United States of America v. Ademeko Maclin-Carney

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted June 9, 2026
Decided June 11, 2026
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Chief Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
REBECCA TAIBLESON, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1398
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ADEMEKO MACLIN-CARNEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 23-CR-20029-001
Stephen P. McGlynn,
Judge.
O R D E R
Ademeko Maclin-Carney was found guilty by a jury of kidnapping in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) and sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment. Maclin-Carney
appeals, but her appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to
withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We notified Maclin-Carney
of counsel’s motion to withdraw, and she did not file a response. See C IR . R. 51(b).
Counsel’s brief adequately explains the nature of the case and discusses potential issues
that an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve. See United States v. Bey,
748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). Because counsel’s analysis appears thorough, we limit
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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our review to the subjects that counsel discusses. See id. We grant the motion and
dismiss the appeal.
BACKGROUND
Maclin-Carney and her brother were charged in connection with the kidnapping
of James “Ed” Good in 2022. See 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1). Defendants lured Good to an
abandoned house under the guise of hiring him for a flooring project. Good was maced,
bound, held at gunpoint, and thrown into the trunk of a car with broken glass.
Defendants attempted to hold him for ransom, but Good escaped and was eventually
located by police. Later that day, Good told police that Maclin-Carney was the woman
who had maced him, but he was unable to identify her in the initial photo lineup
because she had a different hairstyle. When an updated photo was used in a subsequent
lineup, Good identified Maclin-Carney. Five days after Good’s escape, officers arrested
Maclin-Carney.
Prior to trial, Maclin-Carney filed several motions. She first filed a motion in
limine to preclude the “search history related to the penalty for murder” that was found
during a forensic examination of a phone that officers recovered from her. The court
denied the motion.
Maclin-Carney also filed two motions relating to the discovery of threatening
letters and phone calls. The letters instructed Maclin-Carney’s family members to
fabricate an alibi. One letter also contained the names of Good and his wife, as well as
one of the prosecutors, Bryan Freres. Maclin-Carney’s aunt, Laura Nash, testified that
Maclin-Carney instructed her to give the names to Maclin-Carney’s mother with the
intent to have those people “disappear” if she “got an adverse outcome at trial.” The
discovery of the letters triggered an investigation that uncovered calls from Maclin-
Carney stating that Good, Freres, and the trial judge would all “fall on their ass one by
one.” Maclin-Carney moved to disqualify the trial judge, see 28 U.S.C. § 455, and Freres,
see id. § 528. The judge granted the motion to disqualify herself but did not rule on the
motion to disqualify Freres. After the case was reassigned, the new judge denied the
motion to disqualify Freres without prejudice.
Maclin-Carney also filed a motion in limine to bar the government from
presenting evidence of the alleged phone calls and letters. The court denied the motion
with respect to the letters requesting a fabricated alibi, so long as evidence of Maclin-
Carney’s incarceration at the Macon County Jail was excluded from testimony and

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No. 25-1398 Page 3
exhibits. It also directed counsel not to discuss threats against the Goods, the judge, and
Freres at trial.
At trial, the government presented evidence tying Maclin-Carney to the
kidnapping. Good testified that he recognized Maclin-Carney from two previous
flooring projects and identified her by name to officers. He also made an in-court
identification of Maclin-Carney.
Surveillance video was introduced showing a car matching Maclin-Carney’s
silver Kia arriving at the abandoned house before Good. Investigators also matched a
piece of a bumper—found in the yard of the house—to the Kia. Maclin-Carney was
arrested in the same Kia.
Forensic evidence from Maclin-Carney’s phone revealed the presence of two
apps installed before the kidnapping and uninstalled within five minutes of the final
ransom call. One allows the caller to hide the phone number from the recipient, and the
other allows the user to remotely gain control of a different phone. The internet search
history on the phone also contained searches, conducted before the kidnapping, about
Good, his business, and the penalty for third-degree murder.
Physical forensic evidence also tied Maclin-Carney to the kidnapping, including
DNA on Good’s notebook and fingerprints found on the can of pepper spray recovered
from the scene. The government’s DNA expert testified that there was “strong support”
to conclude that Maclin-Carney’s DNA was on the steering wheel of Good’s car, which
was found abandoned. Forensic testing confirmed that fibers from Good’s clothing were
inside the trunk liner of the Kia.
The government also introduced the alibi-fabrication letters. Maclin-Carney
objected to the admission of the letters as unfairly prejudicial, as she had decided not to
put on any alibi defense. But the court overruled her objection, determining that the
letters were “evidence of consciousness of guilt.” An FBI forensic handwriting expert
testified that the handwriting in the letters matched the handwriting of Maclin-Carney.
Nash produced a new letter while on the witness stand, stating she had not
previously produced it because of “threats on my life.” The court did not let Nash
testify about the new letter, and Maclin-Carney moved for a mistrial, arguing that Nash
“implied that [Maclin-Carney] threatened her life or someone on her behalf.” The court
denied the motion and gave a limiting instruction.

