United States of America v. Jessie R. Bates

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted June 9, 2026
Decided June 10, 2026
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Chief Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
REBECCA TAIBLESON, Circuit Judge
No. 25-2292
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JESSIE R. BATES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 23-CR-30082-002
Colleen R. Lawless,
Judge.
O R D E R
Jessie Bates pleaded guilty to one count of distributing 50 grams or more of
actual methamphetamine and was sentenced to 204 months in prison. He filed a notice
of appeal, but his appointed lawyer asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to
withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We grant the motion and
dismiss the appeal.
On October 5, 2023, Bates and his codefendant sold approximately 110 grams of
methamphetamine to a confidential informant. Bates met the informant again on
October 30 and sold him another 110.1 grams of the drug, which was tested at a DEA
laboratory and determined to contain 107.5 grams of pure methamphetamine. Bates
was charged with aiding and abetting his codefendant in distributing 50 grams or more
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

-- 1 of 4 --

No. 25-2292 Page 2
of actual methamphetamine on October 5 (count 1), and again on October 30 (count 2)
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(viii).
Bates initially pleaded not guilty, but on March 5, 2025, he appeared at a change-
of-plea hearing and entered an open guilty plea to count 2. The court determined Bates
was competent and advised him of the essential elements of the offense, possible
penalties, and the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty. The government stated its
intent to dismiss count 1 because an outside laboratory had misplaced the
methamphetamine seized from the October 5 transaction; the government then recited
the facts supporting count 2. Bates agreed with the summary of the government’s
evidence against him and entered his plea to count 2. The court accepted his plea,
finding that he had entered it knowingly and voluntarily and that it was supported by
an independent factual basis containing each of the essential elements of the offense.
A probation officer prepared a presentence report and calculated an advisory
range of 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment (based on a total offense level of 34 and a
criminal history category VI). Bates’s offense level was largely driven by his status as a
career offender, which stemmed from three prior felony convictions for possession and
delivery of cocaine. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a)–(b).
At sentencing, the court asked Bates whether he was satisfied with his attorney’s
representation. Initially, Bates indicated he was not, noting that he felt the proceedings
had been rushed (given some of the late filings and objections), though he asked to
proceed that day with sentencing. The court, however, continued the hearing for a week
to give Bates more time to prepare.
A week later, when sentencing recommenced, the court heard argument on the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. The government argued for a prison sentence of 300 months
and emphasized Bates’s long criminal history. Defense counsel countered that the
guidelines overrepresented his criminal history and sought the statutory minimum
120 months. The court, after considering the § 3553(a) factors, sentenced Bates to
204 months in prison with five years of supervised release to follow.
Counsel reports that Bates is interested in withdrawing his plea and therefore
considers whether there are any nonfrivolous grounds on which he could do so.
United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012). She considers first whether
Bates could plausibly argue that the plea was unknowing or involuntary. Because Bates
did not seek to withdraw his plea in the district court, we would review the court’s
acceptance of it only for plain error. FED. R. C RIM. P. 52(b); see United States v. Collins,

-- 2 of 4 --

No. 25-2292 Page 3
986 F.3d 1029, 1032 (7th Cir. 2021). We have reviewed the transcript of the plea colloquy
and agree with counsel that the district court substantially complied with the
requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. The court determined that Bates
was competent to enter a plea and that he understood the charges against him, the
rights he was waiving by pleading guilty, and the possible penalties. FED. R. C RIM. P.
11(b), (c); United States v. Bridgewater, 995 F.3d 591, 595–96 (7th Cir. 2021).
Counsel also correctly rejects as frivolous an argument that the plea was
unknowing or involuntary based on a less-than-three-gram discrepancy between the
field-tested weight of the methamphetamine seized on October 30 (110.1 grams) and the
amount the government stated at the change-of-plea hearing (107.5 grams). Voluntary
responses made by a defendant under oath before the court are binding, see
United States v. White, 597 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2010), and we presume the truth of a
defendant’s statements at a Rule 11 colloquy, see United States v. Barr, 960 F.3d 906, 917
(7th Cir. 2020). At the colloquy, Bates admitted the factual basis of his plea, specifically
that he sold fifty grams or more of actual methamphetamine on October 30, 2023, and
that he knew the methamphetamine was a controlled substance. These admissions are
presumptively true. See id. The difference of 2.6 grams does not impugn the knowing or
voluntary nature of Bates’s plea.
Next, counsel rightly concludes that Bates cannot plausibly challenge his
sentence on procedural grounds. Counsel proposes no error, and we see none in the
court’s calculation of the guidelines range. Though the probation officer initially
concluded that Bates was responsible for 217.9 grams of methamphetamine and applied
a base offense level of 32, at sentencing Bates and the government agreed that the
officer—by considering the amount of methamphetamine charged in count 1—wrongly
applied U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(4) rather than § 2D1.1(c)(5). The court agreed that the correct
base offense level was 30. The court concluded, however, that because the career-
offender guideline set Bates’s base offense level at 37, the officer’s error would not affect
the guidelines calculation. The three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility
resulted in a total offense level of 34, which, when combined with criminal history
category VI, yielded an advisory range of 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment.
Counsel next considers whether Bates could plausibly challenge the application
of the career offender guideline, see id. § 4B1.1(a)–(b), and correctly determines he
cannot. Bates admitted that the career-offender enhancement applied to him, so we
would review the court’s application of it for plain error. See United States v. Thomas,
897 F.3d 807, 816 (7th Cir. 2018). And Bates cannot plausibly contend that plain error
occurred. In United States v. Ruth, we held that the career-offender guideline defined

-- 3 of 4 --

No. 25-2292 Page 4
“controlled substance broadly ... to ‘include state-law offenses.’” 966 F.3d 642, 654
(7th Cir. 2020). Bates was convicted under the cocaine-specific provisions of 720 ILCS
570/401, the statute at issue in Ruth, and we see no reason to disturb our holding there.
See, e.g., United States v. Wallace, 991 F.3d 810, 817 (7th Cir. 2021).
As for substantive reasonableness, we agree with counsel that any challenge to
Bates’s below-guidelines sentence would be frivolous. A below-guidelines sentence is
presumptively reasonable, and Bates bears “a particularly onerous burden” to rebut
that presumption by showing that the sentence is unreasonably high in light of the
§ 3553(a) factors. United States v. Moore, 851 F.3d 666, 674 (7th Cir. 2017). The court
logically invoked those factors when explaining the sentence, including the seriousness
of the offense (elevated by Bates’s fleeing from the scene) and Bates’s lengthy history as
a low-level street dealer. Balancing these factors against Bates’s challenging childhood,
his age when he committed his prior convictions, his overstated criminal history
(including nine points for driving offenses), and his long history of substance abuse, the
court settled on a below-guidelines sentence of 204 months. It is not our role on appeal
to reweigh these factors. See United States v. Ambriz-Villa, 28 F.4th 786, 791–92 (7th Cir.
2022).
We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

-- 4 of 4 --