United States of America v. Fernando D. Bolden

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-1734
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
F ERNANDO D. BOLDEN ,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 2:24-cr-00002-JPS-1 — J. P. Stadtmueller, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED F EBRUARY 13, 2026 — DECIDED J UNE 12, 2026
____________________
Before BRENNAN , Chief Judge, HAMILTON , and S CUDDER ,
Circuit Judges.
S CUDDER , Circuit Judge. Shortly after police observed Fer-
nando Bolden enter a Milwaukee residence carrying a gun,
they obtained a warrant to search the home. The search recov-
ered a gun, loaded magazines and ammunition, bags of fen-
tanyl and other drugs, and $50,259 in cash. A federal indict-
ment followed, and in time Bolden pleaded guilty to two fire-
arms charges. In doing so, he reserved his right to challenge

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2 No. 25-1734
the search warrant as unsupported by probable cause and the
product of police misrepresentation. While we see the proba-
ble cause analysis as a closer call, we have no trouble agreeing
with the district court that the Milwaukee police acted in good
faith reliance upon the warrant in conducting the search. So
we affirm Bolden’s convictions on that basis.
I
A
In December 2022, a confidential informant told Milwau-
kee police officers that a drug dealer known as “Blessed” had
attempted to give him a sample of crack cocaine. The inform-
ant provided a physical description of “Blessed” and stated
that he drove a red BMW sedan. In early 2023, the informant
also reported that “Blessed” was armed and lived near North
43rd Street and West Good Hope Road in Milwaukee.
The police then built on this information. A license plate
check revealed that the red BMW was registered to Latia N.
Johnson, whose address was 7169 North 42nd Street in Mil-
waukee. Utility records likewise showed Johnson living at the
same address. Police records indicated that Johnson was Bol-
den’s girlfriend. And, upon viewing Bolden’s most recent
booking photo, the informant identified him as “Blessed.”
Wisconsin court records revealed that Bolden was a convicted
felon.
On March 21, 2023, Detective Richard Ticcioni parked in
the rear lot of 7169 North 42nd Street to conduct surveillance
in an investigation unrelated to Bolden. At around 9:44 a.m.,
Detective Ticcioni observed—and captured on video—Bol-
den drive a silver sedan into the parking lot and exit the vehi-
cle carrying a gun. After placing the gun in his pants, Bolden

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No. 25-1734 3
walked toward the residence while holding a set of keys. He
then entered 7169 North 42nd Street.
Three days later, on March 24, Officer Matthew Brooks re-
counted these facts in an affidavit supporting an application
for a warrant to search the 42nd Street residence. A Wisconsin
circuit court commissioner reviewed the affidavit, found it
supported probable cause, and authorized a search for,
among other things, guns and items associated with firearms.
Milwaukee police executed the warrant on March 27. As
they arrived at the address, officers observed Bolden exit the
home with a gun and enter a vehicle. They arrested him
shortly thereafter at a nearby gas station, finding a loaded gun
on him. Back at the residence, officers found another gun,
three loaded magazines, ammunition, $50,259 in cash, a
money counting machine, and bags containing fentanyl, crack
cocaine, and powder cocaine, among other items.
B
Bolden initially faced prosecution in Wisconsin state
court, but law enforcement soon learned that he was dealing
drugs while released on bail. A federal grand jury then issued
a seven-count indictment against Bolden, charging him with
drug and firearm offenses.
Bolden moved to suppress the evidence from the search of
7169 North 42nd Street, asserting that Officer Brooks’ affida-
vit failed to establish he resided there. He also sought a hear-
ing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), alleging that
the affidavit contained material false statements and omis-
sions. The government disagreed, in part by relying on United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), to contend that, even if the
affidavit fell short of establishing probable cause, the good-