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After the government rested, Maclin-Carney moved for judgment of acquittal,
see F ED. R. C RIM . P. 29(a), arguing that because the indictment charged in the
conjunctive, the government needed to prove that the defendants “willfully and
unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnapped, abducted, and carried
away” Good (emphasis added). And because the government failed to prove that the
defendants carried Good, she argued, acquittal should be entered on all charges. The
court denied the motion, reasoning that Good was carried when the defendants
transported him in the car. Maclin-Carney later submitted proposed jury instructions
that used the same language as the indictment, which the court did not accept. Rather,
the court used the pattern jury instruction which contains the disjunctive “or,” as
opposed to the conjunctive “and.”
After the jury convicted Maclin-Carney, she filed combined post-trial motions,
including a further motion for judgment of acquittal, see F ED. R. C RIM . P. 29(c), a motion
for new trial, see F ED. R. C RIM . P. 33, and a motion for arrest of judgment, see F ED. R.
C RIM . P. 34. She argued that the evidence was insufficient to convict. She also listed
every adverse ruling against her, contending that they amounted to cumulative error.
Thus, she argued, the court was required either to vacate the verdict and order a new
trial or to enter a judgment of acquittal. The court denied the motion, reasoning that the
evidence was sufficient to convict Maclin-Carney, that she failed to develop any new
arguments in her motion, and that the motion for arrest of judgment was untimely.
The court sentenced Maclin-Carney to 360 months’ imprisonment, within her
guidelines range of 360 months to life (based on a total offense level of 42 and criminal
history category of II). Maclin-Carney’s offense-level calculation included several
enhancements, notably a two-level increase for obstruction of justice, see U.S.S.G.
§ 3C1.1. The court justified the sentence based on the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a), highlighting the seriousness of the offense; Maclin-Carney’s history and
characteristics, including education level, perceived lack of remorse, and attempt to
fabricate an alibi; and the need for specific deterrence. It also highlighted several
mitigating factors, including her family life and mental health struggles, but found that
the aggravating factors were “off the charts.”
ANALYSIS
In his Anders brief, counsel first considers whether Maclin-Carney could argue
that the district court erred by denying her motion in limine to bar evidence of her
internet searches. We agree with counsel that any challenge to the motion would be

