement’s stipulated factual basis
accurately reflected his conduct. The court accordingly ac-
cepted Mickles’s plea as knowing, voluntary, and supported
by an adequate factual basis.
II. Discussion
Mickles contends that the district court violated Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(3), which provides: “Before

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No. 25-2657 3
entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court must determine
that there is a factual basis for the plea.” In Mickles’s telling,
the district court lacked evidence that he knowingly pos-
sessed the firearm—a necessary element under § 922(g)(1). See
United States v. Coley, 137 F.4th 874, 882 (7th Cir. 2025) (listing
the elements of this offense). Mickles concedes that because
he did not object to the factual basis below or move to with-
draw his plea, our review is only for plain error. See United
States v. Power, 170 F.4th 640, 644 (7th Cir. 2026).
For purposes of § 922(g)(1), “[p]ossession may be either
actual or constructive.” United States v. White, 95 F.4th 1073,
1078 (7th Cir. 2024). Whereas “direct physical control over a
thing” constitutes actual possession, “[c]onstructive posses-
sion is established when a person, though lacking such phys-
ical custody, still has the power and intent to exercise control
over the object.” Henderson v. United States, 575 U.S. 622, 626
(2015). “Proximity together with evidence showing a connec-
tion between the defendant and the gun is sufficient to estab-
lish constructive possession.” Coley, 137 F.4th at 882; see White,
95 F.4th at 1078.
The factual basis supporting constructive possession is
overwhelming, so the district court did not err, let alone
plainly err. As an initial matter, Mickles concedes that he had
exclusive control over the vehicle in which the trooper found
the firearm. That alone suffices, as we have time and again
explained that a defendant’s proximity to contraband, to-
gether with his exclusive control over the premises wherein
the contraband was located, is enough to establish construc-
tive possession. Coley, 137 F.4th at 882; see, e.g., United States v.
Perryman, 20 F.4th 1127, 1133 (7th Cir. 2021); United States v.
Griffin, 684 F.3d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 2012). But there is more:

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4 No. 25-2657
Mickles was driving the vehicle when the trooper found the
firearm under his seat, which further establishes constructive
possession under our precedents. See, e.g., United States v. Gar-
rett, 903 F.2d 1105, 1107–11 (7th Cir. 1990) (upholding a
§ 922(g)(1) conviction where police arrested the defendant
just before he entered a vehicle containing a gun on the floor
of the driver’s side); United States v. Morris, 576 F.3d 661, 670
(7th Cir. 2009) (upholding a § 922(g)(1) conviction where po-
lice found a firearm in the storage compartment of a car the
defendant had driven on several occasions and was in imme-
diately before the search). And Mickles’s admission to police
that he had a firearm dispels any notion that he lacked the
requisite mens rea.
Mickles’s only counterargument—that he was merely re-
turning Gray’s firearm and thus lacked the intent to control
that constructive possession requires—both rests on a mis-
taken legal premise and backfires. First, Gray’s ownership of
the firearm is legally irrelevant. See United States v. Hubbard,
61 F.3d 1261, 1272 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he fact that [the defend-
ant] did not own the guns does not vitiate his possession of
them for purposes of section 922(g).”). And more fundamen-
tally, Mickles’s intent to return the firearm only proves posses-
sion, as Mickles could not bring the firearm from his home to
Gray’s without “the power and intent to exercise control
over” the firearm (and thus constructive possession), if not
“direct physical control” over it (and thus actual possession).
Henderson, 575 U.S. at 626. The factual basis underpinning
Mickles’s guilty plea was more than adequate.
To some extent in his reply brief, and to a greater extent at
oral argument, Mickles attempted to claim that his plea was
not knowing and voluntary because the district court

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No. 25-2657 5
insufficiently reviewed the elements of the offense with him.
But the only argument his opening brief develops is that his
guilty plea lacked a factual basis, so he has waived all other
claims. See United States v. Butler, 58 F.4th 364, 368 (7th Cir.
2023) (arguments not developed in an opening brief are
waived); United States v. Beavers, 756 F.3d 1044, 1059 (7th Cir.
2014) (same).
* * *
The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.

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