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4 No. 25-1734
faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied to prevent
suppression.
A magistrate judge agreed with the government, finding
that Officer Brooks’ affidavit supplied probable cause and, at
the very least, the officers acted in good faith reliance on the
warrant in conducting the search. The magistrate judge also
determined that Bolden had not made the requisite showing
for a Franks hearing.
The district court saw the probable cause question differ-
ently, concluding that Officer Brooks’ affidavit offered too lit-
tle evidence connecting Bolden with the 42nd Street resi-
dence. In the end, though, the district court agreed with the
magistrate judge’s conclusions that the good-faith exception
applied to save the officers’ reliance on a flawed warrant and
that a Franks hearing was unnecessary.
Bolden then entered a conditional plea of guilty to pos-
sessing a firearm both as a convicted felon (18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1)) and in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense
(18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i)). He reserved his right to appeal
the district court’s denial of his suppression motion. The dis-
trict court then sentenced Bolden to 75 months’ imprison-
ment.
Bolden now appeals.
II
On appeal from the district court’s denial of a motion to
suppress, we review legal conclusions without deference and
factual findings for clear error. See United States v. Glover, 755
F.3d 811, 815 (7th Cir. 2014).

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No. 25-1734 5
Both sides devote substantial attention to whether Officer
Brooks’ warrant affidavit supplied probable cause to search
the 42nd Street residence. They debate whether it “contain[s]
facts that, given the nature of the evidence sought and the
crime alleged, allow for a reasonable inference that there is a
fair probability that evidence will be found” in the residence.
United States v. Aljabari, 626 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2010); see
also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (defining probable
cause to require “a fair probability that contraband or evi-
dence of a crime will be found in a particular place”).
The parties do not dispute that Officer Brooks’ affidavit
failed to establish that Bolden lived at the 42nd Street resi-
dence. Their disagreement centers on whether the affidavit
nonetheless contained facts sufficient not only to connect Bol-
den to the residence, but also to support an inference that he
would be likely to keep guns, ammunition, and the like at that
location. Cf. United States v. Yarber, 915 F.3d 1103, 1105–06 (7th
Cir. 2019) (assessing whether the police presented enough
connection between the defendant’s drug dealing and his girl-
friend’s apartment for probable cause to search).
The government is correct to observe that Officer Brooks’
affidavit supported a finding that Bolden had substantial and
regular access to the 42nd Street residence, even if he did not
live there. Foremost, the affidavit stated that Detective
Ticcioni had witnessed Bolden enter the house unassisted and
in broad daylight just three days prior to the warrant applica-
tion. Add in that Bolden’s girlfriend paid the utility bills at the
location and that the informant stated that Bolden lived near
an intersection just one block away and it begins to sound
probable that Bolden had enough access to store items within
the home.

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6 No. 25-1734
Bolden begs to differ, emphasizing that nothing in the af-
fidavit explained the basis for the informant’s representation
that he lived in the vicinity of the 42nd Street residence. In-
deed, he points to records from a prior paternity action show-
ing that he lived in an altogether different area of Milwaukee.
Nor, Bolden underscores, did the affidavit tell the issuing
judge specifically why the police believed he and Latia John-
son were in a romantic relationship. As Bolden sees it, then,
Officer Brooks’ affidavit did little more than recount a single
instance in which Bolden entered the 42nd Street residence—
a showing far short of establishing the probable cause neces-
sary to support a search warrant for weapons.
Both sides make fair points, echoing the differing perspec-
tives offered by the magistrate judge and district court. We
too see the probable cause question as close. On the one hand,
the affidavit shows that Bolden was no casual guest at 7169
North 42nd Street. On the other, however, the police could
have offered greater and more precise support for the facts
underlying this conclusion.
In the end, we need not resolve whether Officer Brooks’
affidavit crossed the threshold of probable cause. Even if Bol-
den is correct that probable cause was lacking, we conclude
that the search survives his motion to suppress under the
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. See Leon, 468
U.S. at 920–22 (concluding that suppression is not the appro-
priate remedy “when an officer acting with objective good
faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate
and acted within its scope”); United States v. Thompson, 801
F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[W]e need not decide whether
the state judge who issued the warrant had a basis for finding