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frivolous. While there is some prejudicial effect from admitting the search for third-
degree murder—a charge Maclin-Carney did not face—that prejudice did not outweigh
the evidence’s probative value because it evinced her intent to use potentially lethal
violence as part of the scheme to kidnap Good. See United States v. Eads, 729 F.3d 769,
777 (7th Cir. 2013).
Counsel also considers, but rightly declines to challenge, the denial of Maclin-
Carney’s motion to disqualify Freres. As counsel correctly points out, there is no
caselaw in our circuit discussing whether a prosecutor, after receiving threats, should
be dismissed. “Although the issue is one of first impression in this circuit, that does not
automatically lead to the conclusion that it is nonfrivolous and cannot be resolved in an
Anders posture without briefing.” United States v. Easter, 553 F.3d 519, 525 (7th Cir.
2009).
Maclin-Carney points to 28 U.S.C. § 528 to suggest that her threat against the
prosecutor gave him a personal interest in the outcome of the prosecution that
disqualified him from continuing to represent the government in this case. The statute
directs the Attorney General to promulgate regulations requiring disqualification of
prosecutors from participating in cases where it “may result in a personal … conflict of
interest, or the appearance thereof.” Id. The statute does not, however, define its own
terms, leaving that to the regulation. The regulation, in turn, defines a “personal
relationship” as one involving a “close and substantial connection of the type normally
viewed as likely to induce partiality,” and which may be presumed in the case of
parents, siblings, children, and spouses. 28 C.F.R. § 45.2(c)(2). As Freres was
threatened―but had no other relationship with Maclin-Carney―there are no
nonfrivolous arguments that could be made that there was a personal conflict of interest
under 28 U.S.C. § 528 and 28 C.F.R. § 45.2. Maclin-Carney’s reading of the statute to
mandate disqualification of prosecutors for receiving threats from defendants would
encourage “shopping” for prosecutors and would only encourage further threats. See,
e.g., United States v. Walsh, 47 F.4th 491, 500 (7th Cir. 2022) (recusal not required when
defendant threatens judge). We decline the invitation to adopt a reading of section 528
that is neither textual nor sensible.
Counsel next rejects any argument that the evidence was insufficient to convict
Maclin-Carney. Evidence is insufficient when no rational trier of fact could have found
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Scott, 150 F.4th 929,
934 (7th Cir. 2025). Here, the government presented ample evidence connecting the

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kidnapping to Maclin-Carney—her car, her phone, the video surveillance footage,
forensic evidence, and witness identification.
Counsel also considers whether Maclin-Carney could challenge the admission of
the alibi-fabrication letters. The government provided evidence—the testimony of
handwriting experts—that Maclin-Carney wrote the letters. And the letters were
directly relevant to her consciousness of guilt, which was itself circumstantial evidence
that she was guilty. See United States v. Frazier, 129 F.4th 392, 406 (7th Cir. 2025). Under
these circumstances, counsel could not raise a nonfrivolous argument that the court
abused its discretion in admitting the letters.
Counsel also rightly rejects any argument that the court abused its discretion by
denying Maclin-Carney’s motion for a mistrial. Under the abuse of discretion standard,
we will reverse a district court’s denial of a mistrial only if “we have a strong conviction
that the district court erred,” such that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial.
United States v. Danford, 435 F.3d 682, 686 (7th Cir. 2006). While Nash’s comment that
she had not disclosed the letter because of threats to her life was incendiary, it would be
frivolous to argue that the court should have granted the motion when it gave a limiting
instruction to disregard that testimony and Nash did not identify who threatened her.
Id. at 687. Jurors are presumed to follow limiting instructions, see Yu Tian Li v.
United States, 648 F.3d 524, 531 (7th Cir. 2011), and particularly given that Nash did not
specify who made the threat, we have no reason to doubt that it was curative here.
Next, counsel examines and rightly rejects as frivolous any challenge to the jury
instructions for the elements of kidnapping. Maclin-Carney objected to the pattern jury
instructions’ use of the disjunctive “or” rather than the conjunctive “and” that appears
in the text of the indictment. But a district court does not abuse its discretion when it
gives jury instructions “in the disjunctive in the context of a conjunctively worded
indictment.” United States v. Rice, 520 F.3d 811, 817 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
And beyond this, the jury instruction accurately reflected the law.
Counsel also considers whether it would be frivolous to argue that there was a
fatal variance to the indictment. But again, counsel is correct that the government’s
evidence did not prove facts different from those alleged in the indictment.
See United States v. Heon Seok Lee, 937 F.3d 797, 806 (7th Cir. 2019). The jury instruction
stated that the Government must prove that Maclin-Carney “willfully and unlawfully
seized confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnapped, abducted, and carried away” Good.