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No. 25-1734 7
probable cause, since the search … survives a motion to sup-
press under the good-faith exception of Leon.”).
III
“[T]he fruits of a search based on an invalid warrant may
be admitted if the officers who executed the search relied
upon the warrant in good faith.” Yarber, 915 F.3d at 1106. In-
deed, Officer Brooks’ decision to obtain a warrant creates a
presumption that he acted in good faith. See United States v.
Rees, 957 F.3d 761, 771 (7th Cir. 2020). To rebut this presump-
tion, Bolden “must show the existence of a situation in which
the good-faith exception does not apply.” Id. Hewing to Leon,
our case law recognizes several such situations, including
“when the affiant misleads the magistrate with a reckless or
knowing disregard for the truth.” Glover, 755 F.3d at 818.
“An affiant acts with reckless disregard for the truth when
he in fact entertains serious doubts as to the truth of his alle-
gations.” United States v. Williams, 718 F.3d 644, 650 (7th Cir.
2013) (cleaned up). This “requires more than a showing of
negligence and may be proved from circumstances showing
obvious reasons for the affiant to doubt the truth of the alle-
gations.” Edmond v. United States, 899 F.3d 446, 457 (7th Cir.
2018) (cleaned up).
Bolden first attempts to fend off Leon’s presumption by
contending that Officer Brooks deliberately or recklessly in-
cluded a false representation in the affidavit when recounting
the evidence Detective Ticcioni obtained on March 21, 2023.
In relevant part, the affidavit stated:
22. Affiant is aware that Detective Ticcioni
stated the driver walked to the rear door of 7169

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8 No. 25-1734
N. 42nd St., used keys to open the rear door, and
entered the residence; …
24. Affiant is aware that Detective Ticcioni cap-
tured this incident on video, which the Affiant
reviewed and corroborated Detective Ticcioni’s
statement.
Bolden points out that Detective Ticcioni’s cellphone
video does not reveal how he entered the 42nd Street resi-
dence. Even more specifically, Bolden emphasizes that a
parked vehicle obscured the view of the door to the residence,
thereby making it impossible to see and “corroborate” that
Bolden “used keys to open the rear door.”
We acknowledge that the video does not show Bolden
putting a key in the door and turning a lock before entering
the home. But it does capture Bolden walking toward the res-
idence with keys in his hand and then entering unassisted
through the rear door. On these facts, we cannot agree that
Officer Brooks misrepresented what he saw on the video. In-
deed, the video does corroborate most aspects of Detective
Ticcioni’s reported statement.
Further, to the degree the affidavit’s description was im-
precise, it was not deliberately or recklessly misleading.
“[G]iven the slight gap between what the affidavit said and
what it should have said, a reasonable observer would find it
difficult to infer anything worse than negligence.” United
States v. Daniels, 906 F.3d 673, 677 (7th Cir. 2018); see also
United States v. Fifer, 863 F.3d 759, 765 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Such
an inconsequential (apparent) discrepancy … falls far short of
negating the presumption of good faith.”).

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No. 25-1734 9
Bolden’s more persuasive argument against good faith
comes in his suggestion that Officer Brooks omitted im-
portant information from the affidavit. See Glover, 755 F.3d at
819–20 (recognizing that an omission can defeat the presump-
tion of good faith). In particular, Bolden observes that the
public docket of a December 2022 paternity action between
him and Johnson listed him with a different Milwaukee ad-
dress. He maintains that Officer Brooks withheld the other ad-
dress to strengthen the affidavit’s connection between Bolden
and the 42nd Street residence.
But Bolden’s argument falters because we see no indica-
tion that Officer Brooks reviewed the docket of the paternity
case. Even if we are mistaken in that observation, the infor-
mation in the paternity docket does not contradict the allega-
tions in the affidavit. The affidavit never stated where Bolden
resided and instead presented facts showing that he had ac-
cess to the 42nd Street residence. Had Officer Brooks re-
viewed the paternity docket, Bolden’s use of another address
some three months prior would not provide an obvious rea-
son to doubt that Bolden maintained significant links to the
42nd Street residence in March 2023.
One final observation deserves mention. Bolden’s opening
brief does not clearly challenge the district court’s denial of
his motion under Franks. See United States v. Jones, 34 F.3d 495,
499 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[A]n argument not made in the opening
brief is waived.”). Regardless, he would only be entitled to a
Franks hearing if he can make a “substantial preliminary
showing” that Officer Brooks’ misrepresentation or omission
was reckless or deliberate. United States v. Hueston, 90 F.4th
897, 902 (7th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). Bolden has not done so
here.

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10 No. 25-1734
For these reasons, we AFFIRM.

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