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While Maclin-Carney argued that she had never physically carried Good, driving him
satisfies this element. See, e.g., Frazier, 129 F.4th at 403–04.
Counsel also rightly concludes that no non-frivolous challenge can be made to
the court’s denial of Maclin-Carney’s post-trial motions. In considering the denial of a
motion for a judgment of acquittal, we ask “whether evidence exists from which any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” United States v. Doody, 600 F.3d 752, 754 (7th Cir. 2010). And when
reviewing the denial of a motion for new trial, we consider whether the evidence
against the verdict is so strong that it would be a miscarriage of justice to let the verdict
stand. See United States v. Friedman, 971 F.3d 700, 713 (7th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). A
challenge to the denial of either motion would be frivolous because, for the reasons
already mentioned, ample evidence supported Maclin-Carney’s guilt. And as to her
motion for arrest of judgment under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 34, it is clear
that the court had jurisdiction over the charged offense, see 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and her
motion does not offer an explanation to the contrary. To the extent her motion can be
construed as one attacking the indictment pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure Rule 12(b)(3), the motion was untimely because motions alleging a defect in
instituting the prosecution must be made before trial. See F ED. R. C RIM . P. 12(b)(3)(A).
Next, counsel evaluates whether Maclin-Carney could plausibly challenge her
sentence but concludes, correctly, that doing so would be frivolous. He considers
whether she could make a procedural challenge to her sentence on appeal. But the court
correctly calculated her guidelines range and, regardless, she agreed with the
calculation, so any potential challenge to it would be forfeited. See United States v. Boyle,
28 F.4th 798, 802 (7th Cir. 2022).
Next, counsel considers, and rightly rejects, several arguments that could be
brought under plain-error review. He first questions whether it was proper to add the
two-year obstruction of justice enhancement given that the alibi-fabrication letters were
never delivered to their intended recipients. But the enhancement applies to defendants
who attempt to obstruct justice, as Maclin-Carney did here. See United States v. Ranjel,
872 F.3d 815, 820 (7th Cir. 2017).
Counsel also questions whether the court considered Maclin-Carney’s mitigating
factors in calculating her sentence. But the court addressed her principal arguments in
mitigation, namely her difficult upbringing, responsibilities as a parent, and struggles
with mental health and substance abuse. The court even went so far as to say that the

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sentence imposed was lower than it originally anticipated because of these mitigating
factors, so she cannot make a nonfrivolous argument that the factors were not
considered in the sentencing calculation. See United States v. Sanchez, 989 F.3d 523, 540
(7th Cir. 2021).
Counsel considers whether it was proper for the court to take Maclin-Carney’s
lack of remorse into consideration when calculating its sentence. But there are no
nonfrivolous arguments to support this argument—the court properly considered lack
of remorse here as to lack of rehabilitation and deterrence. See United States v. Keskes,
703 F.3d 1078, 1090–91 (7th Cir. 2013).
Next, he questions whether there are any nonfrivolous arguments that Maclin-
Carney’s sentence was substantively unreasonable. Her within-guidelines sentence is
presumptively reasonable, and we will uphold a sentence if the court adequately
explained its reasoning. See United States v. Major, 33 F.4th 370, 384 (7th Cir. 2022). Here,
the court explained with reference to the § 3553(a) factors, emphasizing the seriousness
of the offense (referring to kidnapping as a “horrible crime” that “leaves scars and
wounds that are deep and last a very, very long time”); characteristics of the defendant
(stating that Maclin-Carney “didn’t show remorse in prison”); and deterrence
(reasoning that, given her age upon release, she is unlikely to reoffend).
Finally, counsel considers whether any nonfrivolous challenges can be made to
the two-year term of supervised release. Maclin-Carney did not object to the term of
supervised release and therefore waived any challenge to its conditions.
See United States v. Flores, 929 F.3d 443, 449 (7th Cir. 2019). In any event, the term of
supervised release was within guidelines range and is presumed reasonable on appeal.
See United States v. Lickers, 928 F.3d 609, 621 (7th Cir. 2019). No facts in the record would
rebut this presumption.
We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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